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1. INTRODUCTION

Regionalization Alternative -- The Regionalization Alternative contains options

that range from storing all SNF west of the Mississippi River including Naval
SNF, to shipping aU Hanford SNF offsite to either INEL or the Nevada Test Site.
Existing facilities would be upgraded and new storage systems constructed, as in
the Decentralization Alternative for SNF storage at Hanford, or packaging facili·
ties would be constructed as in the Centralization (Minimum) Alternative for offsite shipment.

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is currently deciding the direction of its environmental restoration and waste management programs at the Idaho National Engineering Labo ratory (INEL) for the next 10 years. Pertinent to this decision is establishing policies for the
environmentaUy sensitive and safe transport, storage. and managemen t of spent nuclear fuels

Centralization Alternative -- The Centralization Alternative has two major
option,. Either aU Hanford SNF would be shipped offsite to another location
where all SNF would be centralized (minimum option), or the Ha nford Site
would become the centralized location (maximum option) for aU DOE SNF to be
stored until ultimate disposition .

(SNF). To develop these policies, it is necessary to revisit or examine the ava ilable options.

As a part of the DOE complex, the Hanford Site not only has a large portion of the
nationwide DOE-owned inventory of SNF, but also is a participant in the DOE decision for
manage ment and ultimate disposition of SNF. Efforts in this process at Hanfo rd include assessment of several options for stabilizing, transporting, and storing aU or portions of DOE-owned

The Spent Fuel Working Group Report (DOE 1993a) identified deficiencies related to
existing SNF manage ment at the various DOE sites. Most of these deficiencies result from deg-

SNF at the Hanford Site. Such storage and management of SNF will be in a safe and suitable

radation of the fuel a nd the facilities that store fuel because of the age of these facilities and the

manner until a final decision is made for ul timak disposition of SNF. The Hanford Site will be

fuel storage conditions. Corrective actions to the identified deficiencies for each site, including

affected by the alternative chosen.

the Hanford Site, are listed in DOE (1994a). Hanfo rd Site corrective actions important to this
EIS include the following:

Five alternatives involving the Ha nford Site are being considered for management of the
SNF inventory: 1) the No Action Alternative, 2) the Decentralization Alternative, 3) the 1992/

I.

alternative containerization of fuel stored in the 105-KE Basin to isolate a potential pathway of fuel constituents to the environment

2.

preparation of a K Basins E IS and issuance of the record of decision to provide for management of SNF in the K Basins at the Hanford Site (SNF storage siting and configuration, path forward for ultimate disposition, etc.)

3.

removal of a ll fuel and sludge from the K Basins by December 2002 based on the K
Basins EI S record of decision

4.

technical evaluation amI characterization of N Reactor fuel to support development of
the K Basins EIS

5.

removal of fuel from the Fast Flux Test Facility; the Plutonium and Uranium Recovery
through EXtraction (PUREX) Plant; the 308 Building; the 324, 325, and 327 buildings;
T Plant ; and the 200-West Area Low-Level Burial Grounds to support prolonged safe,
economic. environmentally sound management of those fuels.

1993 Plan ning Basis Alternative, 4) the Regionalization Alternative, and 5) the Centralization
Alternative. AU alternatives will be carefuUy designed to avoid environmental degradation and
to provide protection to human health and safety at the Hanford Site and surrou nding region .
For Hanford, these alternatives are briefly summarized below:

No Action Alternative -- The No Action Alternative would preclude any additional transportation of SNF to or from Hanford but could include activities to
maintain safe and secure materials and facilities. Hanford SNF would continue
to be managed in the current mode and upgrade of existing facilities would occur
only as required to ensure safety and security.
Decentralization Alternative -- The Decentralization Alternative would require
that DOE-owned fuel be managed at the location where it is removed from the
reactor. Ha nford SNF would be safely stored, with some limited onsite relocation of SNF. To accommodate this mission, existing facilities would be upgraded
and new storage systems would be constructed.
1992/ 1993 Planning Basis -- SNF would continue to be managed in the current
mode, which includes upgrades, fuel stabilization, transporl of some SNF to
either INEL or Savannah River Site for storage, and construction of an SNF storage facility at Hanford.

I-I
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On-going corrective actions with prior National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) coverage, such as containerization of fuel in the 105-KE Basin, are included in the No Action Alterna·
tive. Other corrective actio ns are included within the scope of each of the remaining
alternatives. The impacts of continued fuel and facility degradation in the No Action
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Alternative are not fully quantified, although it is generally recognized that prolonged storage in

2_ BACKGROUND

the existing facilities for an additional 40-year period might represent unacceptable risks, as
reflected in DOE (1993a).

2,1 Hanford Site Overview

The Hanford Site portion of this EIS was prepared according to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, as amended; the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)

2 .1.1 Site Description

regulations (40 CFR Part 1500-1508) for the implementation of the NEPA; a nd DOE regulaThe U.S. Department of Energy's Hanford Site lies within the semiarid Pasco Basin of

tions (10 CFR 1021) that supplement the CEQ regulations. This document discusses five alternatives for the management and storage of SNF, the affected environment, and potential

the Columbia Plateau in southeastern Washington State (Figure 2. 1). The Hanford Site occupies an area of about 1450 square kilometers (560 square miles) north of the confluence of the

impacts of thp. alternatives.

Yaki ma River with the Columbia River. The Hanford Site is about 50 kilometers (30 miles)
north to south and 40 kilometers (24 miles) east to west. This land, with restricted public
access, provides a buffer for the smaller areas previously used for production of nuclear materi·
also and currently used

for research, waste management and disposal. and environmental restora-

tion; only about 6 percent of the land area has been disturbed and is actively used. The
Columbia River flows through the northern part of the Hanford Site, and turning south, it forms
part of the site's eastern boundary. The Yakima River runs near the southern boundary and
joins the Columbia River south of the city of Richland, which bounds the Hanford Site on the
southeasl. Rattlesnake Mountain, the Yakima Ridge, and the Umptanum Ridge form the
southwestern and western boundary. The Saddle Mountains form the northern boundary of the
Hanfo rd Site. Two smail east-west ridges, Gable Butte and Gable Mounta in, rise above the
plateau of the central part of the Hanford Site. Underneath the Hanford Site are ancie nt
basaltic flows with basaltic outcroppings on the surface and intermixed beds of sand and gravel
from ancient periods of flooding and glacial epochs. Adjoining lands to the west, north, and east
are principally range a nd agr icultural land. The cities of Richland, Kennewick, and Pasco
(Tri-Cities) constitute the nearest population center and are located southeast of the Hanford
Site,

The Ha nford Site is listed on the National Priorities List under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, a nd Liability Act. The site encompasses more than
1500 waste management units and four groundwater contamination plumes that have been
grouped into 78 operable units. Each !:nit has complementary characteristics of such parameters
as geography, waste characte ristics, type of facility, and relationship of contaminant plumes.
This grouping into operable units allows for economies of scale to reduce the cost and the number of characterization investigations and remedial actions that will be required for the
1-3
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Hanford Site to complete clea nup efforts. More information on the locations of the units is
included in Section 4. 1. Current maps showing the locations of the operable units can be
6
i

I

4

I

I

I

obtained from Westinghouse Hanford Company .

•

8 Miles
I

N

8 Kilometers

I

2.1 .2 History

Saddle Mountain National
Wildlife Refuge
(U.S. Fish and Wildlife

The Hanford Site was acquired by the federal government in 1943. For more than
20 yea rs. Ha nford Site facilities were dedicated primarily to the production of plutonium for
na tional defense and to the management of the resulting wastes. In later yea rs, programs at the
Hanford Site were dive rsified to include research and development for advanced reactors,
renewable energy technologies, waste disposal technologies, and cleanup of contamination
fro m past practices.

2 .1.3 Mission

The new mission for Hanford emphasizes these components:

•

Waste manage ment of stored defense wastes and the handling, storage, and disposal of radioactive, haza rdous, mixed, or sanitary wastes from current operations.
Environme ntal restoration of approximately 1,500 inactive radioactive. haza rdous,
and mixed-waste sites and about 100 surplus facilities.
Research a nd development in energy, health, safety, enviro nmental sciences,
mo lecular sciences. environmental restoration, and waste management.
Technology development of new environmental restoration and waste management
technologies. including site characterization and assessment methods; waste minimization. trea tme nt. and remediati on technology; and education outreach programs.

BEI'ITON
COUNTY

The DOE has set a goal of cleaning up Hanford's waste sites and bringing its facilit ies
into compliance with local, state, and federal environmental laws by 20 18.
59501022.1

2.1 .4 Management
Figure 2-1. Hanfo rd Site and vicinity.

The Ha nford Site is owned by the federal government and managed by the U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operation'S Office (DOE-RL). Westinghouse Ha nford Company is
the site operations and e ngineering contractor.
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Pacific Northwest Laboratory, which is
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operated for the DOE by Battelle Memorial Institute. manages the research and technology laoAmerican Indian Religious Freedom Act (42 U.S.c. 1996)

oratories. In 1994, Bechtel Hanford Company and a team of contractors became DOE's env ironmental restoration contractor at the Hanford Site.

Archaeological and Historic Preservation Act (16 U.S.c. 469-469c)
Archaeological Resources Protection Act (16 U.S.c. 470aa-4701l)

2 ,2 Regulatory Framework

Atomic Energy Act (AEA) (42 U.S.c. 2011 et seq.)
Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act (16 U.S.C 668-668d)

The polic:y of DOE-RL is to carry out its operations in compliance with all applicable federallaws and regulations, state laws and regulations, presidential executive orders. and DOE

Clean Air Act (CAA) as amended by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990
(42 U.S.c. 7401 et seq.)

orders. Environmental regulatory authority over the Hanford Site is vested both in federal

•
•

agencies. primarily the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and in Washington State
agencies, primarily the Department of Ecology. Significant environmental laws and regulations
relevant to the management of SNF at Hanford are discussed in this section . First, major relevant federal and Washington State statutes are listed. Next. the specific topical concerns associ-

Comprehensive Conservation Study of the Hanford Reach of the Columbia River
(PL 100-605)
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA) as amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
(SARA) (42 U.S.c. 9601 et seq.)

ated with spent nuclear fuel are discussed with appropriate citations to federal and state statutes
and regulations. U.S. Department of Energy Orders will not be cited in this discussion because
DOE Orders are not regulations. However, DOE Orders do delineate specific DOE procedures

Clean Wate r Act (CWA) (33 U.S.c. 1251 et seq.)

•

and provide detailed internal guidance for implementation of federal environmental, safety, and
health regulations. DOE Orders establish specific standards, rules, and requirements that sup-

Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (42 U.S.c. 11001
et seq.)
Endangered Species Act (16 U.S.c. 1531-1534)

plement the federal regulations for the design and construction of new facilities, and the opera-

Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (ERA) (42 USC 5801 et seq.)

tion of existing facilities to ensure safe and environmentally sound operations. Finally, it should
be noted that environmental restoration and waste management activities at Hanford are gov-

Federal Facilities Compliance Act (PL 102-386)

erned by the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement),

Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act (16 U.S.c. 661-666c)

which includes detailed provisions for state and federal jurisdiction. as well as specific goals for

Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA) (49 USC 1801 et seq.)

site management and cleanup. The Fourth Amendment to the Tri-Party Agreement (January
Migratory Bird Treaty Act (16 U.S.C 703-711)

1994) contai ns specific milestones (M -34) related to the manage ment of SNF at the Hanford
Site.

National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (42 U.S.c. 4321 et seq.)
National Historic Preservation Act (16 U.S.c. 470-47Ow-6)

2 .2.1 Significant Federal and State laws

•

Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) (25 U.S.c.
3001 et seq.)

Significant federal and state environmental and nuclear materials management laws appliNuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) (42 U.S.c. 10101 et seq.)

cable to the Hanford Site include the following (grouped by federal and sta te and listed

•

alphabetically):
Federal Laws
American Antiquities Act (16 U.S.c. 431-433)

Pollution Prevention Act of 1990 (42 U.S.c. 13101 et seq.)

Reso ur~e Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) as amended by the Hazardous
and Sohd Waste Amendments (42 U.S.c. 6901 et seq.)
Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) (42 U.S.c. 300f et seq.)
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Toxic Substances Control Act ( IS U.S.c. 260 1 et seq.)
Operation of SNF facilities may involve the generation of waste materials or uninte ntional
Wild and Scen ic Rivers Act (16 U.S.c. 1274 et seq.)

tion or reduction of waste at the source whenever fea sible. Reporting and cleanup of spills from

State Laws
Was hington Archaeological and Historic Preservation Code ( RCW Chapter 27.34
et seq.)
•

releases of waste materials to the environment. The Pollution Prevention Act requires preven-

Washington Clean Air Act of 1967 (RCW Chapter 70.94 et seq.)
Washington Haza rdous Waste Management Act of 1976 ( RCW Chapter 70. IOS
e t seq.)

an SNF facility a re governed by CERCLA regulations (40 CFR 300, "National Oil and
Hazardous Substa nces Pollution Contingency Plan"), which apply to the release of haza rdous
substances into the environment. including radioactive substances.

Shipment of SNF is governed by Department of Transporta tion hazardous materials regulations in 49 CFR 171 - 179 (under the a uthority of the Hazardous Materials Tra nsportation Act),

Washington Model Toxics Control Act (RCW Chapter 70.IOSD).

which apply to the ha ndling, packaging, labeling, and shipment of hazardo us mate rials offsite,

Washington Water Pollution Control Act (RCW 90.48 e t seq.).

including radioactive materials and wastes. Safety standards for packaging a nd transporting
radioactive mate rials a re governed by U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) standa rds

2.2 .2 Environmental Standards for Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Facilities

established in 10 CFR Pa rt 7 1, "Packaging of Radioactive Material for Transport and Transporta tion of Radioactive Ma terial Under Certain Conditions.'

Design and pe rfor mance standards for the construction and operation of SNF storage
facilities arise from the Atomic Energy Act, Nuclear Waste Policy Act, Clean Water Act, and
Clean Air Act, paralJel state implementation sta tutes, and other majo r environmental/nuclear

2.2_2_2 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act_ The status of SNF with respect to

RCRA is discussed in Volume I. Most of the a uthority to ad minister the RCRA program,

activities statutes. A general listing of regulations promulgated under these authorities will not

including treatment, storage and disposal standards, and permit require ments, has been dele-

be included in this discussion of the regulatory framework; relevant regulations will be cited as

gated by E PA to the State of Washington, except for corrective action (cleanup). Washington

appropriate in the topical discussions that follow.

State RCRA (WSHWMA) Dangerous Waste Regulations a re found in WAC 173-303
(Washington Administrative Code). Generally, RCRA does not apply to Source material,

2.2.2.7 General Environmental Requirements for Construction and Operation.

special nuclear material, by-product material, SNF, or radioactive-only wastes. Should SNF be

Design and construction of new facilities, modification of existing facilities. and operation of all

processed into or comm ingled with a haza rdous waste as defined by Subtitle C of RCRA, then

facilities would be conducted in accorda nce with applicable state and federal environmental

the generation, treat ment, storage, and disposal of the haza rdous waste portion of such mixed

regulations. Special conside ratio n wit h respect to operations of SNF manageme nt facilities at

waste would be subject to EPA regulations in 40 CFR 260-268 and 270-272.

Hanford are discussed in the following sections.
2 _2 _2_3 Effluents. Regulations in 40 CF R 122 (and also in 40 CFR 12S and 129) apply

Colu mbia River water would be used to serve a wet SNF storage facility. The DOE has

to the discharge of pollutants from a ny point source into waters of the United States.

asserted that it has federally reserved wate r withd rawal rights with respect to its Hanfo rd

A Nationa l Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) pe rmit is required for such dis-

operations. Nevertheless, DOE submitted an application to the Washington Sta te Departme nt

charges, which wo uld include any effluent discharge from a n SNF storage facility into the

of Ecology on July 7. 1987, as a matter of comity for water withdrawal rights from the Columbia

Columbia Rive r. The E PA has not yet delegated to the State of Washington the a uthority to

River for site characterization activities related to the now defunct Basalt Waste Isolation

issue NPDES permits at the Hanford Site. At 40 CFR 121 the regulations provide for state cer-

Project. It may be appropriate to maintain this protocol wit h Washington State in regard to

tification that any act ivity requiring a fede ral CWA water permit, i.e., an NPDES permit or a

future wit hdrawals from the river.

discharge of dredged or fill mate rial permit, will not violate state water quality sta nda rds_
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The EPA drinking water standards in 40 CFR 14 1, "National Primary Drinking Water

Washington State Department of Health regulations in WAC 246-247. "Monitoring and

Regulations: apply to Columbia River water at communi ty water supply intakes downstrea m of

Enforcement of Air Quality and Emission Standards for Radion uclides: contain standards a nd

the Hanford Site. Washington Administrative Code 173-200 sets wate r quality standa rds for

permit requirements for the emission of radio nuclides to the at mosphere from DOE facilities

groundwater. and WAC 173-201 establishes surface water quality standards for the State of

based on Department of Ecology standards in WAC 173-480. "Ambient Air Quality Standards

Washington.

and Emission Limits for Radionuclides."

Department of Ecology regulations in WAC 173-216 establish a state permit program.

The local air authority, Benton County Clean Air Authority, enforces General Regulation

commonly referred to as the 216 program. for the discharge of waste materials from industrial.

80-7, which pertains to detrimental effects, fugitive dust. incineration products, odor, opacity.

commercial. and municipal operations into ground and surface waters of the state. Discharges

asbestos, and sulfur oxide emissions. Benton County Clean Air Authority has been delegated

covered by NPDES or WAC 173-218 (Underground Injection Control Program) permits a re

a uthority to enforce EPA asbestos regulations.

excluded from the 2 16 program. The DOE has agreed to meet the requirements of the 216 program at the Hanford Site for discharges of liquids to the ground.

2 _2 .3 Protection of Public Healt"

2 _2 .2 _4 Air Quality. Hazardous emission standards in 40 CFR 61. "National Emission

Numerical standards for protection of the public from releases to the environment have

Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: provide for the control of the emission of hazardous

been set by the EPA a nd appea r in the Code of Federal Regulations. The most significant of

pollutants to the atmosphere, and standards in 40 CFR 61 , Subpart H, "National Emission

the regulations are discussed in the following pa ragrap hs.

Standards for Emissions of Radionuclides Other Than Radon from Departme nt of Energy
Facilities," apply specifically to the e mission of radionuclides from DOE facilities. Approval to
construct a new facility or to modify an existing one may be required by these regulations. The

Clean Ai r Act standards found in 40 CFR 61.92 apply to releases of radionuclides to the
at mosphere from DOE facilities and state as follows:

EPA has not yet delegated this approval aut hority to the State of Washington for the Hanford
Site.
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 require the addition of 189 substances to the list

Emissions of radionuclides [other than radon-220 and radon-222] to the ambien t ai,'
from Depa rtment of Energy facilities shall not exceed those amou nts that would
cause a ny member of the public to receive in any year an effective dose equivalent
of 10 milliremJyea r.

of hazardous ai r pollutants to be regulated on a schedule that extends to 1999. The haza rdous
air pollutant list includes radionuclides. The amendments require the identification of source

Safe Drinking Water sta ndards fo und in 40 CFR 141.16 apply indirectly to releases of

categories a nd the definition of required control technology (maximum available control

radionuclides from DOE facilities to the extent that the releases impact commun ity water

technology) for each of these pollutants. Hanford may fall within the definition of a major

systems:

source because total emissions from Hanford may exceed the triggering limit of 25 tons per year
for any combination of listed hazardo us air pollutants (emission standards using curies as the
unit of measure for radionuclides will be promulgated in the future). This means that emission

The average annual concentration of beta particle and photon radioactivity from
man-made radio nuclides in drinking wa ter shall not produce an annual dose equivalent to the 'body or a ny inte rnal organ greater tha n 4 milliremJyear.

sources at Hanford may become subject to permitting and reporting requirements and to
installation requirements (including retrofit) for control technology. A new SNF storage facility
may be subject to the maximum available control technology requirements for new sources.
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Also. maximum contaminant levels in community water systems of 5 picocuries per lite r of
combined radium-226 and radium-228, and maximum conta minant levels of 15 picocuries pe r
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liter of gross alpha particle activity. including radium-226 but excluding radon and uranium. are
specified in 40 CFR 141 . The tritium concentration that corresponds to a dose of 4 millirem

N Reactor SNF- Zircaloy-c1ad metallic uranium fuel stored in water in the 10SKW and 10S-KE basins and exposed to air in the Plutonium and Uranium
Recovery through Extraction (PUREX) Plant dissolver cells A. B. and C.

per year is 20.000 picocuries per liter.
Single-pass reaclOr SNF - aluminum-clad metallic uranium fue l stored in wate r in
the 10S-KE and 10S-KW basins and stored in water in the PUREX basin .
2.2.4 Species Protection

Regulations of the Endangered Species Act. the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act.
and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act in SO CFR 10-24,222, 22S-227, 402, and 4S0-4S3 apply to the
Hanford Site. The Endangered Species Act requires a biological assessment to identify any
th reatened or endangered species likely to be affected by the proposed action.

2.2.5 Floodplains and Wetlands

Executive Order 11988, "Floodplain Management," Executive Order 11 990, "Protection of
Wetlands." and 10 CFR 1022, require a n assessme nt of the effects of DOE actions on flood-

Shippingport Core II SNF - Zircaloy-c1ad uranium dioxide fuel stored in water in
T-Plant Canyon Pool Cell 4 .
Fast Flu x Test Facil ity (FFTF) SNF - stainless steel-clad fuel stored in liquid
sodium at the FFTF. consisting mostly of plutonium and uranium oxide fuel. but
also uranium and/or plutonium metals . and carbide and nitride fuel.
Miscellaneous commercial and experimental SNF - consisting mainly of Zircaloyclad uranium dioxide fuel stored in air in the 324, 32S. and 327 buildings ;
TRIGA (traini ng. research. and isotope reactors built by General Atomics) fuel
stored in water ill the 308 Building; miscellaneous fuel stored in air-filled shielded
containers at the 200-West Area burial grounds; and aluminum-clad. uraniumaluminum alloy fuel stored in air in the Plutonium Finishing Plant.

plains and wetlands. These requirements are directed at the protection of water quality and
Plans for management of Hanford SNF are included in the Hallford Spelll Nuclear Fuel

h."ita!.

Project. Recommellded Parh Fonvard (Fulton 1994) and the Spent Nuclear Fuel Project
Technical Baselille Docllmelll Fiscal Year 1995 (WHC 1995). It should be noted. however.

2.2.6 Cultural and Historic Preservation

that the SNF management program has continued to evolve since these documents were issued
Requirements of the Na tional Historic Preservation Act in 36 CFR 800, the American

or drafted. Similarly . Hanford site-specific environmental documentation that will be required

. . . At' 2S CFR 261 a nd 43 CFR 3• and the Archaeological Resources Protection Act
Ant iqUities C In

to support the Hanford SNF management program continues to evolve. Spent nuclear fuel

and the American Indian Religious Freedom Act in 43 CFR 7 apply to the protection of historic

EISs that are being prepared or that will be prepared include this programmatic EIS and a

and cultural properties, including both existing properties and those discovered during
excavation and construction. The American Indian Religious Freedom Act and the Native
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act also provide for certain rights of access by

Hanford site- specific K Basins EIS. The programmatic EIS will lead to a record of decision
that is scheduled to be published in June 1995 . That record of decision will spec ify what SNF
will be managed at which DOE sites. Naval Reactor Propulsion Program sites. or other sites.

Native Americans to traditional a reas of worship a nd religious significance.
The K Basins EIS is expected

2.3 Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Program

10

result in a record of decision that specifies where and how to

relocate. stabilize. and safely store N Reactor and single-pass reactor SNF from the K Basins
to address the urgent need to remedy safety and environmental vulnerabilities. The K Basins

This section presents a summary of current plans, as of December 1994, for the
manageme nt of existing SNF on the Hanford site. The foUowing SNF and associated faciliti es

EIS record of decision will address management o f this SNF over a 40-year period or until
ultimate disposition.

are at Ha nford (Bergsmo n 1994):
During negoti ations o n the Fourth Amendment to the Tri-Party Agreement (TPA). the
DOE . the State of WaS hington Department of Ecology. and the EPA ag reed 10 an e nforceable
VO LL:\1E 1. APPE:"'DlX .t\ . A PRIL 11)95
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milestone that indirectly required issuing that record of decision by June 1996. The record of
decision on the K Basins EIS would be dependent on the programmatic EIS record of decision .

Transferring small quantities of SNF between existing fac ilities where deemed
necessary to comply with other Hanford requirements .

Other environmental documentation (EAs or EISs) will be prepared for any proposed actio ns
related to SNF that are not spec ifically covered in the programmatic EIS or in the K Basins

Discussion of the SNF inventory and plans for managing that inventory are prov ided in
the following sections. Plan ned SNF management activities are summarized in Table 2-1 .

EIS.

Additio nal delails on existing storage facilities are in Chapter 3.
Assuming the EISs are prepared as planned . the Hanford SNF manage ment pl an wo uld

identify and implement management approaches that will prov ide safe . cost-effective storage of

2 .3 .1 N Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel

SNF at ex isting facilities. Activities to identify. and the .. implement. the SNF manage ment
N Reactor SNF is stored in three facilities (Bergsman 1994) :
approach follow :
Issuing the records of decision that are expected to result from the program matic
EIS and the K Basin EIS .
Achieving accord with the TPA or renegotiating acti vities and milesto nes. as
necessary.
Providing facilities for SNF management as necessary to implement the EIS
records of decision. SNF remaining onsite , as a result of the programmatic EIS
record of decision could be placed in wet or dry storage in the 200-East Area until
a decision on ultimate disposition has been made .
Identifyi ng and developing pathways for ultimate disposition of the SNF .

952 metric tons of uranium in 3815 closed canisters in the 105-KW Basin . The
water in this basin has onl y low levels of radionuclide contamination.
1144 metric tons of uranium in 3666 open canisters in the I05-KE Basi n. The
water in this basin is contaminated with radionuclides . and there is a thick laye r of
sludge on the bas in fl oor.
0.3 metric tons of uranium in the form of intact Mark IV fuel elements and fuel
element pieces stored in air on the floor of PUREX dissolver cells A, B. and C.

Until recently. plans included I) containerizing the fuel and sludge stored in the \05 -KE
Basin into Mark 11 (sealed) canisters ; and 2) transferring the spent fuel in PUREX to the

Provid ing facilities and systems for preparing SNF for ultimate d ispos ition.
N Reacto r and single-pass reactor SNF would be stabilized . as necessary . to
implement the K Basins EIS record of decision. It is possible this stabilized form
would be a metal or an oxide . Suitability of other SNF for ultimate disposition in
its current form is yet to be demonstrated. but it is possible that FFTF and
Shippingport SNF may not require further stabilization.

105-KE Bas in and containerizing it in the basin . Alternati ve approaches to each of these
plans . including alternati ve containerization of fuel and sludge at the 105-KE Basi n. expedited
fu el removal from the K Bas ins and dry storage of fuel at PUREX , have been evaluated . and a
palh forward for these materials selected . PUREX SNF would be transferred to Ihe K Basi ns
and subsequently managed wi th the existing K Basi ns SNF inventory pending issuance of an

While the SNF management approach is being defined. the following key . near-term
actions at the existing facilities are being implemented or are planned :

environmental assessment .
Ex ped iled fuel removal from the K Basins has been selected in lieu of conta ineri zation because
of benefits to worker safety and/or the environment . The I05-K Basins SNF would be

Upg rading water treatment systems and retriev ing sludges from the basins ' fl oors.
Performing necessary safety and security upgrades (e .g . • water systems) to extend
facility life until SNF removal can be accomplished .

relocaled to a storage facili ty in the 200 Area. pending completion of the K Basi ns EIS . The
impacls associated with implementation of Ihis palh fo rward are within the envelope of impacts
analyzed in this EIS.

Transferring SNF from liquid-sodium storage at the FFTF to dry storage in
interim storage casks. This ac ti vity would be integrated with FFTF deactivation .
VOLt..:ME I. APPENDiX A. APRIL 1995
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Table 2-1. Summary of planned spent nuclear fuel management activities ."
A~tivity

SJlCnI nudear fucl
N

Rea~tor

Fast Flu x Test FaCI lity

Singk · pa s ~

IV

rcaclllr

Schedule

Starus

Transfer SNF stored at PUREX to 105 -K Basi ns

Complete by 1196

Environmental assessme nl
subm itted

Removt! SNF and >Iudge from 105-K Basins per DNFSB
Rt!commcndallnn 94-1: transfe r !Jnslle to storage system .

Complete by 12/99

K Basi ns EIS init iated

Transfe r SNF from liquid sodium to dry storagt!

Deli ve r firs t 10 casks by 8/95

Environmental assessment
subm itted

Tra"-~fer small quantitie s SN F onsite to satisfy physica l
security requirements.

10/98

Environmental assessme nl
submitted

Transft!r SNF sto red at Pl REX to 105-K Basins

Complete by 1/96

Env ironmenlal assessment
subm itted

ShippingPl,n Corc [(

Transfe r SNF from T-Plan! unsite

Pl ans will be developed pending
ROD for this EIS

Miscdlancllu> in 3(X) Area

T ransft!r SNF from 32413251327 buildings onsite

Complete in mid-1m

Environmental assessmenl
planned and will be prepared
pending ROD for the EIS

Transfer TRIGA SNF from 308 Bu ild ing onsite

Complete in 1996

Environmental assessment
submitted

I

Mi s~ellancous

in 200 Art!a

May be transferrt!d onsite

a. Source : Bt!rgsman ( 1995) .

11

In addi tion. work is ongoing to characterize the N Reactor and single-pass reactor fuel
to provide data relevant to assuring continued safe storage and developing plans for future

2 .3 .3 Fast Flux Test Facilitv Spent Nuclear Fuel

actions . Recent comm itments to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board have set a date of
December 1999 for completing removal of the SNF from the 10S-K Basins .

The SNF from FFTF is stored in the following four FFTF locations. all of which use
liquid sod ium for COOling :

Other N Reactor SNF. which may be recovered as a result of N Basin deactivation.
the reactor core with a capacity of approximately' 82 fuel assemblies

would also be transferred to the 10S-K Basins . A small quantity of this material (less than O.S

in-vessel storage with a capacity of S4 fuel assemblies

MTHM) in the form o f fuel fragments and chips is suspected to be in the sludge at the bOllom
of N Basin.

interim decay storage with a capacity of 112 fuel assemblies and a limitation of
10 kilowalls per assembly

2.3.2 Single-Pass Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel

the Fuel Storage Facility with a capacity of 380 fue l assemblies' and a limitation
of 1.4 kilowatts per assembly .

The single-pass reactor SNF consists of residual fuel elements from the IOS-KW and
10S-KE reactors. plus residual elements from the clean-out of the 10S-C and 10S-D storage

The 1993 inventory of irradiated SNF at FFTF consists of fuel from 329 assemblies: an

basi ns. Currently . 138 elements [0.4 metric tons of uranium (MTU)) are stored in the 10S-KE

additional SS non-irradiated driver fuel assemblies exist. Some irradiated fuel assemblies have

Basin and 47 elements (0. 1 ) are stored in the 10S-KW Basin . In addition. four buckets filled

been disassembled. with the fuel now placed in 40 Ident 69 containers or in the Interim

with 779 si ngle-pass reactor fuel e lements are stored in the PUREX storage basin.

Exami nation and Maintenance Cell. Some irradiated fuel has been shipped offs ite . but is
e xpected to be returned to Hanford .

It was planned that the single-pass reactor fuel stored in PUREX would be transferred to

the 10S-KE Basin. containerized . and possibly transferred to the 10S-KW Basin before the

The DOE plans to transfer FFTF spent nuclear fue l from the liquid sodium-cooled

previously planned Hanford SNF EIS record of decision would be issued. Activities to

storage facilities into dry storage casks . These interim storage casks would hold six or seven

implement this ac tion were initiated (Bergsman 1995). In parallel. alternative dry storage of

assemblies per cask . Delivery of an initial ten casks has been scheduled for August 1995 and

this fuel was considered . consistent with the dry storage evaluation for N Reactor fuel at

an environmental assessment for this activity has been submilled (Bergsman 1995) . The

PUREX . To enable expeditious deactivation of the PUREX plant in support of the Hanford

majority of the casks would be sited in the 400 Area : however. a few may be sited at the

Site cleanup mission and because of the minimal impacts associated with relocation of this

Plutonium Finishing Plant because of requirements for additio nal physical security . A small

SNF to the 10S-K Basins . shipment to the 10S-K Basins was selected as the preferred approach

fraction of the FFTF SNF is sodium bonded. and may be shipped di rectly offsite without

for managing this SNF until issuance and implementation of the K Basins EIS record of

emplaceme nt in dry storage casks if the decision in thi s EIS is to relocate these material s to

deci sion . The SNF may be shipped directly to the 10S-KW Basin instead of the 10S-KE Basin

another DOE site .

and would be stored in a manner consistent with the requirements of the selected storage basin .
The impacts associated with implementation of this path forward are within the envelope of
impac ts analyzed in this EIS .
"paci!}' fo r each core-loading va ries .

b. The Fuel Slorage Faci lity actuall y has a capacity of 466 fue l assembl ies. but is limited to onl y
380 beca use of criticality requirements .
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2 .3 .4 Shippingport Core II Spent Nuclear Fuel

3. SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL MANAGEMENT ALTERNATIVES

The Shippingport Core II spent nuclear fuel is stored in water in the 221 -T Building
(T -Plant) Canyon Pool Cell 4 .

3.1 Description of Alternatives

The 72 standard blanket assemblies wi ll remain in basin

storage in T-Plant until site-specific NEPA review is completed to enable implementation of
dry storage or transfer offsite.

Five major ahe rnatives are being evaluated for safely storing SNF until uhimate

Site-specific NEPA review will not be initiated until issuance

dispositio n is determined. These five alternatives are 1) No Action, 2) Decentralization (with a
of the record of decision fo r this EIS. (One un-irradiated blanket assembly is also stored in ai r
in the T-Planl. )

subset of local stabilization and storage options), 3) 1992/1993 Planning Basis, 4) Regionalization (with options A. B 1, B2, and C), and 5) Centralizatio n (minimum and maximum options).
The five alte rnatives and the ir impacts are being evaluated concurrently by the sites or age ncies

2 .3 .5 Miscellaneous Spent Nuclear Fuel

potentially affected by these ahernatives, including Hanford, Savannah River Site (SRS), Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory (INEL), Oak Ridge National Laboratory (O RNL), the Nevada

A variety of miscellaneous spent nuclear fuel is stored in the 300 Area. Plutonium

Test Site (NTS), a nd the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program.

Finishing Plant , and low-level burial grounds (Bergsman 1994). Specific actions that have
This chap ter describes the spent fuel inventories, activities, and facilities anticipated at

been identified (Bergsman 1995) follow:

Hanford under the various storage alternatives. The inventory of SNF expected to be stored at
The spent nuclear fuel stored in air in the 324, 325, and 327 buildings (mostly
commercial. light-water reaclOr fuel. i.e . . Zircaloy-clad uranium dioxide) is
planned for relocation onsite; an environmental assessment for th is activity will be
prepared . The planned storage facility is a dry storage cask.

Ha nfo rd under each ahernative is summarized in Table 3-1. There are eight rypes of fuel listed
in Table 3-1 to represent the wide variety of SNF currently held at various sites across the
United States. In addition, the United States has obligations for some SNF held in foreign
countries. The specific kinds of SNF held at Hanford that contribute toward the total SNF

TRIG A fuel stored in water in the 308 Building is planned for relocation onsite 10
the 400 Area so that the 308 Building can be deactivated; an envi ronmental
assess ment has been submined for this ac tivity. Alternative disposition of the
TRIGA fuel may be implemented; transfer of this fuel to the Idaho National
Engineering LaboralO ry (INEL) is assumed in the INEL 199211993 Planning
Basis Alternative .

inve ntory are shown in parentheses in column one of Table 3-1. In terms of metric tons of
heavy metal, Ha nford has about 80 percent of DOE's current SNF inventory, primarily because
of the large inventory of spent fuel rema ining from the shut·down N Reactor. The
Centralization Alternative minimum option is not shown in Table 3·1 because the inventory
wo uld eventually be zero at Hanford under this option, as it is in the Region alization Alternative

Miscellaneous fuel residues in the 200 Area are currently being managed as
remote-handled transuranic waste. The TRIGA SNF at the burial grou nds will be
relocated onsite during burial grou nds retrieval operations .

Option C. An overview of the SNF inve ntory as of the year 2035, plan ned activities, a nd
existing a nd new facilities that may result under each of the five storage alternatives is provided
below.

The No Action Alternative described in Subsection 3.1. 1 fo rms the basis for comparison
wit h the remaining four storage altern atives and includes descriptions of the expected activities.
and existing storage facili ties. Decentralization (Subsection 3. 1.2), the 1992/93 Planning Basis
(Subsection 3. 1.3), Regionalization (Subsection 3. 1.4), and Centralization (Subsection 3. 1.5) are
discussed in the remaining sections.
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Table 3-1. Spe nt nuclear fuel inventory at Hanford under the various storage options as of 2035 in MTHM. a.b
Fuel type (name of
Hanford SNF that
is part of this type)
Naval SNF
Savannah River and
aluminum-clad
Hanford (N Reactor
and single-pass
reactors)
Graphite
Commercial
miscellaneous fuels
Experimental, stainless
steel clad (FFfF)
Experimental, Zircaloy
clad (Shippingport)
Experimental, other
such as ceramic,
liquid/salt, etc.
TOTALS:

No Action and 1992/1993
DeeentraliPlanning
zation
Basis
0.00
0.00
0.00

Regionalization
AC
0.00

Regionalization
BId
10.23

Regionalization
B2c
65.23

Regionali7..ation
cf and
Centralization
minimum option
0.00

Centralization
maximum option
65.23

0.00

0.00

8.76

8.76

0.00

213.09

2103.17
0.00

2103.17
0.00

2103.17
27.60

2103.17
27.60

0.00
0.00

2103.17
27.61

2.30

2.30

0.00

125.18

125.18

0.00

156.51

11.27

1l.23

0.00

90.12

90.12

0.00

96.51

15.70

15.70

0.00

64.84

64.84

0.00

77.99

0.00
2132.44

0.00
2132.40

0.00
2103.17

0.29
2430.19

0.29
2485.19

0.00
0.00

1.70
2741.80

2103.17g
0.00

a. MTHM - Metric tons of heavy metal (thorium, uranium, and plutonium as applicable).
b. Source: Wichmann (1995). Quantities of SNF within a given category may be the result of adding together several quantities, some large and
some small, stored at different locations. Individual values are known to within about 1% . Additional digits are shown in the table as a check on
calculations, but inventory totals are known to only two significant figures.
c. All H:mford production SNF remains at Hanford. All other SNF goes to INEL (including Hanford commercial, experimental stainless-steel-clad,
and TRIGA).
d. AU SNF currently located or to be generated in the U.S. west of the Mississippi River is sent to and stored at the Hanford Site, with the exception
of Naval SNF.
e. All SNF currently located or to be generated in the U.S. west of the Mississippi River and aU Naval SNF are sent to and stored at the Hanford
Site.
r. All Hanford Site SNF and all other SNF currently located or to be generated in the U.S. west of the Mississippi River is sent to and stored at
either INEL or NTS. For Hanford, this alternative is identical to the Centralization Alternative minimum option (SNF is shipped offsite).
g. This represents the post-irradiation (end-of-life) quantity. The pre-irradiation quantity, (2116.67 MTHM) is sometimes quoted.

3.1.1 No Action Alternative

Finishing Plant and PUREX rac ilities are excluded from this evaluatio n because SNF will not
remain in those two facilities under any of the alte rnatives. For the purposes or this analysis.

Under the No Action Alternative. only those actio ns that are deemed necessary for can·

SNF at PUREX is assumed

10

be relocated to the K Basins.

tinued safe and secure ma nage ment of the SNF would be conducted. Thus. the existing SNF
would be mainta ined close to its current storage locations. and there would be minima l facili ty

Most of the facilities at the Hanford Site are decades old. some over 40 years. except for

upgrades. Activities required to store SNF safely would continue at each specific site (DOE
the FFTF and its assoc iated storage buildings. A ge neral description. the capacity for additional

1993b).

slOrage of SNF. and the means by which SNF can be received or removed from each facility are
A description of the a nticipated activities that would be necessary under the No Action

provided in Table 3·2 . The dimensional information is for the actual storage area and not for the

Alternative is provided in Subsection 3.1.1.1. followed by descriptions of existing facilities

entire facility in order to provide a basic idea of the storage area required for that specific

(Subsection 3. 1.1.2). and any new facilities (Subsection 3.1.1.3). A comprehensive inventory a nd

inventory of SNF. In many cases. such as the facilities in the 300 Area. only small porti ons of

description of the fuel at Hanford as of January 1993 is given by Bergsma n (1994). That report

the actual faci lities are used to store the spent fuel.

provides detailed information on many of the spent fuel designs and radionucUde inve ntories.
The K Basins contain the vast majority of the SNF at Hanford. The T-Plant. 308. 325.

3.1. 1. 1 Anticipated Activities. In order to carry out the No Action Alternative. the
following activities would occur at the Ha nford Site:

and 327 buildings. and the Plutonium Finishing Plant contain small amounts of stored SNF of
various kinds . Four FFTF locations contain all the FFTF spent fuel. presently stored in sodium :
the Reactor Core. In Vessel Storage . Interim Decay Storage. and Fuel Storage Facility (a

Characterization of the defense production reactor fuel would proceed to establish
the baSIS for safe storage.

•

build ing separate from the reactor containment building). The first of 60 new dry storage casks
are ex pected to be available for FFTF fuel by late 1995 . The existing facili ties have very little

Fuel a nd sludge wo uld be containerized at the J05·KE Basin or other onsite
location .

additional capacity (see Table 3-2) . While there is presently excess capacity in the K Basins. this

The first 10 dry storage casks would be procured for Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF)
fuel.

chosen.

Consolidation of SNF from defense product ion reactors into the J05·KW Basin could
occur. Other fue l may be tra nsferred to dry cask storage where required for safety.

is expected to be consumed by the planned operations. regardless of the storage alte rnati ve

The accessibility and limits on loading SNF are provided as key factors in movement of
any fu el from these facilities to other locations on or offsite. Rail access is available at the
fac ilities storing most of the fuel (K Bas ins . PURFX. and T Plant) : truck shipments wou ld be

3. 1. 1.2 Description of Existing Facilities. SNF is presently located in II facilities on
the Hanfo rd Site: J05·KE a nd J05·KW Basins at the north end of Ha nford in the 100·K Area'

used for the rest. Acceptable casks and procedures for moving these casks may require
evaluation in many cases. Additional details on these facilitie s are provided by Bergsman

T Plant. low·level waste burial grou nds. a nd Plutonium Finishing Pla nt in the 200 West Area; ,
Plutonium and Ura nium Recovery through EXtraction (PUREX) plant in the 200 East Area;

( 1994 ). Bergs man (1995 ). and Manthey ( 1993 ).

FFTF in the 400 Area; and 308. 324. 325. and 327 buildings in the 300 Area in the southeast
corner of the site. Continued storage in these facilities is being evaluated beca use the No
Action Altern ative includes activities required to ensure sa fe and secure storage. The Plutonium

3·3
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The changes to the existing facilities that were analyzed under the No Ac tion Alternative of
SNF storage are shown in Table 3-3.
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Table 3-2. Desc ription of existing faci lities (Be rgs man 1994 : Bergsman 1995).
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Table 3·3 . Assumed changes to existing Hanford fac ilities in the No Action Alternati ve .
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described for conta inerizing the N Reactor fuel and procuring casks for storage of FFTF fuel.
The casks would be stored above ground on an existing concrete pad at the FFTF (Bergsman
1995) . Major changes in rail. electrical. water. or other utilities are not expected under this
alternati ve.
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3.1.2 Decentralization Alternative

In the Decentralization Storage Alternati ve. as in the No Action Alternative. the current
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ml l(h' I CaTtnn~
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spem fue l inventory would continue to remai n close to the point of generation or defueling.
There are some ex isting storage sites that may receive or ship spent fue ls. such as naval spent
fu el. under one o f several options under the Dece ntralization Alte rnati ve. but these options do
not impact Hanford (DOE 1993a) . No SNF would be shipped offsite or received from Dlher
storage locations outside o f Hanford . but local transpo rt might take pl ace to support safety
requirements and research and development . The Decentralization Alternati ve differs from the
o Act ion Alternative in that significant facility developme nt and upgrades are assumed. and

spe nt fuel charac teri zation. research and development. and possibly stabili zation would occur.

3-5

.!).'5

\ O L C ~II; I . A PPE:" D/X ,\ ,\ PRIL 11i'1:,

\ 'OL D1E 1. AI'PE:"DIX A . .,W RJI. 11JI);'i

3·6

Summaries of the anticipated ac tiv ities (Subsection 3. 1.2. 1) and facility requ ire ments

Process Q uses solve nt extraction by which metallic defense fuels are dissolved. se parating

(S ubsections 3. 1.2 .2 and 3. 1.2.3) are provided below.

urani um and plutoni um and a liquid high·level waste stream that would most likely be vi trified
for disposal in a geologic reposito ry. In Process Q it is assumed that the pl .)cess would be

3.1.2. 1 Anticipated A ctivities. The Decentraliza tion Alte rn ative would inc lude the
three ac ti vities (fuel characterization. fuel and sludge contai nerization. and cask procure ment fo r
'FFTF !\Jell me ntio"ed above in Subsection 3. 1. 1 for the No Ac tion Alternati ve as well as the
following ge neral ac ti vities:

carr ied out on the Hanfo rd Site. In commenting on the draft EIS. British Nuclear Fuels Li mited
(BNFL) proposed such processing be carried out in their facilities overseas. A discussion of the
proposed sub-option is provided in Attac hment B. Except for the additional impacts associated
with transporti ng SNF from the Hanfo rd Site to a West Coast shipping port. transoceanic
shipment . transpo rt of the SNF overl and to BNFL facilities . and return shipment of resource

Charac terizatio n of defense production fuels (N Reactor and single·pass reac tor) to
determine the feas ibility of dry storage

materials (uranium-trioxide and plutonium-di oxide) and vitrified high·level was te. environmental
impacts would be similar to those determined for Process Q.

Evaluation of dry storage fo r other fuels (S hippingpo rt Core II. FFTF.
miscellaneous)
Process D consists of drying and passivating the spent fuel and then canning it for storage.
Research and deve lopment on N Reactor fuel stabilization

The relationshi ps between the storage and stabilizing options are shown in Table 3-4.

Construction and utilization of wet and!or dry storage facilities as well as a
stabilization facility to support storage .

Option W involves mov ing the N Reactor fuel from the existing bas in storage into a new
bas in to be built by the yea r 200 I. Simultaneously. a modul ar dry vault would be built fo r

Only the defense fuels are be ing considered for we t storage. but dry storage in casks or
vaults could be used fo r all or part of Han ford's spent fuel in ve ntory under various options

storage of the rest of the spent fuel at Hanford. Option X considers the use of casks fo r dry
storage instead of the vault. but still requires movi ng the N Reactor fuel to a new basi n. The

(Bergsman 1995) . There are four basic options considered for storage of the spent fu els at

casks would be placed on concrete pads outside of any buildings and would include two types of

Hanford under the Decent ra lization Alternati ve . Optio ns W and X include both we t and dry

cask designs: concrete modules holding a storage cask. and upright concrete casks designed

storage : wet storage for defe nse fuels and dry storage for all other spent fuels in e ither a vault

specifically fo r the FFT F fue l. Optio n Y would result in all of the non-defense spent fuel at

or casks. Options Y and Z invo lve onl y dry storage. again either in a vault or casks. but these

Hanford being placed in a large vault fac ility. The defense fuel would req uire process ing in a

options incl ude one of three stabili zation options for the metallic defense fuels.

new fac ility by one of three options (P. Q. or D) prior to canning and placement in storage. The
defe nse fuel s processed using Option P or Option D wo uld be stored in the vault: however.

The three potent ial processes considered fo r stabilizing the defe nse fue ls in conjunction

Option Q would result in several products that would be stored or processed fu rther as high·level

wi th Options Y and Z are shear!leach!calci ne (P). shear!leach!solve nt extrac tion (Q). and' dry ing

waste (Bergs man 1995) . The fi nal option. Option Z. is simil ar to Option Y except that casks

and pass iva tion (D). Process P consists of shearing the fu el into a continuous dissolve r and

wou ld he used instead of a dry storage vault for all of the nondefense spent fue ls. The defense

dissolving it in a ni tric acid solution. Eventua ll y. the processed ma terial (without any

fue ls are hand led as in Option Y. Addit ional deta il s are provided by Bergsman ( 1995) .

rad ionuclide removal) is calc ined. pressed into a ceramic waste fo rm . and sealed in metal
canister~ .
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Alternati ve . Both Options Wand X require a new basin and either a new vault or a new cask
Tab le 3-4. Options under the Decentralizat ion Alternative for Hanford .

Storage
option

Stabilization
option

storage facility. Descripti o ns of these potential new faci lities are provided in Table 3-5 . A
proposeu site consisting of about 260 hectares (o ne-quarter section) for constructi on of all new

Facil ity requirements

De sc ription

IV

None

Wet storage of defense fue ls
Dry storage of other fuels

New basin
New vault

X

None

Wet storage of defense fue ls
Dry storage of other fuels

New basi n
New casks

y

P. Q. or D

Dry storage of all fuel:
stabilize defense fuels prior to
storage

New vault : new processing faci lity Icalcining (P),
solvent extraction (0 ), or drying and passivation ( 0)1

metallic defense fuels in add ition to the new d ry sto rage fac ility . The specifics of this fac ility

P. Q. or D

Dry Slorage of all fucl:
st abil ize defense fuels prior to
storage

New dry storage casks; new processing facility
Icalcining (P). solvent extrac tion (0), or drying and
pass ivat ion (D)f

extraction (p rocess Q) . o r drying and passivati on (process D). For process Q. it is assumed th at

Z

fac ilities is located as shown in Figure 4- 1. The cask facility would cover about twice as much
land area as a va ult facility and wo uld invo lve modular systems placed outside on conc rete pads.
While the basin requirement is dropped for Options Y and Z. a process faci lity is needed fo r the

vary depending on whether they involve shear/leach/calcining (p rocess Pl. shear/leach/solvent

a vitrificati on plant and storage facilities will be available for the processed spent fuel that would
then consist of three products. The vitri fi cation plant and storage fo r high-level wastes are part

3.1.2.2 Description of Existing Facilities and Impacts from the
Decentralization Alternative. The description of the existing facilities used to store SNF at

of the overall plan fo r Hanford .

Hanford was provided in Subsection 3. 1. 1.2 . The Decentralization Alternative wou ld impact the
The potential processing facilities that will result from this alternative will require

facilities beyond that already mentioned for the No Ac tion Alternative to the extent that fuel
wou ld be removed from several of them: the Shippingport fuel would be removed from T Plant
to a desig nated interim storage location on site: FFTF fuel would continue to be removed from
the

so~ i um -cooled

storage faci lities and placed in dry storage casks: and fuel in the 200-W burial

increased utilities. compared with the new dry storage fac ilities th at are not expected to have
majo r utilit y requirements. A rail system for receiving spent fue l at the va rious faci lities may be
req uired and could be tied into the existing system . Water requirements are expected to be
inSignificant. Estimates of the power requirements for processes P. Q. and Dare 10 megawa tts.

grounds might be relocated onsite .

18 megawatts. and 3 megawatts. respectivel y. While the existing excess electrical capacity of
As shown in Table 3-2. there is very little excess capacity in any of the faci lities in which
fuel is currently stored. The stora ge basins . in addition to being old . were built fo r temporary

21 megawatts wou ld be sufficient for one of these facilities. other potential uses of the exist ing
electri cal power capaci ty may require upgrading the existing power system (Bergsman 1995) .

holding. for a matter of months only: hence. bringing them up to standards for prolonged
storage would be fraught with problems and wou ld not be cost-effective . Except for the burial

3.1.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative

grou nds. the locations in which SNF is currently held in air were not intended for prolonged
The 199211993 Planni ng Basis Alternative defines those act ivities th at we re already

storage ei ther. having been built for temporary holding for research and development or pre-

schedu led at the various sites fo r the transportation. receipt. processing. and storage of SNF .

processing . The FFTF storage facilities are all dependent on maintaini ng sodi um in the liquid
state as coolant and storage medium . which is not cost-effective for 40 years of storage for
nonbeneficial use. Hence . the existing facilities are not considered for use in the 40 year storage

3.1.3.1 Description of Spent Fuel Inventory As in the previous two alternat ives. no
new , pent fue l would bc rece ivcd at Hanfo rd under the )99211 993 Pl anning Basis Alte rnati ve .

scenario.

However. the 101 spent fu el element currentl ), in the 308 Building from TRIGA reacto rs and
th e small amount of TRIGA fue l from Oregon State Uni"ersit)' currently in the 2oo-W Area

3.1.2.3 Description of New Facilities. A minimum of two new faci li ties are
required. regardless of which option is chosen for storing spent fuel under the Decentralization
3-9
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Table 3-5. Description of required facilities under the Decentralization
S e\4'
W ;II~r

racilil ~'

B;I\," tW . X I

Dr~

Stor.lfe \ '.11/ 11
F ~..: il lt~ ( WI

01') Stllrage
F:I ' ll lt~ IX )

Shear

Ca~ k

Le a~ h I C ak lnt:

P roX e ~~

IIr Z Fa': lhry

( 'I I

01') Stllrage Vault
Fa c lh~ ' V )

Dr;. SIIIrage
Fa.:lll~ II I

Ca~k

Alt e rn a ti ve . ~

Ol.'scriplion
Building: I W 111 long I( .t! .7 m Wit!.:" 19 .8 m hIg h
l and use' < II(N.t Ill: I < ! ac res)
Water storage pool: r~ c tanglli a r . 520 m:. cast· m·plat /: concrl.'tl.'
Canisters: J (luhk ttar r ~kJ . eac h 0.23 In dIameter ~ n.7.$ m hIgh
Const ruction , 3 }ea r Juration. nperall(ln tty 1001

210:'\ ) 1Tu In
MtXXI camste rs

BUilding: 31J.tI III IIIn8 x 411 .8 III wide .I( 19 ,8 III high
l and USI.': < 4W7 111: I < I acre)
) Iod ular "au!! : rncta l tubes \'ertlcally arrayed 10 cast· m·place conc rete structu re : me rt
CII\(t gas: natu ral ctl nn:cllon cooling.
C anisttrs : !>ho rt . 0.508 m diameter I( ] .96 m (FFfF fuels ): long.
0.551) m dlametcr .\ 4.!l7 m (othe r non-defcnse fuels)
C onstructio n : 3 yea r dUI".mon. upe ration by 1001

JO MT HM In flO ~ hU r1 and
25 10ngc amstc rs

Buildinl!:: none. concrl.'te pads
La nd use: < 8U9-1 m: 1< 2 ac res)
C ask S~·stl.'ms : I ) FFfF casks. :! .29 m diamete r x 4 .!l7 m hIgh. 45.4 MT each.
~ I Cllncrele mndule with fuel cask: reference storage mod ulc IS 2.96 m WIde x !I .52 m
deep .\ -1 .57 m hIgh
Canistl.'rs: 0 .50K m dlamc:le r ). 3.96 m fFFfF cask); 1.68 m dlilmeh:r x 4 ,88 m long.
weighs 90 11 ~1T ISlorage module )
C onstr uction: 3 year du ration. npe rallon by 200 1

] U MTHM . 60 caskl
camsle rs IFFTF desl!.!n )
and 6 storage modulesl
casks

Build ing: m u l ll lc~ \·e l. s"~c l - reln ro rced . USI in place cone rele: 110 .3 m long x !l5 .2 m
wide ). 2!1 .9 m high 115.8 m abo\'e grade l: shld ded malO canyon is 6 . 1 m WIde x 70.1
m long .\ 2!1 9 m high:
Land l 'se: 6070 m: (\ .5 acres)
Operation : :!4 hours/da y. 7 dil) s/week fo r 4 yea rs to stabil ize defense fud s:
7!1 5f effiCIency: 180 day/year
Construction : J year du rallon. ope rillion by 200 1

2103 MTU In 4 years
1.5 MT UlcJay

Bu.ild inR: 100.6 m long x R8A rn Wide x 18.3 m high
Land usc : < R0Q.4 m: ( < :! aett:)
~I od ula r ,'a ult : metal ruhcs 'ertlcally arrayed In cast· in·place conc rete m u crure: inc n
qo rage atmo sphere: natural Cllm'eCllon cooling .
Canl'itl.'rs: U.559 rn dIameter ). 4 . 11 rn I (k fen~ fuels): soon . 0.508 m tha rneter ,' 3.%
m IFFT F fuel s): long . O. !I!I') m d lame lcr .' 4.57 m luther nlln-tlefense fuel s)
Construction : J ~ea r durdW)n. ope n .llnn by 200 1

2133 MTHM m - 1100
defense ca nISle r~. 60 shun
ancJ 25 lung nun-tlcfense
caniSters

Same

a~

01')'

Ca~k

Fuel Dl)!Og lmd
Pa \~ I \allon Faclllt}
IY I'r Z I

decentralization storage alternati ve were already planned prior to this review . It was expec ted
that all newly ge nerated SNF that was owned by the U.S. Government would be sent to either
INEL or to SRS. No new spent fuel was expected to be shipped to Hanford other than possibly

SIOfage Fac ll lf)' descn hcd fm Opllon X

Land USI.' : 10.23-1 m! IS ac re ~ )
Canistl.'rs: add ~to rage modules/casks fo r stabll il.cd defense fuels : same storage
conra tne r dlmen~ l ons as for Opllon X
Soll enl E\lrOte llon
Fud Pr ue e ~ ' FaClhl}
t Y IlTZ I

3.1.3.2 Anticipated Activities Most of the acti vities previously discussed for the
C3paci t~·

limited quantities of material for research or other scientific endeavors supporting the nuclear
industry . Upgrades and replacements of ex isting storage capacity were already planned and
woul d involve those fac ilities described in Subsection 3. 1.2 fo r the Decentralization Alte rnati ve .
Thus. the acti vities that would be conducted under the 199211 993 Planning Bas is are the same as
for the Decentralization Alternati ve under the four options listed in Table 3-4 . except for the
additional acti vity of shipping TRIGA spent fuel to INEL.

3.1.3.3 Description of Existing Facilities and Changes Required by
Alternative The descript ion prov ided in Subsection 3 . 1. 1.2 on the existing faci lities for storing
SNF at Hanfo rd also appl ies to this alternative . No additional changes to facilities are
anticipated from the 199211 993 Planning Basis exce pt that the 308 Building and the 200W Area
burial grounds would no longer contain TRIGA spent fuel.

3.1.3.4 Description of New Facilities. The facilities that would be required unde r the
2133 ~ITH M in 60 cask!
ca nisters (FFfF).
230 modules/casks
(defense). and 6 modulc ~f
casks lothe r non-defensc)

Building: rnulllle\'e!. sled ·remforc ed. casl In place concrele: 26.5 m long x
77 7 m Wide x 25.9 m high 115.8 m ahiwe grade); shielded mai n canyon IS fl . 1 m wide
.'( 76 .:! m long x 15 .9 m high :
Land l'n: 6070 m! ( 1.5 ac res)
Canisters: generates 1 kg /MTli of fuel p roc es~d . resul ung m about 30 cans of glass
for 2103 ~1T l' of fuel
Operation : 14 hours/da y. 7 days/w( ek for 4 years to stabIlize defe nsc fuds:
75 ~ efficlenc} : 280day/}'car
Construction : ) yea r du ratIOn. npe ralloo by 1001

2 103 MTU 10 4 years
1.5 MTU/day

Building: muhlle\·el . steel ·remforced. caSl In place conc retc : II ~ql m long x 64 .0 m
Wide \ 259 m hIgh 0 5.R m .. lxu·e grade): shielded main canyo n IS 6. 1 m \Io'lde x
5ol .l} m long x 15.9 m high:
Land l'SI.': fl)70 m! I 1.5 ac res)
Operation : 14 hours/da y. 7 days/week for 4 yea rs to stabilize ddensc fuels:
75 9(- efricleocy: 180day/year
Comt ructioo : 3 yea r durallon. ope ra tIOn by 2000

2103 MTL' In 4 '·eah .
1.5 MTClcJay .

199211 993 Planning Basis are the same as those shown previously in Table 3-5 for the Decentralization
Alternative. The impact on existing ut ilities would be the same as for the Decentralization Ahernative,
name ly from 3

to

18 megawaus of power fo r stabili zation fac ililies and mi nima l othe r impacts.

3.1.4 Regionalization Alternative

This alte rnati ve prov ides fo r the redistribution of SNF 10 candidate sites based on
simi larity of fuel types (Option A) or on geog raphic location (Options BI . B2. and C). in order
to optimize the storage of SNF owned by the U.S. Government.

The Regionalization Alternati ve as it appl ies to the Hanford Site consists of the following
options:

Option A (regionalized by fue l type) - Defense production SNF would remain at
Hanford : other types of SNF would be sent to INEL.
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Option B I (geographic reg ionalization) - All SNF wes t of the Mississippi Ri ve r except
Naval SNF would be sent to Hanford .

Option A Suboption Y

Option B2 (geographic reg ionalization) - All SNF wes t of the Mississippi Rive r and
Naval SNF would be sent to Hanford.

• transport of other Hanford Site fuel to INEL

Option C (geographic regionalization) - All Hanford SNF would be sent to IN EL or
NTS .

Facilities and features of Regionalization Option A would be the same as those described

• dry storage of all defense production fuel in a large vault facility

• defense production fuel stabilized prior to storage
• use of existing facilities (FFTF and T Plant) and a stabilization facility to load shipping
casks
• leakers . if any . unloaded in a special module at a stabilization facility .

for Hanford defense production fue l in the Decentralization Alternative. The facilities and
features for all other Hanford SNF would be very similar to those described for that SNF in the
Central ization Alternative minimum option.

For N Reactor and single-pass reactor fuel. this option is identical to the Decentralization
Alternative; for other Hanford Site fuel. this option is nearly identical to the Centralization
Alternati ve minimum option.

Facilities and features of Regionalization Options BI and B2 would be incremental to
those described for the Decentralization Alternative and would include facilities and features

Option A Subomion Z

similar to those described in the Centralization Alternative maximum option.

• dry storage of all fuel in casks in a large facility

Facilities and features of Regionalization Option C would be equivalent to those described
for the Centralization Alternative minimum option.

• defense production fuel stabilized prior to storage
• dry storage casks loaded at existing facilities (FFTF and T Plant)

3.1.4.1 Description of Spent Fuel Inventory. The spent fuel inventory that would
be stabilized and/o r stored for each of the Regionalization options is shown in Table 3-1 .

• use of existing facilities (FFTF and T Plant) and a stabilization facility to load shippi ng
casks
• leakers unloaded in a special module at a stabilization fac ility.

3.1.4.2 Activities Required by Each Option.

For N Reactor and single-pass reactor fuel. this option is identical to the Decentralization

Optioo A Suboptjoo X

Alternative: for other Hanford Site fuel. this option is nearly identical to the Centralization

• wet storage of N Reactor and single-pass reactor fuel

Alternati ve minimum option.

• shipment of other Hanford Site fuel to INEL
• use of existing faci lities (FFTF and T Plant) and new wet pool facilities to load shipping
casks .

QmiQn.Jll
All fuel from offsite would be stored dry in casks in a large fac ility. although a ve ry small
amount might require wet storage for an inte rim period prior to dry storage. SNF received from

For N Reactor and single-pass reactor fuel. this option is the same as the Dece ntralization

other DOE locations would arr ive stabilized and canned as necessary for storage. SNF received

Alternative; fo r all other Hanford Site fuel. this option is nearly the same as for the

from uni ve rsities and SNF of U.S. origin from foreign research locations would require canning

Central ization Alternative minimum option.

prior to storage. The required receiving and canning would be done in a new facility because of
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the extended period over which the fuel would be received . A small amount of fuel would
arrive after only limited time since reactor discharge. which would require temporary water
storage until it aged sufficiently to be dry stored . That water storage would be included in the
receiving and canning facility . Technology development would be conducted in a separate,
nearby facility .

Option 82
The activities for this option would be the same as those for Option 81 , except that
additional storage would be required for Naval fuel.

Option C
Hanford fuel would be stabilized as necessary. loaded , and shipped offsite .

3.1.4.3 Existing Facilities. Upgrades , replacements , and additions to the existing
facilities would occur as required under the Decentralization Alternative .

3.1.4.4 New Facilities. Research and development and pilot programs for characterization, stabilization, aad other needs to support future decisions on the ultimate disposition of SNF
would also occur. Refer to Table 3-6 for the potential facility requirements under the three
storage and three stabilization options . A description of these options is given in Section
3. 1.2.1. Anticipated Activities under the Decentralization Alternative . Options X, Y, and Z
with their respective stabilization suboptions are the same as those for the

R~g ionalization

and

Decentralization Alternatives (see Table 3-4). What is different is the specific assortment of fuel
to be managed in each of the alternatives. The stabilization facilities required under the
Regionalization Alternative are the same as those listed in Table 3-5 .
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Table 3-6. Description of required facilitie s under Regionalization Alternatives.
Alternative
Regionalization AI
Suboption X RAX

New Facility
Water basin

Description
Building: 109.7 m long x 42.7 m wide x 12 .2 m high pre -cast concrete
Land use :

Capacity
-2103 MTU in
8000 canisters

< 8094 m! « 2 acres)

Water storage pool : rectangular . 520 m1 , cast -in-place concrete

~

r

:g

Canisters: double barreled, each 0 .23 m diameter x 0 .74 m high

' J>

Construction: 3-year deviation . operation starting in 200 I

w,

Regionalization AI
Suboption Y RAY

Shearlleach/calcine
stabilization process

See Table 3-5

Regionalization AI
Suboption RAY

Large modular dry
storage vault

Building: 94 .5 m long x 88.4 m wide x 18.3 m high cast-in-place
concrete, pre-cas! concrete superstructure
Land Use : - 8094 m1

(-

-2103 MTU in
1200 canisters

2 acres)

Canisters : 0.58 m diameter x 4 . 11 m high
Construction : 3-year duration, operation to start in 200 I
Rcgionalization A\
Suboption RAZ

Shearlleach/calcine
stabilization process

See Table 3-5

Regionalization AI
Suboplion RAZ

Concrete storage
module holding
NUHOMs' casks

Building : 3.0 m wide x 5.5 m long x 4 .6 m high
Land Use: 16. 187 m1 (4 acres)
Casks : 1.7 m diameter x 4 .9 m long
Construction: 3 year duration. operation to begin in 200 I

2013 MTU in 230
prefabricated dry
storage module
casks

Table 3-6. (comu)
Alternatives
New Facility
Description
Note : Facilities required for Alternatives RB I and RB2 are in addition to those required fo r Decentrali zation
Regionalization B I. RB I

Increme ntal cask storage
Receivi ng and canning
faci lity
Technology development
facility

Building: 121.9 m x 365 .8 m
Similar to but larger than that for Decentralization Option X
Building: 53 .3 long x 53 .3 n wide x 16.8 m high 3 foot thick cast-inplace concrete
Building: 53 .3 m long x 30.5 m wide x 16.8 m high pre-cast concrete

Capacity

330 MTHM
188 shipping casks .
50 storage casks

Land use for all three RBI facilities : 40,469 m2 (10 acres)
Construction : Receiving/canning and tech. dev . 1998-2001; for 90 %
of storage fac ility 2000-2010; for remaining 10 % storage 2010-2035;
operating period : 2000 through 2035

w,

Regionalization B2. RB2

--
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-
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Prefabricated by storage
cask facility

Building: 914.4 m x 12 1.9 m; similar to but larger than Option X for
Decentralization

Receiving and canning
fac ility
Technology development
facility
Land use for all three
RB2 facilities :
10 1.172 m1 (25 acres)

Sames as for RB I
Same as for RB I

;T1

a

x

>
>

""
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UHOM s casks INutech Horizontal Modular Storage (from Pacific Nuclear)!

400 MTHM (for
total , with
Decentralization,
of 2500 MTHM)
188 shipping casks
50 storage casks

3.1.5.2 Anticipated Activities. If Hanford is chosen as the site fo r storing the entire

3.1 .5 Centralization Alternative

spent fuel inve ntory. the upg rades. increases. and replaceme nts of storage capacity wou ld occur
Unde r the Centralization Alternative for SNF storage. all current and future SNF from

as required for the existing spent fuel as well as to accommodate the increased spent fue l

DOE and the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program woul d be sent to o ne DOE site o r other

invento ry. If the Centralization Alternative is chosen and Hanford is not selec ted. the acti vi ties

locatio n. T he ac tivities at each site would depend o n whether the SNF was being received o r

wou ld include stabiliza tion to ensure safe storage and transp0rlation offsite.

shipped offsite. Sites not selected would close down their storage faci lities once the fue l had
been removed . The following information summari zes the expected impact at Hanfo rd and

All fuel recei ved from offsite would be stored dry in casks in a largt faci lity . although

provides insight into the characteristics of the SNF alld facilities that would be involved in

some may require wet storage fo r an interim period prior to dry storage. SNF received from

shipping these fuels to Hanford .

o ther DOE sites will arri ve stabilized and canned as necessary for storage . SNF received from
uni versities and from foreig n locations would require conta inerization prior to storage . Naval

3.1.5.1 Description of Spent Nuclear Fuel Inventory The SNF inventory that

SNF would arrive uncontainerized, but wou ld not require containe ri zation . The required

would exist at Hanford under this alternative would include that wh ich is presenlly at Hanfo rd

receiving and containeri zing would be done in a new fac ility because of the large throughput

(see Table 3-1). as well as any new fuel shipped to Hanford . If the minimum option occurs

involved and the extended period (40 years instead of 4) during which the fuel would be

under the Centralization Alternative. then all of this spent fuel would be shipped offsite and there

received . Some university and foreign fuel would require temporary wet storage . That water

wou ld no longer be a spent fuel inventory at Hanford, barring any required fo r research . If the

storage is included in the receivi ng and canning facility . Technology development would be

maximum option occurs. the spent fuel at all of the o ther sites across the United States would

conducted in a separate. nearby facility .

eventually be transported to Hanford .

3.1.5.3 Description of New Facilities . The new facilities required for the alternati',e
The locatio ns from which spent fuel would be sent, in addition to SRS and INEL. include
Argo nne National Laboratories East and West, Babcock and Wilcox. Brookhaven National

in which all U.S. DOE SNF would be stored at the Hanford Site are of the same type as , but
larger than, those required for Regionalization Alternative Option B2 :

Laboratory, General Atomics , Los Alamos National Laboratory , Oak Ridge National
Laboratory , Sandia National Laboratories, West Valley , and Fort SI. Vrain . Naval spent nuclea r
fu el fro m shipyards and prototypes would be sent fi rst to the equivalent of the Expended Core
Faci lit y. which would be rel ocated to Hanford . There the fuel would be examined by the Nava l
Nuclear Propulsion Program prior to being turned over to DOE for storage at Hanford . Foreig n
fuel that may be returned to the Uni ted States following irradiation or testing offsite would also
be included in this inventory under the Centralization Alternative . Summaries of the spent fuel
at each site are shown in Volume I, Attachments B, C. and D and Volume III of DOE ( 1993a).
Add itio nal inform atio n is in DOE (I 992a) (FOri SI. Vrain and Peach Botto m hi gh-temperatu re

The Prefabricated Dry Storage Cask Facility for offsite SNF would be
approximately 120 meters x 1200 meters .
The Receiving and Canning Facility wculd be approximately I 10 meters x 50
meters x 20 meters high.
The Technology Development Faci lity would be approximately 50 meters x 40
meters x 20 meters hi gh .
The land required for these three facilities together would be approximately 14
hectares (35 acres).

gas-cooled reactor spent g raphite fuel) .
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3.2 Comparison of Alternatives
A summary of environmental impacts among the various alternatives is provided in
Table 3-7. The alternatives are briefly described below to aid in interpreting the material
presented .

The No Action Alternative identifies the minimum actions deemed necessary for continued
safe and secure storage of SNF at the Hanford Site . Upgrade of the existing facilities would not
occur other than as required to ensure safety and security .

The Decentralization Alternative includes additional facility upgrades over those considered in the No Action Alternative. specifically. new wet storage (for defense production fuel
only) or dry storage facilities. fuel processing via shear/leach/calcination or shear/leach/solvent
extraction. with research and development activities to support such processing.

The 1992/93 Planning Basis Alternative differs from the Decentralization Alternative only
in that TRIGA fuel currently stored at the Hanford Site would be shipped offsite. The storage
and stabilization options identified for the Decentralization Alternative are also assumed for the
199211 993 Planning Basis Alternative.

The Regionalization Alternative as it applies to the Hanford Site consists of the following
options :

\"OLL' ~IE

•

Option A (fuel type) - Defense production SNF would remain at Hanford: other
types of fuel would be sent to INEL.

•

Option B I (geographic) - All SNF west of the Mississippi River. except Naval
SNF would be sent to Hanford.

•

Option B2 (geographic) - All SNF west of the Mississippi River and Naval SNF
would be sent to Hanford .

•

Option C (geographic) - All Hanford SNF would be sent to INEL or NTS .
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Table 3-7 . Summarized comparisons of the alternatives a .
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4_ AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT

Two options exist at the Hanford Site for the Centralization Alternative : I) the minimum
option. in which all SNF on the Hanford Site would be shipped offsite. and 2) the max imum

4.1 Overview

option. in which all SNF within the DOE complex would be shipped to the Hanford Site for
management and storage. In the laner case. dry storage of all fuel sent to the Hanford Site from
olfsite would be assumed . A facility equi valent to the Decentralization suboptions would be

The Hanford Site is characte rized by a shrub-steppe climate with large sagebrush

assumed for stabilization of defense production fuel prior to storage : fuel received from offsite

dominating the vegetative plant community. Jack rabbits. mice, badgers, deer, elk, hawks, owls,

would have been stabilized for dry storage prior to receipt.

and ma ny othe r animals inhabit the Hanford Site. The nea rby Columbia River supports one of
the last remaining spawning areas for Chinook salmon and hosts a variety of other aqua tic life.
The climate is dry with hot summers and usually mild winters. Severe weather is rare. With
construction of da ms along the Columbia River, nooding is nearly nonexistent.

The Hanford Site was a major contributor to national defense during World War II and
the Cold War era. The site was selected because it was sparsely settled and the Columbia River
provided a n abundant supply of cold, clean water to cool the reactors. As a result of wastes
generated by these national defense activities, there are presently more than 1500 waste
management units and four major groundwater contamination plumes. These have been
grouped into 78 operable units: 22 in the 100 Area (reactor area), 43 in the 200 Area (chemical
processing and refining areas), 5 in the 300 Area (research and development area), and 4 in the
11 00 Area (storage area). An additional four units are found in the 600 Area (the rest of the
Hanford Site). Each of these operable units is following a schedule for clean-up established by
the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement), which
involves the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the Washington Department of Ecology, and
the EPA.

4.2 Land Use
A brief description of the existing land use on the Hanford Site and adjacent lands and a
brief disc ussion devoted to the exist ing land use " " the proposed project site a rea follow.

4.2.1 Land Use at the Hanford Site

The Hanford Site is used primarily by DOE. Public access is limited to travel on the two
access roads as fa r as the Wye Barricade, on Highway 240, and on the Columbia River (see
Figure 4-1). The site encompasses 1450 square kilometers (560 square miles), of which most is
3-23
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open vaca nt land with widely scattered facilities. old reactors. and processing plants (Figure 4-1).
""-\

Washington

\?Ioseanle

In the past. DOE has stated that it intends to ma inta in active institutional control of the
Hanford Site in perpetuity ( DOE 1989). In the future. DOE could release or declare excess
Spokane

portions of the Hanford Site not required fo r DOE activities. Alternatively. Congress could act

. ~'- ' - ' '''"L. .

.../

.or

to cha nge the manage ment or ownership of the Hanford Site. The DOE operational areas a re
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described below:

The 100 Area [II square kilometers (4.2 square miles)], which borders the right
bank (south shore) of the Columbia River. is the site of e ight retired plutonium
production reactors a nd N Reactor. which is in shutdown deactivation sta tus.
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8 Kilometers

o

The 200-West and 200-East Areas [1 6 square kilometers (6.2 square miles)] are
located on a plateau about 8 and II kilometers (5 and 7 miles). respectively. from
the Columbia River. These areas have been dedicated for some time to fuel
reprocessing and waste processing management and disposal activities. The
proposed project would be located betwee n these areas.

•

The 300 Area [1.5 square kilometers (0.6 square miles)]. located just north of the
city of Richland. is the site of nuclear research and development.
The 400 Area [0.6 square kilometers (0.25 square miles)] is about 8 kilometers
(5 miles) north of the 300 Area and is the site of the Fast Flux Test Facility
( FFTF) used in the testing of breeder reactor systems. Also included in this area is
the Fuels and Ma te rial Examination Facility.

FitznerlEberhardt

~ ,

•

The 600 Area comprises the remainder of the Hanford Site and includes the Arid
Land Ecology Reserve (ALE) [3 10 square kilometers (120 square miles)]. which
has been set aside for ecological studies. and the foUowing facilities and sites:

.

-.... -..,
~''''''_';''':-'"-I.~-..:.....(

o

a commercial low-level radioactive waste disposal site [4 square kilometers
(1.7 squa re miles)]. part of which is leased by the State of Washingto n.
Washington Public Power Supply System nuclear power plants [4.4 square
kilometers ( 1.7 squa re miles)] .

.- - --

Hanford Site Boundary

a 2.6-square kilometer ( I squa re mile) parcel of land tra nsferred to
Washington State as a potential site for the disposal of nonradioactive
hazardo us wastes.

-0- State Highway
- - - Site Road
S93120n .s
AFFC·F-l .H

Figure 4-1 . Hanford Site showing proposed spent nuclear fuel facility location.

a wildlife refuge of abo ut 130 square kilometers (50 square miles) under
revocable use permit to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Se rvice.
an area of about 6 square kilometers (2.3 square miles) has been provided to
site a National Science Foundation Laser Gravitational-Wave Interfe rometer
Observatory west of the 400 Area. When completed. this facility will occupy
abo ut 0.6 square kilometers (0.2 square miles).
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a recreational game management area of about 225 square kilometers
(87 square miles) under revoca ble use permit to th e Washington State
Depa rtment of Game.
support facilities for the controlled access areas.

In addition, an area comprising 310 square kilometers (120 square miles) has been designated for use as the ALE by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service for a wildlife refuge and by th e
Washington State Department of Wildlife for a game management area (DOE 1986a). The
entire Hanford Site has been designated a National Environmental Research Park.

The Columbia River adjacent to the Hanford Site is a major site for public use by
boaters, water skiers, fishermen, and hunters of upland game birds and migratory waterfowl.
Some land access along the shore and on certain islands is available for public use.

4.2.2 Land Use in the Vicinity of the Hanford Site

Land use adjacent to the Hanford Site to the southeast and generally along the Columbia
River includes residential, commercial, and industrial development. The cities of Richland,
Kennewick, and Pasco are located along the Columbia River and are the closest major urban
land uses adjacent to the Hanford Site. These cities (known as the Tri-Cities) together support
a population of approximately 96,000.

Irrigated orchards and produce crops, dry-land farming, and grazing are also important
land uses adjacent to the Hanford Site. In 1985 wheat represented the largest single crop in
terms of area planted in Benton and Franklin counties with 190 square kilometers (73 square
miles). Corn, alfalfa, hay, barley, and grapes are other major crops in Benton and Franklin
counties. In 1986 the Columbia Basin Project, a major irrigation project to the north of the
Tri-Cities, produced gross crop returns of $343 million, representing 19 percent of all crops
grown in Washington State. In 1986 the average gross crop value per irrigated acre was $664.00.
The largest percentage of irrigated acres produced alfalfa hay, 29.4 percent of irrigated acres;
wheat, 15.0 percent; and corn (feed grain), 9.4 percent. Other significant crops are potatoes,
apples, dried beans, asparagus, and pea seed.
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rights to hunt. to fish at all usual and accustomed places and to erect temporary buildings for

4.2.3 Potential Project Land Use

curing fish. to gather roots and berries. and to pasture horses and cattle on open unclaimed
The potential project site (Centralization Alternative) is located between the 200-West
and 200·East Areas. The land is currently vaca nt. The proposed project wo uld consist of

lands. The Wanapum Tribe, although members never signed a treaty, claims similar rights on
ceded lands along the Columbia River.

constructing an SNF facility on the site. This potential project would involve typical land uses
that occur during construction phases and a more industrial/ commercial land use after reaching

Tribal members have expressed an interest in renewing the ir use of these resources in

the operational stage.

accordance wit h the Treaty of 1855, and the DOE is assisting them in this effort. Certain land-

4.2.4 Native American Treaty Rights

various sites along the Columbia River, are sacred to them. The many cemeteries found along

marks, especially Rattlesnake Mountain, Gable Mountai n, Gable Butte, Goose Egg Hill, and

the river are also considered to be sacred.
In prehistoric and early historic times, the Hanford Reach of the Columbia River was

4,3 Socioeconomics

populated by Native Americans of vario us tribal affiliations. The Wanapum and the
Chamnapum bands of the Yakama' tribe lived along the Columbia River from south of
Richland upstream to Vantage (Relander 1986; Spier 1936). Some of their descendants still live

Activity on the Hanford Site plays a dominant role in the socioeconomics of the Tri-Cities

nearby at Priest Rapids Dam (the Wanapum Tribe); others have been incorporated into the

( Richland, Pasco, and Kennewick) and other parts of Benton and Franklin counties. The Tri-

Yakama and Umatilla reservations. Palus people, who lived on the lower Snake River, joined

Cities serves as a market center for a much broader area of eastern Washington, including

the Wanapum and Chamnapum to fish the Hanford Reach of the Columbia River, and some

Adams, Columbia, Grant, Walla Walla, and Yakima counties. The Tri-Cities also serves parts of

inhabited the river's east bank (Relander 1986; TraCzer and Scheuerman 1986). Walla Walla

northeastern Oregon, including Morrow, Umatilla, and Wallowa counties. Socioeconomic

and Umatilla people also made periodic visits to fish in the area. These people retain tradi-

impacts of changes at Hanford are mostly confined to the immediate Tri-Cities community and

tional secular and religiuus ties to the region, and many, young and old alike, have knowledge of

Benton and Franklin counties (Yakima County to a lesser extent). However, because of the

the ceremonies and lifeways of their aboriginal culture. The Washane, or Seven Drums religion,

significance of the wider agricult ural region and surrounding communities in the Tri-Cities'

which has ancient roots and had its start on what is now the Hanford Site, is still practiced by

economic base, this section briefly discusses the wider region as well. Detailed analyses of the

many people on the Yakama, Umatilla, Warm Springs, and Nez Perce reservations. Native

socioeconomics are found in Scott et aJ. (1987) and Watson et aJ. (1984). Additionally, the

plant and animal foods, some of which can be found on the Hanford Site, are used in the

impact of the proposed SNF facility might be altered by changes in socioeconomic resources in

ceremonies pe rformed by sect members.

the surrounding counties of Adams, Columbia, Grant, Walla Walla, and Yakima in Washington
state; and Morrow, Umatilla, and Wallowa counties in Oregon (these and Benton and Franklin

Native American Lands designated on the Hanford Site fall under the protective rights of

counties comprise the designated region of influence; see Figure 4-2). This section describes the

the Treaty of 1855 and the National Historic Preservation Act; these will be addressed further in

population, economic activity, housing, and public services and public finance of each county

the Cultural Resources Section. Under the Trea ties of 1855, lands now occupied by the

within the region of influence and the Tri-Cities. Because Benton and Franklin counties are

Hanford Site and othe r southeastern Washington lands were ceded to the United States by the

expected to be most impacted from changes in Hanford Site activities. the info rmation

confederated tribes a nd bands of the Yaka ma Indian Nation, the Confederated Tribes of the

presented in this section concentrates on those counties. with less attention paid to the other

Umatilla Indian Reservation, and the Nez Perce Tribe. Under these treaties, the Native

areas within the defined region of influence.

American tribes obtained the right to perform certain activities on those lands, including the

a. The spelling Yakama rather than Yaki ma has been adopted by the Yaka ma Nation.
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Table 4.3· I summarizes the regional (Benton and Franklin counties) projections for employment. labor force. population. and Hanford Site employment by year for the years 1995·2004.
Population projections were provided by the Washington State Office of Financial Management
( 1992a): employment projections were based on projections from the U.S. Department of
Commerce ( I 992): labor force projections were based on an historical average unemployment rate
of 8.8 %: and Hanford Site employment projections we re provided by DOE. It is anticipated at the
time of this writing that a down·turn in Hanford Site employment will occur. The extent of the

Primary socioeconomic
impact area

down· turn is unknown.

Other counties in the
region of influence

4.3.1 Demographics

This subsection briefly summarizes pertinent demographic information for each of the
counties within the region of influence . Data for Washington were provided by the U.S. Depart·
me nt of Commerce (1992) and the Washington State Office of Financial Management (1992a.b) .
Adams

Data for Oregon were provided by the U.S. Department of Commerce (1992) and the Center for
Population Research and Census ( 1993). Table 4.3-2 summarizes the population figures from 1960
to 1992 for each of the affected counties.

Yakima

During the period from 1980 to 1990. growth in the affected Washington counties has been
less than that of the state. with growth in the counties ranging from ·0.07 percent (Columbia
County) to 1.22 percent (Grant County) per year. During this same period . annual growth for the
state of Washington averaged 1.66 percent. Washington counties within the region of influence
also te nded to have a you nger population. with median ages rangi ng from 28.7 years to 39.0 yea rs.
as compared to the state median age of 33. I yea rs . These counties also tended to have a larger
ave rage household size than the state average. ranging from 2.44 to 3.03 persons . while the state
ave rage household size was listed at 2.53 persons.

Table 4.3·3 summarizes population projections through 2005 for each of the counties within
Figure 4-2. Areas of Washington and Oregon where socioeconomic resources may be affected
by the proposed spent nuclear fuel facility (designated region of influence).

the region of

influ~nce.

All of the Washington counties are expected to experience continued

growth . although most have projected growth rates less than that of the state . Washington is
projected to have an incccase in population of21.8 percent by 2005 (from 4.866 .692 in 1990 to
5.925 .888 in 2005) for an a~nual ave rage increase of 1.45 percent. Growth in the Oregon

BEST COpy AVAILABLE
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Table 4.3-1. Regional economic and demographic indicators.
Year:

.

~

\0

Regional
Employment
Regional Labor
Force
Regional Population
Site Employment

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

81,000

81,780

82,570

3,360

84,170

84,900

85,320

85,740

86,170

86,590

88,820

89,670

90,540

91,410

92,290

93,090

93,550

94,020

94,480

94,950

162,660
18,700

164,810
16,200

166,980
14,700

169,180
14,700

171,410
14,700

173,380
14,700

175,730
14,700

178,100
14,700

180,510
14,700

182,950
14,700
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Table 4.3-2. Population figures by county in the designated region of influence.

County

1960

1970

1980

1990

1992

Adams

9,929

12,014

13,267

13,603

14,100

Benton

coulllies within the region of influence occurred rapidly during the 1970s: however. since 1980

1990
Median
Age

1990
Average
Household
Size

30.7

2.94
2.65

population grow th has tapered off. The Oregon counties within the region of influence are also
expected to experience continued growth, although all have projected growth rates less than that of
the state . Oregon is projected to have an increase in population of 25.5 percent (from 2,842,321 in
1990 to 3.566. 189 in 2005) by 2005 for an annual average increase of 1.70 percent.

62,070

67,540

109,444

112,560

118,500

32.1

Columbia

4,569

4,439

4,057

4,024

4,000

39.0

2.44

Franklin

23,342

25,8 16

35,025

37,473

39,200

28.7

3.03

lation as follows : Richland , 33,550: Kennewick, 44,490: and Pasco, 20,840. The combined

Grant

46,477

41,881

48,522

54,758

58,200

31.9

2.74

populations of BentOn City , Prosser, and West Richland tOtaled 10,460 in 1992. The unincor-

Walla Walla

42,195

42,176

47,435

48,439

50,500

33.5

2.50

Vakima

145,112

145,212

172,508

188,823

193,900

31.5

2.80

Morrow

4,871

4,465

7,519

7,625

8,092'

Umatilla

44,352

44,923

58,861

59,249

60,150'

Wallowa

7,102

6,247

7,273

6,91 1

7, 135'

_ b

Within Benton and Franklin counties, the 1992 estimates distributed the Tri-Cities popu·

porated population of Benton County was 30,000. In Franklin County , incorporated areas other
than Pasco had a tOtal population of 2,540. The unincorporated population of Franklin County was
15,820 .

4.3.2 Eco nomics
a. 1991 estimate.
b. Dash indicates the information was not available.

This subsection summarizes pertinent economic activity within the region of interest and the
Tri-Cities. including information on the general economy, employment, income, and impact of the
Hanford Site. Historically, the primary industries within the region of influence have been related

Table 4.3-3. Population projections by county in the designated region of influence.

County

1995
Forecast

19901995 %
Change

2000
Forecast

19952000 %
Change

2005
Forecast

20002005 %
Change

to agriculture: a multitude of crops encompassing many fruits, vegetables, and grains, are grown
each year . Nearly all of the counties in the region of influence are home to food processing
industries . Other primary industries within the region of influence include those relating to the
wood industry: lumber. wood, and paper products. The data source for the Washington counties

Adams

13,867

1.94

14,163

2.14

14,424

1.84

Benton

121,328

7.79

128,752

6.12

136,892

6.32

was the 1993 WashingtOn State Yearbook (Office of the Secretary of State 1993), and the data

4,025

0.03

4,037

0.30

4,074

0.90

source for the Oregon counties data was the 1991 -92 Oregon Blue Book (Office of the Secretary of

Columbia
Franklin

41,336

10.31

44,630

7.97

48,213

8.03

State 199 1). Table 4 .3-4 summarizes the primary industries, total employment for 1990, and total

Gra nt

58,026

5.97

60,518

4.30

62,983

4.07

payroll for 1990 for the region of influence .

Walla Walla

49,047

1.26

49,910

1.76

50,891

1.97

Vakima

199,578

5.70

207,870

4.15

216,245

4.03

Morrow

8,095

6.16

8,596

6.19

9,157

6.53

Umatilla

62,658

5.75

66,056

5.42

69,506

5.22

Wallowa

7,065

2.23

7,253

2.66

7,496

3.35

4.3.2.1 Empl oyment in the Region of Interest. This subsection provides information on

the employment and payroll breakdown by sector for each county within the region of influence.
The source for the Washington counties was WashingtOn State Employment Security Office ( 1992).
The source for the Oregon counties was Department of Human Resources (1990). Tables 4.3-5
and and 4 .3-6 provide information on ave rage employment and payroll for 1990, broken down by
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Table 4.3-4. County economic summary .
County

1990 Total
Employment

Primary Industries

1990 Total Payroll
($ Million)

Adams

Food processing, agriculture

6,142

87 .2

Benton

Food processing. chemicals. metal
products, nuclear products

50,216

1,200.0

Columbia

Agriculture , food processing. wood
products

1,559

22 .3

Franklin

Food processing, publishing ,
agriculture. metal fabrication

17 ,958

284 .6

Grant

Food processing. agriculture

20,851

346 .0

Walla Walla

Food processing. agriculture, wood
and paper products. manufacturing

20,546

366 .5

Yakima

Agriculture, food processing, wood
products, manufacturing

82,706

1,300.0

Morrow

Agriculture. food processing, utilities,
lumber, livestock. recreation

2,791

Umatilla

Agriculture , food processing, wood
products, tourism, manufacturing,
recreation

21 ,448

366.0

Wallowa

Agriculture, livestock, lumber,
recreation

2,216

37 .9

53 .5

industry , for each of the counties within the region of influence. For the Washington counties, the
average employment includes only persons covered by the Employment Security Act and federal
employment covered by Title 5. USC 85. For the Oregon counties. average employment includes
only employees of businesses covered by the Employment Division Law .

4.3.2.2 Employment in the Tri-Cities. Three major sectors have been the principal

driving forces of the economy in the Tri-Cities since the early 1970s: (1) the DOE and its
contractors, which operate the Hanford Site; (2) Washington Public Power Supply System in its
construction and operation of nuclear power plants; and (3) agriculture , including a substantial
food -processing industry. With the exception of a minor amount of agricultural commodities sold
to local area consumers, the goods and services produced by these sectors are exported from the
Tri-Cities . In addition to direct employment and payrolls, these major sectors also support a
sizable number of jobs in the local economy through their procurement of equipment, supplies. and
business services.
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Table 4.3-5. Employment by industry in the region of influence, t 990 figures.

~
....

Vol

Industry

Adams

Benton

Columbia

Franklin

Grant

Morrow

Umatilla

Walla Walla

Wallowa

Yakima

Agriculture. Forestry.
Fisheries

1.660

4.487

105

4.265

4.496

558

1.366

1.890

54

20.342

Mining

0

3

0

89

0

0

0

0

0

641

Constructio n

0

2.809

27

628

0

33

592

0

86

2.427

Ma nufacturing

1036

12,310

563

1.599

2.76\

884

4.654

3.993

509

9.671

Transportation and
Public Utilities

236

884

58

1.212

657

153

899

593

85

2.824

Wholesale Trade

581

932

57

1,279

1.156

70

1,201

760

76

7.101

Retail Trade

720

7.865

120

2.669

3.109

195

3.845

3.639

360

12,537

Fi nance. Insurance.
Real Estate

120

1.342

24

358

432

50

590

718

82

1,904

Services

564

11.741

144

2.768

2.512

142

3.416

4.207

204

14,491

0
r

Government

1.132

7.843

461

3.091

4.618

697

4,823

4.308

739

11.368

3::

Not Elsewhere
Classified

93

0

0

0

1.110

8

63

438

23

0

<
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Table 4.3-6 . Payroll by industry in the region of influence, 1990 figures ($ milEun).

r

~

Industry
Agriculture. Forestry.
Fisheries

Adams

Benton

Columbia

14.7

39.1

1.5

Franklin

Grant

Walla Walla

Yakima

Morrow

Umatilla

173.4

9.0

18.7

39. 1

47.9

18.4

Wallowa

0.7

Mining

0

0.1

2.3

0

0

0.6

Construction

0

79.3

1.0

12.7

0

0

47.7

0.5

11.9

2. 1

19.6

443.9

7.3

28.4

59.7

94.0

205.2

19.3

88.2

11.2

3.9

21.2

1.2

25.1

14.4

14.1

62.5

6.2

19.6

1.6

10.7

19.2

1.1

26.3

21.4

15.6

118.4

1.5

22.2

1.2

Retail Trade

7. 1

89.0

1.0

31.5

30.3

36.1

143.0

1.5

41.8

3.8

Finance. Insurance. Real
Estate

2.0

22.0

0.4

6.2

7.fJ

13.2

39.0

1.0

10.6

1.0

Manufacturing
Transportation and Public
Utilities
Wholesale Trade

Services
Government
i'\OI

Eisewhe re Classified

0

0

0

0

6.3

286.4

1.2

42.2

28.0

66.6

226.1

1.3

48.3

2.2

21.2

225.8

7.7

70.8

107.0

100.0

258.0

12.8

103.6

13.7

1.6

0

0

29.7

8.6

0

0.2

1.0

0.3

0

57

I) The DOE and its Contractors (Hallford). Hanford continued to dominate the loca l employ-

man ufacturing activity, food processing is a natural extension of the farm sector. More than

ment picture with almost one-quarter of the total nonagricultural jobs in Benton and Franklin

20 food processors in Benton and Franklin counties produce such items as potato products.

counties in 1992 (16,100 of 67,300). Hanford's payroll has a widespread impact on the Tri-Cit ies

canned fruit s and vegetables, wine, and animal feed .

economy and state economy in addition to providing direct employment. These effects are
In addition to those three major employment sectors, three other components are readily

further described in Subsection 4.3.

identified as contributors to the economic base of the Tri-Cities economy. The first component,
2) Washington Public Power Supply System. Although activity related to nuclear power constr uc-

categorized as other major employers, includes five employers: (I) Siemens Nuclear Power

tion ceased with the completion of the WNP-2 reactor in 1983, the Washington Public Powe r

Corporation in north Richland, (2) Sandvik Special Metals in Kennewick, (3) Boise-Cascade in

Supply System continues to be a major employer in the Tri-Cities area. Headquarters personnel

Wallula, (4) Burlington Northern Railroad in Pasco, and (5) Iowa Beef Processors in Wallula.

based in Richland oversee the operation of one generating facility and perform a variety of

The second component is tourism . The Tri·Cities area has increased its convention business

functions related to two mothballed nuclear plants and one standby generating facility. In 1992,

substantially in recent years, in addition to business generated by travel for recreation. The final

the Washington Public Power Supply System headquarters employment was more than

component in the economic base relates to the local purchasing power generated from retired

1700 workers. Washington Public Power Supply System activities generated a payroll of approxi-

former employees. Government transfer payments in the form of pension benefits constitute a

mately $80.4 million in the Tri-Cities during the year.

significant proportion of total spendable income in the local economy.

3) Agriculture. In 1990 agricultural activities in Benton and Franklin counties were responsible

Retirees. Although the Benton and Franklin counties have a relatively young population (approx-

for approximately 12,900 jobs, or 17 percent of the area's total employment. According to the

imately 56 percent unde r the age of 35), 15,093 people over the age of 65 resided in Benton a nd

U.S. Department of Commerce's Regional Economic Information System, about 2200 people

Franklin counties in 1990. The portion of the total population that is 65 years and older is

were classified as farm proprietors in 1990. Farm proprietors' income from this same source

currently increasing at about the same rate as that being experienced by Washington State

was estimated at $121 million in the same year.

(3.0 percent and 3.1 percent, respectively). This segment of the population supports the local
economy on the basis of income received from government transfer payments and pensions,

Crop and livestock production in the bicounty area generated about 7600 wage and salary

private pension benefits, and prior individual savings.

jobs in 1990, as represented by the e mployees covered by unemployment insurance. The
presence of seasonal farm workers would increase the total number of farm workers. Apart

Although information on private pensions and savings is not available, data are available

from the difficulty of obtaining reliable information on the number of seasonal workers, how-

regarding the magnitude of government transfer payments. The U.S. Department of

ever, is the question of how much of these earnings are actually spent in the local area. For this

Commerce's Regional Economic Information System has estimated transfer payments by va rious

analysis, the assumption is that the impact of seasonal workers on the local economy is

programs at the county level. A summary of estimated major government pension benefits
received by the residents of Benton and Franklin counties in 1990 is shown in Table 4.3-7.

sufficiently small to be safely ignored.

About two-thirds of the Social Security payments go
The area 's farms and ranches generate a sizable number of jobs in supporting

II)

retired workers; the re mainder are for

disability and other payments. The historical importance of government activity in the Tri-Cities

activities, such as agricultural services (for example, application of pesticides and fertilizers or

area is reflected in the relative magnitude of the government e mployee pension benefits as

irrigat ion system developmellt) and sales of farm supplies and equipment. These activities,

compared to to tal payments.

often called agribusiness, are estimated to employ 900 people. Although formally classified as a
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Ta ble 4.3-7. Government re tire ment payments in Benton and Frankli n count ies in 1990
($ million).
Be nton
County

Source

Social Security (including survivors and disability)
Railroad retirement
Federal civil.ia ~ retire ment

10 1.5

Frankl in
Coun ty

Total

3 1.1

132.6

2.7

3.6

6.3

10.5

2.8

13.3

Table 4.3-8. Income measures by county, 1990 figures.
Coun ty

Total Personal Income
($ MiUion)

Ada ms
Be nton
Columbia

Per Capita Income ($)

Median Income ($)

16,897

25,750

1,960

17,332

33,800

72

17,927

2 1,000

23 1

Vetera ns pension and military retirement

14.7

3.1

17.8

Franklin

553

14,734

26,300

State and local employee retire ment

22.1

5.5

27.8

G rant

854

15,511

23,625

15 1. 7

46. 1

197.8

WaUa WaUa

799

16,438

25,400
24,525

Total

Yakima

2,920

15,374

4.3.2.3 Income Sources. Three measures of income are presented in Table 4.3-8:

Morrow

144

18,868

29,969

total personal income, per capita income, and median household income. Total personal income

UmatiUa

896

15,069

22,79 1

is comprised of aU forms of income received by the populace, including wages, dividends, and

WaUowa

12 1

17,461

2 1,300

other revenues. Per capita income is ro ughly equivalent to total personal income divided by the
num ber of people residing in the a rea. Media n household income is the point a t which half of
the households have an income greater than the median and half have less. The SOurce for total

4.3.2 .4 Hanford Emplo yment. In 1991 Hanford empioyment accounted directly for

24 percent of total nonagricultural employment in Benton a nd Franklin counti<!s and slightly

personal income and per capita income was the U.S. Department of Commerce's Regional

more tha n 0.6 percent of aU statewide nonagricultural jobs. In 199 1 Ha nford Site operations

Economic Information System; while median income figures for Washington State were

directly accounted for an estimated 42 percent of the payroU doUars earned in the area.

provided in Washington State Office of Financial Management ( 1992b), and by pe rsonal
communication with the Bureau of Census Housing Division for Oregon.

Previo us studies have revealed that each Hanford job supports about 1.2 additional jobs in
the local service sector of Be nton and Franklin counties (about 2.2 total jobs) a nd about

In 1990 the total personal income for the Washington was $92.2 billion; of this, the
counties wi thin the region of influe nce comprised 8.0 percent. Per capita income for

1.5 additional jobs in the state's service sector (about 2.5 total jobs) (Scott e t a!. 1987). Similarly, each doUar of Hanford income supports abo ut 2.1 doUars of total local incomes a nd abou t

Washington State was $18.777; aU Washington counties within the region of influence had per

2.4 doUars of total statewide incomes. Based on these multipliers, Hanford directly or indirectly

c"pita incomes less than that of the state. All W"shington counties within the region of

accounts for more tha n 40 pe rcent of aUjobs in Be nton and Franklin counties.

influence. with the exception of Benton. had median household incomes less than the state
media n of $32.725.

Based on employee reside nce records as of December 1993, 93 percent of the direct
employme nt of Hanford is comprised of residents of Benton and Franklin coun ties. Approxi-

In 1990 the total personal income fo r Oregon was $49.2 billion; of this, the counties wi th in

mately 8 1 percent of the employment is comprised of residents who reside in one of the

the region of influence comprised 2.4 percent. Per capita income for O regon State was $ 17. 182;

T ri·Cities. More than 42 percent of the employment is comprised of R.ichland residents,

two of the th ree affected Oregon counties had per capita incomes greater tha n that of the state

30 percent of Kennewick residents, and 9 percent of Pasco residents. West Richla nd, Benton

in 1990; however, only one of the three coun ties had a median household income greate r than
the sta te median of $27.250.

City. Prosser, and other areas in Be nton and Frankli n counties account fo r 12 percent of total
employment. Table 4.3·9 contai ns the estimated percent of Hanford employees residing in each
of the counties within the region of influence. The infor mation available did not include the
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Table 4.3-9. Hanford employee residences by county.

Tab le 4.3-10. Emergency services within the region of influence.

County

Perce nt of Employees
in R ~:; idence

Adams

0. 18%

Benton

84. 16%

Number of Fire

Commissioned Officers·
County Sheriff

County
Adams

Columbia

0.01 %

Franklin

9.07%

Benton
Columhia

Grant

0.25%

Franklin

WaUa WaUa

0.21 %

Vakima

Districts -

Unincorporated

16 + Sheriff
40

Number of HospitalS

7

2

6

3

10 + Sheriff

Grant

18 + Sheriff
35 + Sheriff

Walla Walla

16 + Sheriff

5.08%

Vakima

63

12

Morrow

0.01 %

M orrow

70

NA

NA

Umatilla

0.01 %

UmatiIJa
Wallowa

12

NA

5

NA

NA
NA

residences of DOE employees nor those of ICF Kaiser Hanford Company or the Bechtel
Hanford Company. It was assumed that the distribution of these employees would be similar to
the distribution of the other Hanford contractors.

12
2

Police protection in Benton and Franklin counties is provided by the Be nton and Franklin
County sheriffs departments, local municipal police departments, and the Washington State
Patrol Division headquartered in Kennewick. Table 4.3-11 shows the number of commissioned
officers a nd patrol cars in each department in June 1992.

Hanford and contractors spent nearly $298 million, or 45.6 percent of total procurements
of $653 million, initiaIJy through Washington ftrms in 1993. About 18 percent of Hanford orders
were filled by Tri-Cities firms.

Table 4.3-11 . Police pe rsonnel in the Tri-Cities
Area

In

1992.

Commissioned Officers

Patrol Cars
32

Kennewick Municipal

58

purchases in fiscal year 1988 (the most recent year available). Estimates show that Hanford

Pasco Municipal

39

II

employees paid $27.0 million in state sales tax, use taxes, and other taxes and fees in fiscal year

Rich land Municipal

44

35

Hanford contractors paid a total of $10.9 million in state taxes on operations and

9

1988. In addition, Hanford paid $0.9 million to local government in Benton, Franklin, and

West Richland Municipal

Vakima counties in local taxes and fees (Scott et a1. 1989).

County Sheriff. Benton County

43

50

County Sheriff. Fra nklin County

23

23

4.3.3 Emergency Services
Source: Personal communication with each department office. January 1993.
This subsection conta ins information on the law enforcement, fire protection, and health
services provided by each county within the region of influence. These figures are presented in
Table 4.3-10, with more deta iled information about the Tri-Cities area. Law enforcement
figures were obtained from each county sheriffs office in December 1993. Data on fire
protect ion and health care facilities were provided by the Office of the Secretary of State (1993).
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The Kennewick. Richland. a nd Pasco municipal departments maintain the largest starrs or

capacity. Their 5754 annual admissions represent more than 42 percent of the Tri-Cities
market. Non-Medicare/Medicaid patients accounted ror 86 percent. or 4982 of their annual

commissioned orricers wi th 53. 44. and 38. respectively.

adm issions. An average stay of 3.8 days per admission was reported ror 1991.
The Hanrord Fire Department. composed or 126 rirerighters. is tra ined to dispose of
haza rdous waste and to right chemical fires. During the 24-hou r duty period, rive ri rerighters

Kennewick General Hospital maintains a 45.5 percent occupancy rate of its 71 beds with

cover the 1100 Area. seven protect the 300 Area, seven wa tch the 200-East and 200-West Areas.

3619 an nual ad missions. Non-Medicare/Medicaid patients in 1991 represented 58 percent of its

six are responsible ror the 100 Areas. and six cover the 400 Area, which includes the WPPSS

total ad missions. An average stay of 3.5 days per ad mission was reported.

area . To perfor m their responsibilities. each station has access to a Hazardo us Material

Response Vehicle that is equipped with chemical rire extinguishing equipment, an attack truck
that carries roam and Purple-K dry chemical, a mobile air truck that provides air ror gasmasks.

Our Lady of Lourdes Health Center, located in Pasco, reported an occupancy rate of 36.5
percent; however, a significant amount of outpatient care is performed there. The outpatient

and a transport tanker that supplies water to six brush-rire trucks. The Hanford Fire Patrol

income serves as a primary source of income for the center. In 1990 Our Lady of Lourdes had

owns five ambulances and maintains contact with local hospitals.

3328 ad missions, of which 52 percent were non-Medicare/Medicaid patients. The institution
reported a n average admission stay of 5.33 days.

Table 4.3- 12 indicates the number or rire-righting personnel. both paid and unpaid, on the
starrs or rire districts in the Tri-Cities area.

4_3_4 Infrastructure

The Tri-Cities area is served by three hospitals: Kadlec Hospital, Kennewick General.

4 .3_4_1 Housing. This section provides information on the total number of housing

and Our Lady or Lourdes. In addition. the Carondelet Psychiatric Care Center is located in

units, the numbe r of occupied housing units, and a breakdown of total housing units by type ror

Richland. Kadlec Hospital. located in Richland, has 136 beds and runctions at 39.5 percent

each of the counties within the region of influence. AdditionaUy, specitic information on the

Table 4.3-12. Fire protecti on in the Tri·Cities in 1992' .

Washington State Office of Financial Management ( 1992b). The data source for the Oregon

housing market in the Tri-Cities is included. The data source for Washington counties was the

Station

Fire-Fighting
Personnel

counties was by personal communication with the Population Research Center at Portland State
Total

City of Kennewick

Washington State Office of Financial Management. Table 4.3-13 summarizes housing
information by coun ty for 19')0 for the region of influence.

Service Area

Kennewick

54

0

54

Pasco

30

0

30

City of Pasco

Richla nd

50

0

50

City of Richla nd

BC RFDb I

6

120

126

Kennewick Area

BCRFD 2
BCRFD 4

4

University. The data source for the Tri-Cities was by personal communication with the

Volunteers

31

32

Benton City

30

34

West Richland

In 1993 nearly 94 percent of aU housing (of 40,344 total units) in the Tri-Cities was
occupied. Single-unit housing, which represents nearly 58 percent of the total units, had a
97 percent occupancy rate throughout the Tri-Cities. Multiple-unit housing, defined as housing
with two or more units, had an occupancy rate of nearly 94 percent. Pasco had the lowest
occupancy rate, 92 percent, in aU categories of housing; foUowed by Ke nnewick, 95 percent. and

a. Source: Personal com municat ion with each depa rtment office. January 1993.
h. BCRFD = Benton County Rural Fire Depa rtment.
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The Tri·Cities are also served by a large number of private agencies and voluntary human

Table 4.3-13. Housing by county in 1990.
County

Total

Occupied

Vacancy
Rate

Adams
Benton
Columbia
Franklin
Grant
WaUa Wa Ua
Ya kima
Morrow
Uma tilla
WaUowa

5,263
44,877
2,046
13,664
22,809
19,029
70,852
3,412
24,333
3,755

4,586
42,227
1,582
12,196
19,745
17,623
65,985
2,803
22,020
2,796

12.9%
5.9%
22.7%
10.7%
13.4%
7.4%
6.9%
17.8%
9.5%
25.5 %

Single
Family

Multiple
Family

Mobile
Homes

3,324
28,193
1,597
7,782
13,692
13,071
49,356
1,828
15,178
2,935

643
10,592
146
3,289
2,661
3,837
11 ,174
366
4,503
235

1,296
6,092
303
2,593
6,456
2, 121
10,322
1, 192
4,418
554

services organizations. The Un ited Way. an umbrella fu nd·raising organization. incorporates
25 participating agencies offering more tha n 50 programs (United Way 1992).

4 .3 .4 .3 Government. This subsection presents the county government revenues by

source (Table 4.3·15) and expenditu res by functio n (Table 4.3·16) for each of the counties within
the region of influence. The data were taken from U.S. Department of Commerce (1990. 1993).
All county data, with the exception of Benton and Yakima counties. a re from 1986·87. Benton
and Yakima county data are from 1990·91. These years were the most recent ones available.

4 ,3 .4.4 Public Education. This subsection provides information on the educational

sectors of each of the counties. The source for school district informatio n. secondary education.
the lowest occupancy ra te, 90 percent. In 1989 mobile homes had the highest occupancy rate,

and enroUment data for the Washington counties was the Office of the Secretary of State

93 percent. Table 4.3-14 shows a detailed listing of total units and occupancy rate by type in the

( 1993); student / teacher ratios were provided by personal communication with the school

Tri·Cities.

districts. Information on the O regon counties was provided by personal communication with the
individual counties. Table 4.3·17 summa rizes information on the number of school districts.

4 .3.4 .2 Human Services. The Tri·Cities offer a broad range of social services. State

enrollment, amI post·secondary institutions wit hin the region of influence.

human service offices in the Tri·Cities include the Job Services office of the Employment
Security Department; Food Stamp offices; the Division of Developmental Disabilities; Financial
and Medical Assistance; the Child Protective Service; emergency medical service; a senior

In the Tri·Cities area. Benton County primary and secondary education is served by

SIX

school districts with an enroUment of 24,876 students in 1992. The student / teacher ratio in the

companion program; and vocational rehabilitation.

Finley School District i. 20,2; in Kennewick. 24.0; in Kia na Benton·City. 25 .0; in Prosser. 22.0
for elementary and 25.0 for secondary; and in Richland. 23.0. The Paterson School District had

Table 4.3-14. Total units and occupancy ra tes (1993 estimates)'.

All
Units

City
Richla nd
Pasco
Kennewick
Tri·Cities

14,388
7,846
18, 110
40,344

Rate
96
92
95
94

Single
Units
9,92 1
3,679
9,824
23,424

Ra te
98
96
97
97

MUltiple
Units
3,827
2,982
5,944
12,753

.

a n enroUme nt of 54 students in 1992. therefore a student/ teacher ra tio was not sought.
Rate

Mobile
Homes

Rate

Currently. the Kennewick. Richland. a nd Kiona·Be nton City school districts are operating at or
near capacity; Kennewick is working to alleviate some of the overcrowded conditions by

95
91
96
94

640
1,016
1,942
3,598

88
86
97
90

constructing one new middle school and two new elementary schools. In addition. plans are

.

unde r way for the construction of a new high school. scheduled to open in 1997. Kion,,,BenlOn
City is in the process of building add itions at elementary and middle schools. The cou nty also
has a post·secondary institution located in Richland. a branch campus of Washington State

a. Source: . Personal communication, Office of Fina ncial Management, State of Washington,
Forecast

Unive rsity. WS U Tri·Cities. Enrollment for spring 1992 was 98 1 students.

DIVISIOn .

Fra nklin County primary and secondary education is served by four school districts wit h
a n enrollment of 8.756 students in 1992 and a student / teacher ratio of 7.0 in Kahlotus: 17.6 in
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Table 4.3-15. Rc::venu e sou rces hy county FY 1986-87 ($ thousand).
Intergovernmenta l
revenue

General revenue from
own sources

Total

Total

From federal
government

From state
government

Total

Taxes

6,690

6,690

736

2,844

3,047

2,304

24,079

24,079

43

7,879

14,064

10,762

Columbia

2,560

2,560

78

1,388

1,040

720

Franklin

6,279

6,279

361

109

5,604

4,859

Grant

17,525

17,525

670

7,661

8,932

6,195

11,698

11 ,698

426

3,763

7,008

5,658

45,310

45,289

392

14,066

28,864

20,429

5,901

5,901

104

1,045

4,724

3,338

Umatilla

9,594

9,594

204

4,971

4,414

3,087

Wallowa

6,215

6,215

60

2,180

3,881

905

County
Adams
Benton

b

Walla Walla
Ya kima

b

Morrow

tI.

Dash indicates that the information was not available.

h. FY 1990-91 .

Utility, liquor
store, and
employee
retirement
revenue

21

or<
c:
~

r.1

Table 4.3-16. Expenditures by county FY \986-87 ($ thousand).
General Expenditures

Major Functions

Capital
County Total Total Outlay Education Welfare

~

N

0-

Adams

6431

Bentonb

22027 22027

6431

IOJ7

13

890

9

Hospitals

-•

Ilealth

Highways

Police
protection

Correction

atural resources
and parks and
recreation

286

3591

475

297

138

3626

3190

1956

4129

216

Sewage and Interest on
sanitation general debt
184

22
223

Columbia 2647

2647

255

230

1106

265

13

306

Franklin

8230

8230

608

461

2883

855

811

177

Grant

17589 17589

3314

1403

6617

1443

1180

704

412

Walla
Walla

11 8 ,

432

1068

4624

1257

610

766

143

989

9761

4188

7382

2971

4 15

487

98

237
67

9

11879

Yakima b 45967 45937
6382

4

10059

187

Morrow

6382

411

216

, mat ilia

10707 10707

188

1095

Wallowa

6139

362

339

6139

349
794

1113
2070

325

1860

270

2562

2337

540

561

346

143

1181

208

111

198

a. Dash indicates that the information was not available.
b. FY 1990-91.

&;q

Uti lity. liquor store. and
employee retirement
expenditure

84
49
22

30

Table 4.3-17. Educatio nal services by co unty in 1992.

Co unty

ca tegories: pre histor ic and historic archaeo logical reso urces. archit ectural reso urceS. anu
Post-Seco nd ary

Number of School
Distr icts

Enrollmen t ( 1992)

Education Institutions

tradi ti ona l cu ltural reso urces. Significa nt cultural resources are those that a re digihle

Of

pOlen tia liy eligihle to the Na ti onal Register of Historic Places (36 CFR (,0.4) .
3.437
24,876

0
I

2

750
8,756

0

Grant
Walla Walla

10
7

13,232
8,324

I
3

Yakima
Morrow

15

42,227
2,008'

0

Umatilla
Wallowa

12
3

12,500'
1,408'

I
0

A da ms
Bento n

6

Columbia
Franklin

Cons ult ation is requireu to identi fy traditi onal cultural properties th at .m::~ important to
maintaining the cultural heri tage of Na tive Amer ica n Tribes. Under th e Treaties of 11l55. lan ds
ultim ately occ upi ed by the Hanfo rd Site were ceded to the United States hy th e co nfedera ted
tribes a nd bands o f th e Yakama Indian Nation. and Confederat ed Trihes of th e U matill a Indi an
Reserva ti on. Under th e trea ty. th e Na ti ve American Tribes acquired th e rights to perform
certai n activities on ope n unclaimed lands. including th e rights to hunt. fish. gather foods '10<1
medicines. and pasture livestock o n these lands. By th e time the Hanfo rd Site was established.
little open unclaimed land remain ed. The Wanapum Band and the J osep h Band of the Nez

a. 1993 enrollment

Perce Tribes never signed a trea ty but have cultural ties to th ese lands.

North Franklin; and 18. 1 in Pasco. The Star Schoo l District had an enrollment of 15 students in

The met hodology for identifying. evaluating. and mitigat ing impacts to cultural resources

1992; therefore, a student/ teacher ratio was not sought. Currently, Pasco School District is

is defi ned by fede ral laws a nd regulatio ns including the National Histo ri c Preserva tio n Act

operating at or near capacity; however, the district is in th e process of remodeling an old high

(N HPA ). th e Archaeological Resource Protecti on Act (A RPA). the Native Ameri can Graves

sc hoo l. The co unty also has a post-secondary institution of learning in Pasco, Columbia Basin

Protectio n and Repatr iation Act (NAGPRA) and th e American Native America n Religious

Commun ity College. Enrollment for 1992 was 6424 st udents.

Freedom Act (A IRFA). A project affects a significant resource when it alte rs th e prope rty 's
characte ristics. including releva nt fea tures of its e nvironm e r. t or use, that qu alify it as significant

4.4 Cultural Resources

accord ing to the Natio nal Register criteri a. These effects may include those listed in
36 C FR 800.9. Impacts to traditional Na tive American properties can he dete rmin ed o nly

The Hanfo rd Site is known to be rich in cultural resources. It contains numerous, well-

through consult ati on with th e affected Na tive A merican groups.

preserved a rchaeo logical sites representing both the prehisto ric and historical periods and is still
though t of as a homela nd by many Native American people. A total of 248 known si tes are pre-

4.4.1 Prehistoric Archaeological Resou rces

historic, 202 are historic, and 14 sites co ntain both prehisto ric a nd historic components. Management of H anford 's cultural resou rces follows the Hanfo rd Cultural Resources Management
Plan (Chatte rs 1989) and is conducted by the Hanfo rd Cultural Resources Laboratory of Pacific

Peo ple have inh abited th e Middle Columbia Rive r region s ince the end of the glac ia l
period. More tha n 10,000 years of prehistoric hum an Clctivity in this largely ariu enviro nm t! nl

No rthwest Labo ratory (PNL). The Plan contains contingency guidelines for handling the

have left extensive archaeologica l deposits along th e rive r shores ( Leo nh ardy and Ri ce 1970:

discovery of previo usly unknown cult ura l resources enco untered d uring construction activities.

G ree ngo 1982; C hatte rs 1989). Well-wa tered areas inland from the river show evidence o f
co nce ntrated human activity (Chatters 19H2. 1989; Daugherty 1952: G reene 1975: Leo nh ardy

C ultural reso urces are defined as any prehisto ric or historic district, site, building,

and Rice 1970; Rice 1980). and recent surveys indicate extensive. although dispersed. use of arid

structure, or object considered to be impo rt an t to a culture, subcul ture, or community for

lowlands for hun ti ng. Graves are co mmon in va ri o us se ttings. and spirit quest monum en ts are

scientific, traditional, religious or any other reason. These are usually divided into three major

still to be found on hi gh. rocky summits of th e mo unt ai ns and buttes ( Rice 1968a). Througho ut
most of the region. hydroelec tric development. agricul tural activities, and domt!stic and inuustrial
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construction have: destroyed or covered th e maj ori ty of th ese dc.!posits. Am ateur arti fact
collectors have had an immeasurable impact on what remains. Within th e H anford Site. fro m

which the pu blic is restricted. a rchaeological deposits found in the Ha nford Reac h of th"

Table 4.4-\' Archaeologica l districts and historic properties on the Hanford Site listed on the
National Register of Historic Places (with the ir archaeological sites).
Site(s) Included

District/ Property Name

Columbia Rive r and on adjacent pl atea us and mountain s have been spared somt: of th e distur-

Wooded Island A D.'

45BNI 07 through 45 BNI 12. 45BNI 68

bances th at have befallen Ol her sites. Th e Hanford Site is thu s a de fac to rese:rve;: of arch aeo-

Savage Isla nd A.D.

45BNI 16 through 45BNI 19. 45FR257 through 45FR262

10gic',1 in fo rmation of th e kind and qua lity that has been lost elsewhe re in the r"gion.

Hanford Island Site

45BNI21

Currently 248 prehistoric archaeologica l sites a re recorded in the files of the Hanfo rd

Hanford North AD.

45BNI24 through 45BN134. 45BNI78

Locke Island AD.

45BNI 37 through 45BN140. 45BN176. 45GR302 through 45GR305

C ultural Resources Laboratory. Of 48 sites induded on the Na tional Register of Historic Places

Ryegrass A.D.

45BN 149 through 45BN 157

(Na tiona l Registe r). two are single sites. Hanford Island Site (45BN 12 1) and Paris Site

Paris Site

45G R3 17

(45GR] 17 ). and the rem a inder are located in seven archaeologica l districts (Table 4.4- I). In

Rattlesnake Springs AD.

45BN170, 45BNI71

Snively Canyon AD.

45BNI72, 45BNI73

100-B Reactor

NAb

addit io n. a draft request for Determination of Eligibility has heen prepa red fo r one traditional
cultural property district (Gable Mo unta in / Gable Butte). Three other sites. Vernit a Bridge
(45BN90) a nd Tsul im (45BN41 2). and 45BN163. are considered eligi ble for the National
Registe r. Archaeologica l sites include re mains of numerous pitho use villages, va rio us types of
open ca mpsites. a nd cemeteries along the river ba nks (Rice 1968a. 1980). spirit quest monu-

a. AD. indicates archaeologieai district (this table).
b. Not appl icable.

ments (rock ca irns). hunting camps. ga me drive complexes. and quarries in mounta ins and rocky
bluffs ( Rice 1968b). hunting/ kill f ites in lowland stabilized dun es, and smaU temporary camps
nea r perenn ia l sources of wa te r located away from the rive r ( Rice 1968b).

on either side of the river (Rice 1980), but this is changing because of a Hanford Cultural
Resources Laboratory effort to inventory a 10 percent sample of the site by 1994. During his
reconnaissance of the Hanford Site in 1968, Rice inspected portions of Gable Mounta in, Gable

Many recorde d sites were fo und during four archaeological reconnaissa nce projects

Butte, Snively Canyon, Rattlesnake Mountain, and Rattlesnake Springs but gave little atte ntion

cond ucted between 1926 and 1968 (Krieger 1928; Drucker 1948; Rice 1968a. 1968b). Systematic

to other areas (Rice 1968b). He also inspected additional portions of Gable Mountain and part

a rchaeological surveys cond ucted from the middle 1980s thro ugh 1993 are responsihle for the

of Gable Butte in the late 1980s (Rice 1987). Other reconna issance of the Basalt Waste

re ma inder (e.g.. Chatters 1989: Chatters and Cadoret 1990; Chatters a nd Gard 1992; Chatters

Isolation Project Reference Repository Location (RRL) (Rice 1984) included a proposed land

et al. 1990. 199 1. 1992. 199.1 ). Little excavation has been conducted at a ny of the sites, a nd the

exchange in T22N. R27E. Section 33 (Rice 198 1). and three narrow tra nsportation and utility

M id-Colu mhia Archaeological Society ha s done most of that wo rk. They have conducted minor

corridors ( Ertec Northwest, Inc. 1982; Morgan 1981 ; Smith et al. 1977). The 100 Areas we re

test excavations at seve ral sites on the river banks and isla nds ( Rice 1980) and a large r sca le test

surveyed in 199 1 th ro ugh 1993, revealing a large number of new archaeological sites (Chatters

at site 45BNI57 (De n Beste and Den Beste 1976). The University of Ida ho also excavated a

et al. 1992; Wright 1993). To date only about 6 percent of the Ha nford Site has been surveyed.

portion of site 45BNI79 ( Ri ce 1980) and collaborated with the Mid-Columbia Archaeologica l

C ultural resource reviews are conducted when proj ects are proposed for areas that have not

Society nn its other work. Test "xcavations have heen conducted by the Hanford Cultural

been previously reviewed; about 100 to 120 reviews we re conducted a nnually thro ugh 199 1: this

Reso urce, Lahora tory at the Wahlu ke (45G R306). Vernit a Bridge (45 BI\ 1 0). a nd Tsul im

figure rose to more than 400 reviews during 1993.

(45 BN412 ) sites a nd at 45 BN446. 45BN423. 45 BN 163, 45 BN432. and 45BN433; res ults support
assessments of significance for th ose sites. M ost of th e archaeological survey and reconnaissa nce ac tivity has concentrated on islands and ·on a st rip of land less th an 400 meters wide
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4.4.2 Native American Cultural Resources
East White Bluffs ferry landing. th e White Bluffs road. th e o ld Ha nford High School. a nd the
In prehistoric and early historic times, the Hanford Reach of th e Columbia River was
heavily populated by Native Americans of various tribal affiliations. The Wa napum and th e
Chamnapum band of the Yakama tribe dwelt along the Columbia River from sou th of Rich la nd
upstream to Vantaye (Relander 1956; Spier 1936). Some of the ir descendants still live nearby at
Priest Rapids, a nd others have been incorporated into the Yakama and Umatilla reservations.
Palus people, who lived on the lower Snake River, joined the Wanapum and C hamnapum to fish
th e Hanford Reach of the Col umbi a River and so me inhabited th e rive r's east bank (Relande r
1956; T rafzer a nd Sche uerman 1986). Walla Walla and Umatilla people also m ade periodic
visits to fish in the a rea. These people retain traditional secular and re ligious ties to th e region,

Cubhlesto ne Ware house at Riverlalld (Rice 19KO). Archaeological sites incl uding the East
\Vhitt> Bluffs townsit e and associated fe rry landings and a n asso rtm t!nt of trash scatters. homesteads. co rrals. an d dumps ha ve heen recorded by th e Hanford C ultural Reso urces Lahoratory

s ince 19H7. Ertec Northwest. Inc.

W ilS

respo nsible for minor test excavC:it io ns at some of th e

historic sites. includi ng the Ha nfo rd townsitt: loca lity. In aduition to th e recorded sites.
numerous unrt:co rded site a reas o f gold mine tailings a long the rjver hank amJ the re ma ins of
ho mesteads. farm fie lds. ra nch es. a nd a ba ndo ned A rmy insta lla tio ns are sca tt e red ove r the
e ntire Ha nford S ite. Of these historic sites. o ne is included in th e Na tio nal Registe r as an
historic site. and 56 are listed as a rcheologica l sites.

and many, young and old alike, have knowledge of the ceremonies a nd lifeways of their aborigina l culture. The Washane, or Seven Drums religion, which has ancient roots a nd had its sta rt
on what is now the Hanford Site, is still practiced by many people on the Yakama, Umatilla,
Wa rm Springs, a nd Nez Perce reservations. Native plant and animal foods, some of which can
be fou nd on the Hanford Site, are used in the ceremonies performed by sect members.

Mo re recent loca t ions are th e defense reactors a nd assoc iated ma te ri a ls processing
facilities th a t now domina te the site. The first reactors ( B, D. and F ) were co nst ructed in 1943
as part of th e Manha tt an Projec t. Plutonium fo r th e first atom ic explosio n and th e bomb th a t
dest royed Nagasak i to e nd Wo rld Wa r 11 was produced in the B Reactor. Additional reactors
and processing facilities were co nstru cted afte r Wo rld Wa r 11 during th e Cold War. A ll reactor
co ntainm e nt bu ildings still sta nd. although many a ncilla ry st ructures have bee n rem oved . T he

4.4.3 Historic Archaeological Resources

B Reacto r has been listed on th e National Registe r of Historic Places. A historic co ntext fo r
The first Euro-Americans who ca me to this region were Lewis and Clark, who traveled
along the Columbia and Snake rivers during their 1803-1806 exploration of the Louisiana
Territory. They were followed by fur trappers, who a lso passed through on the ir way to more

Manhattan Project fac ilities has heen crea ted as part o f a Multiple Prope rty Docume nt. Un t il a
fu ll evalua ti o n of a ll Manhattan Project huildings and fac ilities has been completed. statemen ts
about Na t iona l Register sta tus ca nn ot be made.

prod uctive lands upriver and downstream a nd across th e Columbia Basin. It was not until th e
1860s th a t merchants set up stores, a freight depot, and the White Bluffs Ferry on the Ha nford

4.4.4 200 Areas

Reach. C hinese miners began to work the gravel ba rs for gold. Cattle ranches ope ned in the
1880s a nd farmers soon followed. Several small, thriving town s, including Hanford, White
Bluffs, and Ringold, grew up along the riverbanks in the early 20th century. Other ferri es were
established at Wa hlu ke a nd Richmond. The towns and nearly all othe r struct ures were razed
afte r the U.S. Gove rnment acq uired th e la nd for the Hanford Nuclear Reservation in the ea rly

A n arc haeo logica l survey has been conducted of a ll und eveloped po rtio ns of th e 200-East
A rea. and a 50 perce nt random sa mple has been conducted of undeve loped portions o f the
200-West Area. The old Whit e Bluffs freight road (see Rice 19X4) crosses d iago na lly through
the 200·West Art:a. The road. fo rm erly a Native American trail. has been in co nti nuo us use
since a ntiquity and has played a rol e in Euro·Ame rica n imm igra tio n. deve lop me nt. agriculture.

1940s (C ha tters 1989; Ertec Northwest, Inc. 198 1; Rice 1980).

and Ha nfo rd Site operations. The road has been found to be el igible for listin g o n th e Na tio nal
Historic archaeological sites totaling 202 and II ot he r historic localities have been
recorded by the Hanford C ultura l Reso urces Laboratory o n the Hanford Site. Localities include
the Allard Pumping Plant a t Coyote Rapids, the Hanford Irrigation Ditch, the Ha nford tewnsite,

Registe r of H istori c Places. A 100-m ease ment has been created to protect the road from
uncontrolled disturham.:e. Histo ric bu ildings th a t have not bee n evaluated for National Register
e ligibi lity occur in both the 200-East and 200-West Areas.

Wahluke Ferry, the White Bluffs townsi te, the Richmond Ferry, Arrowsmith townsite, a cabi n at
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4.5 Aesthetic and Scenic Resources

Fluvial and lacustrine processes associated with the ancestral Colum bia River syste m.
including th t: ancestral Snake and Ya kima rive rs. have been active since th e late Miocene.

The land in the vic inity of the Hanfo rd Site is ge nerall y l1at wi th li nle relief. Ran lcsnakc

Deposits of these rive rs and lakes a re represented by the Rin gold Form ation and indica te that

Mountain . risi ng 10 1060 ll1~ le rs (341'1 feel) above Illean sea leve l. forms the wes tern boundary or

deposition was allllost conti nuo us fro m abo ut 10.5 million years before present un til abo ut

tllC sitc. Gable Moulllain and Gable Bune are the highest land fo rms within tile site . The vicw

3.9 million years before present (DOE 1988). At some time befo re 900.000 years ago. a major

towa rd Ran lesnake Mountain is visuall y pleasing. especiall y in the springtime when wildll owers

change in regional base level resulted in flu vial incision of as much as 150 mete rs (500 feet).

are in bloom. Large ro ll ing hi ll s are located

10

the west and fa r nonh . The Columb ia River.

fl ow ing across the northern part of th e sire and form ing llle eas tern houndary. is genera lly
considered scenic. wi th its l:ontrasti ng blue against a bac kground of hrow l1 basa lt k rocks and

The post· Ringold e rosional surface was part iaUy filled with loca lly derived aUuvium and fluvi al
sedimen t before a nd possibly between periods of Pleistocene flooding. However, in most a reas
of the Columb ia Bas in subprovince, the record of Pleistoce ne fluvial activity was destroyed by
cataclysmic flooding. Loess (buff·colored silt) occurs in sheets that mantle much of the upland

desen sagebrush. The Wh ite Bluffs. stee p whitish-brown bluffs adjac-'ntto the Columbia Ri ver
areas of the Colum bia Bas in subprovince.
and above the nonhern bounda ry of the ri ver in this region. are a striki ng feat ure of tlw landscape .
Quate rnary" volcanism has been limited to the extre me western margin of the Columbia
The potential projec t site (under all alternatives except No Action) is charac teri zed by large
sagebrush. desen grasses. and shrubs. Immediate views to the east inc lude the 200·East Area

Basin subprovince a nd is associated with the Cascade Range Province. Airfa U tephra" from at
least three Cascade volcanoes has blanketed the cent ral Colum bia Plateau since the late

faci lities . views in the d istant nonh area of reaClO rs. Somewhat hidden by a slight rise in the land

Pleistoce ne. This tephra includes material from several eru ptions of Mount SI. Helens before

are stac ks for facili ties in 200-West Area to the wes t of the project site . To the south southwes t arc

the May 1980 eruption. Other volca noes have erupted less frequently; two closely spaced

gravel borrow pit and radio and me teorological lOwers. Th is site is of low sensi ti vity in terms of

eruptio ns from Glacier Peak abo ut 11,200 years ago, a nd the e ru ption of Mount Maza ma about

aes th etic.: and scenic resources.

6,600 years ago. Ge neraUy tephra layers have not exceeded more than a few centi meters in
thickness. with the exception of the Mo unt Mazama eruption when as much as 10 cent imeters
(3.9 inches) of tephra feU over easte rn Washington ( DOE 1988).

4.6 Geology
This sectio n summari zes the geologic seuing . including potential geologic haza rds. at the
I'lanford Site . Phys iog raphy. struc ture. so ils. and se ismic ity and volcanic haza rds arc brie ll y
discussed . A more de tailed discussion of these subjects can be found in Cushing (1 992 ).

4.6.1 General Geology

4 .6. 7. 7 Physiography. The Hanford Site, located wit hin the Pasco Basin of the
Colum bia Plateau. is defined generaUy by a thick accumulation of basaltic lava flows that exte nd
laterally from centra l Washington eastwa rd into Ida ho and southwa rd into Oregon (Tallma n
et al. 1979).

The Hanford Site overlies the structu ral low point of the Pasco Basin nea r the conflu ence
of the Ya kima and Columbia rivers. The bo unda ries of the Pasco Bas in are defin ed by

The Hanford Site lies with in the Columbia Intermontane phys iographic prov ince . bordered
on the non h and east by the Rocky Mountains and on the wes t by the Cascade Range. The

anticlinal structures of basalt ic rock. These structures are the Sadd le Mounta ins to the north;
the Umpta nu m Ridge, Yakim a Ridge, a nd Rattlesnake Hills to the west; a nd the Rattlesna ke

domi nant geologic charac teristics of the Hanford Si le have resulted from basaltic volcanism and
ancient ca tas trophic flooding .

a. Quate rn ary· A geologic pe ri od beginning approximately two m illion years ago and exte ndi ng
to the present.
b. Tephra · A coUective te rm for all clastic mater ia ls ejected from a volcano and transported
through the a ir.
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Hills and a series of doubly plunging antielines mergin g with the Horse Heaven Hills to the
south . The terrain within the Pasco Basi n is relatively fl at. Its surface fea tures were formed by

Period

Epoch
Holocene

catastrophic fl oods and have undergone little modification since. with the exception of more

AgeSurficial deposits

O.Ot

recent ly formed sand dunes (DOE 1986a).

"
"

C:-

The e1evat:0r.s of the all uvial plain that covers much of the site vary from 105 meters
(345 feet) above mea n sea level in the southeast corner to 245 meters (803 feet) in the northwest. The 200-Area plateau in the central part of the site va ries in elevation from 190 to

Hanford formation

C

<II
C

<.J

Q;

*

"iO
0

'0;

"

a::

245 meters (623 to 803 feet).
Ql

c

Early ·Palouse· soil
Plio-Pleistocene unit

-2
3.9 -

Ql
<.J

The majo r geologic units of the Hanford Site are (in ascending order): subbasal! rocks

."1

a::

(inferred to be sedimentary and volcanoelastic rocks). the Columbia Rive r Basalt Group with

Upper Ringold
5.3 5.4

interca lated sediments of the EUensburg formation . the Ringold formation. the Plio-Pleistocene
unit. a nd the Ha nford forma tion. Loca lly. sand and silt exist as surface mate rial. A generalized
stratigraphic column is shown in Figure 4.3.

Middle Ringold
Ql

C

Ql

Knowledge of the subbasal! rocks is limited to studies of exposures along the margin of
the Columbia Plateau and to a few deep boreholes drilled in the interior of the plateau

Cl

o

Ql

Ql

C

g

Z

::E

(DOE 1988). No subbasalt rocks are exposed within the central interior of the Columbia
Plateau. ineluding the Pasco Basin . Inte rpretation of data from weUs drilled in the 1980s by

Lower Ringold

Shell Oil Company in the northweste rn Columbia Plateau indicates that in the central part of
the Columbia Plateau the Colun.bia Rive r Basalt Group is underlain predominantly by Tertiary

-8 -

Basal Ringold

continental sediments (CampbeU 1989).

10.5 -

Columbia Rive r Basalt
The Hanford formation lies on the eroded surface of the Plio-Pleistocene unit, on the

• In millions of years

Ringold formation. or 10caUy on the basalt bedrock. The Hanford formation consists of
catastroph ic flood sedime nts that were deposited when ice dams in western Montana a nd

59402040.2
AFFC-F-3.H

northern Idaho were breached and massive volumes of wate r spilled abruptly across eastern and
central Washington. The floods scoured the la nd surface, 10caUy e roding the Ringold formation .
the basa lts. and sedimentary interbeds. leaving a network of buried channels crossing the Pasco

Figure 4-3 _ A generalized stratigraphic column of the majo r geologic un its of the Hanfo rd Site.

Basin (Tallma n et al. 1979). Thick sequences of sediments were deposited by several episodes
of flooding with the last major fl ood sequence dated at about 13.000 years before the present
(Mye rs et al. 1979).

BEST COpy AVAILABLE
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4 .6. 1.2 Structure. The Columbia Plateau is tectonically a part of the No rth Ameri ca n

extending from Wall ula Gap to the Blue Mount a ins. Evidence for quatern ary deformation has

continental pl ate, and is separated from the Pac ific and Juan de Fuca oceanic plates to the west

been reported for 14 localities in or directly associated with the Cle Elum-Wallula dist urbed

by the Cascade Range, Puget-Willamette Lowland, and Coast Range geologic provinces. It is

zo ne. However. no evidence has been reported northwest of the Finley Quarry location

bounded on the north by the O kanogan Highlands. on the east by the North ern Rocky Moun-

( DOE 1988), abo ut 60 kilometers (36 miles) southeast of the approximate center of the Ha nfo rd

ta ins and Ida ho Batholi th, a nd on the south by the High Lava pla ins and Snake Rive r plai n.

Site.

The tectonic history of the Columbia Plateau has included the eruption of the continental fl ood
basalts of the Columbia River Basalt Group d uri ng the period of about 17 to 6 million yea rs
before present, as well as volcanic activity in the Cascade Range to the west ( DO E 1988).

The Hog Ranch-Naneum Ridge anticline is a broad structural arch that exte nds fro m
southwest of We natchee, Washington to the Yaki ma Ridge. This fea ture defines pa rt of the
no rthwestern boundary of the Pasco Basin, but little is known about the structural gerlogy of

Structurally, the Columbia Plateau can be divided into three info rmal subprovinces: the

this portion of the feature, and the southern extent of the feature is not kn own.

Palouse, Blue Mount ains, and Yakim a Fold Belt. All but the easternmost part of the Pasco
Basin is within the Yakima Fold Belt structural subprovince ( DOE 1988). The Ya kima Fold

Northwest-trending wrench (strike-slip) fa ults have been mapped west of 120' W longitude

Belt conta ins fo ur major structural elements: the Yakim a Folds, Cle Elum-Wallula disturbed

in the Columbia Plateau (DOE 1988). The mean strike direction of the dextral wrench fa ults is

zo ne, Hog Ranch-Naneum

a ~ticlin e ,

and northwest-trend ing wrench faults.

320', but nort.heast-trending sinistra l wre nch fa ults that strike 01 3' are less numero us. These
structures a·.-e not known to exist in the central Columbia Plateau.

The Yakima Folds are a series of continuous, narrow, asymmetric anticlines that have

wavelengt hs between about 5 and 30 kilometers (3 to 19 miles) and amplitudes commonly less

Most known faults within the Hanford area are associated with anticlinal fold axes. are

than I kilometers (less than 0.6 miles). The a nticlinal ridges are separated by broad synclines or

thrust or reverse faults a lthough norm al faults do exist, and we re probably forl!' ~d concurrently

basins. The Yakim a Folds are believed to have developed under generally north-south compres-

with the fol ding ( DOE 1988). Existing known faults wit hin the Ha nfo rd area include wre nch

sion, but the origin and timing of the deformation along the fold structures are not well known

(strike-slip) faults as long as 3 kilometers (1.9 miles) on Gable Mo unt ain and the Rattles nake-

(DO E 1988). Thrust or high-angle reverse faults are often fo und along both limbs of the a nt i-

Wallula alignment, which has been interpreted as a right-lateral str ike-slip fa ult. The fa ul ts in

cl ines, with the strike of the fa ult planes parallel or subparallel to the axis of the anticlines.

Central Gable Mounta in are considered NRC capable by the U.S. Nuclear Regul atory Comm is-

Very little direct field evidence indicates quatern ary movement along these anticlinal ridges.

sion criteria ( 10 C FR 100) in that they have slightly displaced the Hanford formation gravels.

One of three cases of suspected Quatern <ry faulting is along the central Gable Mounta in fault in

but their relatively short lengths give them low seismic pote ntial. No seismicity has been

the Pasco Basin. This fault is on the Hanfo rd Site. It was considered by the NRC to be

observed on or near Gable Mo untain. The Rattlesnake-Wallula alignment is interpreted as

presumed capable, but not de monstrated to be capable for licensing purposes of the WNP plant.

possibly being capable, in part because of lack of any distinct evidence to the contrary and
because this structure continues along the northwest trend of faults that appea r active at Wallula

The Cle Elum-Wallul a disturbed zo ne is the central part of a larger topographic alignment
called the Olympic-Wallowa li neament that extends from the northwestern edge of the Olympic

Gap, some 56 kilometers (35 miles) southeast of the central part of the Hanford Site
(DOE 1988).

Mo unt ains to the northern edge of the Wallowa Mount ains in Orego n. The Cle Elum-Wallula
disturbed zo ne is a narrow zone about 10 kilometers (6 miles) wide that transects the Yakima
Fold Belt and has been divided inform ally into three structural domains: a broad zone of

St rike-slip fa ults have not been observed crosscutti ng the Pasco Basi n. An ticlina l ridges
that bound the Pasco Bas in have been mapped in detail, and except fo r some component of dex-

deflected or ano malo us fo ld and fa ult trends extending south of Cle Elum, Washington to

tra l moveme nt on the Rattlesnake-Wallula align ment. no strike-slip fa ults similar to those in the

Ratt lesnake Mo untai n; a narrow belt of aligned domes and doubly plunging anticlines (called

western Ya kima Fold Belt have been observed (DOE 1988). Wrench (strike-sli p) faults have

The Rattles) extending fro m Rattlesnake Mountain to Wallula Gap; and the Wallula fault zo ne,

been observed along the ri dges at bounda ries between geo metr ically coherent segments of the
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structures, as in the Saddle Mountains, but these fa ults are confined to the individua l structures

4.6.2 Minerai Resources

and formed as different geometries developed in the fold. Similar type faults have been mapped
on Gable Mountain and studied in detail. These fea tures are a lso interpreted as wrench (stike·

Sand, gravel, and cobble deposits are ubiquitous components of the soils over the
Columbia Bas in in general and the Hanford Site in particular: therefore, any possible economic

sl'I' ) faults that are a response to folding.

impact to these resources resulting from the siting of the proposed SNF facility or an access
In gene ral, for structures within the Hanford Site area. the greatest deformation occurs in

road wo uld be considered negligible. However, becauJe gravel pits occur near the proposed

the hinge area of the anticlinal ridges and decreases with distance from that area; that is, the

SNF facility site, from which the DOE has been extracting gravel for many uses on the Hanford

greatest amount of tectonic jointing and faulting occurs in the hinge zone and decreases toward

Site. these deposits could have economic value.

the gently dipping limbs. The fauits usually exhibit low dips with small displace ments. may be
confined to the layer in which they occur, and die out to no recognizable displace ment in short

4.6.3 Seismic and Volcanic Hazards

la teral distances (DOE 1988).
The following discussion briefly summarizes seismic and volcanic hazards on the Hanford
4 .6 . 1.3 Soils. Hajek (1966) lists and describes IS different soil types ('n the Hanford

Site. The soil types va ry from sand to silty and sandy loam. Various classifications, including

Site. A more detailed discussion of seismic and volcanic hazards can be found in Cushing
(1992).

land use, a re also given in Hajek ( 1966). The proposed SNF facility site does not contain prime
4 .6 .3.1 Seismic Hazards. The historic record of earthquakes in the Pacific Northwest

or unique farmland.

dates from about 1840. The early part of this record is based on newspaper reports of structural
Section 4.8.2.1 (G roundwa ter Hydrology) provides a full discussion on ranges of thickness

damage and huma n perception of the shaking, as classified by the Modified Mercalli Intensity

of the va ri ous geological units/soil types across the Hanford Site (Figures 4·3 and 4·11). The

scale, and is probably incomplete because the region was sparsely populated. Se ismograph

surface Hanford Formation va ries in thickness across the Hanford Site from approximately IS to

networks did not start providing earthquake locations and magnitudes of earthquakes in the

lOa meters (49 to 328 feet) thick (Figure 4· 11 ). The Middle Ringold Formation varies from 10

Pacific Northwest until about 1960. A comprehensive network of seismic stations that provides

to 100 meters (32 to 328 feet) thick. The Lower Ringold and Basal Ringold Formations only

accu rate locating information for most earthquakes larger than magni tude 2.5 was installed in

extend eastward from the western boundary of the Hanford Site approximate ly II kilometers

eastern Washington in 1969. A summary of the seismicity of the Pacific Northwest. a detailed

(6.8 miles) . The fo rme r is rather uniform in thickness at 20 meters (65 feet), while the latter

review of the seismicity in the Columbia Plateau region and the Hanford Site, and a description

demo nstrates a maxi mum thickness of 40 meters (13 1 feet) at the far western boundary of the

of the seismic networks used to collect the data are provided in DOE (1988).

Hanford Site. Groundwater movement within these laye rs is also discussed in Section 4.8.2.1.
Large earthquakes (magnitude greater than 7 on the Richter scale) in the Pacific
There is a rather thick vadose zone on the Hanfo rd Site. However, conclusions drawn

No rthwest have occurred in the vicinity of Puget Sound, Washington, and near the Rocky

from studies conducted at several locations vary from no downward percolation of precipitation

Mounta ins in eastern Idaho and western Montana . A large earthquake of uncertain location

on the 200 Area Platea u. where soil texture is va ried a nd laye red with depth (all moisture

occurred in north·central Washington in 1872. This event had an estimated maxi mum ranging

penetrating the soil is removed by evaporation) to observations of downward water movement

fro m Vlll to IX and an estimated magnitude of approximately 7. The distribution of intensities

below the root zone in the 300 Area. where soils are coarse textured and where precipitation

suggests a location within a broad region between Lake Chelan, Washington and the British

was above normal (DOE 1987).

Columbia border. Figure 4·4 shows the known fa ults occurrin g in the region.
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Seismicity of the Columbia Plateau, as determined by the rate of earthquakes per area
and the historical magnitude of these events, is relatively low when compared to other regions of

,.,.",

.")-

the Pacific Northwest. the Puget Sound area and western Montana/eastern Idaho. Figure 4·5
shows the locations of aU earthquakes that occurred in the Columbia Plateau befere 1969 with

,=f'T" =~r " -"- " ~'
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IV or larger and wit h a magnitude of 3 or larger. Figure 4·6 shows the locations of all

I

earthquakes that occurred from 1969 to 1986 with magnitudes of 3 or greater. The largest

.... . ..

known earthquake in the Columbia Plateau occurred in 1936 aro und Milton·Freewater, Oregon.
This earthquake had a magnit ude of 5.75 and a maximum of VII, and was followed by a number

""

'\

of aftershocks that indicate a northeast·t rending fault plane. Other earthquakes with

i

Columbia River

magnitudes of 5 or larger and/ or intensities of VI are located along the boundaries of the
Columbia Plateau in a cluster near Lake Chelan extending into the northern Cascade Range; in
northern Idaho and Washington; and alo ng the boundary between the western Columbia Plateau
and the Cascade Range. Three VI earthquakes have occurred within the Columbia Plateau,

-

....

~"

.

including one in the Milton·Freewater region in 1921 , one near Yakima, Washington in 1892,

.. ~

and one near UmatWa, Oregon in 1893.

~ -("~-.

....

~~.-.", \"

~-

'\

In the central portion of the Columbia Plateau, the largest earthqu<',es near the Hanford

..

Site are two that occurred in 1918 and 1973. These two earthquakes had magnitudes of 4.4 and
an intensity of V and were located north of the Hanford Site. Earthquakes often occur in
spatial and temporal clusters in the central Columbia Plateau, and are termed earthquake
swarms. The region north and east of the Hanford Site is a region of concentrated earthquake
swarm activity, but earthquake swarms have also occurred in several locations within the
Hanford Site .
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Earthquakes in a swarm tend to graduaUy increase and decay in frequency of events. and

I

usuaUy no one outstanding large event is present within the sequence. These earthquake

30 Kilometers

swarms occur at shaUow depths, with 75 percent of the events located at depths less than 4 kilo·
Fault · Dashed where approximately located; dotted where concealed

•

.. ..

•

Fault· Bar and ball on downthrown side
Strike· Slip Fault· Arrows show direction of relative horizontal movement

..

meters (2.5 miles). Each earthquake swarm typicaUy lasts several weeks to months, consists of
several to 100 or more earthquakes. and is clustered in an area 5 to 10 kilometers (3 to 6 miles)

Thrust Fault· Sawteelh on upper plate

in lateral dimension. Often, the longest dimension of the swarm area is elongated in an east·
west direction. However, detailed locations of swarm earthquakes indicate that the events occur

59502048.1

on fault planes of variable orientation, and not on a single, throughgoing fault plane.

Figure 4.4. Map of the Columbia Basin region showing the known faultsAFFC.F-4 .H
Earthquakes in the central Columbia Plateau also occur to depths of abo ut 30 kilometers
BEST COPY AVAILABLE
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Figure 4-5. Historical seismicity of the Columbia Plateau and surrounding areas. All
ea rthquakes between 1850 a nd 1969 with a Modified MercaW Intensity of IV or larger with a
magn itude of 3 or greater a re shown (Rohay 1989).
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events. Based on seismic refraction surveys in th e region. the shallow earthquake swarms are

The max imum swarm earthquake for the purpose of se ismic design was a mag nitude 4 .0 event.

occurring in the Columbia River Basalts, and the deeper earthquakes a re occurring in crustal

Figures 4-7 through 4-11 demonstrate the ranges of frequencies versus the acceleration across the

laye rs below the basalts.

Hanford Site (Geomatri x Consultants. Inc. 1993) .

The spatial pattern of seismicity in the central Columbia Plateau suggests an association

The seismic design is based upon a Safe-Shutdown Earthquake of 0 .25 gravity (g: accelera-

of the shallow swarm activity with the east-west-oriented Saddle Mountains anticline. However.

tion) .

this association is complex, and the earthquakes do not delineate a throughgoing fault plane that

risks associa ted with other potential sources that were considered . For DOE site comparison

would be consi" ent with the faulting observed on this structure.

The potential earthquake risk associated with the Gable Mountain structure dominated the

purposes. a maximum horizontal grou nd surface accele ration of 0 . 17-0.20g at the Hanford Site is
estimated to result from an earthquake that could occur once every 2.000 years (DOE 1994c) . The

Earthquake mechanisms in the central Columbia Plateau generally indicate reverse

seismic hazard information presented in this EIS is for general seismic hazard comparisons ac ross

faulting o n east-west planes. consistent with a north-south-directed maximum compressive stress

DOE sites. POlential seismic hazards for existing and new facilities could be evaluated on a facility

and with the formation of the east-west-oriented anticlinal fold of the Yakima Fold Belt

spec ific basis consistent with DOE orders and standards and site specific procedures .

( Roh ay 1987). However, earthquake focal mechanisms indicate faulting on a variety of fault
plane orientat ions.

4.6.3.2 Volcanic Hazards. Several major volcanoes are located in the Cascade Range
west of the Hanford Site . The nearest volcano. Mount Adams. is about 165 ki lometers (102 miles)

Earthquake focal mechanisms alo ng the western margin of the Columbia Plateau also
indicate north-south compression. but here the minimum compressive stress is oriented east-

from the Hanford Site . and the most active is Mount SI. Helens. approximately 220 kilometers
( 136 miles) west-southwest from Hanford .

west, resulting in strike-slip faulting ( Rohay 1987). Geologic studies indicate an increased
component of strike-slip faulting in the western portion of the Yakima Fold Be lt. Earthquake
foca l mechanisms in the Milton-Freewater region to the southeast indicate a different stress
field, one with maximum compression directed east-west instead of north-south.

A period of renewed volcanic activity at Mount SI. Helens began in March 1980 and climaxed
in a major eruption on May 18. 1980. This eruption resulted in about I millimeter (0.039 inches) of
ash fall over a 9-hour period at the Hanford Site . which was near the southern edge of the ash
dispersal plume . Smaller eruptions of steam and ash occurred through October 1980. but none of

Estimates for the earthquake potential of structures and zones in the central Columbia
Plateau have been developed during the licensing of nuclear power plants at the Hanford Site.

these deposited measurable amounts of ash at the site . Because of their close proximity. the volcanic
moun tains of the Cascades are the principal volcanic hazard at Hanford .

In reviewing the operating license application for a Washington Public Power Supply System
project, the Nuclear Regulatory Commi", io n (N RC 1982) concluded that four earthquake
sources should be considered fo r

tr,' purpose of seismic design:

the Rattlesnake-Wallula

The major concern is how ash fall might affect the operation of communications equipment
and electronic devices. as well as the movement of truck and automobile traffic in and out the

al ignment, Gable Mountain, a floating earthquake in the tectonic province, and a swarm area.
project site area .

For the Rattlesnake-Wallula alignment, which passes along the southwest boundary of the

4.7 Air Resources

Hanford Site. the estimated maximum magnitude is 6.5, and for Gable Mountain, a n east- west
structure that passes through the northern portion of the Hanford Site, the estimated maximum
magnitude is 5.0. These estimates were based upon the inferred sense of slip, the fault length,

This section addresses the general ai r resources at the Hanford Site and surrounding reg io n.

or the fault area. The floating earthquake for the tectonic province was developed from the

Included in this section are discussions on climate and meteorolog y. ambient air quality. and

largest event located in the Colum bia Plateau, the magnit ude 5.75 Milton-Freewater earthquake.

atmospheric dispersion .

4-45

VOLUME 1. APPEND IX A. APRIL 1995

VOLU~1 E

I. APPEN DIX A. APRIL 1995

4-46

T =0.3 sec, 5% damping

T =2 sec, 5% damping

10-2

>.

() 10- 3
C

Q)

:J
0Q)
~

LL

ro

:J

C
C

~

o<
c::

r

?i::

m
:--

10- 4
- - Mean
5th%
15th%
5Oth%
85th%
95th%

- - Mean
5th%
15th%
50th%
85th%
95th%

--

- - Mean
5th%
15th%
50th%
85th%

10- 5
10-2

10- 1

Peak Acceleration (g)

1

10-2

10- 1

1

10-2

Spectral Acceleration (g)

10- 1

1

Spectral Acceleration (g)
59403090.5
AFFC-F-7.H
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results for peak horizontal acceleration and 5 percent-damped spectral acceleration at 0.3 and 2.0 seconds (Geomatrix Consultants,
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4.7.1 Climate and Meteorology

collected at a series of automated monitoring sites located throughout the Hanford Site and the
surrounding region (Glantz et al. 1990). This Hanford Meteorological Monitoring Network is

The climate of the Hanford Site. located in southce ntra l Washington State. can be

described in detail in Glantz and Islam (1988).

classified as mid·latitude semiarid or mid·latitude desert. depending on the climatological
classification scheme used. Summers are warm and dry with abundant sunshine. Large diurnal
temperature variations result from intense solar heating during the day and radiational cooling

4_ 7.1. 1 Wind. Prevailing wind directions on the 200-Area plateau are from the northwest in all months of the year. Secondary maxima occur for southwesterly winds. Summaries of

at night. Daytime high temperatures in June. July, and August periodically exceed 38°C (IOO°F).

wind direction indicate that winds from the northwest quadrant occur most often during the

Winte rs are cool with occasional precipitation. Outbreaks of cold a ir associated with modified

winter and summer. During the spring and fall, the frequency of southwesterly winds increases

arctic air masses can reach the area and cause temperatures to drop below _18°C (O°F).

with a corresponding decrease in northwest flow. Winds blowing from other directions (for

Overcast skies and fog occur periodically (Stone et al. 1983).

instance. the northeast) display minimal variation from month to month. Monthly average wind
speeds are lowest during the winter months, averaging 2.8 to 3.1 meters per second (6.2 to

Topographic features have a significant impact on the climate of the Hanford Site. All a ir

6.8 miles per hour). and highest during the summer, averaging 3.9 to 4.4 meters per second (8.7

masses that reach the region undergo some modification resulting from their passage over the

to 9.9 miles per hour). Summertime drainage winds a re generally northwesterly and can

complex topography of the Pacific Northwest. The climate of the region is strongly influenced

frequently gust to 14 meters per second (31 miles per hour). A wind rose for the Hanford Site

by the Pacific Ocean and the Cascade Range to the west. The relatively low annual average

is shown in Figure 4-12.

rainfall of 16.1 centimeters (6.3 inches) at the Hanford Meteorological Station is caused largely
by the rair. shadow created by the Cascade Range. These mountains limit much of the maritime
influence of the Pacific Ocea n, resulting in a more continental-type climate than would exist if

4.7.1.2 Temperature and Humidity. Eight separate temperature measurements are

made at the 122-meter (400-foot) tower at the Hanford Meteorological Station. As of May

the mountains were not present. Maritime influences are experienced in the region during the

1987, te mperatures a re also measured at the 2-meter (6.6-foot) level on the twenty-two 9. I-meter

passage of frontal systems and as a result of movement through gaps in the Cascade Range

(30-foot) towers located on and around the Hanford Site. The three 61-meter (200-foot) towers

(such as the Columbia River Gorge).

have temperature-measuring instrumentation at the 2·, 9.8-, and 61-meter (6.6-, 32-, and
200-foot) levels. The te mperature data from the 9.1- and 61-meter (30- and 200-foot) towers are

The Rocky Mountains to the east a nd the north also influence the climate of the region.

tele mete red to the Hanford Meteorological Station.

These mountains play a key role in protecting the region from the more severe winter storms
and the extremely low temperatures associated with the modified arctic a ir masses that move
southward through Canada . Local and regional topographical features, such as the Yakima

Diurnal and monthly averages and extremes of temperature. dew point, and humidity are
contained in Stone et al. (1983). Ranges of daily maximum and minimum temperatures vary

Ridge and the Rattlesnake Hills, also impact meteorological conditions across the Ha nford Site

from normal maxima of 2°C (36°F) in early January to 35°C (95°F) in late July. On the average,

(Glantz and Perrault 1991). In particular, these features have a significant impact on wind

55 days during the summer months have maximum temperatures greater than or equal to 32°C

directio ns. wind speeds, and precipitation levels.

(90°F). and 13 days have maxima greater than or equal to 38°C (IOO°F). From mid-November
through mid-Ma rch. minimum temperatures average less than or equal to O°C (32°F). with the

Climatological data are collected for the Hanford Site at the Hanford Meteorological

minima in early January averaging -6°C (21°F). During the winter. on average, four days have

Station . The station is located between the 200-West and 200-East Areas and is in close

minimum tempe ratures less than or equal to _18°C (O°F); however, only about one winter in two

proximity to the proposed project site. Data have been collected at this location since 1945 and

experie nces such temperatures. The record maximum temperature is 46°C (115°F), and the

a re summarized in Stone et al. (1983). Beginning in the early I980s, data have also been

record minimum temperature is -33°C (-27°F). For the pe ri od 1912 through 1980, the average
monthly temperatures ranged from a low of - I'soC (29°F) in January to a high of 24.7°C (77°F)
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seven hourly observations indicated wet bulb temperatures greater than or equal to 24°C (75°F).
Fog reduces the visibility to 6 miles during an average of 42 days each yea r and to less than
0.25 mile during a n ave rage of 25 days per year.

4 . 7. 1.3 Precipitation. The average annual precipitation at the Hanford Meteorological
Stat ion is 16.1 centimeters (6.3 inches). Most of the precipitation occurs during the winter with
nea rly half of the an nual amount occurring in the months of November through February. Days
with grea ter then 1.3 cent imeters (0.5 inches) precipitation occur less tha n I perce nt of the year.
A rainfall intensity of a t least 1.3 centimeters per hour (0.5 inches per hour) persisting for
I hour has only a 10 pe rcent probability of occurring in any given year. A rainfall intensity of at

least 2.5 centimeters per hour (l inch per hour) has only a 0.2 pe rcent probability of occurring
in any given year. Winter monthly average snowfall ra nges from 0.8 centimeters (0.3 inches) in
59-4040n . l

March to 13.5 centimeters (5.3 inches) in January. The record snowfall of 53 centimeters

AFFC-F·l2..M

(21 inches) occurred in Decembe r 1992. During the months of December, January, and
Figure 4-12. Wind rose for the Hanford Site using data collected fro m January 1982 to
Decembe r 1989 (Glantz et al. 1990). The direction of each of the petals of the wind rose
indicates the wind direction, and the petal length is representative of the percentage of time the
wind was from that direction. Petal thickness represents measured wind-speed category. The
velocity categories, from thinnest line (near the center of the rose) to thickest line (near the
edge of the rose), are 0.4-1.3 meters per second ( 1-3 miles per hour). 1.8-3.1 meters per second
(4-7 miles pe r hour), 3.6-5.4 meters per second (8-12 miles per hour), 5.8-8.0 meters per second
(13- 18 miles per hour), 8.5-10.7 meters per second ( 19-24 miles per hour), 11.2-13.9 meters per
second (25-31 miles per hour). respectively.

snow. These are described in detail in Stone et al. (1983). For many facilities, estima tes of

in July. During the winter, the highest monthly average temperature at the Hanford Me teoro-

summary and the National Severe Storms Forecast Cente r's database list only 24 sepa rate

February, snowfall acco unts for about 38 percent of all precipitation.

4 . 7. 1.4 Severe Weather. A discussion of severe weat her may include a variety of
meteorological events, including, but not limited to, severe winds, dust and blowing dust, hail,
fog. glaze. ash fall s, extreme te mperatures, tempe rature inversions, and blowing and drifting

severe winds are of particular concern. The Hanford Meteorological Station's climatological

logical Station was 7°C (45°F), and the record lowest was -5.9°C (2 1°F), both occurring during

tornado OCCurrences within 160 kilometers (100 miles) of the Hanford Site from 19 16 to 1992

February. During the summer, the record highest monthly average tempe rature was 27.9°C

(Cushing 1992). Only one of these tornadoes was observed within the boundaries of the

(82°F, in July), and the record lowest was 17.2°C (63°F, in June).

Hanford Site (on its extreme weste rn edge). and no da mage resulted. The estimated probability
of a tornado striking a point a t Hanford is 9.6 x 10-6 per yea r (Cushing 1992). Because

Relative humidity/ dew point temperature measureme nts are made a t the Hanford

tornadoes are infreque nt a nd generally small in the Pacific Nort hwest (and hurricanes do not

Meteorological Station and at the three 61-meter (200-foot) tower locations. The annual

reach this area). risks from severe winds are generally associated wit h thunderstorms or the

ave rage relative humidity at the Hanford Meteorological Station is 54 percent. It is highest

passage of st rong cold fro nts. The greatest peak wind gust recorded at 15 meters (50 feet)

during the winter months. ave raging abo ut 75 percent, and lowest during the summer, averaging

above ground level at the Hanford Meteorology Station was 36 meters pe r second (80 miles per

abo ut 35 percent. Wet bulb tempera tures greater than 24°C (75°F) had not been observed at

hour). Project ions on the return pe riods for peak gusts exceeding a specified speed are given in

the Hanfo rd Me teorological Station before 1975; however, on July 8. 9, and 10 of that year.

Stone et al. ( 1983). Extrapolations based on 35 yea rs of observations indicate a return period of
abo ut 200 yea rs for a peak gust in excess of 40 me te rs pe r second (90 miles pe r hour) a t
15 me te rs (50 feet) above gro und level.
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4.7.7.5 Atmospheric Stability. The transport and diffusion of airborne pollutants is

quality is to be severely restricted), and Class II areas (where moderate degradation of air

dependent on the horizontal and vertical distribution of temperature, moisture, and wind veloc·

quality is allowed) (Wark and Warner 1981). The PSD standards are presented in Table 4.7-1.

ity in the atmosphere. Greater amounts of turbulence or mixing in an atmospheric laye r lead to

The nitrogen oxide emissions from the Plutonium and Uranium Recovery through EXtraction

greater rates of diffusion. The highest rates of diffusion are found in thermally unstable laye rs.

(PUREX) plant and the Uranium Oxide (U0 3 ) plant are permitted by the EPA under the PSD

moderate rates of diffusion are found in neutral layers, and the lowest rates of diffusion are

program (Cushing 1992).

found in thermally stable layers. There are a number of methods for estimating the "stability" of
the atmosphere. Using a method based on the vertical temperature gradient (NRC 1980) and
measurements made at the Hanford Meteorology Station, thermally unstable conditions are

State and local governments have the authority to impose standards for ambient air
quality that are stricter than the national standards. Washington State has established more

estimated to occur an average of about 25% of the time, neutral conditions about 31 % of the

stringent standards for sulfur dioxide. In addition, Washington has established standa rds for

time, and thermally stable conditions about 44 % of the time. Detailed information on Han·

volatile organic compounds, arsenic, fluoride, total suspended particulates, and other pollutants

ford 's atmospheric stability and associated wind conditions are presented in Glantz et al. (1990) .

that a re not covered by national standards. The state standards for carbon monoxide and

4.7.2 Nonradiological Air Quality

Counties Clean Air Authority has the authority to establish more stringent air standards, but has

nitrogen dioxide are identical to the national standards. At the local level. the Benton-Franklin

not done so. Table 4.7-2 summarizes Washington State standards, and background and ambient
National ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) have been set by the EPA as mandated

concentrations for Hanford.

in the 1970 Clean Air Act. Ambient air is that portion of the atmosphere, external to buildings,
to which the general public has access. For DOE facilities, this is interpreted to mean the site

boundary or other publicly accessible location, e.g., highways on the site. The standards define
levels of air quality that are necessary, with an adequate margin of safety, to protect the public

4 . 7.2.7 Background Air Quality. The closest Class I areas to the Hanford Site are
Mount Rainier National Park, located approximately 160 kilometers (100 miles) west of the site;
Goat Rocks Wilderness Area, located approximately 145 kilometers (90 miles) west of the site;

health (primary standards) and the public welfare (secondary standards). Standards exist for
sulfur oxides (measured as sulfur dioxide), nitrogen dioxide, carbon monoxide, particles with an
aerodynamic diameter less than or equal to 10 micrometers (PM IO), lead, and ozone. The
standards specify the maximum pollutant concentrations and frequencies of occurrence that are
allowed for specific averaging periods (that is, the concentration of carbon monoxide when

Table 4.7-1. Maximum allowable increases for prevention of significant deterioration of air
quality".
Pollutant

Averaging Time

Class I

Class II

Particulate matter" (PM IO )

averaged over I hour is allowed to exceed 40 milligrams per cubic meter only once per year).
The averaging periods vary from I hour to I year, depending on the pollutant.

annual

4

17

24 hours

8

30

annual

2

Sulfur dioxide
In addition to ambient air quality standards, the EPA has established standards for the

24 hours

Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) of air quality. The PSD standards differ from the
NAAQS in that the NAAQS provide maximum allowable concentrations of pollutants, while
PSDs provide maximum allowable increases in concentrations of pollutants for areas already in

20
91

3 hours

25

512

annual

2.5

25

Nitrogen dioxide

compliance with NAAQS. Prevention of Significant Deterioration standards are expressed as
allowable increments in atmospheric concentrations of specific pollutants (nitrogen dioxide,
sulfur dioxide, and PM IO) (40 CFR 52.21, "Prevention of Significant Deterioration of Air

a. Source: 40 CFR 52.21.
b. Particulate matter is defined as suspe nded particulates with an aerodynamic diameter less
than 10 micrometers.

Quality"). Different PSD standards exist for Class I areas (where degradation of ambient air
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Table 4.7-2. Washington State ambient air quality standards applicable to Hanford, maximum
background concentration. background as percent of standard, ambient baseline (1995). ambient
baseline as percent of standard, and ambient baseline plus background as percent of standard
(standards and concentrations are in microgram per cubic meter).'

Mount Adams Wilderness Area, located approximately 150 kilometers (95 miles) southwest of
the site; and Alpine Lakes Wilderness Area, located approxima tely 175 kilometers (110 miles)
northwest of the site.

Ambient
Washington

Maximum

Background as

Background

Percent of

Concentration

Standard

0.5

Pollutant

Time

State
Standard

Sulfur
dioxide:

annual

52

1\vf!r3ging

Ambient
Baseline
(effective 1995)

BaSt:line and

Ambitn!
Baseline as
percent of

Background as

Standard

standard

percent of

Air quality in the Hanford region is well within the state and federal standards for criteria
pollutants. except that short·term particulate concentrations occasionally exceed the 24·hour
PM IC standard (Table 4.7·2). Concentrations of toxic chemicals, as listed in 40 CFR Part 60.01,

10

19

are not available for the Hanford Site. Because the highest concentrations of airborne

24 ho ur

260

1 hour

1.018

49

127

12

17

particulate material are genera lly a result of natural events, the area has not been designated

1 hour

655'

49

127

19

27

non·attai nment' with respect to the PM IO standard. However, the local clean air authority is
currently completing discussions with EPA and the Department of Ecology regarding plans to

Pa rticulate mailer

TSP'

PM

conduct additional evaluations of potential sources and mitigation measures, if any, that might

annual

60

56

93

93

24 hour

tSO

356

2J7

241

annual

SO'

26'

52

52

24 hour

ISO

596'

397

397

be implemented to reduce the short-term particulate loading.

Particulate concentrations can reach relatively high levels in eastern Washington because
of exceptional natural events (dust storms, volca nic eruptions, a nd large brush fires ) that occur in

Caroon

8 hour

10.000

6.soo

65

65

monoxide

I hour

40,000

11.800

30

10

30

not estimated

not estimated

the region. Washington ambient air quality standards do not consider rural fugitive dust fro m
exceptional natural events when estimating the maximum background concentrations of particulate in the area east of the Cascade Mountain crest. Similarly, the EPA also exempts the rural

Ozone

I hour

235

not estimated

nOI esti mated

n OI

estimated

Nitrogen

annual

100

36

fugitive dust component of background concentrations when considering permit applications and
enforcement of air quality standards (Cushing 1992).

39

36

4 . 7.2 .2 Source Emissions. Emissions inventories for permitted pollution sources in

dioxide

Benton, Franklin. and Walla Walla counties a re routinely compiled by the Tri-County Air

Le,.

annual

1.5

not estimated

not estimated

not esti mated

nOI

not estimated

estimaled

Pollution Control Boa rd. The a nnual emission rates for stationary sources within the Hanford
Site boundaries were reported to the Washington State Department of Ecology by the

a. Source: Air Quality Impact Analysis in Support of the New Production Reactor Environmental Impact Statement.
b. The sta ndard is nOI 10 be exceeded more Ihan twice in any seven consecutive days.
c. The TSP Slandards have been replaced by the PM 10 standards, bul the forme r a re serving as interim siandards.
d. Arithmelic mean of Ihe quarterly arithmetic mea ns for the fou r calendar quarters of the year.
e. Maximum concenlralions were measured in 1992 at Columbia Center in Kennewick. This value includes background concenlralion
and site concentrations.

U.S. Depa rtment of Energy a nd are provided in Table 4.7-3.

The EPA's ISC/ ST model was used for baseline modeling of stat ionary sources projected
to be in operalion in 1995 (Hadley 1991). Projected baseline conditions (presented in
Table 4.7·2) are estimated to be well below a ny current national or state standards
(Hadley 1991).

... An attainmen t area is an area where measured concentrations of a poUutant are below the
primary and secondary Nationa l Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS).
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Table 4.7-3. Emission rates (tons pe r year) for stationary emission sources wi thin the Hanfo rd
Site fo r 1992'.
Operallon
Source

( hours per year)

Sul rur

TSP

P~I I I)

Dio.tide

8

110

:'\tlrogc n
O:(ldes

VolatIle
Organic
Co mpounds

poll ution. they will overestimate maximum background concentra tions for the Hanford Site or at
Carbon

:\fonQxlde

6J8.l

300 Area Boiler 116

8760

-18

10

2()1}Easl Boile r

8760

200

58

4.

200-West Boiler

8760

260

75

62

120

24

200-Easl. 2()()..Wcsl FUgJlive Coal

8760
8760

Fugi lh:e Emissions. l00-E

8760

107

54

8

the site bounda ries.

"

300 Area 80ilu #1

300 Area Temporary Boile r

onsite monitoring. Beca use these measurements were made in th e vicinity of local sources of

The only offsite monitoring in the vicin ity of the Ha nfo rd Site in 1990 was conducted by
the Washington Depa rtme nt of Ecology fo r particulates (WDOE 199 1). Total suspended
part iculate (TS P) monitoring at Tri·Cities locations was disconti nued in early 1989. Monitoring
a t the re mai ning two locations, Sunnyside a nd Wallula. continued duri ng 1990. T he a nnual
geomet ric mea ns of measure me nts at Sunnyside and Wallula for 1990 were 7 1 microgra ms per

,. Source:: Cushing in preparation.

cubic mete r a nd 80 micrograms per cubic meter, respectively; both of these values exceeded the
Washi ngton Sta te a nnual standa rd of 60 microgra ms pe r cubic me te r. The Washington State

4 . 7.2.3 Nonradiological A ir Quality Moni toring.

24·hour sta ndard, 150 microgra ms per cubic meter, was exceeded six ti mes durin g the yea r at
Sunnyside a nd seven times a t Wallu la (Cushing 1992).

4 . 7.2.3 . 1 Onsit9 Monitoring-The most recent monitoring data ava ilable were

obta ined in 1992. Details of the monitoring program are described in Woodruff a nd

Pa rticu l,t". matter ( PM iO ) was also monitored at three locations: Colum bia Center in

Ha nf ( 1993). The only on site air quality monitoring conducted during 199 1 was for nitrogen

Ke nnewick, Wa lla Wa lla Fire Station, and Wallula. During 1992, the 24·hour PM iO sta nda rd

oxides. These oxides were sampled a t three locations on the Ha nford Site with a bubbler

adop ted by Washington State, 150 micrograms per cubic mete r, was exceeded two times at the

asse mbly operated to collect 24·hour integrated samples. The highest annual ave rage concen·

Colum bia Cente r monitoring location. The maxi mum 24·hour concentration a t Colum bia

tration was < 0.006 parts per million by volume, well below the applicable fe deral and

Center was 596 microgra ms per cubic me ter. The maximum 24·hour concentra tion at the Wa lla

Washington State a nnual ambient standard of 0.05 parts per million by volume (Cushing 1992).

Walla Fire Station was 67 microgra ms per cubic me te r. The maxi mum 24·hour concentratio n a t

Monitoring of total suspended solids was discontinued in early 1988 when the Basalt Waste

Wall ul a was 124 microgra ms per cubic meter. No ne of the sites exceeded th e a nnual primary

Isola tion Project, for which those measurements were required, was concluded . In 1992

standa rd. 50 micrograms per cubic mete r (C ushing in prepa ra tion). As noted previously. the

sampling was done at Rattlesnake Springs (near the southwestern edge of the site) for polychlor·

Benton ·Frankli n count ies area has not been des ignated nonattai nment with respect to PM iO

inated biphenyls ( PC Bs) and volatile organic compounds. Levels of PCB concent rations were

standa rds because th e particulate concentrations result from natural events.

fo und to be .s,0.27 to .s,0.29 na nogram per cubic meter (Woodruff and Hanf 1993). These
val ues are well below the EPA limit of I nanogram per cubic me ter. The volatile organic

4 . 7.2 .4 Summary of Nonradiol ogical Air Quality. Th e Ha nford Site is current ly

compounds tested for we re halogenated alkanes and alkenes, benzene, a nd alkylbenzenes. All

conside red a n attainme nt a rea fo r crite ria poll uta nts. However, PM iO concent ra tions a re high

volatile organic compound concentrations were well below the occupational maximum allowable

enough that the designation may cha nge. T here a re no Class I areas close enough to the site to

concentrations of air contaminant s.

he affected hy emissions at Ha nford. Carbon monoxide concentra tions are at 65 percent of the
alloweu concentration (fo r an eight·hou r averagin~ time). Current PM IO concentrations are at

4.7.2 .3.2 Offsit9 M oni toring-Du ring the past 10 years, carbon monoxide, sulfur

52 percent of the allowed ambien t sta ndard. Ni troge n dioxide concentrations are at 36 percent

dioxide. a nd nitrogen dioxide have been monitored periodically in communities and comme rcial

o f the allowed va lues. All other pollu ta nts, fo r which a mbie nt air qua lity sta ndards exist, a re

areas sout heast of Ha nfo rd. These urban measurements are typically used to estimate the

below 25 percent of the allowed values.

maxim um background poll uta nt concentrations fo r the Hanford Site because of a lack of specific
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A network of dams and mUltipurpose wa ter resources projects is loca ted along the course

4.7.3 Radiological A ir Quality

of the Columbia River. The principal dams are shown in Figure 4- 13. Storage beh ind
Gra nd Coulee Dam . combined with storage upstream in Canada. totals 3. 1 x 1010 cubic meters

Radionuci ide emissions to the atmosphere from the Hanford Site have been stead ily
decreas ing over the la st few years as sit e operations have changetl emphasis fro m the historica l
mi ssion of m ater ial s production

dnd

(I. I x 10 12 cubic feet) of USable storage to regulate the Coiumbia River fo r power. Dood control.
and irrigation of land within the Columbia Basin project.

processing to energy Lind waste managem en t rese arch.

During 1992. all operations at the Hanford Site released less th an 100 Ci of radionuci ides to the
CANADA

atmosphere. most of which consist ed of tritium and noble gases (Woodruff and Hanf 1993) . Of

WASHINGTON

that total. fi ssion and activation products accounted for less than O.03() Ci. uranium isotopes

acco unted for less than I

X

10'(' Ci. and transuranics contributed less than 0.005 Ci. These

\

releases res',lted in a dose to the maxi mally exposed offsite resident of less tha n 0.005 mrem.

. '7

'\

for DOE facilitie s.

')

L

\

perimeter were indistinguishable from those at distant locations that are unaffected by Hanford

~

4 .8 Water Resources

}

~"''''

\)

4.8.1 Surface Wat er

\i

kilometers (1900 square miles) and is located centrally wi thin the Colum bia Basin . Eleva tions

I

wi thin the Pasco Basin are generally lower than other parts of the plateau. and surface dra inage

!

Th e Han ford Site occupies ap prox im ately one·third of th e la nd area within the Pasco
Ba sin . Prim ary surface-water fea tures associated w ith the H anford Site are th e Col umhia

anu
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Rock Island Dam
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McNary Dam
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Dall~S Dam

Lake

~

Little Goose Dam "ll",_
Ice Harbor Da m
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• Walla Walla

Wallula

OREGON

~

~

Richland • Pasco:\..

John Day Dam

.

Rocky Reach Dam

/

:::: , . }

/

«

~

Q

Grand Coulee Dam

~

(/

relative to background : however. their contribution to the total a irbo rne activity was small.

I

Roosevelt

t '\- - "'{

Wells D a m c -

,rf

emi ssio ns. Concent rati ons of two specific radionuclides ( trit ium and iodine· 129) were elevate d

o

Franklm 0

Lake Chelan(lJ~

locations during 1992. Total concentrations of alpha · and beta·emitting radionuciides at the si te

major trihutaries: the Yakima Ri ver. the Snake River. and th e Walla Wall a River.

I

Chief Joseph Dam

)'

Ambie nt ai r mon itor ing fo r radionuclides consisted of sa mpling at 42 onsi te and offsi tt:

enters it from other basins. Within the Pasco Ba sin. the Columbia River is joined by three

N

Within Washington

r- '\..
(

which is several orders of magnitude less than the current EPA standard of 10 mrem per yea r

4 .8 . 1. 1 Surface Water Hydrology. The Pasco Basin occupies about 4900 square

+

Approximale East· West

1'/ Drainage Boundary

i

0

'~i

i~

i

\MoI.S

1020 JO.&O SOK'oIometetS

5 9403090.1
AFFC-F- 13.H

Yakima ri ve rs. Several surface ponds and ditches are present. and they are generally associated
w ith fue l- an d waste-p rocessing act ivit ie s. Several sm all spring- st rea ms occur on th e Ar id L an d

Ecology site on th e western side of th e Hanford Site.
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Figure ~-13 . Locations of major surfaCe! Wah: r resourcc:!s and principal da ms within tht:
Columb,a Plateau.
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Approximately two·thirds of the surface runoff, if there were any from Hanford, wo uld

Total estimated precipitation over the Pasco Basin is about 9 x 106 cubic meters

drain directly into the Columbia River along the Hanford Reach. which extends from the

(318 x 106 cubic feet) annually, averaging less than 20 centimeters per year (-8 inches per year).

upstrea m end of Lake Wallula to the Priest Rapids Dam . One·third a f the surface runoff wo uld

Mea n annua l runoff from the basin is estimated to be less than 3.1 x 107 cubic meters pe r year

drain into the Ya kima River, which fl ows into the Columbia Rive r below the Hanford Site. The

( 109 x 10 7 cubic feet per year), or approximately 3 percent of the total precipitation. The basin·

flow has been inventoried and described in detail by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

wide runoff coefficient is zero for all practical purposes. The remaining precipitation is assumed

( DOE 1986a). Flow along this reach is controlled by the Priest Rapids Dam. Several drai ns

to be lost through evapotranspiration, with a small component (perhaps less than I percent)

a nd intakes a re also present along this reach. These include irrigation outfalls from the

recharging the groundwater system (DOE 1988).

Columbia Basin Irrigation Project and Ha nford Site intakes for the onsite water export system.
Water use in the Pasco Basin is primarily from surface diversion with groundwater
Recorded !low rates of the Columbia River have ranged from 4500 to 18,000 cubic meters

diversions accounting for less than 10 percent of the use. A listing of surface water diversions.

per second ( -158,900 to 635,600 cubic feet per second) during the runoff in spring a nd ea rly

volumes. types of usage, and the populations served is given in DOE (1988). Industrial and

summer. to 1000 to 4500 cubic me te rs per second (35.300 to 158,900 cubic feet pe r sec·

agricultural usage represent about 32 percent and 58 percent, respectively, and municipal use

and) during the low flow period of late summer and winter. The average annual Columbia

about 9 percent. The Hanford Site uses about 81 percent of the water withdrawn for industrial

River flow in the Hanford Reach, based on records from 65 years. is about 3400 cubic mete rs

purpose.. Howeve r, beca use of the N Reactor shutdown and considering the data in DOE

per second (120.100 cubic feet per secand) (DOE 1988). A minimum flow of about 1020 cubic

( 1988), these pe rcentages now approximate 13 percent for industrial, 75 percent for agricultural,

meters per second (35,000 cubic feet per second) is maintained along the Hanford Site. Normal

and 12 percent for municipal use, with the Hanford Site accounting for about 41 percent of the

river elevations within the site range from 120 meters (394 feet) above mea n sea level where the

water withdrawn for industrial use.

river enters the Hanford Site near Vernita to 104 meters (341 feet) where it leaves the site near
Approximately 50 percent of the wells in the Pasco Basin are for domestic use and are

the 300·Area.

generally shallow (less than 150 meters [500 feet]). Agricultural wells, used for irrigation and
The Yakima River, near the southern portion of the Hanford Site, has a low annual flow
compared to the Columbia Rive r. For 57 yea rs of record, the average annual flow of the

stock supply, make up the second·largest category of well use, about 24 percent for the Pasco
Basin. Industrial users account for only about 3 percent of the wells (DOE 1988).

Yakima Rive r is about 104 cubic meters per second (3673 cubic feet per second) with monthly
maximum and minimum flows of 490 cubic meters per second (17,305 cubic feet per second)
and 4.6 cubic mete rs per second ( 162 cubic feet per second), respectively.

Most of the water used by the Hanford Site is withdrawn from the Columbia River. The
principal users of groundwater within the Hanford Site a re the Fast Test Flux Facility, with a
1988 use of 142,000 cubic mete rs (5.0 x 106 cubic feet) from two wells in the unconfined aquifer,

Cold Creek and its tributary, Dry Creek, are ephemeral streams within the Yakima Rive r
drainage system along the southern boundary of the Hanford Site. Both streams drain areas to

and the PNL Observatory, with a water supply fro m a spring on the side of Rattlesnake
Mountain.

thewest of the Hanford Site and cross the southwestern part ofthe site toward the Yakima Rive r.
Regional effects of water·use ac tivities are appare nt in some a reas where the loca l water
Su rface fl ow. whe n it occu rs. infiltrates a nd disappears into the surface sediments in the

tables or potentiometric levels have declined because of withdrawals from wells. In other a reas,

weste rn part of the Ha nford Site (refer to subsection 4.6. 1.3 for a discussion of soil types a nd

water levels in the shallow aquifers have risen because of art ificial recha rge mechanisms, such as

moisture percolation) . Rattlesnake Springs, located on the western part of the site, forms a

excessive application of imported irriga tion water or impoundment of streams. Wastewater

small surface stream that flows for abo ut 3 kilometers (1.8 miles) before disappearing into the

ponds on the Hanford Site have artificially recharged the unconfined aquife r below the 200·East

ground. Approxi mately one·third of the Hanfo rd Site is drained by the Yakima River syste m.

and 200·West Areas. The increase in water table elevations was most rapid from 1950 to 1960.
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and appare ntly had nea rly reached equilibrium between the unconfined aquife r a nd the recharge

-.J~ '- - ---'''''l..

.r'

during 1970 to 1980 when only small increases in wa ter table elevations occurred. Wastewa te r

..... ·L
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J .r·

discha rges from the 200·West Area were significantly reduced in 1984 (DOE 1988), with an

.

!
!

~

N

I

,.J.....

accompa nying decline in wate r table elevations.

.,.r '

.-
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4.8. 1.2 Flood Plains. Large Columbia Rive r floods have occurred in the past

.- '

(DOE 1987). but the likelihood of recurrence of large·scale fl ooding has been reduced by the
construction of several fl ood control/wa ter storage dams upstream of the site. Major fl oods on
the Columbia River a re typically the result of rapid melting of the winter snowpack over a wide
area a ugmented by above·normal precipitation . The maximum historical flood on record

i
i
i
i
.,i

occurred June 7, 1894, with a peak discharge at the Ha nfo rd Site of 21 ,000 cubic meters per
second (742.000 cubic feet per second). The flood plain associated with the 1894 flood is shown
in Figure 4·14. The largest recent flood took place in 1948 with a n observed peak discharge of
20,000 cubic meters per second (706,280 cubic feet per second) at the Hanford Site. The
proba bility of flooding a t the magnitude of the 1894 a nd 1948 floods has been greatly reduced

.

because of upstream regulation by dams.

~ 200 EaSI
200Wesl

240

(?)

.,.

Fast Flux
Test Facility

"""----- - ---;

"",-''t .

The Federal Emergency Management Agency has not prepa red flood plain maps for the

...........r-.,._J

o 2 4 6 8 Miles
-r.J..
! rl....
1'-.,...LI-11
o 4 8 Kilometers
f-I

Ha nford Reach of the Columbia River because that agency prepares maps only for developing
a reas (a criteria that specifically excludes the Hanford Reach).

.. _ . - Hanford Site Boundary
Evaluation of flood potential is conducted in part through the concept of the probable
maxim um fl ood, determined from the upper limit of precipitation falling on a drainage a rea a nd
other hydrologic factors, such as a ntecedent moisture conditions. snowmelt, a nd tributa ry

-0E4J¥1@i
'" ,

State Highway
Flooded Area

Q = 21,000 m3/s

(740,000 fills)

conditions, that could result in maxi mum runoff. The probable maximum flood for the
Columbia River below Priest Rapids Dam has been calculated to be 40,000 cubic meters per
S9Jl20n 2
AFFC-F-14.H

second ( 1.4 million cubic feet per second) and is greater than the SOO·year flood. The flood
plain associated with the probable maxi mum flood is shown in Figure 4·15. This fl ood would

Figure ·H4. Flood a rea during the 1894 flood.

inundate pa rts of the 100·Areas located adjacent to the Columbia River, but the central portion
of the Hanford Site where the SNF facility would be located would re main unaffected ( DOE
1986a).

BEST COpy AVAILABLE
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The U.S. Army Corps of Engi neers (1989) has derived the Standard Project Flood with

N

I

both regulated and unregul ated peak discharges given for the Columbia River below
Priest Rapids Da m. Frequency curves for both natural (unregulated) and regulated peak
discharges are also give n for the same portion of the Columbia River. The regulated Standard

r-

Project Flood for this part of the river is given as 15.200 cubic meters per second (54,000 cubic

,f"
,~

feet per second ) and the 100·yea r regulated flood as 12,400 cubic meters per second
(440,000 cubic feet per second). No maps for the flooded a reas are provided.

i
i
i
i
i.,

.

Potential dam failures on the Columbia River have been evaluated ( DOE 1986a;

~200East

ERDA 1976). Upstream failures could arise from a number of causes, with the magnitude of

West

the res ult ing flood depending on the degree of breaching at the dam. The U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers evaluated a number of scenarios on the effects of failures of Grand Coulee Dam,
ass uming flow conditions of the order of 11.000 cubic meters per second (400,000 cubic feet per
second ). For purposes of emergency planning, they hypothesized that 25 percent a nd

.,.

50 perce nt breaches, the insta nta neous disappearance of 25 percent or 50 percent of the center

~ . -.-.---;

""'-''t .
o 2
I ,,,
o

4

4
"

6
i

I

8 Miles

section of the dam, wo uld result from the detonation of nuclear explosives in sabotage or war.
The discharge or f100dwave resulting from such an instantaneous 50 percent breach at the

"1- . 1..,.-

I

outfall of the G rand Coulee Dam was dete rmined to be 600,000 cubic meters per second

8 Kilometers

(2 1 million cub ic feet per second). In addi tion to the areas inundated by the probable maxim um
flood (see Figure 4·15), the remainde r of the 100 Areas, the 300 Area, and nea rly all of

-0- State Highway
fS4WJ,1 Flooded Area 3
•

Richla nd, Washington, wo uld he fl ooded (DOE 1986a; ERDA 1976). Determinations were not
made for fa ilures of dams upstrea m, for associated fa ilures downstream of Gra nd Coulee, or for

Q = 40,000 m /s
(1,400,000 «3/s)

breaches greater tha n 50 pe rcent of Grand Coulee for two principal reasons: the 50 percent
scena ri o was believed to re present the largest realistically conceivable flow resulting from either
a na tural or human·induced breach (DOE 1986a); that is, it was hard to imagine that a structure
59312077.1
AFFC·F- 1S.H

as large as the Grand Coulee Da m wo uld be 100 percent destroyed instantaneously. It was also
assumed that such a scenario as the 50 percent breach wou ld only occur as the result of direct

Figure 4·15, Flood a rea fo r the probable max imum nood.

explosive de tonation, not because of a natural event such as an earthqu ake. Even a 50 percent
breach under these conditions would indicate an emerge ncy situation where other overriding
major concerns might be present.

The possibility of a la ndslide resul ting in rive r blockage a nd flooding along the Colum bia
River has also been exa mined for an a rea borde ring the east side of the river upstream from the
BEST COpy AVAILABLE
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city of Richland (DOE 1986a). The possible landslide area considered was the 75-meter-

+
N

(250-foot-) high bluff generally known as White Bluffs. Calculations were made for an
8

X

10' cubic meter ( I x

10 6

I

cubic yards) landslide volume with a concurrent fl ood fl ow of

17.000 cubic meters per second (600.000 cubic feet per second) (a 200-yea r fl ood) resulting in a
flood wave crest elevation of 122 me ter (400 foot) above mean sea level. Areas inu ndated
upstream from such a landslide event would be similar to those shown in Figure 4-15 .

A flood risk a nalysis of Cold Creek was conducted in 1980 as pa rt of the characterization
of a basaltic geologic repository for high-level radioactive waste. Such design work is usually
done to the criteria Standard Project Flood or Probable Maximum Flood rathe r than the worst

Dry Creek
(Ephemeral and
Discontinuous)

case or 100-year flood scenario. Therefore. in lieu of 100- and 500-year floodplain studies. a
probable maximum flood evaluation was made for a reference repository loca tion directly west
of the 200-East Area a nd encompassing the 200-West Area (Skaggs a nd Walters 1981).
Figure 4-16 shows the extent of this evaluation.

,

-,.~
\"',

'-.

, Lower Cold Creek
. ' - - (Ephemeral and
\
Discontinuous)
~

/.\,...."".-.
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4.8_1.3 Surface Water Quality.

~
4 .8_ 1_3_ 1 Water Quality of the Columbia River-Tie Department of Ecology
classifies the Columbia River as Class A (excellent) between Grand Coulee Dam and the mouth

"

'.

".
27.50 River Kilometer (mile)
(t7.08)

_ . - Drainage Basin Boundaries
..... :;:::: : :: Probable Maximum Flood Area
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of the rive r near Astoria. Oregon (DOE 1986a). The Hanford Reach of the Columbia River is
the last free-flowing portion of the river in the United States.

Pacific Northwest Laboratory conducts routine monitoring of the Columbia River for both

o
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radiological and nonradiologica l water quality para meters. A yearly summary of results has
been published since 1973 (Woodruff and Hanf 1993). Numerous other water quality studies
have been conducted on the Columbia River relative to the impact of the Hanford Site during

figure 4-16. Extent of probable maximum flood in Cold Cree k area.

the past 37 yea rs. Currently, e ight outfalls are covered by National Pollutant Discha rge
Elimina tion System (NPDES) permits at the Hanford Site: two at the 100-K Area. five at the
100-N Area. and one at the 300 Area. These discharge locations are monitored for various
measures of \Vater quality. including nonradioactive a nd radioactive pollutants. The dose from
a ny radionuclide releases is estimated for the Annual Environmental Monitoring Report for the
Hanford Site. In 1993. monitored liquid disCharges resulted in a dose of 0.012 mrem to the
downstrea m maximally exposed individuals (Dirkes et a l. 1994). Permit a pplications have bee n
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submitted to EPA Region 10 for three new facilities (outfalls) pla nned for the 100 a nd 300
Areas. These new facilities include a treatment facility for process wastewater ( 1325-Nl. a filter

4 .8.1 .3.2 Water Quality of the Unconfined Aquifer-As part of the continuing

e nviron me ntal monitoring progra m. groundwate r monitoring reports have been issueu since 1956

backwash/ash slu icing wastewate r disposal facility (315 /384). and the 300 Area Treated Effluent

a nd a re now published in the Hanford Site Environmental Report. which is issued by calendar

Disposal Facility.

yea r. The sha llow. unconfined aquifer in the Pasco Basin and on the Hanford Site contains
waters of a dilute (less tha n or approximately 350 milligrams per liter tota l dissolved solids)

Radiological monitoring shows low levels of radionuclides in sa mples of Colum bia Rive r
wa ter. Tritium. iodine-129. and ura nium are found in somewhat higher concentratio ns uown-

calcium bicarbonate che mica l type. Other principal constituents include sulfate, silica. magnesium. and nitrate. Variab ility in chemical composition exists within the unconfined aquife r in

stream of the Hanford Site tha n upstream (Woodruff a nd Ha nf 1993), but well below concen-

part because of natural va riation in the composition of the aq uifer material; in part because of

tration guidelines established by DOE and EPA drinking-water sta nda rds (Ta ble 4.8- 1).

agricultural and irrigation practices north. east. a nd west of the Hanford Site; and. on the

Cobalt-60 and iodine-131 were not consistently found in measurable quantities during 1989 in

Ha nford Site. in part because of liquid waste disposal.

samples of Columbia Rive r water from Priest Rap ids Dam. the 300-Area water intake, or the
Richla nd city pumphouse (Woodruff and Hanf 1991). In 1989. the ave rage a nnual stront ium-90
concentrations were essentially the same at Priest Rap ids Dam (upstream of the Hanford Site)
and the Richland Pumphouse (Woodruff and Hanf 1991).

Graham et a!. ( 198 1) compared a nalyses of unconfined aquifer wa te r samples take n by
the U.S. Geological Survey in the Pasco Basin, but off the Hanford Site. with samples take n by
PNL and the USGS on the Ha nford Site for the yea rs 1974 through 1979. In general. Hanford
Site gro undwate r a nalyses showed higher levels of chemical constituents and temperatures than

Nonradiological wa ter qua lity parame te rs measured during 1989 we re similar to those

were re flected in the analyses of offsite sa mples.

reported in previous yea rs a nd were within Washington State Water Quality Standards
( Woodruff and Hanf 1991). Under Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972

Elevated levels of some constituents in the Hanford groundwater result from releases of

(as amended by the Clean Water Act of 1972) the NPDES can regulate permits issued to

various liquid wastes from disposal facilities. prima rily in the 100 Areas (fo rmerly the site of

DOE-RL for discharges of nonradioactive efflu ents made to the Columbia River.

production reactor operations) a nd 200 Areas (forme rly the spent fuel reprocessing and defense

Table 4.8-1. Annual average concentrations of radionuclides in Columbia Rive r water during
1992.'
Wate r conce ntra tions (pCi/L)
Downstream
concentration
Upstrea m
EDA drinking water
(Richland
concentration
standaro
Pumphouse)
( Priest Rap ids Da m)
Radion uclides
20,000
101
50
H-3
8.0
0.09
0.09
Sr-90
NA
0.51
0.42
Uranium
900
0.21
0. 10
Tc-99
< 2.3 x 10.5
< 1.4x lO'"
1- 129

200 Areas are present in a groundwate r plume that exte nds across the southeastern quadra nt of

materials production site). Mobile contaminants, such as tritium and nitrate, from th e

the Ha nford Site and enters the Columbia River a long a broad front north of the 300 Area.
Contamina nts having lower mobility are generally confined to smaller localized plumes in the
vici nity of the disposal facilities and migrate more slowly toward the Columbia Rive r ( Dirkes
et a!. 1994). Some longer-lived radionudides. such as strontium-90 a nd cesium- I37, have
reac hed the grou ndwa ter. prima rily through liquid waste disposal cribs. Minor qu antities of
longer-lived radionuclides have a lso reached the wa ter table via a failed gro undwa ter monitoring
well casing and through reverse well injection. a disposal practice that was discontinued at
Hanford in 1947 (Smith 1980).

a. Data taken from Woodruff a nd Hanf ( 1993).

Of the:: contam inants found in groundwater. several radionudides and nonradioactive
che micals we re present in concentrations that exceeded EPA drinking wa te r standards or DOE
De rived Concentrat ion Gu ides (DCG) in 1993 (D irkes et a!. 1994). These qua nti ties are used
as a relat ive measu re of contami na tion. although with one exception. grou ndwater be neath the
VO LL":\1E I. APPE;.IDlX A. APRil. I9?S
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site is not used for human consumption or food production. Groundwater utilized for drinking

Radioactive and nonradioactive effluents are discharged to the environment from

at the FFfF visitor center contains above-background quantities of tritium and iodine-129 from

Westinghouse Hanford Company facilities in the 200 Area (Cooney et al. 1988). These

the 200 Area plume; however. these levels are well below the EPA drinking water standards.

effluent s. in general. are discharged to the soil column. Cooling water represents by fa r the

There is little opportunity for contaminated groundwater to migrate to loca tions where me mbe rs

la rgest volume of potentially radioactive liquid effluent. Additional treatment systems for these

of the public might utilize it directly for domestic purposes or irrigation. Groundwater in the

efflue nts are being designed and installed pursuant 10 the schedule set forth in the Hanford

unconfined aquifer beneath the Hanford Site is relatively isolated. and generally flows toward

Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. which was jointly issued by DOE. EPA. and the

the north and east where it discharges to the Columbia River. Normal hydraulic gradients

Washington Department of Ecology in May 1989. Under the provisions of the Compre hensive

within the unconfined aquifer beneath the Hanford Site prevent southward migration of

Environmenta l Response Compensation and Liability Act. remedial investigations/ feasibility

groundwater toward populated areas near Richland. and recharge to the Columbia River from

studies will be conducted for groundwater operable units at Ha nford.

aquifers in Franklin County to the north and east prevents radionuclides in the Columbia River
from migrating to groundwater across the river from Hanford.

Springs a re common on basalt ridges surrounding the Pasco Basin. Geochemically. spring
waters are of a calcium or sodium bicarbonate type with low dissolved solids (approximately 200

Groundwater monitoring at the 100 Areas detected concentrations of cobalt-60. strontium90. antimony-125. and uraniu!'a that were above the EPA drinking water standards. Tritium

to 400 milligrams per liter) (DOE 1986a). Compositionally these waters are similar to shallow
local groundwaters (unconfined aquifer and upper Saddle Mountains basalt). However, they are

concentrations exceeded both the EPA drinking water standard and the DOE DCG at one

readily distinguishable from waters of the lower Saddle Mountains (Mabton interbed) and the

sample well in each of the 100-N and 100-K Areas. In 200 Area wells, cobalt-60, technetium-99.

Wanapum and Grande Ronde basalts, which are of sodium bicarbonate to sodium chloride

iodine-129. cesium-1 37, uranium, and plutonium were occasionally found in concentrations that

bicarbonate (or sodium chloride sulfate) type. Currently, no evidence suggests these spring

exceeded the EPA drinking water standard; tritium and strontium·90 exceeded both the EPA

wa ters contain any significant component of deeper groundwater.

drinking water standard and the DOE DCG in some locations. Only uranium exceeded the
EPA drinking wa ter standard in 300 Area wells, a result of liquid waste disposal at former fuel
fabrication facilities.

4.8_ 1. 3.3 Water Quality of the Confined Aquifer-Areal and stratigraphic
changes in groundwater chemistry characterize basalt groundwaters beneath the Hanford Site
(Graham et al. 198 1). The stratigrap hic position of these changes is believed to delineate

Three nonradiological constituents - nitrate. chromium, and trichloroethylene - exceeded
EPA drinking water standards in both 100 and 200 Area groundwater. In addition to those

flow-system boundaries and to identify chemical evolution taking place along groundwater fl ow
paths. Using these data, some potential mixing of groundwaters has also been loca ted:

constituents. some 200 Area wells exceeded EPA drinking water standards for cyanide. fluoride.

however, the rate of mixing is unknown. According to Woodruff and Hanf (1993). no evide nce

carbon tetrachloride. and chloroform. Only trichloroethylene was found above the drinking

of contamination was observed in the groundwater of the confined aquifer on Rattlesnake

water limits in the 300 Area.

Ridge. Groundwater in one well in this aquifer contained 8.800 micrograms of nitrate per liter
in 1992. The well was located near an erosional window in the confining basalt fl ow. In a nother

The occurrence and consequences of leaks from waste storage tanks and of radioactive
mal< . ; I s in soils have been described elsewhere (ERDA 1975). These occurrences have not

well. tritium levels were elevated (maximum of 7.830 picocuries per liter) in 1992. In the same
well. elevated levels of iodine-129 (0.15 picocuries per liter) we re observed in 1992.

resulted, a nd are not expected to result. in radiation exposure to the public (ERDA 1975; DOE
1987). Lea kage from the 105-KE fuel storage basin results in groundwater contamination with

4.8_2 Groundwater

several radionuclides. as noted previously. The more mobile radionuclides reach the Columbia
Rive r via springs near the 100-K Area. although radionuclides in the springs were below the
EPA drinking water standard in 1993 (Dirkes et al. 1994).
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4 .8 .2 . 1 Groundwater Hydrology. The regional geohydrologic setting of the Pasco

Basin is based on the st ratigrap hic framework consisting of nume rous Miocene tholeiitic flood
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basa lt s of the Colu mbia Rive r Basalt b'fOUP; re la tively minor a mounts of inte rcalated fluvial a nd
volca noclastic Ellensburg Formation sediments; a nd fluvial. lacustrine. and glaciofluvial

aqu ifer consisting of fluvial a nd lacustrine sediments lying on top of the basalts. a nd within
deepe r confined-to-semiconfined aquife rs consisting of basalt flow tops, flow bottom zo nes. a nd

suprabasa lt sediments. The vertical order of the geological un its from the surface downwa rd is
Ha nfo rd fo rmatio n. Middle Ringold Formation. Lowe r Rin gold Format ion. Basal Ringold
Formation. and bedrock. e.g .. basalt . Figu re 4-3 illustra tes the stratigraphic layeri ng o f the
hydrogeologic units underlying the Hanford Site. a nd Figure 4-17 shows the order of the

sedime ntary interbeds ( DOE 1988). These deeper aquifers are interca lated with aquitards
consisting of basalt flow interiors. Vertical flow and leakage betwee n geohydrologic units is
inferred and estimated from water leve l or potentiometric surface data but is not quantified. a nd
direct measurements are not available ( DOE 1988).

geological units. The surface Ha nford formati on varies in thickness ac ross the Hanford Site
from app roximately 15 to 100 me te rs (49 to 328 feet) thick (Figure 4-17). The Middle RingOld
Forma tion va ries from 10 to 110 meters (33 to 361 feet) thick. The Lower Ringold and Basal
Ringold Formations extend eastward from the western boundary of the site approxima te ly
l.l kilometers (6.8 miles). The Lowe r Ringold Formation is rat her uniform in thickness at

20 mete rs (66 feet). while the Basal Ringold Formation demonstrates a maximum thickness of

The multiaquifer system within the Pasco Basin has been conceptualized as consisting of
four geohyd rologic units: (1) the Grande Ronde Basalt; (2) Wanapum Basalt; (3) Saddle
Mountain Basalt; and (4) suprabasalt Hanford and Ringold Formation sediments. Geohydrologic units older than the Grande Ronde Basalt are probably of minor importance to the
regional hydrologic dynar.lics and systel"l.

40 me te rs (13 1 fee t) a t the far western boundary of the site (interpolated from Woodruff and
Hanf 1993). La tera l gro undwater movement is known to occur within a shallow, unconfined

The Gra nde Ronde Basalt is the most voluminous and widely spread formation within the
Columbia River Basalt group a lld has a thickness of at least 2745 meters (9000 feet). The
Grande Ronde Basalt geohydrologic unit is composed of the Grande Ronde Basalt and minor
interca la ted sediments equivalent to or part of the Ellensburg Formation (DOE 1988). More
than 50 flows of Gra nde Rond e Basalt underlie the Pasco Bas in, but little is known of the lower
2200 to 2500 meters of this geohydrolugic unit. This unit is a confined-to-semiconfined flow
syste m that is recharged along the margins of the Columbia Plateau where the unit is at or close
to the land surface, and by surface-water and groundwater inflow from lands adjoining the
plateau. Vertical movement into and out of the unit is known to occur. Groundwater within
the unit in the eastern Pasco Basin is believed to be derived from grou ndwater inflow from the
east and northeast.

The Wanapum Basalt geohydrologic unit consists of basalt flows of the Wa nap um Basalt
interca lated with minor a nd discontinuous sedimentary interbeds of the Ellensburg Formation or
equiva le nt sediments. In the Pasco Basin. the Wanapum Basalt consists of three members, each
consisting of mUltiple flows. The geohydrologic unit underlies the entire Pasco Basin and has a
maximum thickness of 370 meters (12 15 feet). G ro undwate r within the Wa napum Basalt
geohyd rologic unit is confined to semiconfined. Recha rge is believed to occur from precipita tion
where the Wanapum Basalt is not overlai n by great thicknesses of you nger basalt, ledkage from
Distance, Kilometers

59402004.1
AFFC· F· 17H

Figure 4-1 7. Geologic cross section of the Hanford Site (modified fro m Tallma n et a l. 1979).
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adjoining formations. a nd surface-wa ter and groundwater inflow from la nds adjoining the
pla teau . Local recharge is derived from irrigation'. Within the Pasco Bas in, recha rge occurs
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along the anticlinal ridges to the north and west. with recharge in the easte rn basin being from

membe r of the Ringold Formation. consisting of sands and gravels with varying amounts of

groundwater inllow from the east a nd northeast (DOE 1988). Interbasin transfe r a nd ve rtical

cementa tion. The bottom of the unconfined aquifer is the basalt surface or, in some areas. the

leakage are also believed to contribute to the recharge.

clay zones of the Lower Ringold. A semiconfined aquifer occurs in areas where the coarsegra ined Basal Ringold :ies between the basalt and the fine-grained Lowe r Ringold. The

The Saddle Mountains Basalt geohydrologic unit is composed of the yo ungest formation
of the Columbia River Basal t Group and several thick sedimentary beds of the Ellensburg

confined aquifers consist of sedimentary interbeds and/or interflow zones that occur between
dense basalt !lows in the Columbia River Basalt Group. The main water-bearing portions of the

Formation or equivalent sediments that comprise up to 25 percent of the unit. Witbin the Pasco

inte r!low zones occur within a network of interconnecting vesicles and fractures of the !low tops

Basin . the Saddle Mountains Basa lt contains seven members. each with one o r more flows. This

or !low bottoms.

geohydrologic unit unde rlies most of the Pasco Basi n. attaining a thickness of about 290 meters
(950 fee:). but is absent along the northwest part of the basin a nd along some a nticlinal ridges.
Groundwa ter in the Saddle Mountains geohydrologic unit is confined to semiconfined. with
recharge and discharge believed to be local (DOE 1988).

4.8.2.2 VadosB ZonB Hydrology. Sources of natural recha rge to the unconfined
aquifer a re rainfall a nd runoff from the higher bordering elevations, water infiltrating from small
ephemeral streams, and river water along in!luent reaches of the Yakima and Columbia rivers.
In order to define the movement of water in the vadose zone, the movement of precipitation

The rock materials that overlie the basalts in the structural and topographic basins within

through the unsaturated (vadose) zone has been studied at severalloeations on the Hanford

the Columbia Plateau generally consist of Miocene-Pliocene sediments. volcanics. Pleistocene

Site. Conclusions from these studies are varied depending on the location studied. Some

sediments (including those from catastrophic flooding). and Holocene sediments consisting

investigators conclude that no downward percolation of precipitation occurs on the 200-Area

mainly of alluvium and eolian deposits. The suprabasalt geohydrologic unit (referred to as the

Plateau where soil texture is varied and is layered with depth, and that all moisture penetrating

Ha nford / Ringold unit) consists principally of the Miocene-Pliocene Ringold Formation stream.

the soil is removed by evaporation. Others have observed downward water movement below the

lake, and alluvial materials. and the Pleistocene catastrophic flood deposits informally called the

root zone in tests conducted near the 300 Area, where soils are coarse textured and

Ha nford formation . Groundwater within the suprabasalt geohydrologic unit is generally

precipitation was above normal (DOE 1987).

unconfined. with recharge and discharge usually coincident with

topogr~phic

highs and lows

(DOE 1988). The Hanford / Ringold unit is essentially restricted to the Pasco Basin with
principal recharge occurring along the periphery of the basin from precipitation and ephemeral
streams.

From the recharge a reas to the west, the groundwater !lows downgradient to the
discharge areas, primarily along the Columbia River. This general west-to-east !low pattern is
interrupted locally by the groundwater mounds in the 200 Areas. From the 200 Areas, a
component of groundwate r also !lows to the north, between Gable Mountain and Gable Butte.

Little if any natural recharge occurs within the Hanford Site, but artificial recharge occurs
from liquid waste disposal activities (Woodruff and Hanf 1993). Recharge from irrigation

These flow directions represent current conditions; the aquifer is dynamic, and responds to
cha nges in na tural and artificial recharge.

occurs east and north of the Columbia River and in the synclinal valleys west of the Hanford
Site. Upward leakage from lower aquifers into the unconfined aquifer is believed to occur in
the northern and eastern sections of the Hanford Site. Groundwater discharge is primarily to
the Columbia River.

Local recharge to the shallow basalts is believed to result from infiltration of precipitation
a nd runoff along the margins of the Pasco Basin. Regional recharge of the deep basalts is
thought to result from interbasin groundwater movement originating northeast and northwest of
the Pasco Basin in areas where the Wa nap um a nd Grande Ronde Basalts crop o ut extensively

Groundwater under the Hanford Site occurs under unconfined and confined conditions

( DOE 1986a). G roundwater discharge from the shallow basalt is probably to the overlying

(Figure 4-17). The unconfined aquifer is contained within the glaciofluvial sa nds and gravels of
the Ha nford formation a nd within the Ringold Formation. It is dominated by the middle
VO Lt:~1 E
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unconfined aq uifer and the Columbia River. The discharge area(s) for the deep grounrJwdters is

migrate downgradient with the groundwater flow where it enters the Columbia River; 1 curie of

presently uncertain. but flow is believed to be generally southeastward with discharge "peculated

tritium was discharged to the Columbia River from the 100 Areas in 1992 (Woodruff and Hanf

to be south of the Hanford Site (DOE 1986a).

1993).

4.8.3 Existing Radiological Conditions

Nitrate concentrations also exceeded DWS at various locations in the 100. 200. and
300 Areas and at several 600 Area locations. Elevated concentrations were also detected for

This section relates to the hydrology of the Hanford Site in general and to the hydrology
of the 200 Area specifically because it is the location of the proposed SNF facility.

chromium. cyanide. ca rbon tetrachloride, chloroform, and trichloroethylene in various sample
wells in the 100 and 200 Areas. For further information regarding groundwater quality on the
Hanford Site. refer to DOE (1992b).

4.8.3. 1 Hydrology of the Hanford Site. Groundwater quality on the Hanford Site ha s

been affected by defense-related activities to produce nuclear materials. Due to the arid nat ure
of the climate, natural recharge of the groundwater on the site is normaUy low. Artificial

4 _8.3_2 Hydrology of the 200 Area",. The unconfined aquifer beneath the Hanford
Site is contained within the Ringold Formation and the overlying Hanford formation . The

recharge has occurred in the past from the disposal of liquid waste associated with processing

unconfined aquifer is affected by wastewater disposed to surface and subsurface disposal sites.

operations in the 100, 200, and 300 Areas that created mounds of water underlying discharge

The depth to groundwater ranges from 55 to 95 meters (180 to 310 feet) on the 200 Area

points. While most of the site does not have contaminated groundwater, large areas underlying

Plateau. The bottom of the unconfined aquifer is the uppermost basalt surface or, in some

the site do have elevated levels of both radiological and nonradiological constituems. 'The liqu id

areas, the clays of the Lower Ringold Member. The thickness of the unconfined aquifer in the

effluents discharged into the ground have carried with them certain radionuclidcs and chemicals

200 Areas ranges from less than 15 to 61 meters (50 to 200 feet) . Beneath the unconfined

that move through the soil column at varying rates, eventually enter the groundwater. and form

aquifer is a confined aquifer system consisting of sedimentary interbeds or interflow zones that

plumes of contamination (see Figure 5.54 in DOE 1992a).

occur between dense basalt flows or flow units.

Groundwater monitoring is conducted on an annual basis on the Hanford Site as part of
the Hanford Ground-Water Environmental Surveillance Program and other monitoring

The sources of nat ural recharge to the unconfined aquifer are rainfall from areas of
high relief to the west of the Hanford Site and two ephemeral streams, Cold Creek and Dry

programs to study the movement of plumes, groundwater quality. and the concentration of

Creek. From the areas of recharge, the groundwater flows downgradient and discharges into the

certain constituents as regulated by the EPA. the DOE. and Washington State. In 1992, several

Columbia River. This general flow pattern is modified by basalt outcrops and suberops in the

groundwater samples were taken from app roximately 720 wells, of which 50 percent were

200 Areas and by artificial recharge.

sampled at least quarterly or more frequently. The remainder were sampled either once or
twice. Figure 5.49 in DOE (1992a) illustrates the locations of these monitoring wells.

The unconfined aq uifer beneath the 200 Areas receives artidcial recharge from liquid
disposal areas. Cooling water disposed to ponds has formed groundwater mounds beneath two

Results indicate that total alpha, total beta, tritium, cobalt-60, strontium-90,

former and one continuing high-volume disposal sites: U Pond in the 200-West Area, B Pond

technetium-99, iodine-129, cesium-137, and uranium concentrations in wells in or near operating

east of the 200-East Area. and Gable Mountain Pond north of the 200-East Area. The water

areas exceeded Drinking Water Standards (DWS) (see Tables C2 and C3 in Appendix C of

table rose approximately 20 meters (65 feet) under U Pond and 9 meters (30 feet) under

DOE [l992a]). Concentrations of uranium in the 200-West Area. tritium in the general

B Pond compared with pre-Hanford conditions (Newcomb et al. 1972). However, U Pond and

200 Area. strontium-90 in the 10J -N and 200-East Areas exceeded the Derived Concentration

Gable Mountain Pond have been eliminated and. with no further recharge from them, the water

Guides (DCGs) [see Table C6 in Appendix C of DOE ( 19Q2b)]. Tritium continues to slowly

levels will decline over the coming years. U Pond was deactivated in 1984 and Gable Mountain
Pond was decommissioned and backfilled in 1987. The volume of B Pond increased afte r the
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elimination of Gable Mountain Pond.

and Watso n 1985 ). The Columbia River and other water bodies on the Hanford Site provide
habitat for aq uatic organisms. The Columbia River is also accessible for public recreational use

The dry nature (for example. climate. waste form . and depth to water) of the low·level

and commercial navigation.

burial ground and the limited natural surface recharge available from precipitation minimize the
probability of leachate formation and migration from these facilities.

Topography of the proposed SNF facility site is level to gently sloping to the northeast.
Substrate on the subject area is primarily Burbank loamy sand intergraded with Rupert sand.

Additional characterization and enhanced groundwater monitoring of the 200 Areas

The latter consists of broad. stabilized sand dunes. Several used and unused unpaved roads

are currently being conducted pursuant to requirements estabtished under the Resources

cross the project area (Figure 4-18) with resulting disturbance to the plant community. The

Conservation and Recovery Act. When complete. this work will supply additional information

subject area outside the disturbed area is primarily a mature stand of big sagebrush with an

on the 200 Areas.

understory of cheatgrass. an alien weed species. and Sandberg's bluegrass (Figure 4-18); there
are approxi mately 494 square kilometers (191 square miles) of this community on the Hanford

4.8.4 Water Rights

site. Sagebrush·bitterbrush/cheatgrass comprises the second largest plant community. Cover of
big sagebrush increases rapidly from 10-25 percent near Route 4 to 25-50 percent over the

The Hanford Site, situated along the Columbia River and near the Yakima River. ties
within a region traditionaUy concerned about water rights. Typical water uses in this region

remainder of the site. Cover of cheatgrass and Sandberg's bluegrass is mostly uniform across
the subject area at 25-50 percent and 10-20 percent, respectively.

include coating a commercial nuclear power plant. irrigation, and municipal and industrial uses.
Cooling water was withdrawn from the Columbia River to cool the defense reactors at Hanford.

4.9.1 Terrestrial Resources

The DOE continues to assert a federaUy reserved water withdrawal right with respect to its
existing Hanford operations. Current activities use water withdrawn from the Columbia River
under the Department's federaUy reserved water right.

4.9. 1. 1 Vegetation. The Hanford Site, located in southeastern Washington, has been

botanicaUy characterized as a shrub·steppe. Because of the site's aridity. the productivity of
both plants and animals is relatively low compared with other natural communities. In the early

4.9 Ecological Resources

1800s, the dominant plant in the area was big sagebrush with an understory of perennial bunch·
grasses, especiaUy Sandberg's bluegrass and bluebunch wheatgrass. With the advent of

The Hanford Site is a relatively large. undisturbed area (1450 square kilometers
[-560 square miles]) of shrub· steppe that contains numerous plant and animal species adapted

settlement that brought livestock grazing and crop raising, the natural vegetation mosaic was
opened to a persistent invasio n by atien annuals, especiaUy cheatgrass. Today cheatgrass is the

to the region's semiarid environment. The site consists of mostly undeveloped land with widely

dominant plant on fields that were cultivated 50 years ago. Cheatgrass is also weU estabtished

spaced clusters of industrial buildings located along the western shoreline of the Columbia River

on rangelands at elevations less than 244 meters (800 feet) (Rickard and Rogers 1983). Wild·

and at several locations in the interior of the site. The industrial buildings are interconnected by

fires in the area are common ; the most recent extensive fire in 1984 significantly altered the

roads, railroads, and electrical transmission tines. The major facilities and activities occupy

shrub component of the vegetation. The dryland areas of the Hanford Site were treeless in the

about 6 percent of the total available land area. and their impact on the surrounding ecosystems

years before land settlement; however. for several decades before 1943, trees were planted and

is minimal. Most of the Hanford Site has not experienced tillage or tivestock grazing since the

irrigated on most of the farms to provide windbreaks and shade. When the farms were

early 1940s. The Columbia River fl ows through the Hanford Site. and although the river flow is

aba ndoned in 1943, some of the trees died but others have persisted, presumably because their

not directly impeded by artificial dams within the Hanford Site, the historical daily and seasonal
water fluctuations have been changed by dams upstream and downstream of the site (Rickard
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I) thyme buckwheat/ Sandberg's bluegrass
2) sagebrush/ bluebunch wheatgrass
3) sagebrush/ cheatgrass or sagebrush/ Sandberg's bluegrass
4) sagebrush-bitterbrush/ cheatgrass
5) greasewood /c heatgrass-sahgrass
6) winterfat/ Sandberg's bluegrass
7) cheatgrass-tumble mustard
~)

willow or riparian

9) spiny hopsage/ Sandberg's bluegrass
10) sand dunes.

The dominant plant community on the proposed SNF site is sagebrush/ Sandberg's
bluegrass, with cheatgrass-tumble mustard occurring in the southern portion of the site. A table
listing common plants on the Hanford Site can be found in Cushing (1992).

Almost 600 species of plants have been identified on the Hanford Site (Sackschewsky
et al. 1992). The dominant plants on the 200 Area Plateau are big sagebrush, rabbitbrush,
cheatgrass, and Sandberg's bluegrass, with cheatgrass providing half of the total plant cover.
More than 100 species of plants have been identified in the 200 Area Plateau. Cheatgrass and
Russian thistle. annuals introduced to the United States from Eurasia in the late 1800s, invade
areas where the ground surface has been disturbed. Certain desert plants have roots that grow
to depths approaching 10 meters (33 feet) (Napier 1982); however. root penetration to these
depths has not been demonstrated for plants in the 200 Areas. Rabbitbrush roots have been
1. thyme buckwheaVSandberg's bluegrass
2. sagebrushlbluebunch whealgrass
3. sagebrush/cheatgrass or sagebrush/Sandberg's bluegrass
4 . sagebrush-bi"erbrush/cheatgrass
5. greasewoodlcheatgrass-saltgrass
6. winlerlaVSandberg's bluegrass
7. chealgrass-tumble mustard
8. willow or riparian
9. spiny hopsage
10. sand dunes

Figure

~-18.

found at a depth of 2.4 meters (8 feet) near the 200 Areas (Klepper et al. 1979). Mosses and

a
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8 kilometers
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8 miles
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lichens appear abundantly on the soil surface; lichens commonly grow on the shrub stems. The
important desert shrubs. big sagebrush and bitterbrush, are widely spaced and usually provide
less than 20 percent canopy cover. The important understory plants are grasses. especially
chea tgrass. Sandberg's bluegrass. Indian ricegrass. June grass. and needle-and-thread grass.

Distri bution of vegetation types on the Hanford Site.
As compared to other semiarid regions in North America, primary productivity is

roots are deep enough to contact groundwater. Today these trees serve as nesting platforms for

relatively low and the number of vascular plant species is also low. This situation is attributed

several species o f bi rds. includ ing hawks. owls. rave ns. magpies. and great blue hero ns. and as

to the low annual precipitation (1 6 centimeters [-6 inches)), the low water-holding capacity of

night roosts for wintering bald eagles ( Rickard and Watson 1985). The vegetation mosa ic of the

the rooting substrate (sand). and the droughty summers and occasionally very cold winters.

Hanford Site currently consists of 10 major kinds of plant communities:
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Sagebrush and bitterbrush are easily killed by summer wildfires. but the grasses and ot her
herbs are relatively resistant and usuaUy recover in th e first grow ing season after burn ing. Fire

Short·horned and sagebrush lizards are also common in selected habitats. The must common
snakes are the gopher snake. the yellow·bellied race r. and the Pacific rattlesnake. all found

usually opens the community to wind erosion. The severity of erosion depends on the severity

througho ut th e Hanford Site. Striped whipsnakes and dese rt night snakes are rarely found. but

and areal extent of the fire. Hot fires incinerate entire shrubs and damage grass crowns. Less

some sightings have been recorded for the site. Toads and frogs are fo und near the permanent

intensive fires leave dead stems standing, and recovery of herbs is prompt. The most recen t and

water bodies and along the Columbia River. Cushing ( 1992) contains a list of all the reptiles

extensive wildfire occurred in the summer of 1984.

and amphibians occurring on the Hanford Site.

Bitterbrush shrubs provide browse for a resident herd of wild mule deer. Bitterbrush

4 .9.1.4 Birds. Fitzner and Gray ( 199 1) and Landeen et al. ( 1992) have presented data

shrubs are slow to recolonize burned areas because invasion is by seeds. Bitterbrush does not

on birds observed on the Hanford Site. The horned lark and western meadowlark are the most

sprout even when fire damage is relatively light.

abundant nesting birds in the shrub·steppe. A list of some of the more common birds present
on the Hanford Site can be found in Cushing (1992).

Certain passerine birds (such as sage sparrow, sage thrasher, and loggerhead shrike) rely
on sagebrush or bitterbrush for nesting. These birds are not expected to nest in places devoid of
shrubs. Jackrabbits also appear to avoid burned areas without shrubs. Birds that nest on the

4 .9 . 1.4.1 Birds Inhabiting Terrflstrial Habitats-The game birds inhabiting

terrestrial habitats at Hanford are the chukar, gray partridge, and mourning dove. The chukar

ground in areas without shrubs included longbilled curlews, horned larks, Western meadowlarks,

and partridge are year-round residents, but mourning doves are migrants. Although a few doves

and burrowing owls.

overwinter in southeastern Was hington, most leave the area by the end of September. Mourning doves nest on the ground and in trees all across the Hanford Site. Chukars are most numer-

An ecological inventory of the vegetation on the proposed SNF facility site revealed two

ous in the Rattlesnake Hills, Yakima Ridge, Umtanum Ridge, Saddle Mountains, and Gable

primary vegetation types: burned and unburned sagebrush/cheatgrass. Two species

Mountain areas of the Hanford Site. A few birds also inhabit the 200-Area Plateau. Gray

predominated in the burned area: cheatgrass and tarweed fiddleneck; the unburned vegetation

partridges are not as numerous as chukars, and their numbers also vary greatly from year to

comprised mainly cheatgrass and big sagebrush. During the one-day survey, app roximately

yea r. Sage grouse populatio ns have declined on the Hanford Site since the 1940s. and it is

43 species were identified.

probable there are no grouse nests on the site at this time. The nearest viable population is
located on the U.S. Army's Yakima Training Center. located to the north and west of the

4.9. 1.2 Insects. More than 300 species of terrestrial and aquatic insects have been

Hanford Site.

found on the Hanford Site. Grasshoppers and darkling beetles are among the more conspicuous
groups and. together with other species, are important in the food web of the local birds and

In recent yea rs, the number of nesting ferruginous hawks has increased, at least in part

mammals. Most species of darkling beetles occur throughout the spring to fall period. although

because the hawks have accepted steel powerline towers as nesting sites. Only about 50 pairs

son e species are present only during two or three months in the faU (Rogers and Rickard 1977).

are believed to be nesting in Washington . Other raptors that nest on the Hanford Site are the

Grasshoppers are evident during the late spring to fall . Both beetles and grasshoppers are

prairie falcon. northern harrier. red-tailed hawk, Swainson's hawk, and kestrel. Burrowing owls.

subject to wide annual variations in abundance.

great horned owls. barn owls, and long-ea red owls also nest on the site but in smaller numbers.

4.9. 1.3 Reptiles and Amphibians. Among amphibians and reptiles. 12 species are

4 .9. 1.5 Mammals. Approximately 39 species of mammals have been identified on the

known to occur on the Hanford Site (Fitzner and Gray 199 1). The occurrence of these species

Hanfo rd Site (Fitzner and Gray 199 1). and a complete list can be fo und in Cushing ( 1992). The

is infrequent when compared with similar fau na of the southwestern United States. The

largest vertebrate predator inhabiting the Hanford Site is the coyote, which ranges aU across the

side·blotched lizard is the most abundant reptile and can be found th rougho ut the Hanford Site.
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site. Coyotes have been a major cause of destruction of Ca nada goose nests on Columbia River

Si te appear to be relatively stable. The he rd is characte rized by a la rge proportion of very old

isla nds. especially islands upstream from the aba ndoned Hanford townsite. Bobcats and badgers

a nimals ( Ebe rhard t e t al. 1% 2) a nd high fawn mortality. Isla nds in the Ha nford Reach of the

also inhabit the Hanfo rd Site in low numbers.

Columbia Rive r are used extensivdy as fawning sites by the deer (Eberha rdt e t al. 197'1) and
th us are a very importa nt habi tat fo r this species. Hanford Site deer freque ntly move offsite

Black-tailed jac krabbits are common on the Hanford Site. mostly associated with mature

and a re killed by hunters on adjacent public a nd private la nds (Ebe rhard t et al. 19M4).

sta nds of sagebrush. Cottontails a re also common but appear to be more closely associated with
the buildings. debris piles. and equipment laydown areas associa ted with the onsite laboratory
and industrial facilities.

The ecological survey conducted on an area adjacent to the proposed SNF fac il ity site
recorded (by presence or sign) 12 bird. 7 mammal. and 3 reptile species.

Townse nd's ground squirrels occur in colonies of various sizes scattered across the

4.9.2 Wetland s

Ha nford Site but marmots are scarce. The most abundant mammal inhabiting the site is the
G reat Basin pocket mouse. It occurs aU across the Columbia Rive r plain a nd on the slopes of

Several habitats on the Hanford Site could be conside red as wetlands. The largest

the surro unding ridges. Other small mammals include the deer mouse. harvest mouse.

wetla nd habitat is the ripa rian zone borde ring the Columbia Rive r. The extent of this zone

grasshopper mouse. montane vole. vagra nt shrew. a nd Merriam'S shrew.

va ries. but it includes extensive stands of willows. grasses, vario us aquatic macrophytes. and

other plants. The zone is extensively impacted by both seasonal water level fluctuations and
The Hanfo rd Site has seve n species of bats that are known to be or are potential
inhabita nts. arriving mostly as faU or winter migrants. The pallid bat frequent s deserted

da ily va riations related to power generation at Priest Rapids Dam immediately upstream from
the site.

buildings and is thought to be the most abundant of the va rious species. Other species include
the hoary bat. silver-haired bat. California brown bat. little brown bat, Yuma brown bat. and
Pacific western big-eared bat.

O the r exte nsive a reas of wetlands can be found within the Saddle Mountain Na tional
Wildlife Refuge a nd the Wahluke WildLife Refuge Area. These two areas e ncompass all the
lands extending from the north bank of the Columbia Rive r northward to the site boundary a nd

A he rd of Rocky Mountain elk is present on the ALE Reserve. It is believed these

east of the Columbia River down to Ringold Springs. Wetla nd habitat in these areas consists of

animals immigrated to the reserve from the Cascade Mountains in the early 1970s. This herd

fairly large ponds resulting from irriga tion runoff. These ponds have extensive sta nds of cattails

had grown fro m approximately 6 animals in 1972 to 11 9 animals in the spring of 1992. Elk

( Typha sp.) and othe r emergent aqua tic vege tation surrounding the open wate r regions. They

freq uently move off the ALE Reserve to private lands located to the north and west. pa rt icularly

a re extensively used as resting sites by wa terfowl.

during late spring. summer. and early faU. However. while the elk a re on the Hanford Site. they
restrict thei r act ivities to the ALE Reserve. Lack of water and the high level of human activity

Some we tla nds habitat exists in the ripa rian zones of some of the la rger spring strea ms on

presumably restrict the eLk from using othe r a reas of the Hanford Site. Despite the a rid ciima te

the ALE Reserve. These areas a re not exte nsive a nd usually a moun t to less tha n a hecta re in

and their unusual habitat. these elk appear to be very healthy; a ntler and body size for give n age

size. although the riparian zone along Rattlesna ke Springs is probably abo ut 2 kilome te rs

classes a re among the highest recorded for this species (McCorquodale et al. 1989). In addition.

( 1.2 miles) in length a nd consists of peach leaf willows. cattails. a nd other plants. No wetlands

reproduct ive output is also among the highest recorded for this species. Elk remain on the ALE

are on or in the vicinity of the proposed project site area.

Reserve because of the protection it provides from human disturba nce.

Mule deer are fo und throughout the Hanford Site. although areas of highest concentrations are on the ALE Reserve and along the Columbia River. Deer populations on the Ha nford
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4.9.3 Aquatic Resources

by 1988 (Dauble and Watson 1990). The destruction of other mainstream Columbia
spawning grounds by dams has increased the relative importance of the Hanford Reach

There are two types of natural aquatic habitats on the Hanford Site: one is the Columbia

spawning (Watson 1970, 1973). Fish migrating from the Columbia River up the Snake River

River. which flows along the northern and eastern edges of the Hanford Site, and the other is

would not be expected to pass through the Hanford area because the confluence of the two

provided by the small spring·streams and seeps located mainly in the Rattlesnake Hills. Several

rivers lies downstream from the Hanford Site.

artificial water bodies, both ponds and ditches, have been formed as a result of wastewater
disposal practices associated with the operation of the reactors and separation facilities. These
bodies of water are temporary and will vanish with cessation of activities, but while present, they

4 .9 .3.2 Spring Streams. The smaU spring streams, such as Rattlesnake and Snively

springs, contain diverse biotic communities and are extremely productive (Cushing and Wolf

form established aquatic ecosystems (except West Pond) complete with representative flora and

1984). Dense blooms of watercress occur and are not lost until one of the major flash floods

fauna (Emery and McShane 1980). West Pond is created by a rise in the water table in the

occurs. The aquatic insect production is fairly high as compared to that in mountain streams

200 Areas and is not fed by surface flow; thus, it is alkaline and has a greatly restricted comple-

(Gaines 1987). The macrobenthic biota varies from site to site and is related to the proximity

ment of biota.

of colonizing insects and other factors.

4.9.3. 1 The Columbie River. The Columbia River is the dominant aquatic ecosystem

4.9.4 Threatened, Endangered, and Sensitive Species

on the Hanford Site and supports a large, diverse community of plankton, benthic invertebrates,
fish , and other communities. It is the fifth largest river in North America and has a total length

Threatened and endangered plants and animals identified on the Hanford Site, as

of about 2000 kilometers (-1240 miles) from its origin in British Columbia to its mouth at the

listed by the federal government (50 CFR 17) and Washington (Washington Natural Heritage

Pacific Ocean. The Columbia has been dammed both upstream and downstream from the

Program 1994), are shown in Table 4.9-1. No plants or mammals on the federal list of

Hanford Site, and the reach flowing through the area is the last free-flowing, but regulated,

endangered and threatened wildlife and plants (50 CFR 17.11, 17.12) are known to occur on the

reach of the Columbia River in the United States. Plankton populations in the Hanford Reach

Hanford Site. However, several species of both plants and animals are under consideration for

are influenced by communities that develop in the reservoirs of upstream dams, particularly

formal listing by the federal government and Washington.

Priest Rapids Reservoir, and by manipulation of water levels below by dam operations in
downstream reservoirs. Phytoplankton and zooplankton populations at Hanford are largely
transient, flowing from one reservoir to another. GeneraUy, insufficient time doe,' not aUow

4 .9.4 . 1 Plants. Four species of plants are included in the Washington listing. Columbia

milk·vetch (Astragalus columbianus Barneby) and Hoover's desert parsley (Lomatium tuberosum)

characteristic endemic groups of phytoplankton and zooplankton to develop in the Hanford

are listed as threatened, and Columbia yeUowcress (Rorippa columbiae Suksd.) and northern

Reach. No tributaries enter the Columbia during its passage through the Hanford Site. Gray

wormwood (Artemisia campestris ssp. borealis var. wormskioldii) are designateri as endangered.

and Dauble (1977) list 43 species of fish in the Hanford Reach of the Columbia River. Since

Columbia milk·vetch occurs on dry land benches along the Columbia River in the vicinity of

1977, the brown bullhead (/ctalurns nebulosus) has also been coUected, bringing the total number

Priest Rapids Dam, Midway, and Vernita. It also has been found on top of Umtanum Ridge

of fish species identified in the Hanford Reach to 44. Of these species, the chinook salmon,

and in Cold Creek Valley near the present vineyards. Hoover's desert parsley grows on steep

sockeye salmon, coho salmon, and steelhead trout use the river as a migration route to and

talus slopes in the vicinity of Priest Rapids Dam, Midway, and Vernita. YeUowcress occurs in

from upstream spawning areas and are of the greatest economic importance. Both the faU

the wetted zone of the water's edge along the Columbia River. Northern wormwood is known

chinook salmon and steelhead trout also spawn ir, the Hanford Reach . The relative contribution

to occur near Beverley and could inhabit the northern shoreline of the Columbia River across

of upper river bright stocks to faU chinook salmon runs in the Columbia River increased from

from the 100 Areas.

about 24 percent of the total in the early 1980s to 50 percent to 60 percent of the total
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Table 4.9- \. Threatened (T) and e ndangered (E) species known or possibly occurring on the
Ha nford Site.
Commo n name

Scientific name

Federal

State

management plan to mitigate eagie disturbance; this has been done by Fitzner and Weiss
(DOE/ RL 1994). The Endangered Species Act of 1973 also requires that Section 7 consultation
he unde rtaken when a ny action is taken that may jeopardize the existence of. destroy, or

Plants

adversely modify habitat of the ba ld eagie or other endangered species.

Columbia milk·vetch

Astragalus co/umbianus

Columbia yellowcress

Rorippa co/umbiae

E

Hoover's desert parsley

Lomatium tuberosum

T

Northern wormwood

A rtemisia camp r'itris

E

T

borealis var. wonllSkioldii

Table 4.9-2 lists the designated candidate species that are under consideration for possible
addition to the threatened or e nda ngered list. Table 4.9-3 lists the plant species that are of
concern in the sta te of Washington and are presently listed as sensitive or are in one of three
monitor groups (Washington Natural Heritage Program 1994).

Birds
Aleutian Canada goose

Braltta canadensis leucopareia

T

E

Peregrine falcon

Fa/co peregrinus

E

E

Bald eagie

HaliaeefltS leucocephalus

T

T

(fede ral a nd state candidate species), sage sparrows (state candidate), burrowing owls (state

White pelican

Pelecanus erythrorhyclros

E

candidate), pygmy rabbits (fede ral candidate and state threatened), sage thrashers (sta te
candidate), western sage grouse (federal and state candidate), and sagebrush voles (state

Sandhill crane

Grus canadellSis

E

Ferruginous hawk

Buteo regalis

T

monitored). Although the last five species were not discovered during the present survey of the
proposed SNF site, the habitat should be considered potentially suitable for their use. Pygmy

Mammals
Pygmy rabbit

Sagebrush habitat is considered priority habitat by Washington because of its relative
scarcity in the state and its requirement as nesting/breeding habitat by loggerhead shrikes

Brachylagus idahoensis

T

rabbits and western sage grouse have only rarely been seen on the Hanford Site, and then
primarily in upland regions. Loggerhead shrikes have been seen frequently on the proposed

Insects
Oregon silve rspot butterfly

Speyena zerene hippolyta

T

T

SNF facility site a nd are known to select tall big sagebrush as nest sites (Poole 1992). Although
this species begins migration at the beginning of August (Poole 1992), one individual was

4. 9 .4. 2 Animals. The federal government lists the Aleutia n Ca nada goose (Brallla

canadensis leucopareia) and the bald eagie (HaliaeefltS leucocepha/us) as threatened a nd the

observed during the present survey of the proposed SNF site. However, no nests were located.
G round squirrel burrows used by burrowing owls and owl pellets were observed during the

peregrine falcon (Falco peregrinus) as e nda ngered. In addition to the peregrine falcon. Aleutian

present survey of the proposed SNF site. Numerous sage sparrows were a lso observed on the

Canada goose. and bald eagie, Washington lists the white pelican (Pe/ecanus erythrorlrynchos)

proposed SNF site. Pygmy rabbits would not have been observed during th is survey because

and sandh ill crane (Grus canadensis) as endangered and the ferruginous hawk (Buteo regalis) as

they are primarily crepuscular and nocturnal a nd may have already begun hibernation.

threate ned. The peregrine falcon is a casual migra nt to the Ha nford Site and does not nest

However, this species is not known from lowland portions of the H anford Site. The closest

here. The Oregon silverspot butterfly (Speyena zerene hippolyta ) has recently been classified as a

known ferruginous hawk (federal candidate a nd state threatened species) nest is approximately

threa tened species by both the state and federal governments. The bald eagie is a regular

8.9 kilometers (5.3 miles) northwest of the subject area. The subject area should be considered

winter resident and forages on dead salmon a nd waterfowl along the Columbia River; nesting

as comprising a portion of the foraging range of this species.

atte mpts have been made on the Hanford Site, but those have not been successful to date.

e ndangered or threatened, or candidates for such listing by Washington or federal governments,

does not nest on the Hanford Site. Increased use of power poles for nesting sites by the

or species listed as monitor species by Washington State, were observed on the proposed SNF

ferr ugino us hawk on the Hanford Site has been noted. Washington State Bald Eagie Protection

No other species listed as

site.

Rules were issued in 1986 (WAC-232-12-292). These rules require DOE to pre pare a
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Table 4.9-2. Ca ndidate species.
Common Name

Table 4.9-3. Washington plant species of COncern occurring on the Hanford Site.
Scientific Name

Federal

State

Mollusks

Dense sedge

Shortfaced larue

Fislrerola (= LarIX) /Zuttalli

Columbia pebble sna il

Fluminicola (=Lithoglyphus)
columbiana

X
X

X

Gavia immer

Swainson's hawk

Buteo swainsoni
Buteo regalis
Centocrcus urophasianus phaios
Amphispiza belli

Sage sparrow
Burrowing owl
Loggerhead shrike
Northern goshawk
Harlequin duck
Lewis' woodpecker
Long·billed curlew
Sage thrasher
Flammulated owl
Western bluebird
Tricolored blackbird
Golden eagle
Black tern

Bristly cyptantha
Piper's daisy

Common loon

Western sage grouse

Gray cryptantha
Shining flatsedge

Birds

Ferruginous hawk

Common Name

Athene cunicularia
Lanius ludovicianus
Accipter gentilis
Histrionicus histrionicus
Melanerpes lewis
Numenius americanus
Oreoscoptes montanus
Otus fammeolus
Sialia mexicana
Agelaius tricolor
Aquila chrysaetos
Chlidonius niger

X
X
X
X

Southern mudwort
False·pimpernel
Dwa rf desert primrose

X
X

Desert dodder
Thompson's sandwort

X
X

X

X

Robinson 's onion

Columbia River mugwort

X

Stalked·pod milkvetch

X
X
X
X
X
X

Carex densa
Cryptantha leucoplraea
Cryptantha interrupta
Cyperus rivularis
Erigeron piperia/Zus
Limosella acaulis
Lindemia anagallidea
Oenothera pygmaea
Cuscuta denticulata
Arenaria franklinii
v. thompsonii
Allium robinsonii
Artemisia lindleyana
Astragalus sderocarpus

Fuzzy beardtongue penstemon

Astragalus speirocarpus
Astragalus succumbens
Balsamorhiza rosea
Cirsium brevifolium
Pellaea glabella
Pens/elnon en'antheros

Squill onion

Allium scillioides

Medick milkvetch
Crouching milkvetch

X

Scientific Name

Rosy balsam root
Palouse thistle
Smooth cliffbrake

Statusa

S
S
S
S
S
S

S
S
MI
M2
M3
M3
M3
M3
M3
M3
M3
M3
M3
M3

X

Mammals

Merriam's shrew

Sorer merriam;

Pacific western big·eared bat

Plecotus townsendii townsendii
Brachylagus idflhoensis

Pygmy rabbit

X
X
X

Palouse milkvetch

Insects
Columbia River tiger beetle

The following species may inhabit the Hanford Site, but have not been recently collected, and
the known collections are questionable in terms of locations or identifica tion.

Few-flowered blue·eyed Mary

X

Cinindela columbica

Coyote tobacco

Astragalus alTectus
Collinsia sparsiflora
Nicoh'ana attenuata

S
S
S

Plants
Columbia milk-vetch
Columbia yellowcress
Hoover's desert pa rsley
Northern wormwood
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Astragalus columbianus
Rorippa columbiae
Lomatium tuberosum
Artemisia campetis borealis
var. wormskioldii

4·94
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X
X
X
X

a. Abbreviations: S, sensitive; taxa vulnerable or declining, and could become endangered or
threatened without active management or removal of threats. MI , Monitor group I; taxa for
which there are insufficie nt data to support listing as threatened, endangered, or sensitive.
M2, Monitor group 2; taxa with unresolved taxonomic questions. M3, Monitor group 3; taxa
that are more abunda nt or less threa tened than previously assumed.
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4.9.5 Radionuclide Levels in Biological Resources

traffic noise. The Leq is expressed in A-weighted decibels (dBA) over a specified period of time
and is a frequency-weighted measure of sound level related to human hearing characteristics and

Samples of vegetation and wildlife are routinely coUected as part of the site environ·

the concept of equal loudness.

mental monitoring program and analyzed for various radionuclides. The following summarizes
the levels reported in Woodruff and Hanf (1993).
A single sample of vegetation coUected on the Hanford Site contained 0.015 picocuries
strontium-90 per gram dry weight and 0.0059 picocuries cesium-137 per gram dry we ight. These

4.10.1 Hanford Site Sound Levels

Most industrial facilities on the Hanford Site are located far enough away from the site
boundary that noise levels at the boundary are not measurable or are barely distinguishable

values are lower by nearly an order of magnitude from those reported for the previous five

from background noise levels. Modeling of environmental noises has been performed for

years. Mean values of cesium· 137 in upland gamebird muscle (n = 4) in 1992 were 0.02 pico-

commercial reactors and State Highway 240 through the Hanford Site. These data are not

curies per gram wet weight and were about an order of magnitude higher than similar samples

concerned with background levels of noise and are not reviewed here. Two studies of environ·

coUected off of the Hanford Site the previous five years (n = 42). Mean values of cesium-137 in

mental noise were done at Hanford, as described in subsections 4.10.2 and 4.10.3. One study

rabbit muscle (n = 12) were 0.09 picocuries per gram wet weight and exceed those coUected on

reported environmental noise measurements taken in 1981 during site characterization of the

the Hanford Site the previous five years (n = 27) by about threefold, and were an order of

Skagit/ Hanford Nuclear Power Plant Site (NRC 1982). The second was a series of site

magnitude higher than samples collected off of the Hanford Site. Values for strontium-90 in

characterization studies performed in 1987 that included measurement of background

rabbit bone (n = 12) had a mean value of 4.08 picocuries per gram wet weight; mean values

environmental noise levels at five places on the Hanford Site. Additionally, such activities as

collected on the Hanford Site for the previous five years (n = 37) were 43 picocuries per gram

weU drilling and sampling have the potential for producing noise in the field apart from major

wet weight, an order of magnitude higher. Mean strontium-90 concentrations in the bones of

permanent facilities. Noise can be disruptive to wildlife and studies have been done to compile

rabbits (n = 20) collected off of the Hanford Site were 0.37 picocuries per gram wet weight.

noise data in remote areas.

One sample of muscle collected from a deer in the 200-Areas contained 0.006 picocuries
cesium-137 per gram wet weight, nearly two orders of magnitude less than a similar sample

4.10.2 Skagit/Hanford Data

collected off of the Hanford Site. Fish populations are safe for human consumption.
Radionuclide levels of fish from the Hanford Reach are not significantly higher than those of
fish found upstream. Because the confh;ence of the Snake and Columbia Rivers is downstream
from the Hanford Site, the Snake River salmon runs do not migrate through the Hanford reach.

Preconstruction measurements of environmental noise were taken in June 1981 on the
Hanford Site (NRC 1982). Monitoring was conducted at 15 sites, showing point noise level
reading ranging from 30 to 60.5 dBA. The corresponding values for more isolated areas ranged
from 30 to 38.8 dBA. Measurements taken in the vicinity of the sites where the Washington

4.10 Noise

Public Power Supply System was constructing nuclear power plants ranged from 50.6 to 64 dBA,
reflecting operation of construction equipment. Measurements taken along the Columbia River

Noise is technically defined as sound waves perceptible to the human ear. Sound waves

near the intake structures for WNP-2 were 47.7 and 52.1 dBA, compared to more remote river

are characterized by frequency, measured in Hertz (Hz), and sound pressure expressed as

noise levels of 45.9 dBA (measured about three miles upstream of the intake structures).

decibels (dB). Noise levels are often reported as the equivalent sound level (Leq), which

Com munity noise levels from point measurements in North Richland (3000 Area at Horn

normaUy refers to the equivalent continuous sound level for an intermittent sound, such as

Rapids Road and Stevens Road [Route 240)) were 60.5 dBA, largely attributed to traffic. North
Richland is abo ut 20 miles from the proposed site for SNF facilities.
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alo ng these roadways because of the geographic remoteness of work areas on the Hanford Site.

4.10.3 Basalt Waste Isolation Project Data

Information on noise contours generated by peak rush hour traffic in terms of community Leqs
Background noise levels were determined at five sites located within the Hanfo rd Site.

and dBAs is not available at this time.

Noise levels are expressed as equivalent sound levels fo r 24 hours (Leq·24). The ave rage noise
level for these five sites was 38.8 dBA on the dates tested. Wind was identified as the primary

4.10.6 Background Information

contributor to background noise levels with winds exceeding 12 mph significa ntly affecting noise
levels. This study concluded that background noise levels in undeveloped areas at Hanford can
best be described as a mean Leq·24 of 24 to 36 dBA (Cushing 1992). Periods of high wind.
which normaily occur in the spring, would elevate background noise levels.

Studies at Hanford of noise propagation have been concerned primarily with occupational
noise at work sites. Environmental noise levels have not been extensively evaluated due to the
remoteness of most Hanford activities and their isolation from receptors that are covered by
federal or state statutes. The Noise Control Act of 1972 and its subsequent amendments (Quiet

4.10.4 Noise Levels of Hanford Field Activities

Communities Act of 1978, 42 USC 4901·4918, 40 CFR 201-211) empower the state to direct.
The State of Washington has adopted RCW 70.107, which authorizes the Washington

In the interest of protecting Hanford workers and complying with Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA) standards for noise in the workplace, the Hanford

Department of Ecology to implement rules consistent with federal noise control legislation.
The Hanford Site is currently in compliance with state and federal noise regulations.

Environmental Health Foundation has monitored noise levels resulting from several routine
operations performed in the field at Hanford. These included weil drilling, pile driving,

4.11 Traffic and Transportation

compressor operations, and water wagon operation. Occupational sources of noise propagated
in the field from outdoor activities ranged from 93.4 to 96 dBA.

4.10.5 Noise Related to the Spent Nuclear Fuel Facility

4.11 .1 Regional Infrastructure

This section discusses the existing transportation environment at and around the Hanford
Site. Personnel and most material shipments are transported by road. Bulk materials or large

Ambient noise levels at the proposed project SNF site just west of the 200-East Area on
the Hanford Site are very low and would be expected to be less than 40 dBAs. The land is
currently vacant, and no vehicular traffic transverses the site. A lightly used road borders the
eastern side of the proposed SNF site and occasional traffic generates moderate amounts of

items are shipped by barge. Rail transportation is used only to move irradiated fuel, certain
high-level radioactive solid wastes, equipment, and materials (primarily coal). High-level and
low-level wastes from spent fuel stabilization are transported to waste management facilities by
pipeline.

veh icular noise, but only for those personnel near the road. Existing traffic noise on the
Hanford Site is centered primarily on the main arteries leading into the site. These are Route 4
South, which connects with the Richland Bypass (Route 240) and eventuaily with Interstate 182.
Another main road is Route 10, which also connects with Route 240 and leads into the
200 Areas in the site center. It is estimated that 3,300 privately owned vehicles travel to and
from the site each day using these roads. The vast majority of the privately owned vehicle
movement occurs during the rush hours of 6 to 8 a. m. and 3:30 to 6 p.m. In addition. it is
estimated that 3.600 oncoming truck shipments, 445 oncoming rail shipments, and 837 intrasite
truck shipments occur each day on the Hanford Site. The movement of all this vehicular traffic

The regional transportation network in the Hanford vicinity includes the areas in Benton
and Franklin Counties from which 93 percent of the commuter traffic associated with the site
originates. Interstate highways that serve the area are 1-82, 1-182, and [-90 (Figure 4-19).
[nterstate-82 is 8 kilo meters (5 miles) south-southwest of the site. [nterstate-1 82, a 24-kilometer
( IS-mile) long urban connector route 8 kilometers (5 miles) south-southeast of the site, provides
an east-west corridor linking 1-82 to the Tri-Cities area. [nterstate-90 (not shown in Figure 4-19), located north of the site, is the major link to Seattle and Spokane and extends to the
east coast; SR 224 (not shown in Figure 4-1 9). also south of the site, serves as a 16-kilometers

generates noise along these affected road corridors. However, little, if any, population exists
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Hanford
SIte Boundary

(IO-mile) link between 1-82 and SR 240. State Route 243 exits the northwestern boundary of the

8 Miles

f-,--'-r--+-,,- '----"

site and serves as a primary link between Hanford and 1-90. State Route 24 enters the site from

8 Kilomete rs
Interstate Highway

the west. continues eastward across the northernmost portion of the site, and intersects SR 17

-0- U.S. Highway
-0- State Highway
~

~

approximately 24 kilometers (15 miles) east of the site boundary. State Route 17 is a
north-south route that links 1-90 to the Tri-Cities and joins U.S. Route 395, which continues

Existing Facility

south through the Tri-Cities. State Route 14 (not shown in Figure 4-(9) connects with 1-90 at

Town

Vantage. Washington. and provides ready access to !-34 (not shown in Figure 4-19) at several
locations along the Oregon and Washington border.
General weight, width. and speed limits have been established for highways in the
Hanford vicinity. However, no unusual laws or restrictions that have been identified would
significantly inOuence general regional transportation.

Airline passenger and air freight service is provided at the Tri-Cities Airport owned and
operated by the Port of Pasco, at Pasco, Washington. The air terminal is located approximately
16 kilometers (10 miles) from the Hanford Site. Delta Airlines provides domestic Boeing-737
and 727 service to Salt Lake City where lOultiple major airline service is available for domestic
and international travel. Two feeder airlines service the Tri-Cities: United Express, a subsidiary
of United Airlines, and Horizon Airlines, a subsidiary of Alaska Airlines, provide service to
Seattle, Portland, and several other regional cities. Federal Express serves the Tri-Cities by
charter airplane from Spokane to Pasco and Airborne Express serves the Tri-Cities with charter
airplane from Seattle to the Richland airport, Richland, Washington.

4.11.2 Hanford Site Infrastructure

Hanford's onsite road network consists of rural arterial routes (see Figure 4-20). Only

BEl\'TON
COUNlY

104 of the 461 kilometers (65 of the 288 miles) of paved roads at Hanford are accessible to the
public. Most onsite employee travel occurs along Route 4, with controlled access at the Yakima
S93120n.S
AFFC·F19-H

Figure 4-19. Transportation routes in the Hanford vicini ty.

and Wye barricades. State Route 240 is the main public route through the site. Public highways
SR 24 and SR 243 also traverse the site.

The highway network is in excellent condition. A recently completed major highway
improvement project involved repavement and widening of the four-lane access route to the
BEST COPY AVAILABLE
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Wye Barricade. The highway network has been used extensively for transporting large
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equipment items. construction materials. and radioactive materials. Resurfac ing, sealing. and

resto rat ion programs are currently planned for segments of SR 17. SR 224. SR 240. and
U.S. Route 395.

In 1988 abo ut 32 percent of the work force at Hanford worked in offices in Richland. The
remai ning work force was on the site. Approximately 80 percent of the work force resides in

~

!I

i

'1

the Tri·Cities: Richland (45 percent). Kennewick (28 percent), and Pasco (7 percent).

N

I

i
i
i=--,~

Approximately 1600 of the employees on the site use bus transportation.

In 1988 nearly 12 million miles were logged by DOE vehicles at Hanford. In addition, an
estimated 3,300 privately owned vehicles were driven onsite each weekday and 560 were driven

i.

onsite each weekend day. Assuming a round.trip distance of 30 miles on site for each of these

"'.

vehicles, a total of about 40 million miles were driven annuaUy by workers onsite.

The primary highways used by commuters are SR 24, SR 240, and 1·182; 10, 90, and
10 percent of the work force use these routes, respectively (totals to more than 100 percent
because some commuters use two of the routes). With these commuting patterns, workers
annuaUy travel about 27 million miles offsite. Trucks used for material shipment to Hanford
o

I

2
'I

o

4

6

I'I!

4

compose about 5 percent of the vehicular traffic on and around the site. At present there are

8 Miles
I

periods of moderate traffic congestion, some of which is expected to be aUeviated by a new road

8 Kilometers

to the 200 Areas.
._ .-

--0-

Hanford Site Boundary
State Highway

Richland

During 1988, 169 accidents were reported onsite, with 20 involving DOE vehicles. The

Site Road

>--<

other accidents involved privately owned vehicles and included seven injury accidents and one

Railroad

fatal accident on SR 240. Among offsite highway segments of concern, most accidents occurred

Guarded Barricade

along 1·82. According to available da ta, the 15 accidents involving trucks in 1987 in the Benton/
Frankl in county study area resulted in 13 injuries and 3 fatalit ies.
S9501022.2

Onsite rail transport is provided by a short·line railroad owned and operated by DOE.
figure 4-20. Transportation routes on the Hanford Site.

This line connects just south of the Yaki ma River with the Union Pacific line. which in turn
interchanges with the Washington Central and Burlington Northern railroads at Kennewick.
AMTRAK passe nger rail service is provided in the Tri·Cities at the Burlington Northern depot
at Pasco. Approximately 145,000 rail miles were logged at Hanford in 1988. primarily
transporting coa l to stea m plants. Two noninjury rail accidents occurred at Hanford in 1988.
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The Hanford Site infrequently uses the Port of Benton dock facilities on the Columbia
River for off·loading large shipments. Overland wheeled trailers are then used to transport
those shipments to the site. No barge accidents were reported in 1988.

DOE promulgates radiation

protecti('~

standards for occupational workers. These standards

include radiation dose limits to control worker do.e from both external radiation and internally
deposited radionuclides. The current radiation dose limits were promulgated in 10 CFR Part
835, "Occupational Radiation Protection," which was enacted in 1993. This regulation includes

4.12 Occupational and Public Health and Safety

limits on total effective dose equivalent to workers, dose to individual organs, and dose to
members of the public (including minors and unborn children of workers) that may be

This section summarizes the Hanford Site programs designed to protect the health and

incidentally exposed while at DOE facilities.

safety of workers and the pUblic. It also describes existing radiological and nonradiological
conditions and provides a historical perspective on worker and public exposures and potential

Hanford contractors base their radiologicall'rotection programs, procedures, and manuals
primarily on 10 CFR Part 835. This regulation establishes the criteria for radiation protection

health effects.

for occupational workers. It lists allowable doses, establishes a policy on keeping doses as low as
The section is based on existing documentation and generic descriptions. Reference is
made to policies, orders, guidance documents, annual occupational exposure and environmental

reasonably achievable, and specifies training requirements for radiation protection personnel
and other workers. The DOE Radiological Control Manual, DOE/EH·0256T, issued by DOE

reports, and to other site descriptive documents. The parameters of greatest interest are the

Headquarters, establishe.s practices for conducting radiological control activities at all DOE sites.

history of radiological releases and worker radiation doses, particularly those associated with the

The DOE requires monitoring and reporting of radiation exposure records for individual

storage of SNF.

workers and certain visitors. Monitoring is required by 10 CFR Part 835 when the potential
exists for an individual to receive an annual effective dose equivalent above 100 millirem (I

The DOE, the DOE· RL, and all Hanford Site contractors have established policies to

millisievert), or an annual dose equivalent to an individual organ greater than 10 percent of

help ensure a safe and healthful workplace for all employees and visitors and to protect the

DOE occupational exposure limits. Personnel to be monitored are assigned a thermo·

environment and public health and safety. The DOE· RL manager has the overall responsibility

luminescent dosimeter that is worn at all times during radiation work on the Hanford Site. This

for safety and health at the Hanford Site. Each contractor develops and enforces occupational

instrument measures the amount and type of external radiation dose the worker receives.

and public health and safety programs that meet or exceed the requirements of DOE orders,

Dosimeters for all DOE and contractor personnel are processed by Pacific Northwest

other federal agencies, and Washington State.

Laboratory. The centralized operational dosimetry program reads, records, and summarizes

4.12.1 Occupational Health and Safety

reports of radiation dose are provided annually to each worker. Summary reports are also

results of dosimetry data as required. Records of occupational exposure are maintained, and

provided to DOE and published periodically (Smith et al. 1992)
Programs are in place at the Hanford Site to protect workers from radiological and
non radiological hazards. Radiological protection (health physics) programs are based on
requirements in regulations and DOE orders, and on guidance in radiological control manuals.

4.12.1 .2 Radiation Doses to Workers. The reported cumulative doses to all Hanford

Site workers and visitors for aU activities are given as a baseline for site operations.

Occupational nooradiological health and safety programs are composed of industrial hygiene
In 1993, about 14,500 workers were monitored at the Hanford Site. Of those monitorerl,

programs and occupational safety programs.

11,000 were classified as radiation workers, with an average annual dose equivalent of 0.02 rem
4.12. 1. 1 Radiological Health and Safety/Health Physics Program. In order to help

ensure that workers at DOE facilities are adequately protected from ionizing radiation, the
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per individual (Lyon). This dose is well below the 10 CFR Part 835 dose limit of 5 rem per year
and the DOE Administrative Control Level of 2 rem per year for occupational exposure.
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For 1993. the estimated collecti ve dose·equivale nt was 200 person-re m for all Ha nford

by the DOE (WHC 1990; Lansing et al. 1992). In the four-year period fro m 199 1 through 1994.

Site radiat ion wo rkers. Based on standard dose-to-health effects conversion facto rs

industria l-type accidents resulted in 98 lost working days at the K Basins out of a total of

( IC RP 1991). no hea lth effects would be expected to result a mong worke rs so exposed.

approxima tely 70.000 days worked.

The worker radiati on dose of most interest in thi s document is th e cumulative collec tive

dose to SNF workers. which is described in the foll owing subsect ion . The SNF manage me nt

4 _12_1_5 Industrial Hygiene Program. Occupational nooradiological health a nd safety
progra ms at Hanford are composed of industrial hygiene a nd occupational safety progra ms.

alternatives conside red in this docume nt are similar to those current work activities associa ted

Industrial hygiene programs address such subjects as toxic chemicals a nd physical agents,

wi th ma intenance and storage of SNF at the Hanford Site.

carcinogens, noise, biological haza rds, lasers, asbestos, and ergonomic factors. Occupational
safety progra ms address such subjects as machine safety, hoisting and rigging, electrical safety,

4 . 12. 1_3 Radiation Dose to K-Basin Workers. On the Ha nford Site the bulk of the

building codes, welding safety, and compressed gas cylinders.

SNF is sto red in the 105-KE and 105-KW Basins. which are collectively referred to as the KBasins. T he K-Basins are located within the 100-K Area of the Hanford Site. The basins are
filled with recirculating wa ter to cool the fuel and to provide radiological shield ing fo r personnel

The governing docume nt is DOE 5480.10, "Contractor Industrial Hygiene Prugra m," dated
6-26-85. The DOE-RL implementing procedure for DOE 5480.10 is RLIP 5480.10 "Industrial

working in the facility. Westinghouse Ha nford Company (WHC) operates the K Basins for

Hygiene Program," dated 7-30-90. The procedure establishes additional requirements a nd

DOE. Therefore the best measure of radiation dose from SNF is the dose to WHC e mployees

direction for implementation of an industrial hygiene program for DOE-RL and its contractors.

assigned to work a t the K Basins. The collective radiation dose to WHC K Basin workers over

In addi tion to the progra m requirements of DOE 5480.10, the RL Industrial Health Progra m

the 2-yea r period 199 1 and 1992 averaged 22 person-rem per year, or approximately 0.4 re m pe r

addresses the following subject areas:

year for each wo rker. A n ave rage of 58 wo rkers were assigned to the K-Basin during 199 1 and
1992. or approximately 29 workers per basin (Holloman and Motzco 1992, 1993).

The nominal collective radiation dose per yea r of operation of each SNF basin in the
100-K Area is estimated to be II person-rem . During the plutonium production mission, each

(1)

Use of respiratory equipment

(2)

Asbestos material

(3)

Regulated carcinogen or suspect carcinogenic materials

(4)

Sanitation

reactor at the Hanford Site had a simila r nuclear fuel storage basin associated with its opera-

(5)

Control of hazardous materials

tion. This resulted in a n estimated total radiatio n dose of 2000 person-rem, assu ming 179 total

(6)

Filter testing

operating reactor yea rs plus six yea rs of K-Basi n operation following sh utdown of the production

(7)

Hearing conservatio n

reactors ( Be rgsman 1994). The refore, operation of nuclear fu el storage basins has acco unted for

(8)

Indoor air quality

approxima tely 2.4 percent of the tota l radiological dose received by all Ha nfo rd Site workers

(9)

Human factors

from 1945 through 1985. 86, 100 re m (Gilbert et al. 1993). Based on standa rd dose-to-health

( 10)

Hazardous waste site safety f health management.

effects conve rsion facto rs (ICRP 1991). the dose to SNF wo rkers since Hanfo rd start up would
statistically relate to one fatal cancer among these wo rkers.

The responsibilities and authorities of the Occupational Medical Services Contractor
(contracted by DOE to Hanford Environmental Health Foundation) of the Industrial Health

4 . 12. 1.4 Worker Safety and Accidents. No incidents of overexposure to radia tion

have hee n reported to DOE duri ng 1990 a nd 1991 in association with SNF storage ac tivities at
the Hanfo rd Site. Overexposures are defined as a ny exposure over regulatory limits established

Program are also described in DOE 5480.10. These are 1) to provide technical industrial health
support services, tha t is, air and wa ter moni toring; 2) to evaluate, recommend, a nd trai n workers
in the use of respiratory devices, as requested by DOE-RL and its contractors; 3) to provide an
industrial health a nalytical laboratory; 4) to conduct work environ ment surveys; 5) to support
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noise abatement and hearing conservation; and 6) to maintain permanent records of personal

relating to the prevention, control, and abatement of environmental poUution. The Hanford Site

exposure monitoring data. Hanford Environmental Health Foundation maintains centralized

is also in compliance with EPA's National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air PoUutants for

records and r,rovides DOE-RL and its contractors with the results of monitoring efforts.

Radionuclides, 40 CFR 61, Subpart H. The EPA offsite air emissions limiting standard is
10 millirem/yea r effective dose equivalent to the pUblic. The National Primary Drinking Water

The RL contractors are required to do the following:

Regulations of the Safe Drinking Water Act apply to the drinking water supplies at the Hanford
Site. Several radionuclides are included in these water standards (40 CFR 141, 142;

•
•

Conduct an effective program to educate employees on the potential health haza rds
in their work environment, the control measures, and the protection necessary to
reduce those risks to acceptable levels.
Inform employees of health hazards and the results from monitoring of harmful
toxic or physical agents in the work environment, and document this action .

56 FR 33050-33127,1991) For 1993, the Hanford Site Environmental Report (Dirkes et al. 1994)
relates that the facility is in compliance with these requirements.

4 . 12_ 2_ 1 Environmental Programs. DOE 5400.1, "General Environmental Protection

Program; establishes the requirement for environmental protection programs. The Hanford Site
Records are maintained in accordance with DOE 1324.2, DOE 5483.1A, and DOE 5484.1.

Environmental Report is prepared annually pursuant to DOE 5400.1 to summarize environmental

Contractors of DOE-RL are required to maintain records of employee toxic and physical agent

data that characterize Hanford Site environmental management performance and regulatory

exposure and potential personal exposure data. Contractors of DOE-RL are also requ ired to

compliance status. The most recent report summarizes the status in 1993 of compliance with

maintain Hanford Site material safety data sheets.

environmental regulations, describes programs at the Hanford Site, discusses estimates of
radiation dose to the public from Hanford activities, and presents information on effluent

The DOE requires that as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) principles for

monitoring and environmental surveillance, including groundwater monitoring (Dirkes et al.

radiological and nonradiological hazardous materials be applied in the preparation of aU health

1994). In 1993, environmental programs were conducted at the Hanford Site to restore

and safety plans, and that aU such ALARA criteria are foUowed during the course of the work.

environmental quality, manage waste, develop appropriate technology for cleanup activities, and
study the environment.

Training requirements consistent with 29 CFR 1910.120 for entry into sites potentially
containing toxic or hazardous material are specified by DOE (29 CFR OSHA 1991).

4.12.2.2 Environmental Monitoring/Surveillance Information. Environmental

monitoring at the Hanford Site consists of effluent monitoring and environmental surveillance,
The DOE-RL requires that aU work (including preliminary investigation activities) be

including groundwater monitoring. Effluent monitoring is performed by the operators at the

conducted in such a manner that it conforms to applicable federal and state safety and health

facility or at the point of release to the environment. Environmental surveillance consists of

standards and that aU operating equipment meets aU safety and operability standards and

sampling and analyzing environmental media on and off the Hanford Site to detect and quantify
potential contaminants and to assess their environmental and human health significance. The

requirements .

annual Hanford Site Environmental Reports (Dirkes et al. 1994) present a summary of this
information for the Hanford Site. The Hanford Site operations contractor, Westinghouse

4_12_2 Public Health and Safety

Hanford Company, also reports summary data annually on radioactive and nonradioactive
The DOE has the responsibility under the Atomic Energy Act to establish the necessary
standards to protect members of the public from radiation exposures resulting from DOE

materials released into the environment from facil.ities they manage (WHC 1993a). Several
federal and state laws and regulations require the reporting of radioactive and nonradioactive

activities. In addition, Presidential Order 12088, "Federal Compliance with Pollution Control

releases. The Hanford Site reports pursuant to the federal Clean Air Act (Diediker et al . 1994)

Standards." requires aU federal facilities to comply with the legislative acts and regulations

and Clean Water Act.
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4. 12.2.3 Natural Cancer Incidence.

The probability of an American contracting

4 . 12.2.4.1 Maximally Exposed Individual (MEl) Dose. The MEl is defined in

ca ncer in their lifetime is 340 in 1000 (American Cancer Society 1993). and 20 percent of

the Hallford Site Ellvirollmelltal Report as 'an hypothetical person who lives at a location and has

Americans will die from cancer. an estimated 526.000 cancer deaths in 1993. Table 4.12·1 shows

a lifestyle such that it is unlikely that other members of the publk would receive higher

the estimated 1993 cancer incidence for different types of cancer for the United States and for

radiation doses' (Dirkes et al. 1994). The potential radiation doses to MEl have been published

Washington State. For the United States the probability of contracting cancer in 1993 is 4.9 in

in annual Hanford Site Environmental Reports since 1957. For 1993, the total potential dose

1000. and 2.2 in 1000 of dying from that cancer. For Washington State the probability of

(via ai r and water pathways) to the MEl from Hanford operations was calculated to be 0.03

contracting cancer in 1993 is 3.2 in 1000, and 1.4 in 1000 of dying from that cancer.

mrem (Dirkes et al. 1994). Estimates of the potential cumulative Effective Dose Equivalent
(EDE) to the ME l from both air and water sources for the 28·year period 1994 through 1972

The expected survival period for cancer victims has increased as detection and treatment
technologies have improved. Currently. 40 percent of the victims of all forms of cancer survive

were reconstructed by the Hanford Environmental Dose Reconstruction (HEDR) Project (TSP
1994).

for at least 5 years.
The highest cumulative dose to an adult resident for the years 1944 through 1972 from
4 . 12.2.4 Potential Radiation Doses. Potential radiation doses and exposures to

pathways associated with releases to the air was 1 rem; almost all of this dose was received

members of the public from releases of radionuclides to air and water at the Hanford Site are

during 1945. The highest cumulative dose to an adult resident for the years 1944 through 1971

calculated and reported annually by the Surface Environmental Surveillance Project at the

from pathways associated with releases to the water was 1.5 rem; about one·half of this was

Pacific Northwest Laboratory.

received during the period from 1954 through 1964. Thus the total cumulative dose from both
air and water releases was about 2.5 rem. For comparison, the dose received by an average

Table 4.12-1. Estimated 1993 cancer incidence and cancer deaths in the United States and the
state of Washington for different forms of cancer (American Cancer Society 1993).
United States' 1993
Washington State" 1993
Estimated
Estimated
Estimated
Estimated
deaths
new cases
new cases
deaths
Type of Cancer
All types & sites

Female breast
Colon & rectum
Lung
Oral
Uterus
Prostate
Skin melanoma
Pancr eas

Leukemia

1,170,000
182,000
152,000
170,000
29,800
44,500
165,000
32,000
27,700
29,300

526,000
46,000
57,000
149,000
7,700
10,100
35,000
6,800
25,000
18,600

6,350
850
950
2,700
125
125
700
125
425
350

Radiation doses received by the public from Hanford releases after 1972 were vanishingly small.
The maximum cumulative dose to the thyroid of a smaU child for the years 1944 through
1951 was estimated to be 240 rad; the majority of this dose was received during 1945.

4 . 12.2.4.2 Population Dose· Estimates of the potential cumulative dose to the

population within 50 miles (80 km) of the Hanford Site for 1944 through 1972 were estimated
from the releases to air and water developed by the Hanford Environmental Dose
Reconstruction (HEDR) project. Pat hways of exposure associated with releases to the air
dominated the population doses until after 1954 when their contribution decreased rapidly. The
cumulative population dose during 1944 through 1972 was 100,000 person·rem; essentially all of
this dose was received through air pathways in 1945. The cumulative population dose during
1944 through 1972 associated with water pathways was estimated to be about 6,000 person·rem;

a. Total population 250 million.
b. Total population 5 million.
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14,825
3,300
2,400
3, 100
500
600
3,300
600
475
550

resident during this 28·year period from natural background radiation was approximately 9 rem.

most of this dose was received during the decade between 1954 and 1964.
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The total potential radiation dose to the population within 50 miles (80 km) for 1993 was

area is purchased from the Bonneville Power Administration, a federal power marketing age ncy.

0.4 person-rem (Dirkes et al. 1994). By comparison, the total dose received in 1993 by this

The ave rage rate for residential customers served by the three local utilities is approximately

same population was about 110,000 person-rem.

$0.0396 per kilowatt hour. Electrical power for the Hanford Site is purchased wholesale from
the Bonneville Power Administration. Energy requirements for the site during FY 1988

About 50 cancer deaths would be implied by the total public radiation dose from Hanford

exceeded 550 ave rage megawatts.

activities since 1944 using standard dose-to-health-effects conversion factors (ICRP 91).
EssentiaUy aU of these would have been a result of radiation exposures received during 1945.
For perspective, the population within 50 miles (80 km) of the Site would have experienced

Natural gas, provided by the Cascade Natural Gas Corporation, serves a smaU portion of
residents, with 4800 residential customers in June 1992.

about 75,000 cancer deaths in 1993 fro m aU causes.
In the Pacific Northwest, hydropower, and to a lesser extent, coal and nuclear power.

4_13 Site Services

constitute the region's electrical generation system. Total generating capacity is about
40,270 megawa tts. Approximately 74 percent of the region's instaUed generating capacity is
hydroelectric, which supplies approximately 65 percent of the electricity used by the region.

4.13.1 Water Consumption

Coal· fired generating capacity is 6,702 megawatts in the region, 16 percent of the region's
The principal source of water in the Tri-Cities and the Hanford Site is the Columbia

electrical generating capacity. Two commercial nuclear power plants are in service in the Pacific

River. from which the water systems of Richland, Pasco, and Kennewick draw a large portion of

Northwest, with a 2247-megawatt capacity of 6 percent of the region's generating capacity. Oil

the average 4.3 x 107 cubic meters (11.38 billion gaUons) used in 1991. Each city operates its

and natural gas account for about 3 percent of capacity.

own supply and treatment system. The Richland water supply system derives about 67 percent
of its water from the Columbia River, approximately 15 to 20 percent from a weU field in North
Richland, and the remaining from groundwater weUs. The city of Richland's total usage in 1991

The region's electrical power system, more than any other system in the nation, is
dominated by hydropower. On average, the region's hydropower system can produce

was 2.1 x 107 cubic meters (5.65 billion gaUons). This current usage represents approximately

16,400 megawatts. Variable precipitation and limited storage capabilities alter the system's

58 percent of the maximum supply capacity. The city of Pasco system also draws from the

output from 12,300 ave rage megawatts under critical water conditions to 20,000 average

Columbia River for its water needs; the 1991 estimate of consumption is 1.1 x 10 7 cubic meters

megawatts in record high water years. The Pacific Northwest system's reliance on hydroelectric

(2.81 billion gaUons). The Kennewick system uses two weUs and the Columbia River for its

power means that it is more constrained by the seasonal variations in peak demand than in

supply. These weUs serve as the sale source of water between November and March and can

meeting momentary peak demand.

provide approximately 62 percent of the total maximum supply of 2.8 x 107 cubic meters
(7.3 billion gaUons). Total usage of those weUs in 1991 was 1.1 x 107 cubic meters (2.92 billion

Throughout the 1980s, the Northwest had more electric power than it required and was

gaUons).

operating with a surplus. This surplus has been exhausted, however, and there is only approxi-

4.13.2 Electrical Consumption

Hydropower improvement projects currently under construction .in the Northwest include about

mately enough power supplied by the existing system to meet the current electricity needs.

150 megawatts of new capacity. The cost and availability of several other resources are
Electricity is provided to the Tri-Cities by the Benton County Public Utility District,

currently being studied (Northwest Power Planning Council 1986). Approximate rates for

Benton Rural Electrical Association, Franklin County Public Utility District, and City of

current consumption of electricity, coal, propane, natural gas, and other utilities at the Hanfo rd

Richland Energy Services Department. All the power that these utilities provide in the local

Site are shown in Table 4.13· 1.
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4.13.3 Waste Water Disposal

In order for Hanford programs to meet operational and mission requirements, many
hazardous materials are or have been used onsite. Hazardous materials are not waste. but when

The major incorporated areas of Benton and Franklin counties are served by municipal
wastewater treatment systems, whereas the unincorporated areas are served by onsite septic

no longer useful. may become waste. Because of the potential for impacts to human health and
the environment, hazardous materials have been included in Subsection 4. 14.7.

systems. Richland's wastewater treatment system is designed to treat a total capacity of 27 mil·
lion cubic meters per year (a daily average flow of 8.9 million gallons per day with a peak fl ow
of 44 million gallons per day). In 199 1 the system processed an average of 4.83 million gallons

Wastes at the Hanford Site are generated by both facility operations and environmental
restoration activities. Facility operations include nuclear and non-nudear research, materials

per day. The Ken newick system similarly has significant excess capacity, with a treatment

testing, laboratory analysis, high-level waste stabilization, and nuclear fuel storage.

capability of 12 million cubic meters per year (8.7 million gallons per day); 199 1 usage was

manufacturing, repair and mai nte nance, and general office work. They also include operation of

4.8 million gallons per day. Pasco's waste-treatment system processes an ave rage of 2.22 million

aUwaste management facilities for treatment. storage, or disposal of Hanford wastes. as weU as

gallons per day, while the system could treat 4.25 million gallons per day or 16.2 liters per day.

any waste shipped to Hanford for storage or disposal. Environmental restoration operations
include remediation (identifying and arranging for the cleanup of inactive waste sites) and

4.14 Materials and Waste Management
This section discusses the management of materials and waste and presents both a

deco ntamination and decommissioning of surplus facilities.

Wastes and materials handled at the Hanford Site are described in subsections 4. 14. 1

historic overview and the current status of the various waste types being generated and stored at

through 4.14.7. These wastes and materials have been classified as high-level waste (discussed in

the Hanford Site. Regulatory requirements governing the management of these materials and

detail in subsection 4.14. 1), transuranic waste (discussed in detail in subsection 4. 14.2), mixed

wastes are discussed in Section 2.2.

low-level waste (discussed in detail in subsection 4.14.3), low-level waste (discussed in detail in
subsection 4. 14.4), hazardous waste (discussed in detail in subsection 4. 14.5), industrial solid

Table 4.13-1. Approximate consumption of utilities and energy on the Hanford Site ( 1992).
Consumption

Energy
Electricity

45,000 metric tons

(50,000 tons)

Fuel Oil

83.000 cubic meters

(22.000,000 gallons)

Natural Gas

680,000 cubic meters

(24,000,00 cubic feet)

LPG-propane

110 cubic meters

(29,000 gallons)

Gasoline

3.600 cubic meters

(950,000 gallons)

1,700 cubic meters

(450,000 gallons)

Power Demand

VO LUME I. APPEi':UrX A. APRIL 1995

The total amount of waste generated and disposed of at the Hanford Site has been, and is
being. reduced through the efforts of the pollut ion prevention and waste minimization programs
at the site. The Hanford Waste Minimization (and PoUution Prevention) Progra m is an
ambitious program aimed at source reduction, product substitution. recycling, surplus chemical
exchange. and waste treatment. The program is tailored to meet Executive Order 12780. DOE
orders. RCRA and EPA guidelines. All wastes on the Hanford Site, including radioactive.

Other Utilities
Water

subsectio n 4.14.7). Table 4. 14-1 shows expected waste disposal rates as of the year 2000,
including the expected disposition.

340,000 megawatt-hours

Coal

Diesel

waste (discussed in detail in subsection 4. 14.6), and hazardous materials (discussed in detail in

15.000,000 cubic meters

(4,000 + million gallons)

mixed. hazardous and non-hazardous regulated wastes are included in the Hanford Waste
Minimization Program.

57 megawatts

4-114

15'7

4-i 15

VOLUME I. APPENDIX A. APRIL 1995

Table 4.14-1. Base line waste quantities as of the year 2000 at Hanford a.

Waste identification

An nual
disposal
volume from
stabilization
operations
wastes (m 3 jyr)

Annua l disposal
volume from
stabilization
of stored
wastes

Total annual
disposal
volume
from aU waste
stabilization

(m 3 jyr)

(m 3 jyr)

Disposition
c

Interim onsite
storaged
Interim onsile
storage f

High-level waste
solidb

0

240

240

Transuranic waste
solid c

0

170

I70c

13,000

7,000

20,000

Mixed waste
solid g

300

0

300

Interim onsite
storage

Hazardous waste
liquid and solid

100

0

100

Offsite
disposal

2,000,000
38,000

10,000,000
0

12,000,000
38,000

Liquid effluent
Onsite disposal

210,000
4

0
0

210,000
4

Liquid effluent
Onsite disposal

Low-level waste
solid g

Other waste
nonhazardous
liquid
solid
sewage
liquidh
solidI

a.
b.
di
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.

Onsite
disposal

Baseline values are projected from 1988 data.
Liquid high-level waste (HLW) is held in interim storage and then processed to a solid form for
posal.
The baseline value is taken from 1988 data for planned future activities.
These wastes are targeted for disposal at a federal repository.
Liquids containing transuranics are processed as HLW.
These wastes are targeted for disposal at WIPP.
Solidified or absorbed-liquid-waste quantities are included in the solid waste quantity.
Liquid effluents from sewage treatment operations.
Solids from sewage treatment operations.

Reductions in the volumes of radioactive wastes generated have been achieved through
methods s uch as intensive surveying, waste segregation, recycling, a nd use of a dministra ti o n a nd
engineering controls. Some examples of waste reduction foUow :

•

Waste minimization efforts have reduced the volume of waste water discharged to
process trenches in the 300 Area by more tha n 5,600 cubic m e te rs (> 1.5 millio n
gaUons) per day. By the end of 1992, waste reduction effo rts had red uce d liquid
waste by more than 22,000 cubic meters (> 5.8 million gaUons) ( Woodruff a nd H a nf

1993).
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In 1991. 440.645 kil ograms (97 1.440 po unds) of ferrou s metals. 49.323 kilograms
( 108,737 pounds) of nonferrous metals. 275 cubic meters (9.076 cubic feet) of wood
scrap, and 136.077 kilograms (299,993 pounds) of scrap paper were recycled.
During 1992. approximately 18 1.440 kil ogra ms (400.000 pounds) of pape r we re
recycled (Woodruff and Hanf 1993).
On-going projects include packaging red uction, waste minimization design. a nd technology
transfer.

Table 4.14-2. Radioactive waste generated on the Hanford Site from 1988-1 990 in kilograms
(excl udi ng mixed waste).
Low- Level Waste

Transuranic Waste

High-Level Waste

1988

3.800,000

1989
1990

8.300.000
3.600,000

21.900
27,200

o
o
o

Ca lendar Yea r

24.500

Source: DOE 199 1.
Databases are used at the Hanford Site to track and manage waste management
information. These databases have been screened to ensure that the information supplied is

processing a t irradIated fuel. sepa ration and extraction of plutonlum and uramum. prepa ratIOn

of plutonium metal. a nd decontamination and decommissioning activities. Between 1943 and

supported by official dat aba s~s. reports, or othe r public documents. Al though the most reliable

1964. 149 single-shell ta nks were built to store liquid radioactive wastes. No new wastes have

data ava ilable have been used to quantify and characterize waste volumes, past waste volumes

been added to these tanks since 1980; much of the liquid waste originally stored in the single-

are imprecise and may be subject to change as characterization of previously disposed waste is

shell tanks has been transferred to some of the 28 one-million gallon double-shell ta nks for safer

undertake n and completed.

storage ( DOE 1993c) .

High-level waste has been accumulating at Hanford since 1944. Most of these high-level

4.14_1 High-Level Waste

wastes have undergone one or more treatment steps (e .g., neutraliza tion , precipitat ion.

High-level radioactive waste is defined in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982
(PL 97-425) as "(A) the high ly radioactive material resulting fro m the reprocessing of SNF,

decantation, or evaporation) and will eventually requ ire incorporation into a stable. solid
med ium (e.g.. glass) for final disposal ( DOE 1993d, 1992b).

including liquid waste produced directly in reprocessing and any soiid mate rial derived from
such !.iq uid waste that conta ins fission products in sufficient concentrations; and ( B) other highly
radi oactive material that the [Nuclear Regulatory Commission], consistent with existing law.

Between 1956 and 1990. the Plutonium and Uranium Recovery th rough EXtraction
(PU REX) plant processed irradiated reactor fuel to extract plutonium and uran iu!!' ( DOE
1982). The wastes from Ihe PU REX process we re placed in double-shell tanks after 1970. and

determines by rul e r equires permanent isola ti on."

are the second high-leve l waste stream ( DOE 1993c).
High-level waste at Hanford was generated from the reprocessing of production reactor
fuel for the recovery of plutonium. ura nium. and neptunium for defense and other national

Cesium and Strontium Capsules: From 1968 to 1985. most of the high-heat emitti ng

programs of spent reactor fuel and irradiated targets. Radioactive waste generated on the

nuclides (strontium-90 and cesium-137. plus their daughters) we re extracted from the old tank

Ha nfe d Site from 1988 through 1990 is shown in Table 4. 14-2.

waste. conve rted to so!.ids (stro ntium fluoride and cesiu m chloride). placed in douhle-walled
metal cylinders (capsules) about 50 centimeters (20 inches) in length and 5 ce ntimeters

4 . 14. 1. 1 Historic Overview. Until recen tly, the primary mission of the Ha nford Site

was production of special nuclear material for defense purposes. Since 1943. the Ha nford Site

(2 inches) in di ameter. which were stored in the Waste Encapsulat ion a nd Storage Facility in
wate r- fill ed pools ( DOE 1993d) .

has been involved in fabrica tion of reactor fue l elements, operation of production reactors,

4 . 14. 1.2 Current Status. The re are two high-level waste streams at Ha nford: the

single-shell tank wastes and do ub le-shell tank PU REX aging wastes. All wastes contained in
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double-shell tanks consist of mixtures of high-level wastes, transuranie waste_ and several lowlevel wastes_ a nd are managed as if they contain high-level waste. The single-shell tank wastes
make up 95 percent of the Hanfo rd Site high-level mixed waste (DOE 1993c).

There are currently 164,000 cubic meters (2 14,500 cubic yards) of wastes in the single-

fifty-nine cesium capsules and 605 strontium capsules a re stored in pools of water in the Waste
Encapsulation and Storage Facility. The capsules will be stored at Hanford until they can be
transported to a proposed national repository ( DOE 1992d).

4_14,2 Transuranlc Waste

shell tanks, which are managed as high-level waste. The waste is multi-phased: most is sludge
with interstitial liquids; some is in the fo rm of crystalline solids, and there are some superna tant
liquids present in the tanks. There are curre ntly 92,000 cubic meters ( 120,000 cubic ya rds) of
PUREX wastes in the double-shell ta nks (DOE 1992e).

Transuranic waste is defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.c. 20 14[ee]) as
"materia l contaminated with elements that have an atomic numbe r greater tha n 92, including
neptunium. plutonium , americium, and curium, and that are in concentrations greater than

10 nanocuries per gram, or in such other concentrations as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
No known treatment is currently possible for these two waste streams, although it is

may prescribe to protect the public health and safety."

planned to treat high-level wastes in the Hanford Waste Vitrification Plan t, for which
construction is scheduled to begin in 2002, with an operational start date in 2009 (DOE 1993c).

Transuranic waste is primarily generated by research and development activities,
plu tonium recovery. weapons manufacturing, e nviro nme ntal restoration, and decontamination

No high-level wastes are expected to be generated in 1995 from SNF management

activities.

and decommissioning. Most transuranic waste exists in solid form (e.g., protective clothing,
paper trash, rags, glass, miscellaneous tools, and equipment). Some transuranic waste is in
liquid form' (sludges) resulting from chemical processing for recovery of plutonium or other

Cesium and Strontium Capsules: The total number of cesium capsules produced is 1,577.

transuranic elements.

As of August 19, 1993, the number of known dismantled cesium capsules is 249; these have been
put to be neficial use a nd are not expected to be returned. The total number of remaining
capsules requiring disposa l is 1,328. Of the 1,328 remaining capsules, 959 are in storage at
Hanford, and 369 capsules have been leased for beneficial use. One of these capsules developed
a small leak, a nd others have shown signs of bulging, so current plans are to bring aU leased
capsules back to the Hanford Site (DOE 1993d).

4,14,2_1 Historic Overview, Prior to 1970 all DOE-generated transuranic waste was

disposed of onsite in shallow, unlined trenches. From 1970 to 1986, transuranic wastes were
segrega ted from other waste types and disposed in trenches designated for retrieval. Since 1986
all tra nsuranic waste has been segregated and placed in retrievable storage pe nding shipment
and final disposal in a permanent geologic repository ( DOE 1992d, 1993g).

The total number of strontium capsules produced is 640. As of August 19, 1993, the
num ber of kn own dismantled strontium capsules is 35; these have been put to beneficial use and
are not expected to be returned. The total number of remaining capsules requiring disposal is
605. Of the 605, 60 1 are in storage at Hanford, and 4 have been leased offsite for beneficial
use.

4 , 14, 2 ,2 Current Status, Currently, all transuranic wastes are stored in above-grade
storage facilities in the Hanfo rd Central Waste Complex and Transura nic Waste Storage and
Assay Facility. The plan is to ship the stored tra nsuranic waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot
Plant near Carlsbad, New Mexico for final disposal. The inventory of transuranie wastes is given
in Table 4. 14-3,

Therefore, at present 1.328 cesium capsules (2.47 cubic meters - 3.23 cubic yards) and 605

4,14_3 Mixed Low-Level Waste

strontium capsules ( 1.08 cubic meters - 1.41 cubic ya rds) require storage. Nine-hundred and
Mixed low-level waste is defin ed as mixtures of low-level radioactive materials and
(chemically a nd/ or physically) hazardous wastes. Typica lly, mixed low-level waste includes a
4-119
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Table 4. 14-3. Tra nsuranic waste inventory through 199 1'.
Disposition of TR U Waste

It is expected that of all the mixed low· level wastes at Hanford. 49 percent ca nnot be

Mass of TR U Nuclides (kilograms)

Buried Waste

Retr ievable Storage

Volume
(c uhic meters)
109.000"

346
480

treated until the (echnology is modified or ve rified. The rem ain ing 5 1 perce nt is to be proc·
essed through the 242A·Evaporator (a clcsed system in which distillates are passed th rough a n
ion·exchange syste m to remove cesium) (DOE 1993c).

10.200
In 1992. eight defue led submarine reactor compartment disposal packages were rece ived

a. Source: DOE I 992d. Figures 3.3-3.6.
b. This num ber includes soils contaminated with TRUs.

a nd placed in Trench 94 of the 200·East Area Low-Level Waste Burial Grou nds (Woodru ff and

va riety of contaminated materials, including air filters, clea ning materials, engine o ils and grease.

pai nt residues. photographic materials, soils. building materials. and decommissioned plant

Hanf 1993). The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Progra m will prepare an EIS for the ir proposal to
bu ry additional reactor compartments at Hanford. As of November 1993. there were a tota l of
35 subma rin e reactor compartments stored in Trench 94.

eq uipment.

4. 14.3 . 1 Historic Overview. Between 1987 and 199 1, 16.745 cubic meters (2 1.902 cubic

ya rds) of mixed low·level waste were buried at the Hanford Site (between 1944 and 1986. no

Mixed low·leve l wastes generated in 1995 from SNF management activities will total 0.4
cubic mete rs (0.6 cubic ya rds).

differentiation was made between low·level a nd low-level mixed wastes); all buried low-level
wastes from that peri od are reported in subsection 4. 14.4). Another 4.225 cu ic meters
(5.526 cubic yards) of mixed waste has been accumulating in storage in the Central Waste
Complex. located in the 200·West Area (DOE 1993d).

4.14.4 Low-Level Waste

Low·level radi oactive waste is defin ed in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982
(PL 97·425) as "radioactive material that (A) is not high·level radioactive waste. spent nuclear

The Ha nfo rd Site also receives defueled subm arin e reactor compartments, which are
contaminated wi th PCBs and lead. These compa rtments are ma naged as mixed waste. Several
compa rt ments a re received each yea r and placed in a trench in the 200·East Area ( DO E 1993b).

fu el. transuranic waste. or by·product material...; and (B) the (Nuclear Regulatory Commission].
consistent with existing law. classifies as low·level radioactive waste." By·product materi al is
defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.c. 20 14(e)(2)] as "( I) any radioactive
materia l (except special nuclear materi al) yielded in or made radi oactive by exposure to the
rad iation incident to the process of produci ng or ut ilizing specia l nuclear ma teri al. and (2) the

4 . 14. 3.2 Current Status. In 1992.56.245 kilogra ms ( 124.000 pounds) of mixed low·level

waste we re generated. The 78 mixed low· level waste strea ms at Hanfo rd ma ke up 85,000 cubic

ta ilings or wastes produced by the extraction or concentration of ura nium or thorium fro m any
ore processed prim arily for its source material content."

mete rs ( 111. 176 cubic ya rds) of waste ( 10 1,3 14,863 kilograms· 223.36 1.0 10 pounds). Ninety·six
percent of the total is beta/gam ma emitting waste in the fo rm of mostly aqueo us liquid in the
double·shell ta nks. One strea m (double·shell ta nk miscellaneous waste) accounts fo r
40.000 cubic mete rs (52.318 cubic ya rds) of the mixed low·level wastes. and in cJ mbination.
the double·shell tank Double·She ll Slu rry Feed. double·shell tank Complex Concentrate and
double·shell tan k Double·Shell Slur ry make up another 34.500 cubic meters (45,1 24 cubic ya rds).
Three mixed low·level waste streams related to the 183·H Solar Evaporation Basi n cleaning

Commercial fuellow·level waste can be ge nerated by fuel fab rication and reactor
operatio ns. Low·level waste also results fro m commercia l operatio ns by private orga nizations
that are licensed to use rad ioactive materials. These include inst itutions e ngaged in research

and va rio us medical and industri al activities. Some low· level waste is also ge nerated by DOE
environme ntal restoratio n activities. Other low· level wastes will be gene rated in future yea rs by
routine decomm issioning and decontamination opera tions.

made up 2.500 cubic mete rs (3.270 cubic yards) of wastes. These inorga nic sludge/particulate
wastes have been neutralized a nd treated for packaging ( DOE 1993c).

VOLUME 1. APPENDIX A. ,\P Rl L 1995

VO I.l; ~IE

I. ;\PPE:"'DlX A APRIL 1995

4· 122

1&6

4.14.4.1 Historic Overview. From 1944 to 1991 , approximately 558.916 cubic rr:eters

In 1995, 174.5 cubic meters (228.3 cubic yards) of low-level wastes will be generated from

(731.034 cubic yards) of low-level waste was buried at Hanford (DOE 1993d). Between 1944

SNF management activities. Of this amount, 167.2 cubic meters (218.7 cubic yards) are contact

and 1986, no differentiation was made between low-level and low-level mixed wastes - all data

handled, and 7.3 cubic meters (9.6 cunic yards) are remote handled.

from that pe riod are reported in this section. Another 130 cubic meters (170 cubic yards) was
placed into storage.

4_14.5 Hazardous Waste

U.S. Ecology operates a licensed commercial low-level waste burial ground at Hanford on

Hazardous waste is defined in the State of Washington Dangerous Waste Regulations

a site that is leased to the State of Washington. Although physically located on the Hanford

(WAC 173-303) as solid waste designated by 40 CFR Part 261 and regulated as haza rdous

Site, it is not considered part of the Hanford facility.

wastes by the EPA. The State of Washington designates wastes as either "dangerous waste" or

The site area is 40 hectares (99 acres). of

which 29.5 hectares (72.9 acres) is considered usable, with 11.9 hectares (29.4 acres) used by the

"extremely hazardous waste." Hazardous wastes are generated during normal facility operations

end of 1991. Through 1991 338,500 cubic meters (442,741 cubic yards) of low-level wastes had

a nd environmental restoration activities at the Hanford Site (Table 4.14-5).

been disposed of at this site (DOE 1992d).
Mixed wastes are wastes that contain both hazardous waste (regulated under the
4 _14.4.2 Current Status. Solid low-level waste currently is placed in unlined, near-

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act) and radioactive waste (regulated under the Atomic

surface trenches at the 200-Area Low-Level Waste Burial Grounds. Onsite sources at the

Energy Act). The following special nuclear mate rial production and site restoration activities

Hanford Site generated about 4500 square meters of low-level waste in 1992. Table 4.14-4 lists

have generated or may generate mixed waste:

quantities of radioactive materials received at the Hanford Site from offsite generators over
5 years. The site continues to receive low-level waste from offsite generators for disposal.

fabrication of reactor fuel elements

Major sources of this waste have been the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard in Washington, Brook-

operation of the production reactors

haven National Laboratory in New York, and Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory in California.

processing of irradiated fuel

Other points of origin include DOE facilities at nuclear power stations in Shippingport,

sepa ration and extraction of plutonium and uranium

Pennsylvania; Bechtel in Albany, Oregon; and Wood River in Charleston, Rhode Island (DOE

preparation of plutonium metal

1993d). The U.S. Ecology commercial low-level burial ground continues to operate.

•

Table 4_14-4. Offsite low-level waste receipts summary (from 1987 through 1991).'

•

enviro nmental restoration (Le., soil and groundwater clean up )
research and development support projects

Year

Volume (m 3)

Activity (curies)

1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

7,000
5,000
600
5,500
5,300

68,000
107,000
1,500
240,000
489,000

Table 4_14-5. Hazardous waste generated on the Hanford Site from 1988 through 1992
(including mixed waste).
Mixed waste
Hazardous
Total (t)
(t)
waste (t)
Calendar year
1988
1989
1990
199 1
1992

a. Source: Draft Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Fiscal Year 1993 SiteSpecific Plan for the Richland Field Office (DOE 1993d). (Does not include waste quantities
received at the U.S. Ecology low-level burial ground.)

4-123

1(;;10

VOLUME 1. APPENDIX A. APRIL 1995

maintenance and operations support.

VO L U ~E

1. APPE:":DlX A. APRI L 1995

25,000
9400
12.000
4600
3400

80,000
66,000
780
330
620
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105,000
75,000
13.000
4900
4000

Tank wastes constitute 99 percent of the mixed wastes at the Hanford Site. The Ha nford

The principal present wa ste management practice for newly generated nonradioactive

Site currently has 233,689 cubic meters (305,654 cubic yards) of mixed wastes stored in these

hazardous waste is to ship it offsite for treatment, recycling, recovery. and/or disposal. The

tanks: 145,952 cubic meters (190,898 cubic yards) of high·level waste, 3,935 cubic meters (5. 147

Nonradioactive Dangerous Wa st~ Storage Facility (616 Building) and the 305·B Waste Storage

cubic yards) of mixed transuranic waste, and 84,802 cubic mete rs (110,917 cubic yards) of mixed

Facility are the only active facilities storing nonradioactive hazardous waste (other than less than

low·1evel waste. These wastes consist of 108 different waste streams (2 high·level waste, 22

90.day storage areas) (DOE 1992d. 1993d). other than two boxes (one conta,ning mixed and one

mixed transuranic waste, and 84 mixed low·level waste). Of the 108 identified waste streams, 97

containing nonradioactive waste) stored in the 222·S laboratory complex.

are still being generated. Additional environmental restoration waste streams are expected.
Their numbers and types remain to be determined (DOE 1993c).

Hazardo us wastes generated in 1995 from SNF management activities will total 2.2 cubic
meters (2.9 cubic yards).

The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act components of mixed waste at the Hanford
Site are mainly the following listed wastes: D002B (alkaline liquids, 22 streams), D006B

4.14.6 Industrial Solid Waste

(cadmium, 29 streams), D007 (chromium, 34 streams), D008B (lead, 30 streams), and F003
(nonchlorinated solvents, 30 streams). Waste sou rces are primarily the separations and
extraction processes that were used to produce special nuclear material (DOE 1993c).

4.14.5.1 Historic Overview. In the past, hazardous waste generated at Hanford was

Solid wastes a re generated in all areas of the Hanford Site. Nondangerous solid wastes
include the following nonradioactive, nonhazardous wastes:

(a)

construction debris, office trash, cafeteria waste/ga rbage, empty containers, and
packaging materials, medical waste, inert materials, bulky items ouch as appliances
and furniture, solidified filter backwash and sludge from the treatme nt of fiver
water, failed and broken equipment and tools, air filters, uncontaminated used
gloves and other clothing, and certai n chemical precipitates such as oxalates

(b)

nonradioactive friable asbestos (regulated under the Clean Air Act)

(c)

ash generated from powerhouses

(d)

nonradioactive demolition debris from decommission projects.

either shipped offsite, recycled, or treated onsite. Hazardous waste was also disposed of on site
(e.g., buried in trenches, burial grounds, or discharged to cribs or directly to the soil). For
example, from 1943 through 1945, acids from a pipe·c1eaning operation were discharged to the
soil through two side·by·side cribs in ail area west of the old White Bluffs townsite. From 1955
through 1973. approximately 379·2,271 cubic meters (100,000·600,000 gallons) of organic liquids,
including carbon tetrachloride, were discharged to the soil in the 200·West Area. Drums
conta ining approximately 19 cubic mete rs (5.000 gallons) of organic solvent (primarily hexane)
were buried at the 6 18·9 burial ground north of the 300 Area. Many of these disposal sites have
been or will be closed under RCRA or remediated under CERCLA (DOE 1993d).

4.14.6. 1 Historic Overview. Both prior to a nd after establishment of the reservation,

a number of landfills have been used on the Hanford Site for solid ',vaste disposal, including the
4 . 14. 5.2 Current Status. As of March IS, 1993, the Hanford Site contained 64 interim

status treatment, storage, or disposal units. Present plans are that final RCRA permits will be

Horn Rapids. Central, Original Central. White Bluffs. East White Bluffs, Wahluke Slope and
Hanford Townsite Landfills.

sought for 24 of these 64 interim status treatment, storage, or disposal units. Thirty·four units
will be closed under interim status. Six units will be dispositioned through other regulatory
options. Future circumstances may cause these numbers to change. The treatment, storage, or

disposal un its within the Hanford facility include, but are not limited to, tank systems, surface
impo undments. container storage areas, waste piles. landfills, and miscellaneous units. Other
RCRA perm its, such as research, development, arid demonstration permits (for example, the
200·Area Liquid Effluent Treatment Facility), are also being pursued (DOE 1993d).
4· 125
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The active Hanford Site Solid Waste Landfill. located in the 200·Area. bega n operatio n in
1973. Nondangerous wastes in category (a) above are buried in the solid waste section of the
Solid Waste Landfill. located in the 200·Area. Nonradioactive friable asbestos is buried in
designated areas at the Solid Waste Landfill. The nonradioactive dangerous waste section of th e
landfill was closed to chemicals in January 1985, and closed to asbestos in May 1988. Ash
generated at powerhouses in the 200·East and 200· West Areas is buried in designated sites near
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those powerhouses. Demolition waste from 100·Area decommissioning projects is buried in situ

4. 14. 7. 1 Historic Overview. H aza rd~ s che micals are used thrOughout the Hanford

or in designated sites in the 100 Areas (Woodruff and Hanf 1993; WHC 1993b). Solid waste

Site in facility and environmenta l restoration operations. The types of chemicals in inventory

has also been sent to the City of Richland landfill.

on site tend to be static since Hanford's mission involves mainly remediation a nd decontamination and decommissioning (as opposed to production or processing). The amount of

4 . 14. 6.2 Current Status. [n 1992,22,2 13 cubic meters (29,054 cubic ya rds) of solid

chemicals actuaUy on site changes from day to day, and there is no requirement to keep a real·

waste and 1,0 17 cubic meters (1,330 cubic yards) of asbestos were deposited in the solid waste

time inventory of the quantity of chemicals on site at anyone time. Also, the percentage of

section of the Solid Waste Landfill. Pit 10 was opened for disposal of inert material as defined

haza rdous chemicals used on site that eventuaUy become hazardous waste cannot be determined.

in Washington Administ rative Code (WAC) 173·304, and a total of 11,389 cubic meters
( 14,986 cubic yards) were disposed of there. A summary of the solid waste disposed of at the
Hanford Site from 1973 through 1992 is shown in T3ble 4.14·6. The landfill is currently

4.14.7.2 Current Status. The Hazardous Materials Inventory Database currently being

u.<ed to generate Tier 2 data indicates that approximately 1484 hazardous chemicals are

scheduled for closure in 1997 (WHC 1993b). Quantities of solid waste disposed of at the City of

reported in inventory at over 783 locations on the Hanford Site. These 1484 chemicals are

Richland Landfill are not readily available.

contained in approximately 2926 different hazardous materials, in weights that range from

4.14.7 Hazardous Materials

(78,614,420 pounds).

less than 0.5 kilograms (one pound) to a maximum inventory of 35,658,872 kilograms

A hazardous chemical is any chemical that poses a physic" 1 or health hazard [as defined
in 29 CFR 1900. 1200(c)]. The Emergency Plan ning and Communi ty Right·to·Know Act sets
forth reporting requirements (Tier I and Tier 2) that provide the public with information on

The DOE has prepared chemical inventory reports required by the Emergency Planni ng
and Community Right·to·Know Act since 1988 (for calendar year 1987). In 1992 the Emergency

haza rdous chemicals to enhance community awareness of chemical hazards and facilitate the

Planning and Community Right·to·Know Act reporting threshold was exceeded for 53 haza rd ous

development of state and local emergency response plans.

chemicals.

Table 4.14-6. 1973· 1992: Historical annual volume of onsite buried solid sanitary waste in cubic
meters per yea r.
Volume (mJ/ ycar)

Wasle Typt
Construction
Debris a

73-8 1
4.149

82

83

5.819

9,494

84

10.378

as
10.789

86
14,254

87
14,316

88

12.842

87

90

12.469

10,088

91

92

5.666

7,330

M'elalsb

1.383

1.940

3.165

3,459

3.596

4,751

4.m

4.28 \

4,156

3,363

1.889

2.443

Pape r

5.658

7.936

12,946

14.15\

14.712

\9,437

19.522

17.512

17,003

13,757

7.727

9,996

M'isce llaneousc

Total

1.383

1,940

3.165

3,459

3.569

4,751

4.m

4,28 1

4, 156

3.363

\ ,889

2.443

12.573

17,635

28,n O

31,447

32.694

4),}93

43,382

38.916

37.78.5

30.571

17.170

22.213

a. Construction Debris: Volume is calculated basc::d o n disposal volume (excludi ng asbestos) at the onsite landfill : Construction
deb ns 33 perce nt : \ 1eta ls 11 percent. Paper 45 percent, Miscellaneous Waste II percent.
b. \ lctals: Sec note b above. Category consists of large bulky items such as appliances and furniture.
c. ~1 i.sce ll a n eo us: Ca tego ry includcs garbage. paCkaging. empty containers, medical waste and inert materials.

4·127

1'70

VOLUME I. APPENDIX A, APRIL 1995

VOLU\l E I. APPENDIX A. AP rUL 1995

4· 128

VII

5. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES

of fuel would continue to establish a safety envelope for extended interim storage, fuel wo uld be
conta inerized at the 105-KE Basin. and the first \0 dry storage casks wou ld he procured for

Descriptions of analyses for various pote ntial e nvironmenta l consequences as a result of

FFTF fuel.

impleme nting I) No Action, 2) Decentralization, 3) 1992/1993 Planning Basis, 4) Regionaliza tion, a nd 5) Centralization Alternatives for interim storage of SNF for the Hanfo rd Site are
presented in the following subsections. By and large these discussions are at the progra mmatic
level because in many cases specific alternative treatments and locations, particularly for new
facilities, have not been identified for the Hanford Site.

Results presented in the Hanford Site Envi ronmental Report for 1992 (Woodruff and
Hanf 199:\) suggest that under normal conditions no significant environmental effects wo uld he
associated with the No Action Alternative, For exa mple, the radiation dose to the maxima lly
exposed individual in the Ha nfo rd environs from all HaOlford sources was calculated to have
heen 0.02 mrem and the collective population dose was 0.8 person-rem during 1992. Continued

5.1 Overview

storage of SNF contributed only a small portion of those doses. No health effect s wo uld be
expected as a result of such small doses. For perspective, the Hanford Site doses for 1992 may

An overview of the various alternat ives and a brief summary of potential pnvironmental

consequences of interest are provided in the following subsections. For purposes of this pro-

be compared to ann ual individual doses of 300 mrem and an annual collective dose of about
100,000 person-re m from natural background radiation .

gramma tic analysis, all new facilities were assumed to be constructed in a qu arte r section of land
adjacent to the 200·East Area; commitment of that amount of land within the industrialized

5_1_2 Decentralization Alternative

200 Areas would be consistent with the site mission and would not represent a conOict on land
use. Up to 15 percent of that area would be disturbed during construction of storage and
support facilities where required. A survey of the area described revealed no threatened and

The Decentraliza tion Alternative would consider additio nal facility upgrades over those
considered in the No Action Alternative, specifically, new wet storage (for defen se prod uction

endange red species or cultural resources. Routine operations under any of the alternatives

fuel only) or dry storage facilities, fu el stabilization via shear/ leach/ca lcination or shear/ leach/

would not add significantly to current occupational or near·zero public exposure to radiation.

solvent extraction, wit h research and development activities to support SNF ma nage ment.

Although not quantified, no significant addi tions to current releases of criteria pollutants or
other haza rd ous mate ri als would be expected from implementing any of the altern atives.

Impacts from storage prior to implementation of new wet or dry storage or fu e ls

However, such implementation requires a smaU increase in Hanford's e lectrical power

stabilization wo uld not differ fro m those indicated for the No Actio n Alternative. In the evenl

consumpt ion; the la rgest increase wo uld be less than \.5 percent. The influx of w.o,kers would

new storage fac ilities are selected some impacts wou ld be associated with construction of th os~

probably increase competition for desirable housing and strain teacher/student ratios in some

faci lities. A proposed site has been identified comprising one-quarter section of land adjacent to

loca l school districts, the extent of which (altho ugh small in any case) would depend on the

Ihe 200-Easl Area where any new facilities associated wilh SNF storage or stabil ization thaI

option chosen.

mighl be necessary would be assumed to be built. The area has been surveyed both for
threa tened and endangered species and for the presence of cultural resources; none we rt! fo und.

5,1,1 No Action Alternative

However, one federal ca ndidale species, Ihe loggerhead shrike, a nd one slate ca ndidate species.
the sage sparrow, were seen. Use of thi s area is consistent wi th the Hanforo mission an d wou ld

The No Action Alternative identifies the minimum actions dee med necessary for

impact no threa tened or endangered biota. Construction would take place on up to 15 perc~ nt

contin ued safe and secure storage of SNF at the Hanford Site. Upgrade of the existing facilities

of the selected site. Constru ction activities wo uld result in dust generation an d various amount s

would not occur othe r tha n as required to e nsure safety and security. No receipt of fu els from

of poliulanlS released from diesel-fueled equipment : howeve r. concentral ions al points of public

offsite would occur. No resea rch and development would take place; however, cha racterization
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access are expected to be we lJ be low permiss ible levels. Impacts associa ted with SN F storage

Fac il ities and fea tures of Regio nalization B1 and B2 options wo uld be incremental to

would he expected to be less th an th ose in th e No Action A lternative.

those desc rihed for th e Dece ntraliza tio n A lte rn ative and would he si milar. hut not identical. to
tho st.' dt.'scrihed in th e Centraliza tio n Max imum Alt ernat ive.

Resea rch a nd development of technologies for SNF stabiliza ti on would be und ert aken in
existi ng hot cell facilit ies in the 300 A rea. A ltho ugh no t exa mined in detail fo r th is program·

Facilit ies and fea tures of Regionaliza tion C would be equ ivalent to those descrihed for

matic analys is, no imp ortant env iro nm e ntal conseque nces have resu lt ed fro m wo rk in th ese

the Centr aliza ti o n Minimum Alternative.

fa<.:ilit ies and none wo uld be anticipa ted fo r deve lopme nt activit ies re lated to fue l process ing.

5.1 .5 Centralization Alternative
5.1.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative
Two optio ns exist at th e Hanford Site for the Centraliza tion A lternative : 1) shipme nt of
The 1992/ 1993 Pla nni ng Basis Altern ative d iffe rs fro m th e Decentra liza ti on A ltern ative

aU fuel with in the DOE complex to th e Hanford Site for manage ment and sto rage. and 2) ship·

only in th at TRIG A fu el cu rrently stored at the H anford Site wo uld he shipped to INEL for

men t of a ll fu el off of th e Hanfo rd Site. In the former option. dry storage of aU fuel sent to th e

storage. The storage and stabiliza tion options ide ntified fo r the Decentralizat ion A lt ernative are

Hanfo rd Site from offsite wo uld be assum ed. A facility equ ivalent to th e decentraliza tio n sub·

also assu med for the 1992/93 Plann ing Bas is A I",rn ative and that discussio n is not repeated

optio ns wo uld be assumed fo r processing of SNF prior to storage; fuel received fro m offsite

her ~.

The potential impacts of transporta ti on o f TRIGA fu el to INE L a re covered in

wo uld have bee n stabilized fo r dry sto rage prior to receipt. The consequences of imple menting

Append ix I.

th is optio n would be large r th an those of the Decentralizati on Altern ative. In th e option of
tra nsferr ing aU Hanfo rd fu el to ano th er site. a fu el stabilization and packaging fac ili ty wo uld

5.1.4 Regionalization Alternative

need to be constructed to pre pare existin g fuel for shipment.

T he Regiona liza tion Alte rn ative as it app lies to the Hanford Site co nta ins th e fo llowi ng

5.2 Land Use

optio ns:

A)

Im p lications of implementing th e alte rn atives fo r interim sto rage of SNF on land use at

All SNF. exce pt de fen se prod uctio n SN F. wo uld he se nt to INE L.

the Ha nford Site are d iscussed in th e fo Uowing subsections.
B 1) All SNF wes t of the Mississippi Rive r. except Naval SNF would be se nt to H anford.
B2 ) All SNF west of the Mississippi River a nd Nava l SNF wo uld be se nt to Ha nfo rd.

C)

5.2.1 No Action Alternative

All Hanford SNF would be se nt to INEL or Nevada Test Site (NTS).
No new SNF fac ilities wo uld he buut at th e Hanford Site; thus. land use patterns would
remain as described in Secti.l n 4.2 and have no impact o n the ex isting e nviron me nt. The

Facilities and features of Regi onalization A would be the same as those descr ibed for

Hanfo rd defense productio n fu el in the Decentraliza tio n Alte rn at ive. T he faci lities and fea tures
for a ll o th er Hanfo rd SNF wou ld be very si milar to those described fo r th at spent nucl ea r fuel in

Hanford Site would rema in a fede ral facili ty ded icated to nuclear resea rch and deve lopment and
e nvi ro nme nta l cleanu p. Othe r continuing activiti es wo uld in clude waste manageme nt. commercia l power production, eco logical research, and wi ldlife manageme nt. as described in Section 4.2.

th e Central iza ti on Minimum A lt ernative.
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5.2.2 Decentralization Alternative

5.2.4 Regionalization Alternative

This alternative would req uire the co nstruction o f an SNF facility for fuel manageme nt
and storage. Most SNF fro m th e Hanford Site would be stored at that facility.

Constructio n of facilities in support o f th e Regionalization A lternative as it applies to the
Hanford Site wou ld result in th e following disturbance of native vegetati on and land use
co mmitment s:

Histo rically, the Hanford Site has been used for nuclea r mate ri als prod uction. The
const ruct ion and ope ration of an SNF facility would be co nsiste nt with this historical use.

A)

Off·site land use wo uld not be affected by const ructi on and ope rations of an SNF facility, except
to the exte nt that some undeveloped la nds probably would be developed for wo rke r housing.
Such development would be subject to local land use and zo ning controls, which vary by
jurisdiction. No project facilities would be located offsite.

From abo ut 2 to 7 hectares (6 to 18 acres) when all SNF, except defense production
SNF would be sent to INEL.

BI) From abo ut 14 to 17 hecta res (36 to 43 acres) when all SNF west of the Mississippi
Rive r, except Naval SNF would be sent to Hanford.
B2) From about 24 to 27 hectares (6 1 to 68 acres) when all SNF west of the Mississippi
River and Naval SNF would be sent to H anford.

No direct or indirect effects would occur to wildlife refuges on the H anford Site because
SNF activities wo uld not be close to these areas. Similarly, no dir ect or indirect effects would

C)

From about 2 to 5 h~cta res (6 to 12 acres) when all H anford SNF wo uld be sent to
INEL o r NTS.

occur to th e Columbia Rive r. Although construction at the SNF site would disturb native
vegetatio n (Section 5.9. 1), on up to 7 hectares ( 18 acres) of the 65·hectare (160-acre) site, this
would involve only a small part of si milar natural habitat at Hanford. The use of Hanford as a

These areas involve only a small part of similar natural ha bitat at Hanford. The use of
Hanford as a National Environmental Resea rch Park would not be significantly affected.

Natio nal Environmental Research Park would not be significantly affected.

5.2.5 Centralization Alternative
No impacts req uiring mitigat ion would occur to land uses a result of construction or
If Hanford is selected as th e si te for implement ing the Centralization Alternative, th e

operation of an SNF facili ty at the Hanfo rd Site.

SNF facility and its support facilities (i ncl uding a new Expended Core Facilirj) would be
co nstructed. The impacts of such co nstruction wo uld be esse nti ally th e sa me as those presented

5.2.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative

fo r the Decentralization Alternative. Although co nstruction at the SNF site wou ld disturb native
The 1992/ 1993 Pla nning Basis Alternative differs from the Decentralizati on Alternative
only in that TRIGA fuel currently stored a t the Hanfo rd Site may be shipped to lNEL for

vegetation (Section 5.9. 1) on up to 37 hectares (93 acres) of th e 65-hectare ( 160-ac re) site, this
would involve only a small part of similar natural habitat at Hanford. In addition to the above

storage. Thus. land use wou ld be essent ially the sa me as in the Decentraliza tion Alternative.

total, new construction would also include construction of a new Expe nded Core Facility for fuel

Although constr ucti on at the SNF site would disturb native vegetation (Sectio n 5.9. 1). on up to

from the Naval Nuclear PropUlsion Program . The use of Ha nford as a Na ti onal Environ mental

7 hectares ( 18 ac res) of the 65·hectare ( 160-acre) site, this wo uld involve only a small part of

Research Park would not be significan tly affected.

similar natural habi tat at Hanford. The use of H anford as a National Environmental Resea rch
If Hanford is not selected as th e site for ce ntra lization of SNF, an SNF stab iliza tio n and

Park wo uld not be significantly affected.

packaging facility would be built to prepare the fuel fo r transport offsite. This faci lity would
have so mew hat smaller const ructi on requirements th an wou ld be required fo r sto rage of all
DOE SNF at Hanford. The land use impacts would be simila r to those described for th e
Regionaliz" tion optio n C.
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5.2.6 Effects of Alternatives on Treaty or Other Reserved Rights of Indian Tribes
and Individuals

the state of Oregon. the majority of the impacts would be confined to the Benton-Frank lin County
region and the Tri-C ities (Richland . Kennewick . and Pasco) (see Figure 4-2).

The Yakama Indian Nation and the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian
Reservation acq uired certa in rights and privileges in the 1855 treaty. These rights and privileges
are also claimed by the Wanapum Tribe. In Article III. of the 1855 treaty it states that "The
exclusive right of taki ng fish in aU streams, where funning through or bordering sa id reserva tion,

is further secured to sa id confederated tribes and bands of Indians. as also the right of taking
fish at all usual and accustomed places, in common with citizens of the Territory, a nd of erecting

The socioeconomic impacts are classified in terms of direct and secondary effects. Changes
in Hanford employment and expenditures are classified as direct effects. while changes that result
from Hanford regional purchases . nonpayroll expenditures. and payroll spending by Hanford
employees are classified as secondary effects. The IOtal socioeconomic impact within the region is
the sum of the direct and secondary effects .

temporary buildings for curing them; together with the privilege of hunting, gathering roots and
berries, and pasturing their horses and cattle upon open unclaimed land.'"

Although access to the Hanford Site has bee n restricted, tribal members have expressed
an interest in re newing their use of these resources in accordance with the Treaty of 1855, and
the DOE is assisting them in this effort. In keeping with this effort, each of the alternatives

Estimates of total employment impacts were calculated using the Regional Input-Output
Modeling System developed for the Hanford region of influence by the U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis. This assessment repons the changes in employment and earnings based on historic data .
which indicate that 93 percent of Hanford employees reside in the Benton-Franklin county area.
Table 4.3- 1 in Section 4.3 presents the baseline projections from which comparisons can be made .

would provide for the rights and privileges identified in the treaty:

Taking Fish - The alternatives considered in this document would not reduce access
to fishing locations on the Hanford Site.
Hunting. Gathering Roots a nd Berries and Pasturing Livestock - The No Action
Alternative would not further reduce the areas potentially available for hunting,
gathering roots and berries, or pasturing livestock. All existing fenced areas
assigned for SNF storage and a suitable buffer zone would likely remain unavailable
for these activities. All other alte rnatives w;Juld require the construction of new
facilities. This would further reduce the land base available for hunting, gathering,
a nd past uring. This impact could be on the order of 18 acres.

All employment comparisons are made relative to the regional employment projections and
not current Hanford Site employment projections. While a down-turn in Hanford Site employment
is anticipated. the extent of the down-turn is unknown. The effect of such a down-turn on the
region's employment projection used in this analysis is expected to be minimal because the regional
projection. released in 1992. assumed a more stable rate of growth than the actual "boom"

experienced in recent years.

5.3.1 No Action Alternative

5.3 Socioeconomics
Under the No Action Alternative. only the minimum actions required for continued safe
The followi ng section describes the socioeconomic impacts of the SNF project at the
Hanford Site. For the a nalysis, a ten·county region of influence was identified. While the
region of influence covers the counties of Adams, Benton, Columbia, Franklin, Grant, Walla
Walla, and Yakima in the state of Was hington; and Morrow, Umatilla, and Wallowa counties in

and secure storage of SNF would occur. No new facilities would be constructed . and only minimal
facility upgrades would take place . It is assumed that existing personnel wou ld be utilized under

this alternative. and therefore no incremental socioeconomic consequences are anticipated.
Socioeconomic conditions wou ld continue as described in Section 4.3.

a. These treaty rights and privileges are subject to diverse interpretations. None of the lands
contemplated for use for SNF processing a nd /or storage at Hanford were on "open unclaimed la nd"
when the government established the Hanford Site.
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5.3.2 Decentralization Alternative

Under the Decentralization Alternative, significant facility development and upgrades are
permitted, with various suboptions defined for processing and storage of the SNF . The socioeconomic consequences related to implementing the decentralizatioll alternatives are described in this
subsection. The employment and population impacts related to construction and operation of the
Decentralization Alternative suboptions are presented in Table 5.3- 1. It was assumed that up to
300 current Hanford workers could be reassigned to operation activities (this number excludes
current workers at the Fast Flux Test Facility because it was assumed that they would be
reassigned to activities related to the Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant) . Construction activities
were assumed to require new workers coming into the area . Estimates of direct jobs were
provided by Bergsman (1995). For construction activity, direct jobs were reported as number of
jobs in the peak year and total person-years because it was assumed that construction activities
would "ramp-up" to the peak year, and then "ramp-down," with the total number of jobs related to
construction activity equaling the total person-years required, as reported in Bergsman (1995) .
Increases in activity levels could strain an already tight housing market and add to school-capacity
concerns. However , because construction activities are short-term relative to the total project time
frame, impacts from construction activities may be overstated.

5.3.2.1 Employment. All construction activity is assumed to peak in 1998 . Construction
activity for storage options W, X, Y, and Z occurs in the years 1997-2000; construction activity
for processing suboptions P and Q occurs in the years 1998-200 I. Increases in employment range
from 221 (suboption X) to 1.094 (suboptions Y and P) and equate to between 0.3 and 1.3
percentage points over baseline regional employment projections (see Table 4 .3-1). All operations
activity peaks in 2002, with incremental activity tapering off. Increases in employment range from
442 (suboptions Z and P) to 880 (suboptions Q and Small Vault) persons and equate to between 0.5
and 1.0 percentage points over baseline regional employment projections. Beyond 2004 ,
operations activity will taper off as processing activities (suboptions P and Q) will occur only
through 2005 . Suboptions Y and Z each require only 50 workers beyond 2005 for operations
activity. Because it is anticipated that up to 300 current workers could be reassigned , no
incremental socioeconomic impacts are anticipated after 2005 . This is also true with suboptions W
and X because they are assumed to absorb between 200 and 210 current workers for the first two
years of operation (200 1-2002) , with employment requirements falling to between 150 and 95
5-9
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Table 5.3-1 . Comparison of the socioeconomic impacts of spent nuclear fuel Decentralization Alternative suboptions.
Decentralization Alternative
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
Suboption W
Direct jobs
216
181
216
251
0
0
0
0
Secondary jobs
0
0
240
280
240
200
0
0
:t90
Population Change
0
590
680
590
0
0
0
Suboption X
178
irect jobs
0
0
200
221
200
0
0
Secondary jobs
220
240
220
200
0
0
0
0
Population Change
540
600
540
490
0
0
0
0
Suboptions Y and P
Direct jobs
715
464
0
318
1,094
1,033
971
0
Secondary jobs
1,070
350
1,200
1, 130
780
590
0
0
2,810 2,650
Population Change
1,370
0
870 2,980
1,950
0
Suboptions Q and SmaII Vault
Direct jobs
62
947
934
0
0
920
872
880
Secondary Jobs
70
1,040
1,
120
0
0
1,020
1,010
960
Population Change
0
170 2,580 2,540 2,510 2,380
2,610
0
Suboptions Z and P
Direct Jobs
213
935
926
442
0
0
920
715
Secondary Jobs
1,030
1,020
0
0
230
1,010
780
570
Population Change
1,310
0
0
580 2,550 2,530 2,510
1,950
Suboptions Q and Cask
Direct jobs
0
45
917
917
917
872
0
822
Secondary Jobs
1,010
0
50
1,010
1,010
1,050
0
960
POQulation Change
120 2 1500 2 z500 2 z500 2 1380
0
0
2 1430

I~ /

2003

2004

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

464
590
1,370

464
590
1,370

880
1,120
2,610

880
1, 120
2,610

442
570
1,310

442
570
1,310

822
1,050
2,430

822
1,050
2 z430

workers in 2003 and 2004. For the remaining years (2005-2035). suboptions Wand X each would

fuel would be sent to and stored at the Hanford Site (Regionalization B2): and regionalization in

require only 60 workers for operation activities.

which all SNF currently located in the western United States. or to be generated in the western
United States. including all Hanford SNF . would be sent to and stored at another location

5.3.2.2 Population. For construction-related acti vities. the population is expected to peak

(Re gionalization C).

in 1998. with increases in population ranging from 600 (suboption X) to 2.810 (suboptions Y and
P) and equating to between 0.4 and 1.7 percentage points over baseline projections (see Table 4.3-

5.3.4.1 Regionalization A. In this casr. all SNF currentl y located at Hanford . except

I). All operations activity peaks in 2002. with incremental activity tapering off through 2007.

defense production fuel. would be sent to IN EL. For the Hanford Site . the faci lity requirements

Increases in population range from 1.310 (suboptions Z and P) to 2.610 (suboptions Q and Small

for the N reactor and single-pass reactor fuel would be the same as those described in the

Vauit) persons and equate to between 0.7 and 1.5 percentage points over baseline projections

Decentralization Alternative . Facilities for all other Hanford Site fuel would be similar to those

for 2002.

described within the Centralization minimum alternative. The population and employment impacts
related to Regionalization A are presented in Table 5.3-2.

5.3.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative
5.3.4.1.1 Employment. All construction activity is assumed to peak in 1998.

This aiternative defines those activities that were already scheduled at the various sites for

Construction activity for suboptions RAX . RAY. and RAZ occurs in the years 1997-2000 and

the transportation. receipt, processing. and storage of SNF. Under this aiternative. no new spent

construction activity for suboption P occurs in the years 1998-2001. Increases in employment

fuel would be sent to the Hanford Site, but the TRIGA fuel would be shipped offsite. The

range from 176 (suboption RAX) to 1.065 (suboption RAY and P) and equate to between 0.2 and

upgrades of existing storage facilities, as defined in the Decentralization aiternative, were already

1.3 percentage points over baseline projections of regional employment (see Table 4.3- 1). All

planned . so the impacts of the 1992/ 1993 Planning Basis Alternative are essentially the same as

operations activity peaks in 2002. with incremental activity tapering off. Increases in employment

outlined in Subsection 5.3. 2. Because of the shipment of TRIG A fuel, an additional two workers

range from 208 (suboption RAY and P) to 230 (suboption RAZ and P) persons and equate to

per year would be required over 3 years of operation; however, it was assumed that current

between 0.2 and 0.3 percentage points over baseline projections. Beyond 2004. operations activity

personnel would be reassigned to fill these jobs; therefore, the incremental impacts would be the

will taper off as processing activities (suboption P) will only occur through 2005. Suboptions
RA Y and RAZ each require only 50 workers beyond 2005 for operations activity . Because it is

same as those presented in Table 5.3-1.

anticipated that up to 300 current workers could be reassigned . no incremental socioeconomic
impacts are anticipated after 2005. This is also true with suboption RAX because it would require

5.3.4 Regionalization Alternative

only 59 workers for operation activities after 2005.
Under this aiternative, SNF would be redistributed to candidate sites based on similarity of
5.3.4.1.2 Population. For construction-related activities. the population is expected

SNF types or region within the country. There are four possible cases: regionalization of SNF by
fuel type (Regionalization A); regionalization in which all SNF currently stored in the western

to peak in 1998. with increases in population ranging from 480 (suboption RAX) to 2.900

United States . or to be generated in the western United States. except Naval SNF would be sent to

(suboption RAY and P) and equating to between 0.3 and 1.7 percentage points over baseline

and stored at the Hanford Site (Regionalization BI) ; regionalization in which all SNF currently

projections (see Table 4.3-1). All operations activity peaks in 2002. with incremental ac ti vity

stored in the western United States. or to be generated in the western United States. and all Naval

tapering off through 2006. Increases in population range from 620 (suboption RAX ) to 680
(suboption RAY and P) persons and equate to between 0.3 and 0.4 percentage points over baseline
projections for 2002.
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Table 5.3-2. Comparison of socioeconomic impacts of spent nuclear fuel Regionalization A suboptions.
Regiona lization A Subo~tions
Suboption RAX
Direct Jobs
Secondary Jobs
Population Change
Suboption RAY and P
Direct Jobs
Secondary Jobs
Population Change
Suboption RAZ and P
Direct Jobs
Secondary Jobs
Population Change

o<

t

:::

m

:>

"'0
"'0

m

z
o
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;>

>
"'0
2
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2003 2004

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

0
0
0

0
0
0

90
100
250

176
190
480

176
190
480

176
190
480

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

150
160
410

1,065
1,170
2,900

1,065
2,900

1,065
1,170
2,900

715
780
1,950

208
270
620

208
270
620

208
270
620

0
0
0

0
0
0

150
160
410

865
950
2,360

865
950
2,360

865
950
2,360

715
780
1,950

230
290
680

230
290
680

230
290
680

/~1

1,170

0

5.3.4.2 Regionalization 81. In this case, aLI SNF currently stored or to be genera ted
in the western United States. except Naval SNF, would be sent to and stored at th e Hanford
Site. Facility requi rements for this case would be incremental to those described for th e
Decentralization Alternative. Additional facilities include a storage facility for offsite fuel, a
receiving and canning facility, and a technology development facility (RB I). The popUlation and
employment impacts related to regionalization Blare presented in Table 5.3-3.

5.3.4.2.1 Employment. Ali construction activity is assumed to peak in 2000.
Construction activity for suboptions W, X, Y, and Z occurs in the years 1997-2000; construction
activity for suboptions P and Q occurs in the years 1998-2001; and construction of the additional
facilities (suboption RB 1) for receiving and canning and technology development occurs in the
years 1998-2001 , with 90% of the storage facility being constructed during the years 2000-2010
and the remaining 10% being constructed during the years 2010-2035. Increases in employment
range from 398 (suboption X and RBt) to 1,191 (suboption Y and P and RBI) and equate to
between 0.5 and 1.4 percentage points over baseline projections of regional employment (see
Table 4.3-1). Ali operations activity peaks in 2002, with incremental activity tapering off.
Increases in employment range from 73 (suboption X and RB 1) to 1,050 (suboption Q and
Small Vault and RBI) persor. and equate to between 0.1 and 1.2 percentage points over
baseline projections. Beyond 2004, operations activity will taper off as described in
Section 5.3.2.2.1.

5.3.4.2.2 Population. For construction-related activities, the population is
expected to peak in 2000, with increases in population ranging from 1,090 (suboptions W and
RBt and X and RBI) to 3,250 (suboption Y and P and RBI) and equating to between 0.6 a nd
1.9 percentage points over baseline projections (see Table 4.3-t). Ali operations activity peaks
in 2002, with incremental activity tapering off through 2006. Increases in population ra nge from
200 (suboptions X and RBt) to 3,100 (suboptions Q , Small Vault, and RBt ) persons and equate
to between 0. 1 and 1.7 percentage points over baseline projections for 2002.

5.3.4.3 Regionalization 82. In this case, all fuel currently stored or to be gene rated in
the western United States, including Naval fuel , would be sent to and stored at the Hanford Site.
Facility requirements for this case would be essentially the sa me as those described in the
Regionalization B 1 case, as the only difference would be the presence of Naval fuel. The
receiving and canning facility, offsite storage facility, and technology developm ent facility are
referred to as suboption RB2. Also required for this case is the Naval Nuclear Propulsion
VOLU:-.1E I. AP PE:'\'D IX A. APRJL 1995
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Program's Expended Core Facility (ECF). Discussion on the relocation of the ECF to the
Hanford Site is provided in Appendix D to the INEL Spent Nuclear Fuel PElS and is not
incll!ded here. Population and employment impacts of the Regionalization B2 case are
presented in Table 5.3-4.

5.3.4.3.1 Employment. All construction activity is assumed to peak in 2000.

Construction activity for suboptions W, X, Y, and Z occurs in the years 1997-2000; construction
activity for suboptions P and Q occurs in the years 1998·2001; and construction of the additional
facilities (suboption RB 1) for receiving and canning and technology development occurs in the
years 1998·2001, with 35% of the storage facility being constructed during the years 2000·2010
and the remaining 65% being constructed during the years 2010·2035. Increases in employment
range from 488 (suboptions X and RB2) to 1,281 (suboptions Y, P, and RB2) and equate to
between 0.6 and 1.5 percentage points over baseline projections of regional employment (see
Table 4.3-1). All operations activity peaks in 2002, with incremental activity tapering off.
Increases in employment range from 80 (suboptions X and RB2) to 1,085 (suboptions Q , SmaU
Vault, and RB2) persons and equate to between 0.1 and 1.3 percentage points over baseline
projections. Beyond 2004, operations activity will taper off as described in section 5.3.2.2.1 .

5.3.4.3.2 Population. For construction-related activities, the population is

expected to peak in 2000, with increases in population ranging from 1,330 (suboptions X and
RB2) to 3,490 (suboptions Y, P and RB2) and equating to between 0.8 and 2.0 percentage
points over baseline projections (see Table 4.3·1). All operations activity peaks in 2002, with
incremental activity tapering off through 2006. Increases in population range from 220 (sub·
option X and RB2) to 3,190 (suboptions Q , SmaU Vault, RB2) persons and equate to between
0.1 and 1.8 percentage points over baseline projections for 2002.

5.3.4.4 Regionalization C. In this case, aU fuel currently stored or to be generated in

the western United States, including aU Hanford Site fuel , would be sent to and sto red at INEL
or NTS. Facility requirements for the Hanford Site in this case are identical to those described
in the Centralization Minimum Alternative. Employment and population impacts of this case
are provided in Tahle ).3-5 and are discussed in Section 5.3.5.2.
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Table 5.3-4. Comparison of socioeco nomic impacts of spent nuclea r fuel Regionalization B2 suboptions.
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Regionalization Alte rnative
Suboptions Wand RB2
Direct Jobs
Secondary Jobs
Population Change
SUboptions X and RB2
Direct Jobs
Secondary Jobs
Population Change
Suboptions Y, P, and RB2
Direct Jobs
Secondary Jobs
Population Change
Suboptions Z, P, and RB2
Direct Jobs
Secondary Jobs
Population Change
Suboptions Q, Small Vault
and RB2
Direct Jobs
Secondary Jobs
Population Change
Suboptions Q , Cask,
RB2
Direct Jobs
Secondary Jobs
Population Change

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

0
0
0

0
0
0

216
240
590

451
490
1,230

446
490
1. 20

491
540
1,340

310
340
850

107
120
300

80
90
220

80
90
220

0
0
0

0
0
0

200
220
540

421
460
1,1 50

430
470
1,170

488
540
1,330

310
340
850

80
90
220

80
90
220

80
90
220

0
0
0

0
0
0

318
350
870

1,294
1,420
3,530

1,263
1,380
3,440

1,281
1,400
3,490

1,025
1, 120
2,790

669
840
1,960

669
840
1,960

669
840
1,960

0
0
0

0
0
0

213
230
580

1,135
1,240
3,090

1,158
1,270
3,150

1,230
1,350
3,350

1,025
1,120
2,790

647
810
1,900

647
810
1,900

647
810
1,900

0
0
0

0
0
0

62
70
170

1,147
1,260
3,130

1,164
1,280
3,170

1,230
1,350
3,350

1,182
1,300
3,220

1,085
1,370
3,190

1,085
1,370
3,190

1,085
1,370
3,190

0
0
0

0
0
0

45
50
120

1,11 7
1,230
3,040

1,147
1,260
3,130

1,227
1,350
3,340

1, 182
1,300
3,220

1,027
1,300
3,020

1,027
1,300
3,020

1,027
1,300
3,020
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Table 5.3-5. Comparison of socioeconomic impacts of spent nuclear fuel Centralization Alternative - maximum case
suboptions.

z
!2
x

Centralization Alternative
SUboptions Wand CM

>
-:l

Direct Jobs
Secondary Jobs
Population Change
Suboptions X and CM
Direct Johs
Secondary Jobs
Population Change
Suboptions, Y, P, and CM
Direct Jobs
Secondary Jobs
Population Change
Suboptions Z , P, and CM
Direct Jobs
Secondary Jobs
Population Cha nge
Subopt.ions Q, SmaU Vault,
Direct Jobs
Secondary Jobs
Population Change
Suboptions Q, Cask, and CM
Direct Jobs
Secondary Jobs
Popula tion Change

;>
~

r

:;;

'"

v.

Y'
oc

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

0
0
0

0
0
0

216
240
590

626
690
1,710

606
660
1,650

611
670
1,670

430
470
1,170

7.42
280
680

193
220
540

193
220
540

0
0
0

0
0
0

200
220
540

596
650
1,620

590
650
1,610

608
670
1,660

430
470
1, 170

164
180
450

135
150
360

135
150
360

0
0
0

0
0
0

318
350
870

1,469
1,610
4,000

1,423
1,560
3,880

1,401
1,540
3,820

1, 145
1,260
3, 120

804
1,000
2,350

804
1,000
2,350

804
1,000
2,350

0
0
0

0
0
0

213
230
580

1,310
1,440
3,570

1,318
1,440
3,590

1,350
1,480
3,680

1,145
1,260
3,120

782
970
2,280

782
970
2,280

782
970
2,280

0
0
0

0
0
0

62
70
170

1,322
1,450
3,600

1,324
1,450
3,610

1,350
1,480
3,680

1,302
1,430
3,550

1,220
1,530
3,580

1,220
1,530
3,580

1,220
1,530
3,580

0
0
0

0
0
0

45
50
120

1,292
1,420
3,520

1,307
1,430
3,560

1,347
i,480
3,670

1,302
1,430
3,550

1, 16:L
1,460
3,410

1, 162
1,460
3,410

1,162
1,460
3,410

/~q

5.3.5 Centralization Alternative

Under this alternative. all current and future SNF would be stored at a centralize d
location. There are two possible options: the maximum option in which all fu e l is stored at
Hanford. and the minimum option in which all fuel at Hanford is shipped offsite. The socioeconomic consequences related to implementing the Centralization Alternative suboptions are
described in this subsection. The employment and population impacts related to construction
and operation of the maximum option are presented in Table 5.3-5. The population and
employment impacts related to construction and operation of the minir;wm option are presented
in Table 5.3-6. It was assumed that up to 300 current Hanford workers could be reassigned to
operation activities (this number excludes current workers at the Fast Flux Test Facility, as it
was assumed that they would be reassigned to activities related to the Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant). Construction activities were assumed to require new workers coming into the
area . Estimates of direct jobs were provided by Bergsman (1995). For construction activity,
direct jobs were reported as number of jobs in the peak year and total person-years because it
was assumed that construction activities would "ramp-up" to the pe ak year, and then "rampdown," with the total number of jobs related to construction activity equaling the total personyears required as reported in Bergsman (1995). Although the housing market is currently
uncerrain and beginning to turn downward , increases in activity levels could strain the housing
market and add to school-capacity concerns. However, because construction activities are shortterm relative to the total project time frame, impacts from construction activities may be
oversta ted .

5.3.5. 1 Centralization - Maximum Option. Under the maximum option. Hanford SNF
would be stabilized and stored under one of the options outlined in the decentra lization
alternative, with larger storage facilities . A facility would a lso be built to receive SNF fro m
other sites. Additionally, the ECF would be relocated from the INEL site . The impacts of the
ECF to regional population and employment are presented in Appendix 0 of Volume 1 of this
EIS and are not discussed here. Table 5.3-5 presents the e mploym e nt and pop ulation impa cts of
the options under the maximum centralization option.

5.3. 5.1 . 1 Employment. All construction activity is assumed to peak in 2000.
Construction activity for sUboptions W, X, Y. and Z occurs in the years 1997-2000; construction
activity for suboptions P and Q occurs in the years 1998-2001 ; and construction activity for th e
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Table 5.3-6. Comparison of socioeconomic impacts of spent nuclear fuel Centralization Alternative - minimum case suboptions.
Centralization Alternative
1~95
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
Suboption P
Direct Job~
0
0
0
715
715
715
715
360
360
360

Secondary Jobs
Population Change
Suboption Q
Direct Jobs
Secondary Jobs
Population Change
Suboption D
Direct Jobs
Secondary Jobs
Population Change

0
0

0
0

0
0

780
1,950

780
1,950

780
1,950

780
1,950

460
1,070

460
1,070

460
1,070

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

872
960
2,380

872
960
2,380

872
960
2,380

872
960
2,380

786
1,000
2,330

786
1,000
2,330

786
1,000
2,330

0
0
0

0
0
0

619
680
1,690

620
680
1,690

619
680
1,690

619
680
1,690

357
460
1,060

357
460
1,060

357
460
1,060

357
460
1,060

/q/

receiving and canning facility (suboption CM) occurs in the yea rs 1998-200 1, with SO% of the

1.0 percentage points over base line projections (see Table 4.3-1). All operations activi ty peaks

construction act ivity for the modular storage facility occurring during the years 2000-2010 and

in 2002. wit h incrementa l activity ending a fter 2006 for suboptions P and Q , and after 2004 for

the other SO% occurring during the years 2010-203S. Increases in e mployment ra nge from 608

suboption D. Increases in employment range from 3S7 (suboption D) to 786 (suboption Q)

(subopt ions X and CM) to 1,401 (suboptions Y, P, and C M) and equate to between 0.7 and

persons and equate to between 0.4 and 0.9 percentage points over baseline projections.

1.7 percentage points over baseline projections of regional employment (see Table 4.3- 1). All

operations activity peaks in 2002, with incremental activity tapering off. Increases in employ-

5.3.5.2.2 Population. For construction-related act ivities, the population is

ment range from 164 (suboptions X and CM) to 1,220 (suboptions Q, Small Vault, and CM)

expected to peak in 1998. wit h increases in populatio n ranging from 1.690 (suboption D) to

persons a nd equate to between 0.2 and 1.4 percentage points over baseline projections. Beyond

2.380 (suboption Q) and equating to between 1.0 and 1.4 percentage points over baseline

2004, operations activity will taper off as processing activities (suboptions P and 0) will occur

projections (see Table 4.3-1). All operations activity peaks in 2002, with incremental activity

only through 200S. Operation of the receiving and canning facility will require 190 workers

end ing after 2006. Increases in population range from 1,060 (suboption D) to 2.330 (sub-

through 20 11 , falling to ISO workers through 203S. Suboptions Y and Z each require only

option Q) persons a nd equate to between 0.6 and 1.3 percentage points over baseline

SO workers beyond 200S for operations activity. Because it is anticipated that up to 300 current

projections fo r 2002.

workers could be reassigned, no incremental socioeconomic impacts are anticipated after 200S.
This is also true with suboptions Wand X because each would require only 60 workers for

5.4 Cultural Resources

operation activities.

The potential impacts of SNF management activities on cultural resources were assessed

5_3 _5. 7.2 Population. For construction-related activities, the population is

by I) identifying project activities that could directly or indirectly affect significant resources;

expected to peak in 2000, with increases in population ranging from 1,620 (suboptions X and

2) ide ntifyi ng the known or expected significant resources in areas of potential impact; and

CM) to 3,818 (suboptions Y, P, and CM) and equating to between 0.9 and 2.2 percentage points

J) determining whether a project activity wo uld have no effect, no adve rse effect, or a n adve rse

over baseline projections (see Table 4.3-1). All operations activity peaks in 2002, with incre-

effect on significant resources (36 C FR 800.9). Direct impacts a re considered to be those

me ntal activity tapering off through 2007. Increases in population range fro m 4S0 (suboptions X

associa ted with gro und disturbance or activities that would destroy or modify an architectural

and CM) to 3,S80 (suboptions Q, Small Vault, and CM) persons and equate to between 0.3 and

structure. Indirect impacts are considered to be th ose resulting from improved visitor access,

2.0 perce ntage points over baseline projections for 2002.

changes in land stat us. or other actions that limit scientific investigation of the resources.

5.3.5.2 Centralization. Minimum Option. Under the minimum option, Hanford's SNr

Possible measures that would he wo rked out in consultation wit h the Washington State

would be shipped offsite. Some stabilization of fuel would be required prior to shipment of N

Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO). Advisory Cou ncil for Historic Preservation. anu area

Reactor a nd single·pass reactor fuel. Three options were identified for the stabilization: a

tribes may include avoidance or data recovery.

shearI leachi calei ne facility (suboption P); a solvent extraction facility (suboption Q); or a drying
and pass ivation facility (suboption D). Suboptions P and Q a re the same processing facilities

5.4.1 No Action Alternative

that we re included in the Decentralization Alternative. Table S.3-6 presents the employment
and population impacts of the suboptions under the Centralization minimum option.

Th e N o A cti on Alt ernative would not involve upgrade or expansion of t::xisting facilities.
oth er than th ose that may be required to ensure sa fety and security. Specific actions co n s ide r~t.I

5.3.5.2. 7 Employment. All construction activity is assumed to peak in 1998.

in th e No Action Altern ative include continued storage at th e following facilities:

Construction activity for suboptions P and Q occurs in the years 1998·2001. Increases in
employment range fro m 620 (suboption D) to 872 (suboption Q) and equate to between 0.7 and
S·2 1
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105-KE a nd 105-KW Basins

would contribute to the degradation of nearby archaeological sites. These effects could be

T Plant

mitigated through a worker education program, which would use posters to inform workers of

FFfF

ap plicable laws. briefing sessions for all persons expected to work along the corridor, a nd

308 Building

penalties for disturbing an archaeological site. The briefing sessions would stress the importance

324 Building

of cultural resou rces a nd specifics of the laws and regulations that exist for site protection.

325 Building
327 Building

Direct or indirect impacts are not anticipated to any known trad itional cultural resources

Low-Level Burial Grounds.

that are significant to members of the Yaka ma Indian Nation, the Confederated Tribes of the
Umatilla Indian Reservation, or the Wanap um Ba nd. This conclusion is based on the proposed

With the exception of FFrF, these are existing Manhattan Project and /or Cold War
fac ilities curre ntly under evaluation for National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) eligibility.

locations of facilities relative to sacred and culturally important areas identified through ethnohistorical resea rch and interviews with elders of bands that formerly used the Hanford Site
(Chatters 1989).

No new facilities would be required; however, the following facility modifications would
be considered:

5.4.2 Decentralization Alternative

Upgrade water supply and distribution system to 100-K Area.

This al ternative would involve additio nal facility upgrades beyond those described for the

Upgrade seismic adequacy of K Basins.

No Action Alternative, including the construction of new storage facilities a nd/o r a processing

Upgrade fire protection systems for the K Basins.

facility. Several suboptions have been proposed that would require construction of new facili-

Safeguards and security upgrades

ties. Table 5.4-1 lists the various suboptions and their facility requirements.

0

the K Basins.

Upgrade of the water supply and distribution system has the potential to adversely affect
prehistoric archaeological sites in the vicinity of the 100-K Area. Seve ral archaeological sites
(45BN115, 45BNI52, 45BN423, 45 BN434, 45BN464, 45BN424, and H3-10) have been identified

Table 5.4-1. Facility requirements of Decentralization suboptions and est imations of area
disturbed, [hecla res (acres)].

New pool

New
dry
vault

None

2.4 (6)

2.4 (6)

None

2.4 (6)

in th is area (C hatters et a J. 1992). These sites are being evaluated fo r the ir National Register
eligibility. A careful review of the detailed project plans is necessary prior to initiation of this
wo rk. If the upgrade results in ground disturba nce, as in the replace ment and/or add ition of
new water lines. then these actio ns could directly affect the archaeological sites. However.
proper design of the upgrade system could allow for avoida nce of these prehistoric sites. If

X

Y

P

4.9 ( 12)

2.4 (6)

7.3 ( 18)

Q

2.4 (6)

4.9 (12)

7.3 (1 8)

D

4.9 (12)

2.4 (6)

7.3 ( 18)

4.9 (12)

2.4 (6)

7.3 ( 18)

Q

2 (5)

4.9 (12)

6.9 ( 17)

D

4.9 (12)

2.4 (6)

7.3 ( 18)

modifications are not likely to affect the historical or architectural value of the Manhattan
Z

option

P
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1C) 5

land
disturbed
4.9 (12)
4.5 (I I)

2 (5)

by Hanford worke rs in the culturally sensitive 100- K Area. if unaut horized artifact collection
5·21

New

W

conjunction wit h affected Native American Tribes and the SHPO. The remaining facil ity

Some indirect e ffects might result fro m the continued operation of SNF storage facilities

New
process
facility

Process

avo idance is not poss ible. so me sort of data recovery or other measures may be developed in

Project and/ or Cold War facilities.

New
dry
casks

Suboptions

All suhoptions would require the temporary use of 105-KE a nd 105- KW hasins for

All new facilities would be located on a 160-acre site just west of 200·East Area

pct ckaging of fud pri or to reloca ti on to a new wet storage facility, or stabilizati on for dry

(Figu re 4- 1). The constr uction of these facilities is not expected to directly affeCl any

storage. These are existing Manha ttan Project and/ or Cold War faci lit ies (c urrently under

archaeologica l resources. The proposed project area has been surveyed for cultural reso urces

eva luation for Na tional Register eligibility). Modifications to these existing facilit ies are

( HC RC 94-(,00-00 I). a nd no prehistoric or historic a rchaeological properties were found.

conside red to he comparable to those ident ified in the No Action Alte rn at ive.

Consultation wi th the State Historic Preservation Office a nd affected Native American Tribes is
still io progress. No indirect e ffects would be anticipated e ithe r because no archaeological sites

Actio ns duri ng the upgrade of the water supply a nd distribution system for

th ~

are kn own to occur within approximately 4 kilometers of the location proposed for the SNF

100- K Area that disturh ground have the pote nt ia l to adversely affect prehistoric archaeological

storage facilities. The SNF facilities would be constructed in an industrialized area and would

sites in the vicinity of the 100-K Area (45BNI15. 45BN152. 45BN423. 45BN434. 45B1\-I(,-I .

not alter the feeling or associa tion of the Manhattan Project and/or Cold War facilities located

45BN42-1. and H3- 10). A review of specific upgrade actions is required to dete rmine these

nearby.

effects prior to initiation of these actions. Design of the upgrade syste m sho uld incorporate
avo idance:: of th ese prehisto ric sit es. If avo idance is not possihle. some sort of data recove ry nr

Text describing impacts to areas of kn own traditional or reiibious significa nce to specific

othe r measures may be developed in conjunction wit h affected Native American Tribes. the

Nat ive American Tribes for the No Action Alternative in Subsection 5.4. 1 also applies to the

SHPO. and th e Advisory Council.

Decentraliza tion Alternative.

An indirect effect of corninued operation and maintenance of the se facili ti es is the-

5.4.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative

pote ntial for Hanfo rd workers to conduct un authorized a rtifact collection activities. This effect
could he mitigated through a worker ed ucation program. which would use posters to inform

This alte rn ative involves continued SNF onsite transportation, receipt, processing, and

workers of applicahle laws. briefing sessions for aU persons expected to work along the co rridor.

storage at the Ha nford Site. However, the TRIGA fuel currently stored at Hanford would be

and penalties for dist urbing an archaeological site. The briefing sessions would " ress the

shipped to INE L. The impacts to cultural reso urces caused by storage of this fuel at INEL are

im porta nce of cultural reso urces and specifics of the laws and regul ations that exist for site

covered in Volume 1, Appendix B (INEL Spent Nuclear Fuel Manageme nt Program). The

protf<.:ti o n.

storage and stabilization facility options for Hanford under this alte rn ative are assumed to be
consistent wi th those of the Decentralization Alternative. Refer to Subsection 5.4.2 for a

All of the suboptions wou ld req uire the construction of new facilities. Wet storage pool

discussion of the cultural resource impacts.

an ti dry storage::: \'a ult facili tie s would be cast·in · pl ace concrete stru ctures. Th e dry cask storage:::

faci lity would consist of modular storage casks on a concrete pad. Th e stabiliza ti on faciJi ties

5.4.4 Regionalization Alternative

would b~ multil ~\'e l steel-reinforced. ca ~l -in-pl ace concrete stru ct ures. Th e totallam.l area

di,turhed by the construction of these facili ties is estim ated to ra nge from II to 18 acres.

All new facil ities wou ld be constructed on the 65 hectare (:63-ac re) site west of 200-East
Area (Figure 4. 1). Construction of the.e facili ties is not expected to have a direct e ffect on any
significant archaeologic reso urces. The proposed project a rea has been surveyed for cultural
resources (HC RC 94-600-017). and no prehistoric or historic a rchaeologica l properties were
found. Two isola ted art ifac ts, one histo ric a nd one prehistoric in origin, were recorded during
the inve nto ry. Because of their isolated status. ne ither of the a rt ifacts is considered significant.
No indirect effects are anticipated because no known archaeological sites a re present within
approximately 4 kilometers (2 1/2 mile<) of the location proposed for the SNF storage facilit ies.
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American Tribes, the SHPO. and the Advisory Cou ncil. Text describing pote ntial unauthorized

Bet.'a use th e site for th e new SNF facilities is in an industri alized area. co nstru cti on of th ese
fal·iJities would not alter the fee li ng or associat ion of th e M an hatta n Project and / or Cold War

artifact collection and possible mitigation measures for the D ecentralization Alternative in

fac iJiti c!s· !O<.:at ed nc!arhy.

Subsection 5.4.2 also applies to the Regionalization Alternative.
Text describing impacts to areas of known traditional or religious significance to specific

Although no cultura l resource impacts a re eX!Jected. the potential for discovery during
construc ti on is prorortional to th e amount of land th at would be disturbed. For th e va rious

Native American Tribes for the No Action Alternative in Subsection 5.4. I also applies to the

ar t io ns of the Regionalizati an Alternat ive, th ose areas would amou nt to th e following amounts

Regionalization Alternative.

of land :

5.4.5 Centralization Alternative
A)

From about 2 to 7 hectares (6 to 18 acres) when all SNF, except defense production
SNF. wouid be sent to INEL

BI) From abo ut 14 to 17 hectares (36 to 43 acres) when all SNF west of the Mississippi
River, with the exception of Naval SNF, would be sent to Hanford
B2) From about 24 to 27 hectares (6 1 to 68 acres) when all SNF west of the Mississippi
Rive r and Naval SNF would be sent to Hanford
C)

Abo ut 2 to 5 hecta res (6 to 12 acres) when all Hanford SNF would be sent to INE L
or NTS.

This alternative consists of two scenarios: shipment of all SNF off of the Hanford Site
(minimum option), and storage of all SNF at the Hanford Site (maximum option). For the
minimum option, a new fuel stabilization and packaging (canning) facility would be constructed.

The maximum option would require a processing facility (equivalent to Decentralization
process options p. Q . or D) with a specialty fuel processing area; an inspection and packaging
facility; an SNF storage complex (similar to the decentralization options W, X, Y, or Z); and a
new Expended Core Facility. The existing 105·KE and 105·KW Basins wo uld be used to
package defense production fuel for wet transport to the processing facility. These a re existing

In any event. th e maximum opti on would require a processing facility (equiva lent to
D ec-== ntraliza tion process opti ons P. Q. or D ) with a specia lty fu el processing area ; an inspecti on

Manhattan Project and/ or Cold War facilities that are currently under evaluation for National

and packaging fac ility: a n SNF storage complex (similar to. but la rger tha n that for the

Register e ligibility. Modifications to these facilities are considered to be similar to those

Decentralization options W. X. Y. or Z); and a new Expended Core Facility. The existing

depicted for the No Action and Decentralization Alternatives (refer to Subsections 5.4. I and

IOS·KE and I05·KW hasins wo ul d be used to package fuel for wet transport to the processing

5.4.2). Ground·disturbing upgrades to the 100·K Area water supply and distribution system are

faci lity. Th ese are existing Manhatta n Project a nd / or Cold War facilities that are currently

considered to have pote ntially adverse effects on prehistoric archaeological sites 45B N I 15.

unde r evaluation for National Register eligibility. Modifications to these faciliti es are

45BN 152, 45BN423, 45BN434, 45BN424, H3· 10, and/o r 45 BN464 located in this vici nity. A

consi dere!u to he similar to th ose depicted for th e No Action and D ecentraliza tion altern atives

review of the specific upgrade plans is required to determine the effects before begin ning these

(rder to Subsections 5.4. I and 5.4.2). Gro und·disturb ing upgrades to the 100·K Area water

activi ties. Design of the upgraded water supply system should incorporate avo ida nce of the

surply etnd distributi on system are considered to have pot entiaUy adverse effect s on prehistoric

prehistoric sites. If avo idance is not possible, th en some data recovery or oth er measures would

arc haeologica l sites 45BN 115. 45 BN 152. 45BN423, 45BN434. 45BN424. H3· 10. and /o r 45BN464

be deve loped in conjunction with the affected Native American Tribes. the SHPO. and the

IO(,lI teu in th is vic inity. A rt:vicw of the! specific upgretd e pl ans is required to determ ine th e

Advisory Council . Text describing potential un authorized artifact collection and possible

dkcb ht:fo rt: heginning tht: se ac tivi ties. Design of the upgraded wat er supply system should

mitigation measures for the Decentraliza tion Altern ative in Subsection 5.4.2 also applies to the

in«lrpo r<lle ilvo iJ;mct.' of the prehistori(, si tes. If avoida nce is not possible. th en some data

Centraliza tion Alternative.

r~c()\'ery

or other

m ~ a s ures

would he developed in conjunction with the affected Na tive
All new facilities woul d be constructed on the 160·acre site west of 200·East Area
( Figure 4. I). The construction of these fac ilities is not expected to have a direct effect on a ny
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archaeologic resources. The proposed project area has been surveyed for cultural resources
(HC RC 94·600·00 1). and no prehistoric or histor ic arch aeological properties were found . No

No impacts requiring mitigatio n would occur to the aesthetics or to th e visual enviro nment as a result of constructi on o r operatio n of an SNF facility at the Ha nford Site.

indirect e ffects a re anticipated beca use no known archaeological sites are present with in approx·
imately 4 ki.lo meters of the location proposed for the SNF storage facilities. The site for the

5.5.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative

new SNF facilities is in an industrialized area, thus constr uction of th ese facilities wou ld not
alter the feeling o r associati on of the Manhattan Project and/ o r Cold Wa r facilities located
nearby.

Activities in this alternative are sufficiently similar to those of the Decentralization
Alternative that they are not repeated here.

Text desc ribing impacts to areas of kn own traditional or religious significance to specific

5.5.4 Regionalization Alternative

Native American Tribes for the No Action Alternative in Subsection 5.4. 1 also applies to th e
This alternative (see Section 5.1.4 for details) would require the construction of a variety

Centralization Alternative.

of SNF fac ilities depending on the option chosen. The facilities would range from a
packaging/ stabilization facility if all fuel were to be removed from Hanford (option C) to

5.5 Aesthetic and Scenic Resources

storage facilities fo r all SNF west of the Mississippi River (option 82). However, changes
Implications of implementing the alternatives for inte rim storage of SNF on aesthetic

caused by construction and operation of these facilities would be consistent with the existing
overall visual e nvironment of the Hanford Site. Topographic features obstruct the SNF site

and scenic reso urces at the Hanford Site are discussed in the following subsections.

from view from populated areas. The site could be seen from the farmland bluffs to the east of
the site th at overl ook the Columbia River. However. these lands are o n private property th at is

5.5.1 No Action Alternative

not readily accessible to the public. Landowners would likely grant access permission o nly
Im pacts from this altern ative would have no effect on the aesthetic and scenic reso urces.

during the hunting season. if at all.

No impacts requiring mitiga tio n would occur to the aesthetics or to the visual enviro n-

5.5.2 Decentralization Alternative

ment as a result of construction o r operation of an SNF facility at the Hanford Site.
This alternative wo ul d require the construction of an SNF facility at Hanford. where
5.5.5 Centralization Alternative

most SNF fro m the Hanford Site would be stored.

Changes caused by constructio n and operatio n of an SNF facility would be consistent
wi th the existin g overall visual enviro nment of the Hanford Site. Topographic features obst ruct

If Hanford is selected as the site for cent ralizat io n of SNF. then the SNF facility and its
support facilities would be constructed here.

the SNF site from view fro m populated areas. The site cou ld be seen from the farmland bluffs
that ove rl oo k the Columbia River on the east. However, th ese lands are on private property not
read ily accessible to the publ ic. Landowners wou ld like ly grant access permissio n only dur ing

Cha nges caused by construction and operati on of an SNF fa cility would be substantially
larger in the Ce nt ra lization Maximum Alternative. However. they wo uld be cons istent with the
existing overall visual environment of the Hanford Site. Topographic fea tures obstruct the SNF

the hunt ing season, if at all.

site from view from populated areas. The site could be seen from th e fa rml and bluffs th at

VOLlJ :\1 E 1.

A P P E~Dl X

;\. APruL 1995

VULL.::\1E I. AP P E~ DI X A APruL 1995

5·30

1
overlook the Columbia River on the east. However, these lands are on private property not
read ily accessible to the public. La ndowners would likely grant access permission only durin g
the hunting season, if at all.

offsite receptors and wo rkers was obtained by summ ing the consequences associated with the
individual facilities. although these receptors may be physically at very different locations. The
health conseque nces in terms of cancer fatalities we re calculated using recommendations of the
International Commission on Radiological Protection in its Publication 60 ( ICRP 1991) - 4E-04

No impacts requiring mitigation would occur to th e aesthetics or to the visual e nviron-

ment as a result of construction or operation of an SNF facility at the Hanford Site. If Ha nford
is not selected as the site for centra lization of SNF, only an SNF packaging/processing facility
for shipment of fuel would be constructed and there would be eVen less potential for impact to
the aesthetic and scenic resources.

fatal cancers/rem for workers and 5E-04 fatal cance rs/rem for the general population. Risk
conversion factors were applied to both individual and collective doses, altho ugh they are based
on population ave rages for individuals with varying degrees of sensitivity. The individual risk
estimates therefore represent the risk to a hypothetical individ ual, which would be somewhat
lower tha n the risk to mo re sensitive members of the populat ion.

5.6 Geologic Resources

None of the alternatives would result in a dose to the maximally exposed offsite
resident that exceeds I percent of the current EPA standard of 10 millirem/ year. The conse-

No postulated impacts to the geologic resources of the Hanford Site have been identified
under any of the alternatives. Thus, geologic resources would remain as described under
Section 4.6.

quences of the No Action Alternative are caused by emissions from existing facilities where
spent fuel is stored. These facilities contribute a relat ively small fraction of the total dose from
a irborn e emissions at all Hanford Site operations (less than half and likely much less). The
No Action Alternative represents the baseline for Si'.'F operations at Hanford. The

5.7 Air Quality and Related Consequences

consequences of the Decentralization. Regionalization. and Centralization Alternatives vary

depending on which storage and processing options are considered. Options including
The consequences of the five alternatives on ambient air quality at the Hanford Site are

processing of de fense reactor fuel result in the highest doses, which are at most an orde r of

presented in this section. In the case of radiological emissions, the consequences are compared

magnitude greater than those in the No Action Alte rnative. The consequences of options

among the alternatives and to current Hanford Site operations. For nonradiological emissions,

involving only contai nerization of defense reactor fue l followed by wet storage, and drY storage

projected ambient concentration at key receptor locations are compared with current concentra-

of all other fu el. in a new faci lity are app roximately an order of magnitude lower than those in

tions at the Ha nford Site. Development of the specific analysis for each alternative is discussed
in subsequent subsections.

the No Action Alternative.

The potential nonradiological ai r quality pollutants of concern for this assessment include
The consequences of rad iological emissions were evaluated using the GENll computer

all poll utants for which there exist federal, state, or local standards. This includes both the

code package (Na pier et al. 1988). The radiological consequences of airborne emissions during

standard set of criteri a polluta nts (e.g., nitrogen dioxide, oxides of sulfur, respirable particles)

normal operation have been estimated for the SNF storage alternatives considered in this

and toxic poUutants.

document. Three separate a nalyses were performed for each facility included in a particular
alte rn a tive using the GENll computer code. The receptors evaluated in these cases were at the

For criteri a pollutants, concentration levels are regul ated by the provisions of the Clean

location of maximum exposure representing a potential on site worker outside of the SNF

Air Act; Washington State standards for these criteria pollutants are at least as stringent as the

facili ty, the maximally exposed offsite resident, a nd the collective population within 80 kilo-

fede ral standards. In the State of Washington, the Department of Ecology has the responsibility

meters. Standard parame ters for radiological dose calculations at the Hanford Site were used

for promulga ting and enforcing a ir quality standa rds for the protection of public health. The

for these estimates (Schreckhise et al. 1993). The maximum impact of each a lternative on

regulation that governs the control of to.:;c a ir pollutants (WAC 1990a,b) requires the owners of
new or modified a ir e mission sources to app ly for approva l before construction. Owners of
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sources emitting toxic ai r poUutants must demonstrate that they wiU employ the best ava ilahle
control tec hnology for emissions control with rea sonable environmental, energy. and economic

5.7.1 No Action Alternative

impacts.

Facilities included in the No Action Alternative consist of those where SNF is currently
Construction of new facili ties can also negatively impact ai r qu ality th rough the e mission

Slmod at the Hanford Site . Minimal repackagi ng. stabilization. and re location of fuel would be

of fugitive dusts. To model this aspect, the EPA's Fugitive Dust Model (FDM) was selected.

undertaken to onsure continued safe storage prior to ultimate disposition. The majority of spent

This model is especiaUy des igned to compute the air qua tity impacts from fugi tive dust

fuel at Hanfo rd is located at the 100·K Area we t storage basins . In addi tion. smaller quantities of

emissions, such as those associated wi th facility construction sites (Winges 1992). The FDM

fuc l are stored at other ons ite fac ilities. These include T Plant and a low-level waste burial ground

uses steady·state Gaussian plume algorithms and a gradient·transfer depositio n algorithm to

in the 2oo·West Area: the Fast Flux Test Fac ility in the 400 Area: and the 308. 324. 325. and 327

compute a ir quality impacts. Emissions for each source must be appo rtioned into a series of

buildings in the 300 Area . Releases for the No Action Alternative are based on operat ions for

particle·size classes; each of which is assigned a representative deposition velocity. The model

these facilities du ring 1992 (Bergsman 1995). These emissions were assumed to represent

can operate using either joint frequency distributions or hourly meteorological data to represent

operations at existing SNF storage faci li ties over the EIS evaluation period. although they are

atmosp heric conditions. The model can handle up to 200 sources and 500 receptors per model
run. The user may define a variety of point, line, area, and volume sources.

subject to change with individual facili ty missions and operating status. It should also be noted
that some ex isting facili ties support a variety of other programs in energy research and waste
manageme nt in addition to laboratory and hot cell exam ination of fuel materials. The historical

The Industrial Source Complex (ISC2) models were selected to estimate routine non.
radiological ai r quatity impacts. There are two ISC2 models: the ISC2 short· term model
( ISCST2) a nd the ISC2 long·term model (ISCLT2). The two ISC2 models use steady.state
Gaussian plume algorithms to estimate poUutant concentrations from a wide va riety of sources

associated with industrial complexes (EPA 1992). The models are appropriate for nat or roUing

releases from these mUlti· purpose faci lities may reflecI other acti vities in add ition to spent fue l
storage. The past operating emissions. therefore. represent an upper bound eSlimale for the fue l
storage ac ti vi ties. The No Action Alternative also represents the baseli ne of maximum expected
impacts for future spent fuel storage activities.

terrain, modeling dom a ins with a radi us of less than 50 kilometers, and urban or rura l environ.
5.7.1.1 Radiological. Radiol ogical air emissions fo r normal operation of ex isting fuel

ments. The ISC2 models have been approved by the EPA for specific regulatory applications
and are designed fo r use on pe rsonal compute rs. Input requirements for the ISC2 model

storage fac ilities in the No Action Alternative are listed in Tables 5.7- 1 through 5.7-3 (DOE/ RL

include a variety of information that defines the source configuration and poUutant emission

1993) . The sealed fuel canisters temporarily stored at the 2oo-West Area buri al ground are

parameters. The user may define a variety of point. line. area. and volume sources. The

assu med to re lease negligible quantities of radionuclides in this analys is. although ac tual emissions

ISCST2 .model uses hourly meteorological data and joint freque ncy distribution data to compute

from the stored fue l have not been quantified .

stralghth ne plume transport. Plume rise, stack· tip downwash. and building wake can be
computed. The ISC2 models compute a va riety of short· and long·term averaged products at
user·specified receptor locations a nd receptor ri ngs. The ISC2 models also treat deposition
processes a nd aUow the exponential decay of poUutants.

The consequences of air em issions from existing faci lities utilized in the No Action
Alternative are summarized in Table 5.7-4 and include a maximu m annual dose of I E·5 rem to a
potential onsite work er with a 5E·9 probability of fatal cancer. The maxi mum dose to an offs ite
reside nt is estimated as 3E·6 rem/yea r. and the corresponding probability of fatal cancer is I E-9 .
The dose estimate for an onsite worker or an offsi te indi vidual represents the sum of doses to
separate maximall y exposed individuals for each of the fac ilities included in the alternative .
Because these faci lities are in different areas of the Hanford Site. the respec ti ve maximally exposed
workers and offsi te res idents are at different locations . The aClual dose to a si ngle worker or
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Table 5.7-1. Annua l atm osph eric releases for normal operation · we t storage basins at

100·KE Area and 100·KW Area.
100· KE Area
Release (Ci / yr)

Rad ionuclide

Table 5.7-3 . Annual atmospheric releases for normal operation - fuel storage at 200 West Area T
Plant and 400 Area FFTF.

100·KW Area
Release (Ci / yr)
Radi onuclide

Cohalt·GO
Strontium·90
Ruthe nium· IOG
Antimony·125
Cesium· 137
Europium·154
Plutonium·238
Plutonium·24I
Americium·24I
Plutonium·239

1.4E·06
9.9E·07
G.2E·06
NA'
2.7E·05
4.9E·OG
3.0E·08
NA
NA
1.8E·07
(b)

1.3E·OG
1.6E·04
1.3E·05
1.1 E·05
2.3E·04
NA
I.3E·OG
3.9E·05
5. IE·06
8.5E·06
(b)

Tritium

200-West Area T Plant
Release (Cityr)

400 Area FFTF
Release
(Cityr)

NA'
1.2E-05
I.3E-05
2.0E-06
2.2E-05

8.5E +OO·
6.7E·06'
NA
NA
l.IE·06'

Argon-4 1
Total betatstrontium-90
Cesium-137
Americium·241

Total alphatplutonium-239

a. NA indicates not available .
b. Releases of Ar-41 occurred during reactor operation in 1992. The reactor was subsequently shut
down. and releases of short-lived activa tion products are not anticipated from future fuel storage
activities .
c. Total beta emissions were assumed to be strontium-90 for modeling purposes.
d . Total alpha emissions were assumed to be plutonium-239 for modeling purposes .

a. NA indicates not ava ilable.
b. Although tritium emissions are not routinely monitored at th ese fa cilities, th e releases from

both hasins we re recently estima ted as 1·2 Ci/year. These emissions could acco unt for up to
25 % of the total dose from these facilities to the maximaUy exposed offsite resident.
H owever. th e contribution from the 100 area tritium emissions would not change th e
estimated dose from aU Hanford emissions to the site's maximaUy exposed offsite reside nt.

offsite resident from all facilities combined would therefore be less than the sum of the individual
facility receptor doses reported in Table 5.7-4 . The peak collective dose to the population within
80 kilometers (50 miles) is 3E-2 person-rem per year. which is predicted to result in less than one

Table 5.7-2. Annual atmospheric releases for normal operation - fuel storage at 300 Area 308.
324. 325. and 327 buildings.

Radionuclide

308 Building
Release (Ci / yr)

324 Building
Release
(Ci / yr)

325 Building
Release
(Ci/ yr)

327 Building
Release
(Ci/ yr)

NA'
1.1 E·07
3.0E·08

9.6E+00
6.4E·07
3.9E·07

2.5E+01
2.4E·OG
8.5E·07

NA
9.3E·07
1.1 E·07

fatal cancer (6 x 10 4 ) over 40 yea rs of storage .

5.7.1.2 Nonradio/ogical Consequences. The No Action Alternative involves no new
construction so there would not be an increase in particulate emissions. The facilities currently
used in storing the SNF do not have any nomadiological releases. so there wou ld be no increase in

Tritium
b

Total beta
Total alpha'

a. NA indicates not available.
h. Tota l beta e missions we re assumed to be strontium·90 for modeling pu rp oses.
c. Tota l a lpha e missions we re assumed to be plutonium·239 for modeling purposes.

concentrations of these pollutants.

5.7.2 Decentralization Alternative

The Decentraliza tion Alternative permits construction of new facilitie s where these
represent an improvement over current storage practices. Relocation of fuel could be undertaken
as part of this alternati ve to meet programmatic needs: however. no fuel would be shipped to. or
received from. offsite locations. lt is assumed for purposes of this analysis that new faciliti es
would be constructed under this alternative. and that they would be located in a dedicated SNF
management complex adjacent to the 200· East Area.
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Table 5.7-4. Radiological consequences of airborne emissions during normal operation in the No-Action Alternative for spent nuclear
fuel storage at Hanford.
Onsile worker

Area
IOOKE

t""

c:

s:

('Tl

WeI Basin

Probability of falal
cancer

Peak annual dose
(EDE) (remJyr)

Probability of falal
cancer

Peak annual dose
(EDE) (person·
remJyr)

9.3E.()6

2.0E-07

S.7E-03

IOOKW

WeI Basin

1.2E-07

3.3E-09

9.1 E-OS

300

308 Bldg

3.3E-09

2.1E-09

1.4E·OS

300

324 Bldg

1.4E-08

2.9E-07

3.0E-03

300

325 Bldg

1.2E-07

1.9E.()6

l.lE-02

300

327 Bldg

1.7E-09

2.4E-09

2.6E-OS
O.OE+OO

200W

Burial Ground

O.OE+OO

O.OE+OO

200W

T Planl

l.3E-07

3.3E-08

2.4E-03

Fasl Aux TeSI
Facility

1.9E.()6

1.9E-07

4.1E-03

400

o<

Facilily

Peak annual dose
(E DE) (remJyr)

80 kilomeler populalion

Offsile residenl

TOlal from All Facililies

I.2E-OS

4.6E-09

2.6E.()6

l.3E-09

2.7E-02

Number of
falal cancers

I.3E-OS

The Decentralization Alternative at Hanford includes two basic options. t!ac h with

severa l suboptions dependin g on the types of storage a nd processing facilities included. The

Tab le 5.7-6. Estimated annua l atmosphe ric releases for normal operation - shear/leach/calcine
fud process at 200-East Area.

Ijrst major option includes a combination of wet storage of defense production fue l and dry

Radionuclide

storage of all ot her fuel in either a sma U vault facility (suboption W) or in casks (s uboption X).

Release
(Ci/yr)

The second major option provides for dry storage of aU fuel , which would require processing of

Tritium

7.0E+02

defense fuel prior to dry storage. If a shear/leach/calcine process is used (s uboption P), the

Carbon-14

6.5E+OO
2.7E+OS

calcine product a nd all other fuel would be consolidated in a single large va ult facility (s ub-

Krypton-85

option Y) or in casks (suboption Z). If a solvent extraction process is chosen for the defense

Strontium-90

4.8E-07

fuel (suboption Q), the oxide products could be stored in either new or existing facilities that

Ruthe nium- I06

4.3E-09

would have lower space and shielding requirements tha" for the calcine product. A high-level

Antimony-125

1.0E-OB

liq uid waste stream would also be produced and transierred to underground storage tanks. All

Tellurium-125M

2.5E-09

fuel other than the processed defense fuel would be stored in a small vault facility or in casks as

lodine·129

5.0E-03

in suboptions Wand X.

Cesium-134

1.0E-08

Cesium-137

6.0E·07

Cerium-1 44

2.3E-09

5.7.2.1 Radiological. Estimated radiological air emissions for normal operations of

new facilities in the Decentralization Alternative are listed in Tables 5.7-5 through 5.7-7. The

Promethium-147

1.6E·07

dry storage facilities are assumed to have no rad iological emissions under normal operating

Samarium-15 1

7.4E-09

condi tions because aU fuel is contained in sealed decontaminated canisters and storage casks.

Europiu m-1 54

7.2E-09

Therefore, there is no mechanism for routine release of radionuclides from dry storage facilities

Americium -242

2.4E-1 2

over the time period covered in this document.

Curium-242

6.IE-12

The consequences of ai r emissions from individual faciliti es in the Decentralization
Alternative are summarized in Table 5.7-8 and include a maximum annual dose of 2E-9 rem to a

Table 5.7-5. Estimated annual atmosphe ric releases for normal operation - new wet storage at
200-East Area.
Radionuc! ide
Release (Ci/yr)
Cobalt-60
1.4E-05
I.IE-06
St rontium-90
Ruthenium-106
6.2E-06
Cesium-137
2.3E-05
Europium-154
4.9E-06
Plutonium-238
I.IE-08
Plutonium-239
6.7E-08
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Plutonium-238

3.2E·09

Plutonium-24 I

3.BE-07

Americiu m- 24I

7.BE-09

Plutonium.239/240

1.5E-08

potential onsite worker (8E-I3) probabi lity of fata l cancer) for the option including a combination of wet and dry spent fuel storage faci lities. The dose to a n offsite resident at the highest
exposure location is estimated as 6E· 10 re m/yeor. and the corresponding probability of fat al
cancer is 3E·I3. The peak collective dose to the population withi n 80 kilometers is 2E-5 personre m pe r year. wh ich is predicted to result in less tha n one (4 x 10. 7 ) fatal cancer over 40 yea rs of
storage.
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Table 5.7-7. Estimated annual atmospheric releases for normal operation - spent nuclear fuel
solvent extraction fuel process at 200-East Area.

Release
(Ci/yr)

Radionuclide

VOLUME 1. APPENDIX A. APRIL 1995

Tritium

7.0E+02

Carbon-14

6.5E+00

Krypton-85

2.7E+05

Strontium-90

2.4E-02

Ruthenium-106

5.1E-04

Antimony-125

4.6E-04

TeUurium-125M

2.4E-04

Iodine-129

1.9E-02

Cesium-134

5.1E-04

Cesium-137

3.0E-02

Cesium-144

1.2E-04

Promethium-147

8.1E-03

Samarium-151

7.4E-09

Europium-154

4.2E-04

Europium-155

1.7E-04

Americium-242

2.4E-12

Curium-242

6.IE-12

Plutonium-238

1.6E-03

Plutonium-241

1.9E-02

Americium-241

4.4E-03

Plutonium-239/240

8.0E-03
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Table 5.7-8. Radiological .:onsequences of airborne emissions during normal operation in the Decentralization Alternative for spent
nuclear fuel storage at Hanford.
Onsite worker

Area

Facility

BO km population

Offsite resident

Peak annual dose (EDE)
(rem/yr)

Probability of
fatal cancer

Peak annual dose
(EDE) (rem/yr)

Probability of
fatal cancer

Peak annual dose
CEDE) (personrem/yr)

Number of fatal
cancers

Combination Wet + Dry Storage Option

200 E

New Wet Storage

2.0E.{)9

B.OE-13

S.7E-1O

2.BE-13

2.3E-05

1.2E-08

200 E

New Dry Storage

O.OE+OO

O.OE+oo

O.OE+OO

O.OE+oo

O.OE+OO

O.OE+OO

O.OE+OO

O.OE+OO

Dry Storage Only Option with Defense Fuel Processing

o<

~

s:
rn
:>

."

."

rn
Z

o

X

?>
:>
C!

."

r

~

200 E

New Dry Storage

O.OE+OO

O.OE+OO

O.OE+OO

O.OE+oo

200 E

New Fuel Calcine

4.1E-06

1.7E.{)9

7.0E-06

35E-09

3.4E-Ol

1.7E-04

200E

New Solvent Extraction

2.7E-OS

I.IE-OB

2.lE-05

I.IE-08

1.3E+00

6.3E-04

For the aU dry storage option, processing defense fuel is required in the Decentralization

emiss io ns at the constructi on site and resulting airborne concentrations. Although extensive

Alternative (s uhoptions P and Q), and additional emissions would result from these activities if

construction activities have the potential to contribute to short-term airborne particulate

they were conducted. The dose to the onsite worker from air emissions wo uld be 4E-6 re m per

concentrations if they coincide with high wind events, such effects would generaUy be obvious

year for a shear/ leach/calcine process or 3E-5 rem per year for a solvent extraction process

only in the immediate area and could be mitigated by dust control measures over both the short

(2E-9 or IE-8 probability of fatal cancer, respectively) in addition to those from the dry storage

a nd long term. In any case. such activities would be temporary and would not adversely affect

facility. The corresponding consequences for the offsite resident would be 7E-6 re m per yea r

regional air quality on a continuing basis. Construction activiries wo uld also result in increased

(4E-9 probability of fatal cancer) for the shea r/ leach/calcine facility and 2E-5 re m per yea r

emissions of poUutants from diesel- and gasoline-powered construction equipment. However,

(IE-8 probability of fa tal cancer) for the solvent extraction facility. The collective dose to the

the increase in ambient levels of poUutants would be minimal because of the relatively low levels

offsite population from the respective fuel processing facilities is estimated at 0.3 to I person-

of emission and large distances to the nearest points of public access and the site boundary.

rem per year, resulting in less than one expected fatal cancer «0.02) over 40 years of storage.
5_7_2 _2 _2 Nitrogen Oxides. Nitrogen oxide emissions during facility operation are
5. 7.2.2 Nonradio!ogica! Consequences. Fugitive dust e missions from new construction

approximately the same for both the shear/leach/calcine facility and the solvent extraction

activities, toxic chemical emissions, and nitrogen oxide emissions from fuel processing would

facility. It is assumed that aU nitrogen oxide emissions are in the form of nitrogen dioxide.

contribute to the nonradiological emissions in the Decentralization Alternative.

Annual concentrations at the nearest point of public access, 7.5 kilometers (6.4 miles) southwest
of the release site, are estimated to be 0.1 micrograms per cubic meter. This concentration is

5.7_2.2 _1 Fugitive Dust. Three different construction options are under

consideration in this alternative: I) construction of wet and dry storage facilities, 2) construc-

0. 1 percent of the aUowed Washington State standard and 0.4 percent of the Prevention of
Significant Deterioration (PSD) standard.

tion of dry storage and the shear/leach/calcine facility, and 3) construction of a dry storage and
a solvent extraction facility. In options I and 2, approximately 12 acres would be disturbed for

Nitrogen oxide concentrations were also caleulated for onsite locations. The maximum

the construction of the storage facilities; in option 3, 6 acres would be disturbed for the dry

annual concentration estimated by the model is 1.2 micrograms per cubic meter, which occurs

storage facility. An additional 6 acres would be disturbed for the shear/leach/calcine facility or

500 meters (0.3 miles) south of the processing facility. The maximum ground level concentra-

12 acres for the solvent extraction facility. In total up to 12 acres would be disturbed in the first

tion is some distance from the processing facility because the emissions are from an elevated

option and 18 . "res in the second and third options (Bergsman 1995).

stack rather than at ground level. For example, at a distance of 100 meters (0.06 miles) from
the base of the facility, the greatest estimated nitrogen oxide annual concentration is only

Details of the construction process are not available for the alternatives. but a standard

1.8 x 10-5 micrograms per cubic meter.

default value of 1.2 tons/acre/month of particles can be assumed to be generated during new
construction (EPA 1977). Most of the particles produced by construction activities are large and

5. 7.2.2.3 Toxic Chemica! Emissions. Informatio n about routine toxic chemical

settle a short distance from the source (Seinfeld 1986). A conservative estimate is that approxi-

e missions from eithe r the shear/ Ieach/caleine facility or the solvent extraction facility is

mately 30 pe rce nt of the mass released would be particles smaU enough to be tra nsported away

unava ilable. However cont rol techniques would be used to ensure that concentrations of toxies

from the construction site (EPA 1988).

in the atmosphere comply with the DOE abatement policy and local permitting req uire ments.

Experience with construction activities at Hanford indicates that fugitive dust concentra-

5.7.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative

tions at the nearest point of public access and at the site boundaries would be less than
Washington State PM ,. limits for both annual a nd 24-hour ave rages. Standard control techniques (such as applying waler to the disturbed ground) could be used to limit the PM,o
VO LUME I. APPENDIX A, APRJL 1995
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The 1992/ 1993 Planning Basis Alternative is assumed to be similar to the
Decentralization Alternative discussed in the previous section, including construction of wet or
5-43
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dry storage facilit ies adjacent to the 200·East Area and process facilities fo r defense production

Alternative. Option B2 wo uld include a separate facility to examine and characterize Nava l

fuel if it is to be sto red dry. The only change to the Ha nford Site fuel inventory wo uld involve

SNF, as described in Appe nd ix D to Volume 1 of this EIS.

shipment of a re lative ly small quantity of TRIGA fuel to an offsite locati on. This wou ld not
substantially alte r th e scope of plann ed spent fu el storage activities, and th e 1992/ 1993 Pla nning

The third Regio nalizatio n option (designated Option C) wo uld relocate all SNF at th e

Basis Alternative assumes emissions for new facilities are the sa me as those in the

Ha nfo rd Site to another western U.S. loca tion. The only new facility that would be required for

Decentralization Alte rnative.

this option is a processing a nd packaging facility to stabilize and repackage defense fuel and to
place other fuel into canisters as needed for shipping offsite. Prior to preparation fo r offsite

5. 7.3. 1 Radiological Consequences. The consequences for this alternative are

shipment. SNF would continue to be ma naged at existing facilities, as for the No Action

assumed to be the sa me as those for the Decentralization Alte rn ative. Refer to Table 5.7·8 for

Alte rn ative. All new facil ities considered in the Regio nalization Alternative options would be

the list of facilities included in this option and their consequences.

constructed in a dedica ted SNF management complex adjacent to the 200·East Area, as for the
D ecentralization Alternative.

5.7.3.2 Nonradiological Consequences. The consequences for this alternative are
considered to be the same as those for the Decentraliza tion Alternative.

5. 7.4.1 Radiological Consequences. Emissio ns from new facilities in Regionalization
Alte rn ative A would be the same as those described for the Decentralization Alternative in

5.7.4 Regionalization Alternative

Table 5.7·8. Although this option does not include the dry storage capacity for fuel other tha n
defense productio n fuel, dry storage facilities add nothing to the normal operating emissions;

The Regionalization Alternative at Hanford incl udes three options, de pending on the
quantity of SNF shipped to, or from, the site. Option A provides fo r regional storage of SNF by

therefo re, th e emissions and consequences from this alternative would be quantitatively th e
sa me as those previously described for the Decentralization Alternative.

type, and would entail shipping all fuel at Hanford except defense production fuel to another
location. In this case, defen se fuel would either be stored wet at a new pool facility, o r it wo uld

Emissions from the new facilities in the Regionalization Alternative Band C options are

be processed for dry storage using suboptions similar to those described in the Decentralization

expected to be bounded by those in the Centralization maximum and minimum options,

Alternative.

respectively, as described in Section 5.7.5.

An ad dition al option in the Regio nalization Alternative describes importing SNF to

5. 7.4 .2 Nonradiological Consequences. Beca use of the similarity of operations.

H anford from other sites based on th ei r geographic distribution. In the first option, designated

co nseque nces for the Region alization Alternative are considered to be the same as those for th e

Option B 1, all fuel at locations west of the Mississippi River except Naval SNF would be stored

Decent ralization Alternat ive.

at H anford. In th e second optio n, designated Option B2, all SNF at locations west of th e
Mississippi River and Naval SNF would be stored at H anford. All imported fuel would

5.7.5 Centralization Alternative

ultimately be placed into a new dry storage facility, the size o f which would be determined by
the quantity of impo rted fuel to be sto red. In addition, a receiving and canning facility wo uld be

The Centralizatio n Alternative at H anford includes two options: a maximum option

built to repackage any fu el as needed, and to provide tempo rary wet storage for fuels that could

in which all SNF for which DOE is responsible would be stored at H anfo rd. and a minimum

not be immediately placed into dry storage. This option would also include a techn ology

op ti on in which all SNF currently at Hanfo rd would be shipped to anothe r s ite. The maxi mum

deve lop ment facility for fuel characteriza tion and resea rch related to SNF manage ment. S ~ .

option is similar to th at described in the Regionalization Option B2. except that the size of the

curren tly at H anford would be stored according to th e options described in the Decentralization

receiving a nd canning and dry storage facilities wou ld be increased as necessary to accommodate
th e large r quantity of imported fuel. The minimum option is identical to that described for th e

VO l U:-'1E 1. APPENDIX A, APRIL 1995
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Regionalization Alternative, Option C. All new facilities considered in the Centralization
Altern ative options would be constructed in a dedicated SNF management complex adjacent to
the 200-East Area.

5.7.5.1 Radiological For the Centralization maximum option at Hanford, emissions

from the wet storage and processing facilities would be identical to those described in the
Decentralization Alternative (refer to Tables 5.7-5 through 5.7-7). Minimal emissions from the
large dry storage facility are assumed in this case (see Table 5.7-9) because some of the
imported fuel could be stored without canning, and the assumption of zero emissions could not
be justified as in the Decentralization Alternative. The consequences of emissions from a
relocated Expended Core Facility (ECF) are described in Appendix D to Volume 1 of this EIS
and are not included here. It should be noted that the assumptions used in Appendix D calculations for the ECF at Hanford may differ from those used to estimate the consequences of
emissions from other Hanford facilities.

The consequences of air emissions from individual facilities in the Centralization
Alternative maximum option are summarized in Table 5.7-10 and include a maximum annual
dose of 9E-9 rem to a potential worker (4E-12 probability of fatal cancer) for a combination of
wet and dry spent fuel storage facilities. The dose to an offsite resident at the highest exposure
location is estimated as 2E-9 rem/year, and the corresponding probability of fatal cancer is
8E-13. The peak collective dose to the population within 80 kilometers is 7E-5 person-rem per
year, which is predicted to result in less than one (4 x 10-8

)

fatal cancer.

Table 5.7-9. Estimated annual atmospheric releases for normal operation - new dry storage at
200-East Area (maximum option).

VOLUME 1. APPEl\'OIX A, APRJL 1995

Radionuclide

200-East Area
Release (Ci/yr)

Cobalt-60
Strontium-90
Yttrium-90
Cesium-137
Plutonium-239

2.8E-08
9.1E-07
9.1E-07
1.2E-07
2.8E-07
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Table 5.7-10. Radiological consequences of airborne emissions during normal operation in the Centralization Alternative for spent
nuclear fuel storage at Hanford.
Onsite worker

Area

Facility

SO krn population

Offsite resident

Peak annual dose
CEDE) Crem/yr)

Probability of fatal
cancer

Peak annual dose
CEDE) Crem/yr)

Probability of
fatal cancer

Peak Annual Dose
CEDE) (Personrem/yr)

limber of
Fatal Cancers

Combination Wet + Dry Storage Option

200 E

i\:cw Wet Storage

2.0E-O'J

S.OE-13

S.7E-1O

2.9E-13

2.3E-05

1.2E-OS

200 E

i\:ew Dry Storage

7.0E-09

3.0E-12

1.0E-09

S.OE-13

4.8E-05

2.4E-OS

New Dry Storage

7.0E-09

3.0E-12

I.OE-09

S.OE-13

4.SE-OS

2.4E-08

200 E

New Fuel Calcine

4.1E-06

1.7E-09

7.0E-06

35E-09

3.4E-Ol

1.7E-04

200E

New Solvent Extraction

2.7E-OS

l.lE-08

2.lE-05

l.lE-08

1.3E+00

6.3E-04

Dry Storage Only Option with Defense Fuel Processing

200 E

Relocation of E.q x:nded Core Facility"

a. Data for the expended core facility CECF) are presented in AppendiJe D to Volume I of this EIS. Assumptions used in Appendix D calculations for the ECF at Hanford may
differ from those used to estimate the doses consequences of emission from other Hanfo rd facilities.
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Process ing of defense fuel is required prior to dry storage in the maximum option. and
additiona l air em issions wou ld result from those ac tivities if defense fuel is stored dry rather

The Multimedia Environmental Pollutant Assessment System (MEPAS). a computer
model. was utilized to simulate the release. migration, fate, exposure, and risk to surrounding

than wet. The dose to the wo rker would increase by 4E-6 remlyear for a shear I leach/caicine

receptors of wastes that are discharged into the environment from the operation of SNF

process or 3E-5 remlyear for a solvent extraction process (2E-9 or I E-B probability of fatal

faci lities. The MEPAS model is a fu lly integrated, physics-based, PC-platform, intermedia

can~er. respectively). The corresponding added consequences for the offsite resident would be

transport· and risk·computat ion code that is used to assess hea lth impacts from actual and

7E-6 remlyear (4E-9 probability of fatal cancer) for the shear I leachicaleine facil ity and

potentia l re leases of both hazardous chemicals and radioactive mate rials. The MEPAS model is

2E-5 remlyear ( I E-B probability of fatal cancer) for the solvent extraction facili ty. The collec-

designed fo r site-specific assessments using readily available information. It follows EPA risk-

tive dose to the offsite population from the respective fuel processing facilities is estimated at

assessment guidance in evaluating I) the release of conta minants into the environment : 2) their

0.3 to I person-rem per yea r, resulting in less tha ~ one (5 x 10'" ) fatal ca ncer.

movement through and transfer between various environmental media [i.e .. subsurface (vadose

and saturated zones), surface water, overland (surface soil), and atmospheric); 3) exposure to
In the Centralization Alternative minimum optio n. the consequences of existing facilities

surrounding receptors via inhalation, ingestion, dermal contact, and external dose; and 4) risk to

utilized for interim fuel storage prior to shipment offsite are the same as in the No Action

ca rcinogens and haza rd to noncarcinogens. The MEPAS model follows ICRP INCRP and EPA

Alternative. Consequences for defense fuel processing prior to shipment a re described under

guidelines, where the user is allowed to choose the appropriate guidelines.

the centralization maximum alte rnative and a re equivalent to those from the shear I leachicaleine
facility. Refer to Tables 5.7-4 a nd 5.7-10 for the consequences of facilities included in this

5,8,1 No Action Alternative

option.

The only release directly to the surface water in the No Action Alternative was
5. 7.5.2 Nonradiological. Because of the similarity of operations leading to

nonradiological impacts on a ir quality, consequences for the Centralization Alternative are

associated wit h the 105-KE and 105-KW basins. The 105-KE and 105-KW basins were combined as one release and represented by a "singie liquid release point to the Colu.mbia River"

considered to be the sa me as those for the Decentralization Alternative with the addition of

(Bergsman 1995). The an nual liquid discharge is assumed to be 1.4E+06 cubic meters per year

emissions from the naval fuels Expended Core Facility. Analysis of nonradiological releases

(3.7E+08 gallons per yea r), with a total activity of approximately 0.4 Ci: 0.26 Ci tritium,

from the Expended Core Facility can be fo und in Volume I, Appendix D.

0.066 Ci cobalt-60, 0.0 I Ci cesium-137, 0.00 10 Ci strontium-90, and 9.2E-06 Ci plutonium-239
(Bergsman 1995). All of the constitue nts in this assessment are radionuclides. The release is

5_8 Water Quality and Related Consequences

assu med to continue at this level over the period of 18 yea rs fro m 1997 through 20 15.
Operational liquid effluents from the K Basins are discharged to the Columbia River via the

This section evaluates the potential impacts to groundwater and surface water resources

monitored and regulated National Pollutant Discharge Eliminatio n System (NPDES) permitted

from the construction a nd operation of SNF storage and associated support facilities at the

1908-KE outfall. Contaminant migration is fro m the point-source discharge point to the Co-

Hanford Site. Potential impacts to gro undwater a nd surface water, water use, and water quality

lumbia River, and in the Columbia River to receptors downstream. The flow discha rge in the

from the potential release of contamina nts into, and migration through, hydrologic water-based

Columbia Rive r is assumed to be under low-flow conditions of 1.000 cubic meters per second

environments a re evall'ated. The potential significance of these impacts is evaluated wit h

(36.000 cubic feet per second) (Whelan et al. 1987), which represents the most conservative case

respect to environmental contaminant levels from potential releases of contaminants into the

for maximizing surface water concentrations. As a conservative assumpt ion. the removal of

environment and the hea lth impacts of th ese contamina nt levels. Contaminant waste strea ms

water from the Columbia River is assumed to be 100 mete rs (328 feet) downstream of the point

include radionuclide a nd chemical carcinogens and noncarcinogenic chemicals.

of entry of the con taminant int o the rive r. The assessment addressed recreational activities

(e.g., boating, swimming. and fishing) in the Columbia River and use of the water as a drinking
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water supply and for bathing, irrigation, etc. The risk of fatal cancer in this scena rio considering
aU pathways was found to be less than one chance in a billion. For more information, refer to
Whelan et al. (1994).

source term would then exceed what could be expected for a new SNF wet storage or transfer
facility. Factors contributing to the conservatism in volume estimates are the design criteria,
which state that the new facility will contain leak-detection systems (Hale 1994) and will have a
lower surface area [i .e., 2000 square meters (6600 square feet)] available for leakage as

Intermittent leakage of water from the K Basins is monitored via onsite groundwater
sa mpling. Although radionudide concentrations in some of the 100-K area monitoring weUs
exceed EPA drinking water standards, this condition does not constitute a risk to the public
beca use the groundwater is not used directly for human consumption or food production.
Ana lyses of water from the K a rea springs, where groundwater enters the Columbia Rive r,
indicate that radionuclide levels are below the EPA drinking water standards. Dilution of this
seepage in the river flow would further reduce the risk to the downstream population, as
indicated by the fact that radionuclide concentrations in the Columbia River at the Richland

compared to FAST [i.e., 3830 square meters (12,560 square feet)] (Hale 1994). For the
purposes of this assessment, the entire release is assumed as a point source, which is the most
conservative assumption. The concentration data associated with the release were contained in
or derived from January 6, 1986 to February 14, 1994 weekly water quality reports for FAST
and a re considered ~ o be reasonable nonzero release source terms at the 95% confidence level.
Although surve illance at the FAST facility occurs daily with radiological surveys occurring
weekly, the aqueous release assumes that the liner and/ or piping leaks and secondary
conta inment failure go undetected for one month.

pump house are orders of magnitude below the drinking water standard ( Dirkes et al 1994).
The specific radionuclide activities in the release solution are ass umed as foUows:
S.B.2 Decentralization Alternative

280 pCi/ L strontium-90, 3360 pCi/L cobalt-60, 160 pCi/L cobalt-57 b, 93 pCi/ L cesium-137, and
100 pCi/ L antimony-125. All of the constituents in this assessment are radionuclides.

The Spent Nuclear Fuel Wet Transfer and Storage scenario was documented. The
source term represents the maximum potential water releases that would be expected if a
secondary containment failure ,nd/oi' piping leak occurred and went undetected for one month
at a state-of-the-art wet storage fuel / transfer facility utilizing water treatment technology now
ava ilable. Releases resulting from such a failure should not be thought of as operational or
planned re leases. However, for the purposes of a nonzero release source-term, this scenario
add resses those situations where an unexpected release may occur. The source-term
information was derived from data related to the operation of the Flourinel and Storage Facility
(FAST) at INEL's Chemical Processing Pla nt (ICPP 666) a nd is considered to be extremely
conservative, given the state-of-the-art engineering practices, monitoring, leak-detection

Contaminant migration is through the '1adose zone through the saturated zone to the Columbia
River, and in the Columbia River to receptors downstream. The flow discha rge in the Columbia
River is assumed to be under low-flow conditions 1000 on 3 per second (36,000 cubic feet per
second) (Whelan et al. 1987), which represents the most conservative case for maximizing
surface water concentrations. As a consclVative assumption, the removal of water from th e

Columbia River is assumed to be 100 meters (328 feet) downstream of the conta minant influent
point to the river. The assessment addresses recreational activities (e.g., boating, swimming and
fishing) in the Columbia River a nd use of the water as a drinking-wate r supply a nd for bathing,
irrigation e tc. The risk of fatal cancers considering aU pathways was found to be significantly
iess than one chance in a trillion. For more information, refer to Whelan et a l. (1994).

eqcipment, and surveilla nce procedures likely to be used at any new SNF facility, such as FAST.
The Decentralization Alternativp also includes a n operational release scena rio to the
Any new facility would be built using state-of-the-art technologies, including leak
detection a nd water-balance monitoring equ ipment. This equipment, along with the uncertainties associa ted with evaporation monitoring, will have a minimum detection sensitivity. It is
possible that the new SNF facility could experience a failure that would result in a leak that is

Ha nford 200 A rea T reated Effluent Disposal Facility (TEDF). Liquid effluents wo uld be added
to the TE DF, which receives liquid efflue nt from ma ny facilities in the 200 Area. The "Discha rge Target" aUowable concentrations in the TEDF are presented in Bergsma n ( 1995 ). Only
380 liters (100 gaUons) per day will be discharged to the TEDF bas in from this operation,

below the sensitivity of the detection system. Based on the size of the facility and the curre nt
monitoring programs at similar facilities, 5 gaUons per day has been established as a conservative value to acco unt for potentia.l undetected leakage from the facility. The nonzero re lease
VOLUME I. APPENDIX A. APRIL 1995
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although other facilities unrelated to SNF storage will also be discharging to the basin . For a

100 meters (328 feet) downstream of the point of entry of the contaminant into the river. The

ponded situation. the maximum outflow from the basin is equal to the transmission rate (i.e ..

assessment addressed recreational activities (e.g., boating, swimming, and fishing) in the Colum-

saturated hydraulic conductivity under a unit hydraulic gradient) of the soil immediately below

bia River and use of the water as a drinking-water supply and for bathing, irrigation, etc.

the ba" n. which is 24 cubic meters per day (6260 gallons per day). To maximize the flow
velocity through the vadose zone and the mass flux of contaminant leaving the basin (i.e ..
concentration x area x flow velocity), the assessment assumes that this facility leaks into the va-

The maximum radionuclide and chemical carcinogenic risks were found to be less than
50 chances in a billion for all of the constituents through all of the exposure routes. Likewise,

dose zone over a 4-year period with the infiltration rate limited by the transmission rate of the

noncarcinogenic chemical individual doses were found to be below their respective reference

soil. The discharge from the pond is assumed to last for 4 years from 2002 through 2006.

doses, except chromium VI, which had a dose about 50 percent higher than the reference dose.
Chromium VI had an assigned distribution coefficient (i.e., Kd) of zero (Serne and Wood 1990),

Based on the movement of the second tritium plume from the Plutonium and Uranium
Recovery through Extraction cribs in the 200 Area to Well 699-24-33. a distance of 6 kilometers

which represents the most mobile condition in the vadose zone. For more information, refer to
Whelan et a1. (1994).

(4 miles) in a 5-year period (1983 to 1988), the average pore-water velocity (i.e., specific discharge divided by the effective porosity) in the saturated zone was 3.3 meters per day (10.8 feet

5.8.3 1992/1993 PlannIng BasIs Alternative

per day) (Schramke et al. 1994). Davis et a1. (1993) performed a more recent analysis and
determined the pore-water velocity as 0.02 meters per day (0.08 feet per day) just below the
TEDF site. although this is not necessarily indicative of the velocity as the water moves toward

Scenarios and consequences relating to water quality would be the same as for the
Decentralization Alternative. For more information, refer to Whelan et a1. (1994).

the river. 90th velocities were initially used in assessing the migration of contamination from
the basin to determine the most conservative result with respect to risk. In the final analysis,

5.8.4 Regionalizatlon Alternative

the highest pore-water velocity of 3.3 meters per day (10.8 feet per day) was used because 1) it
is consistent with other assessments at the installation, 2) the oontaminants reached the river

Scenarios and consequences relating to water quality in the Regionalization options

and receptors earlier. and 3) the resulting exposure analysis provided the more conservative

would be the same as for water quality aspects in the Decentralization Alternative. For more

estimate of risk over the 7000-year assessment time frame.

information, refer to Whelan et a1. (1994).

Radionuclides. chemical carcinogens, and noncarcinogens are contained in the waste

5.8.5 CentralizatIon Alternative

stream. The concentrations in the TEDF were represented by the dis.:harge targe t allowable
concentrations. Contaminant migration is from the ponded water, through the vadose zone.
through the saturated zone to the Columbia River. and in the Columbia River to receptors

Scenarios and consequences relating to water quality would be the same as for the
Decentralization Alternative. For more information, refer to Whelan et al. (1994).

downstream. The flow discharge in the Columbia River is assumed to be undc r low-fl ow conditions of 1000 cubic meters per second (36.000 cubic feet per second) (Whelan et a1. 1987), which

5.9 Ecological Resources

ff"presents the most ccnservative case for maximizing surface water concentrations. As a

conservative assumption. the removal of water from the Columbia River is assumed :0 be

Implications of implementing the alternatives for interim storage of SNF on terrestrial
resources. wetlands, aquatic ecosystems, and threatened and endangered species at the Hanford
Site are discussed in the following subsections.

VOU::o.tE I. APPE:"DlX A. APRJL 199$

5-52

5-53

cJc9'-1

VOI.UME I, APPEND IX A, APRIL 1995

5.9.1 No Action Alternative

5.9.2 Decentralization Alternative

Implica tion s of implementing the No Action A lt e rnat ive for int e rim storage of SNF o n

Implications of implementing the Decentralization Alternative for interim storage of SNF

terres trial resources, wetlan ds. aquatic resources, and threa tened and endangered specie s at th e

on terrestrial resources, wetlands, aquatic resources, and threatened and endangered species at

Hanford Site are discussed in the following subsections.

the Hanford Site are discussed in the following subsections.

5. 9. 1. 1 Terrestrial Resources. No new SNF facilities would be constructed at Hanford

5.9.2.1 Terrestrial Resources. This alternative would require the construction of an

a nd there would be no impacts to the terrestrial resources of the Ha nford Site beyond those

SNF facility for fuel management and storage. Most spent fuel from the Hanford Site would be

resulting from natural processes of succession and the impacts of ongoing Hanford operations.

stored he re.

They would re ma in as described under Section 4.9.1.
Construction of an SNF facility at Hanford would disturb up to 9 hectares (24 acres) on
5.9.1.2 Wetlands. No new SNF facility would be constructed; therefore. no cha nges to

wetla nds on the Hanford Site wo uld be expected beyond those changes resulting from natural
processes and the impacts of ongoing Ha nford operations (see Section 4.9.3) .

the 65 hectare (160 acres) site, representing about

om percent of the total area of the Hanford

Site. Approximately 9 hectares (24 acres) would be occupied by facilities, access roads, or
rights·of.way and therefore, would remain developed for the Life of the project. The remaining
land would be revegetated with native grasses and shrubs upon completion of construction.

5.9. 1.3 Aquatic Resources. No new SNF facility would be constructed and the fact
that the re are no surface water facilities o n th e SNF facility site indicates that th e re wo uld be no

Vegetation within construction areas would be destroyed during land·clearing activities.

impacts on the aquat ic resources of the Hanford Site other than those changes resu lting from

Plant species that are dominant on the Hanford SNF site, and thus would be most affected,

natu ral processes and the impacts of ongoing Ha nford operations a nd they would re main as

include big sagebrush, cheatgrass, and Sandberg's bluegrass. Total area destroyed would amount

described in Section 4.9.3.

to about less than 1 percent of this community on the Ha nford Site. Although the plant
communities to be disturbed a re well-represented on the Hanford Site, they are relatively

5. 9 . 1.4 Threatened and Endangered Species. No new SNF faci lities would be

uncommon regionally because of the widespread conversion of shrub-steppe habitats to

constructed and opera ted at Ha nford . Thus. populations of species listed as e ndange red or

agriculture. Disturbed areas are generally recolonized by cheatgrass, a non native species, at the

threatened. or candidates for such listing by the federal and Washington State gove rnments. or

expense of native plants. Mitigation of these impacts could include mini mizing the area of

species listed as monitor species by the Washington State government would not be impacted

disturbance and revegetating with native species, including shrubs, and establishing a 2: 1 acreage

(e ithe r direct ly by displace ment or indirectly by hab ita t a ltera tion) beyond e ffects resulting from

replaceme nt habitat in concert with a habitat e nha ncement plan presently being developed for

ongoing Hanford operatio ns a nd na tu ra l processes.

the Hanford Site in genera l. Adverse impacts to vegetation on Ha nford are expected to be
limited to the project area a nd vicinity and are not expected to affect the viability of any pla nt

5.9. 1. 5 Radioecology. Releases of radionuclides to the e nvironme nt are expected to

populations on the Hanford Site.

be on the order of those released in the rece nt past by site opera tions (Woodruff a nd Hanf
1993 ). a nd thus will not be accumulated into te rrestrial or aqua tic ecosyste ms in concentrations

that could ca use measurable impacts.

Construction of an SNF facility and support facilities would have <o rne adver<e affect on
anima l populations. Less mobile animals such as invertebrates, reptiles, a nd sma ll mammals
within the project a rea would be destroyed during land-clearing activities. Larger mammals and
birds in construction and adjacent areas would be disturbed by construction activities and would
move to adjacent suitable habitat, a nd these individual a nimals might not survive a nd reproduce.
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Project facilities would displace about 9 hectares (up to 24 acres) of animal habitat for the life

5.9.2 .4 Threatened and Endangered Species. Construction and operation of the SNF

of an SNF facility . Revegetated areas (e.g., construction laydown areas and buried pipeline

facility would remove approximately 9 hectares (24 acres) of relatively pristine big sagebrush/

routes) would be reinvaded by animal species from surrounding, undisturbed habitats. The

cheatgrass-Sandberg's bluegrass habitat. This sagebrush habitat is considered priority habitat by

adverse impacts of construction are expected to be limited to the project area and vicinity and

the State of Washington because of its relative scarcity in the state and its use as nesting/

should not affect the viability of any animal populations on the Hanford Site because similar

breeding habitat by loggerhead shrikes, sage sparrows, sage thrashers, burrowing owls, pygmy

suitable habitat would remain abundant on the site.

rabbits, and sagebrush voles. Bald Eagles, peregrine falcons, and Oregon silverspot butterflies
do not inhabit the potential proposed site.

Very small quantities of radionuclides would be released to the atmosphere during SNF
facility operations. No organisms studied to date are reported to be more sensitive than man to
radiation (NRC-S). Therefore, as concluded for humans, the effects of these releases on
terrestrial organisms are expected to be minor.

Loggerhead shrikes, listed as a federal candidate (Category 2) and state candidate
species, forage on the proposed SNF site and are relatively common on Hanford. This species
is sagebrush-dependent, as it is known to select primarily tall big sagebrush as nest sites.
Construction of the SNF facility would remove big sagebrush habitat which would preclude

These impacts to the vegetation and animal communities could be mitigated by minimizing the amount of land disturbed during construction, employing soil erosion control

loggerhead shrikes from nesting there. SNF site development would also be expected to reduce
the value of the site as foraging habitat for shrikes known to nest in adjacent areas.

measures during construction activities, and revegetating disturbed areas with native species.
These measures would limit the amount of direct and indirect disturbance to the construction
area and surrounding habitats and would speed the recovery process for disturbed lands.

Sage sparrows and sage thrashers, both state candidate species, occur in mature sagebrush/ bunchgrass habitat at Hanford. Sage thrashers were not observed on the SNF site, and
are extremely rare on the Hanford Site. These species are known to nest primarily in

Operational impacts to terrestrial biotic resources would include exposure of plants and
animals to small amounts of radio nuclides released during operation of the SNF facility. The

sagebrush. Construction of the SNF facility would preclude both of these species nesting there
and reduce the site's suitability as foraging habitat for these species.

levels of radionuclide exposure would be below those levels that produce adverse effects.
SNF construction is not expected to substantially decrease the Hanford population of
5.9.2.2 Wetlands. No wetlands occur on or near the SNF facility site, so no impacts

loggerhead shrike, sage sparrow, or sage thrashers because similar sagebrush habitat is still

from the construction and operation of the facility to wetlands would occur. Wetlands resources

relatively common on the Hanford Site. However, the cumulative effects of constructing the

on the Hanford Site would remain as described in Section 4.9.2. No mitigation efforts would be

SNF facility, in addition to future developments that fu rther reduce sagebrush habitat (causing

required because no wetlands would be affected.

further fragmentatio n of nesting habitat), could negatively affect the long-term viability of
popUlations of these sp"cies on the Hanford Site.

5.9.2.3 Aquatic Resources. No aq uatic habitats occur on the SNF site; thus, no
impacts to aquatic resources are expected from the construction and operation of the SNF

Burrowing owls, a .<tate candidate species, are relatively common on the Hanford Site

facility. No mitigation efforts would be required because no impacts are anticipated to aquatic

and nest in abandoned ground squirrel burrows on the proposed SNF site. SNF construction

resources.

would remove sagebrush and distu': b soil, displacing ground squirrels and thus reducing the
suitability of the area for nesting by burrowing owls. Construction would also displace small
mammals, which constitute a portion of the prey base for this species. Construction for an SNF
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facility would. however. not be expected to negatively impact the viability of the population of

5.9.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative

burrowing owls on Ha nford, as their use of ground squirre l burrows as nests is not limited to
burrows in big sagebrush habitat.

The 199211993 Planning Basis Allernative differs from the Decentralization Allernative onl y
in that TRIGA fuel currentl y stored at the Hanford Site would be shipped to INEL for storage . (It is

Pygmy rabbits, a federal candidate (Category 2) and state threatened species, are kn own
to utilize taU clumps of big sagebrush habitat throughout most of their range. Howeve r, this
species has not recently been observed on the Hanford Site. Construction of the SNF facility
would therefore reduce the potentia l for recolonization by this species by removing habitat

poss ible that the TRIGA fuel may be transferred to third parties for beneficial use prior to the
planned time of shipment to INEL. ) Thus. impacts on terrestrial resources, wetlands. aquatic
resources. threatened and endangered species. and radioecology at the Hanford Site would be
essentiall y the same as described for the Decentralization Allernative .

suitable for its use.
5.9.4 Regionalization Alternative
Sagebrush voles, a state monitor species, are common on the Hanford Site and select
burrow sites nea r sagebrush; however, this species is common only at higher elevations around
the Hanford Site. Construction of the SNF facility would remove sagebrush habitat, precluding
sagebrush voles from utilizing the site. However, construction would not affect the overaU
viability of sagebrush vole populations on the Hanford Site because the majority of the
population is found on the Fitzner/ Eberhardt Arid Lands Ecology Preserve.

The closest known nests of ferruginous hawks, a federal candidate (Category 2) and state

All ne w facilities would be constructed on the 65 hectare (163-acre) site west of 2oo-East
Area (Figure 4 . 1). Aithough impacts on terrestrial resources are expected to be minimal. the
impacts that would occur would be roughly proportional to the amount of land that would be
disturbed during construction. For the various options of the Regionalization Allernative, those
areas would amount to the fo llowing amounts of land :
A)

threatened species, and Swainson's hawk, a state candidate, are 8.5 km (5 mil and 6.2 km
(3.7 mil, respectively, from the proposed SNF site. The SNF site comprises a portion of the
foraging range of these hawks. Construction of the SNF facility is not expected to disrupt the
nesting activities of these species. However, construction would displace smaU mammal

From about 2 to 7 hectares (5 to 18 acres) when all SNF except defense production
SNF wo uld be sent to INEL.

B I) From about 15 to 17 hectares (38 to 43 acres) when all SNF west of the Mississippi
Rive r except Naval SNF would be sent to Hanford .

pop ula tions and thus reduce the prey for these birds. The cumulative effects of constructing the

B2) From about 25 to 28 hectares (63 to 70 acres) when all SNF west of the Mississipp i
River and Naval SNF would be sent to Hanford .

SNF facility, in addition to future reductions in sagebrush habitat (causing further fragme ntation

C)

of foraging habitat), could negatively affect the long-term viability of populations of these two
species on Hanford.

From about 2 to 5 hectares (5 to 12 ac res) when all Hanford SNF would be sent to
INEL or NTS .

While the largest area cited above (28 hectares) is about three times the size of the area to be
disturbed in the Decentralization Alternative , it is still a ve ry small fraction of similar habitat on the

5.9 .2.5 Radioecology. Releases of radionuclides to the environment are expected to

Hanford Site . By and large the discussion on flora and fauna presented in Section 5.9.2 app lies to

be below those currently released by site operations (Woodruff and Hanf 1993), and thus will

the Regionalization Allernative . bea ring in mind that the area involved would be more or less

not be accumulated into terrestrial or aquatic ecosystems in concentrations that could ca use

depending on the option chosen.

measurable impacts.
5.9 .5 Centralization Alternative

If Hanfo rd is selected as the site for the Centralization Alternati ve. an SNF facility . as
substantially described in the Decentralization Alternative , would be constructed at Hanford .
VOLUME I, APPENDIX A. APRIL 1995

5-58

5-59

c!)8f)

VOLUME I. APPENDIX A. APRI L

1Q9~

Although the facility would store about 25 weight percent more SNF than would be stored under

noise levels from constructing and operating a facility the size of a production reactor and its

the Decentralization Alternative and the number of casks would increase the required space. the

support facilities, including increased traffic along the major roadways, would result in little or

ecological impacts would be essentially the same as those described in Section 5.9.2.

no increase in the annoyance level experienced by communities or individuals.

If Hanford is not selected as the site for the Centralization Alternative, an SNF

No significant noise impacts from activities associated with SNF facility construction and

packaging facility would be built to prepare the fuel for shipment offsite. While that facility

operation are expected at sensitive receptor locations outside the Hanford boundary or at

would not be as extensive , the SNF facility, the ecological impacts would not likely be

residences along the major highways leading to the proposed SNF site at Hanford.

importantly different from those described in Section 5.9.3 for the Decentralization Alternative.
5.10.3 1992/1993 Planning BasIs Alternative

5,10 Noise
The 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative differs from the Decentralization Alternative
Implications of implementing the alternatives for interim storage of SNF on noise levels

only in that TRIGA fuel currently stored at the Hanford Site would be shipped to INEL for

at the Hanford are discussed in the following subsections.

storage. (It is possible that the TRIGA fuel may be transferred to third parties for beneficial

5.10.1 No ActIon AlternatIve

same as described for the Decentralization Alternative.

use prior to the planned time of shipment to INEL.) Thus, impacts would be essentially the

Under this alternative, new SNF facilities would not be constructed, and the noise

5.10.4 Regionalization Alternative

associated with SNF facility construction and operation activities would not occur. Because no
major changes in existing noise·emitting sources are expected at Hanford during the projected
SNF facility construction period, the ambient noise levels at Hanford would be expected to
remain essentially the same for the no·action alternative as during the baseline period.

All new facilities would be constructed on the 65 hectare (163·acre) site west of 200·East
Area (Figure 4.1). Although noise is not expected to be a factor in evaluating the alternatives,
the amount and duration of noise associated with construction would be roughly proportional to
the amount of land that would be disturbed during construction. For the various options of the
Regionalization Alternative, those areas would amount to the following amounts of land:

5.10.2 Decentralization Alternative

This alternative would require the construction and operation of an SNF facility for fuel

A)

management and storage. Most spent fuel from the Hanford Site would be stored here. The
results of a detailed analysis of the potential noise impacts from constructing and operating a
new production reacto r (project since cancelled) and its support facilities at Hanford have been
published. The analysis indicates that noise from constructing a facility the size of a production
reactor, and from operational facilities, equipment, and machines, would not cause ambie nt
noise levels to exceed the limits set by the Washington State '1oise control regulations or EPA
guidelines. The latter are set to protect the public from the effect of broadband environmental
noise and to protect the public against hearing loss. The results also indicate that increases in

From abo ut 2 to 7 hectares (5 to 18 acres) when all SNF except defense production
SNF would be sent to INEL.

B1) From abou t 15 to 17 hectares (38 to 43 acres) when all SNF west of the Mississippi
River except Naval SNF would be sent to Hanford.
B2) From about 25 to 28 hectares (63 to 70 acres) when all SNF west of the Mississippi
River and Naval SNF would be sent to Hanford.
C)

From About 2 to 5 hectares (5 to 13 acres) when all Hanford SNF would be sent to
INEL or NTS.

Although not likely to be heard offsite, the duratio n of noise that is generated would
range from about a quarter to three times that described for the Decentralization Alternative
depending on the Regionalization option chosen.

VO l t: ~ E

I. APPE.'TIIX A. APRJl 1995

5·60

;J!31

5·61

VOLUME 1. APPEl'o'DIX A. APRIL 1995

5.10.5 Centralization Alternative

be substantiaUy smaUer. AU shipments were assu med to be made by truck. A detailed
description of the approach and other important shipment-related parameters are discussed in

If Hanford is selected as the site for centralization of SNF. new SNF faciliti es would be
constructed at Hanford. Although somewhat larger than for the Decentralization Alternative.

Volu me 2, Chapter 5, and Appendix I. Hanford-specific information and input parameters are
presented in this sect ion.

the impacts from noise would be the same as those described in Subsection 5.10.2.
The doses per incident-free shipment of each type of SNF were calculated using

5.11 Traffic and Transportation

RISKIND and RADTRAN 4. The potential receptors considered are the transportation crew of
two, on-link (on the road) and off-link (persons near the roadway) populations. Guards and/ or

The implications of implementing the alternatives for interim storage of SNF on traffic

inspectors may also be exposed to the shipments. Guards and inspectors may be exposed when

and incident-free onsite transportation of SNF and materials supporting SNF storage at the

they prepare a shipment to leave its origin facility or prepare to receive a shipment that has

Hanford are discussed in the foUowing subsections. The impacts of offsite transportation of

arrived at a destination facility. Guards and inspectors may also be exposed while the shipment

SNF are discussed in Appendix I.

is enroute between facilities. Guard and inspector dose. at origin and destination facilities are
included in the doses calculated in Section 5.13. Most onsite shipments originate in the 200 and
100 Areas and will not travel through a guarded checkpoint. The guard/inspector doses for

5.11 .1 No Action Alternative

these shipments are zero. Only the misceUaneous fuel shipments originating in the 300 Area
Implications of implementing the No Action Alternative for interim storage of SNF on

and the FFTF shipments originating in the 400 Area will travel past a guarded checkpoint (see

traffic and incident-f. ee onsite transportation of SNF and materials supporting SNF storage are

Wye Barricade in Section 4.11 ). Doses to the guards at the Wye Barricade were calculated

discussed in the foUowing subsections.

assuming they we re exposed briefly at a distance of 5 meters, (16 feet) from the shipment, as
described in Volume 2, Chapte r 5. The computer code R1SKlND was used to calculate

5. 11. 1. 1 traffic. Under the No Action Alternative, the number of workers would stay

maximum and individual doses; RADTRAN 4 was used to calculate coUective population doses.

the same as under present conditions; therefore, there would be no change in traffic patterns.
At present, there are periods of moderate traffic congestion, some of which is expected to be

Five general classes of SNF were considered in this analysis. These include N Reactor
fuel. FFTF fuel, single-pass reactor (SPR) fuel , PWR Core-ll fuel, and misceUaneous fuel. A

aUeviated by a new road to the 200 areas.

sixth type of fuel, fuel wastes in EBR-ll metal casks, was assumed to have similar shipping
5.11.1.2 Transportation. The RISKIND (Yuan et al. 1993) and RADTRAN 4

characteristics to misceUaneous fuels . Some of the key shipment characteristics for these fuels

(Neuhauser and Kanipe 1992) computer codes were applied to calculate the radiation doses to

are presented in Table 5.11-1 , including the SNF material form s, quantities. shipment capacities.

transport workers and the public that are estimated to result from incident-free on site

and num bers of shipments. Radio nuclide inventories for the various types of fu el shipments are

transportation of SNF. R1SKlND was also used to calculate the consequences of bounding

provided in Table 5.11 -2. The radionuclide inventories were derived from the irradiated fuel

transportation accidents. All of the onsite SNF shipments were assumed to emit radiation that

inventories and characteristics provided by Bergsman (1994, 1995) and the shipment

would result in a dose rate at the regulatory limit (i.e., 0.01 rem per hour at 2 meters (6 feet)

characteristics listed in Table 5. 11-2.

from the external surface of the shipments). This assumption contributes to the conservatism of
the analysis because the shipment dose rates cannot be larger than this value but frequently will

The population densities of the different areas of the Hanford Site across which
shipments must travel will influence the transportation impacts. Doses to persons along the
highways (i.e., off-link doses) will be received only by Hanford Site workers for onsite shipments.
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Table 5.11-1. Spent nuclear fuel shipment characteristics.
Fuel Type

Material Form

Quantity,
Assemblies

Shipment Capacity,
Assemblies/shipment

Number of
Shipmentsa

N Reactor

Uranium metal clad
with Zircalloy-2

Short: 66,300
Long: 63,700

FFTF

Mixed uraniumplutonium oxide in
stainless steel tubes

317

4

80

1,100

900

2

Single·pass reactor

PWR Core-II
Fuel wastes in EBR-II
metal casks

M iscellant::ous

Uranium metal
enclosed in aluminum
jackets
Natural uranium oxide
clad in zirconium alloy
Plutonium-uranium
compounds sealed in
stainless steel canisters
Various uranium
compounds from
research and
development programs

Short: 128
Long: 96

Short: 518
Long: 664
Total: 1,182

72

71

24 casks

1 cask per shipment

24

77

4

20

a. This column provides the number of onsite shipments projected to occur in the Decentralization, 1992/1993 Planning Basis,
Regionalization, and Centralization Alternatives. For the No-Action Alternative, one shipment of N Reactor fuel currently at
PUREX amI all of the miscellaneous fuels were assumed to be transported onsite.

Table 5.11-2. Radionuclide inventories for shipments of each type of spent nuclear fuel on the
Hanford Site (Ci/shipment).,·b
Radionuclide
H-3
Mn-54
Fe-55
Co-GO
Ni-63
Kr-85
Sr-90
Y-90
Ru-106
Rh-106
Sb·125
Te· 125m
Cs·134
Cs-137
Ba-137m
Ce-1 44
Pr-144
Pr-144m
Pm· 147
Sm·151
Eu-154
Eu-155
U-233
U-234
U-235
U-238
Np-237
Pu-238
Pu-239
Pu-240
Pu -24 I
Pu -242
Am-241
Cm- 243
Cm-244

FFfF
2.IE+02
7.0E+02
6.9E+02
7.3E+02
6.0E+01
1.8E+03
I.3E+04
I.3E+04
1.8E+04
1.8E+04
3.7E+03
9.IE+02
5.2E+03
3.6E+04
3.4E+04
6.3E+03
6.3E+03
7.6E+01
2.8E+04
1.4E+03
1.0E+03
3.2E +03
O.OE+OO
O.OE+OO
2.0E·04
2.7E-02
4.6E-02
6.6E+02
1.4E+03
1.5E+03
6.3E+04
5.2E·0 1
8.0E+02
4.6E+O I
8.8E +0 1

N Reactor
3.9E+03
O.OE+OO
I.IE+03
7.9E+02
O.OE+OO
7.5E+04
8.7E+05
8.7E+05
7.IE+03
7.IE+03
I.GE+04
4.3E+03
1.9E+04
I.IE+06
1.0E+06
4.IE+03
4.IE+03
O.OE+OO
2.9E+05
I.3E+04
I.3E+03
4.8E+ 03
O.OE+OO
1.5E+00
6.7E-02
1.0E+OO
3.5E-02
O.OE+OO
1.8E+02
4.5E+01
1.7E+03
3.0E-03
3.IE+01
O.OE+OO
O.OE+OO

PWR Core-II
fuel
1.6E+02
O.OE+OO
6.IE+03
4.2E+03
2.7E+03
1.6E+03
1.8E+04
1.8E+04
2.9E+02
2.9E+ 02
I.IE+03
2.6E+02
1.6E+03
3.6E+04
3.4E+04
O.OE+OO
O.OE+OO
O.OE+OO
4.5E+03
1.9E+02
2.IE+03
7.6E +02
O.OE+OO
O.OE+OO
O.OE+OO
O.OE+OO
O.OE+OO
I.IE+03
2.8E+02
3.7E+02
6.8E +04
O.OE+OO
1.6E+03
O.OE+OO
7.9E+02

Single-pass
reactor

Misc.c

3.9E+03
O.OE+OO
I.IE+03
7.9E+02
O.OE+OO
7.5E+04
8.7E+05
8.7E+05
7.IE+ 03
7. IE + 03
1.6E+04
4.3E+03
1.9E+04
I.IE+06
1.0E+06
4. IE+03
4. IE+03
O.OE+OO
2.9E+05
1.3E+04
I.3E+03
4.8E +03
O.OE+OO
1.5E+00
6.7E-02
1.0E+00
3.5E-02
O.OE+OO
1.8E+02
4.5E+0 1
1.7E+03
3.0E-03
3.IE+OI
O.OE+OO
O.OE+ 00

O.OE+OO
O.OE+OO
O.OE+OO
4.3E+02
O.OE+OO
6.3E+02
3.IE+02
3.IE+02
1.4E+03
1.4E+03
O.OE+OO
O.OE+OO
O.OE+OO
3.5E+03
3.3E+03
9.6E+03
9.6E+03
O.OE+OO
7.7E+03
O.OE+OO
O.OE+OO
6.4E+OI
1.3E-OI
2.IE+01
2.6E-02
3.3E-04
O.OE r OO
3.8E +OI
6.9E+01
2.0E+02
1.1E+04
6.9E-OI
O.OE+OO
O.OE+OO
O.OE+OO

( 1993") .
h. For ra di onuclides that are indicated to have 0.0 Ci per shipment, the quantities of fission
and activat ion a re less than 5 C i/assembly and less than 10 g/assembly for actinides.
Radi onuclides not listed on the table are also less than these quantities.
c. Fue l inve nto ri es for EBR- II casks are assumed to be applicable to misceUaneous fuels. The
SNF in EBR· II casks and miscellaneous SNF consist primarily of irradiated light·water reactor
fue ls.

<=PBw

are listed in Table 5.11-3. The off-link doses are included in the occupational dose results.

EBR·II/

,I. Radio nuclide in ve nt ory data were derived from information in Bergsma n (1994) a nd WHC
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The population densities for each work area on the site, used for occupational dose calculations,
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For the calculation of doses to persons traveling on the highways (i.e., on-link doses), twolane highways were assumed and the number of persons per vehicle was assumed to be 2.0. No
vehicle stopS were included in the calculations because the shipments are not long enough to
warrant intermediate stops for food and rest. One·way traffic densities were based on traffic
counts provided in DOE (1989). Because average traffic densities were not available in that
document and there are no administrative restrictions on time of day when SNF transport could
occur, the peak count on a given ro ute segment (vehicles per day) was used to calculate the
traffic density for that route. The traffic densities used for the five types of SNF and shipping
distances fo r the various fuel types are provided below.
FFTF Fuel - 640 vehicles per hour; 28 kilometers one-way shipping distance
N Reactor Fuel - 170 vehicles per hour; 16 kilometers one·way shipping distance
PWR Core \I Fuel - 180 vehicles per hour; 5 kilo meters one-way shipping distance

•

Single-pass Reactor Fuel - 100 vehicles per hour; 16 kilometers one-way shipping
distance

EBR.II /300 Area MisceUaneous Fuel· 640 vehicles per hour; 37 kilometers oneway shipping distance.
Table 5.11-3. Population densities for work areas at Hanford.

Work Area
100 Band C
100 D and DR
100 H
100 K
100 N
200 West
200 East
300
400
600
WPPSS

Worker
Population
4
4
4
124
360
1968
2923
2487
638
514
1125

VOLUME I. APPENDIX A. APRIL 1995

Land Area,
km 2

1.7
1.5
0.7
0.9
1.0
9.5
9.0
1.5
2. 1
1450
4.4
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Worker Density, per km 2
3

140
360
210
330
1700
300
0.35
260

The computer code RISKIND was used to calculate the doses to Maximally-Exposed

Table 5.11-4. Impacts of incident-free transportation for the No Action Alternative.'

Individual ( MEl) me mbe rs of the public as discussed in Volume 2_ Chapter 5. Two exposure

General
Populatio n'

Impactsb

scenarios we re modeled. including a "tailga ter" a nd a "bystander." The dose received by a tail-

Occupational

gater was calculated by assuming that an individual precedes or follows an SNF shipment for the

Total Dose (person-rem)

7.8E-02

1.2E-01

entire duration of a shipment. The exposure dista nce was assumed to be 48.8 meters (160 feet) .

Cancer Fatalities

3.9E-05

4.7E-05

The dose calculated in Volume 2. Chapter 5. was based on a 37 kilometers (23 miles) shipping
distance. which is also the same as the longest shipping distance anticipated for SNF shipments
at Hanford (300 Area to the 200 Area). Therefore. the public MEl dose amounts to 0.0 15
millirem per tailgating incident.

The dose to a "bystander· was calculated in Volume 2. Chapter 5. to be 0.00 14 millirem.

a. The N Reactor fuel currently at PUREX is the only N Reactor fuel transported in this
alternat ive. The impacts of transporting this fuel were calculated by adjusting the impacts of
transporting all N Reactor fuel (0.3 MTHM at PUREX/2096 MTHM total N Reactor fuel) .
b. Total detriment. which includes latent cancer fatalities. nonfatal cancers. and genetic
effects in subsequent generations. can be calculated by multiplying the total dose to the
general populatio n by 7.3E-04 effects per person-rem and the total occupational dose by 5.6E04 effects per person-rem.
c. Rural population density.

This dose was calculated assuming a shipment passes by an individual at an average speed of
56 kilometers per hour (35 miles per hour) at a distance of I meter (3 feet) from the shipment.
This individual was postulated to be standing on the side of the road as an SNF shipment passes
by and was assumed to be exposed only one time.

The doses to the maximally-exposed workers and members of the public are summarized
below:
The dose to a ta ilgater was calculated to be 0.015 millirem.

The dose to the maximally-exposed worker from incident-free transportation will be
received by the truck crew. The dose to the truck crew was calculated using the maximum
allowable dose rate in the truck cab (2 millirem per hour) for all shipments. It was assumed

The dose to a bystander was calculated to be 0.0014 millirem.
The dose to a truck crewman that accompanies all of the spent fuel shipments in
the No Action Alternative was calculated to be about 46 millirem.

that the maxi mum-exposed worker will acco mpa ny all of the spent fuel shipments. even though
the dose will most likely be apportioned over a large r number of workers. The total dose
received by this individual was calculated by multiplying the maximum dose rate by the total

The RlSKlND computer code was used to calculate the radiological consequences of
accidental releases of radioactive mate rial during transportation. Consequences of ,"vere.

shipping time. The total shipping time for the various alternatives was determined by dividing

reasonably foreseeable accidents were calculated to workers and the offsite population. Worke rs

their total shipping distances by the average speed. 56 kilometers per hour (35 miles/hour).

were placed at a distance that maxi mizes the dose from a pote ntial release.

Hanfo rd-specific

population density data (see Beck et al. 1991) we re used to assess the integrated doses to the
The results of the a nalysis of the No Action Alternative are presented in Table 5.11 -4. As

offsite public. as described in Volume 2. Chapter 5.

shown. two shipment ca!";>aigns occur in this alternative; I) shipment of N Reactor fuel s at
PUREX to the 105-K basins for storage and 2) shipment of miscellaneous SNF in the 300 Area
to the 200 Area to be placed in dry storage. The total radiological impacts from incident-free

As discussed in Appendix 1. maxi mum radiological impacts were calculated for a severe.
reasonably foreseeable accident. For this assessment, the consequences were assessed to

transporwt ion in this alterna tive a re dominated by the shipments of miscellaneous fuel s from

populations and individuals assuming the most severe accident scenario wi th a probability

the 300 Area to the 200 Area. This is primarily because there are approximate ly 24 shipme nts

greater than I E-07. The methods and data described in Appendix I were used to calculate the

of miscellaneous fuels. and the N Reactor fu el at PUREX will make up only a fraction of a

accident probabilities of the va rious shipments in the No Action Alternative. Hanford-specific

shipment.

numbers of shipments and shipping distances were used in the calculatio ns. Accident rate

information from Saricks and Kvi tek ( 199 1) for urban areas in the State of Washington were
used in the calculations. The results of these ca lc ulatio ns indicate that tt.e probabilities of the
5-67
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severe accident defined in Appendix I for the irradiated fuels transported in the No Action

Nonradiological impacts consist of fatalities that may result from traffic accidents as well

Alternative are less than the I E-07 criteria. The most likely severe accide nt scenario was

as health effects from pollutants emitted from vehicles involved in onsite shipments of spent

determined to be one involving shipments of miscellaneous fuels from the 300 Area. The

nuclear fuel. These risks are unrelated to the radioactive nature of the materials being trans-

probability of such an accident was calculated to be about IE-09. As shown in Table 5.11 -5. this

ported. Nonradiological impacts from accidents were calculated using unit risk factors derived

is also the highest-consequence accident scenario for the No Action Alternative.

by Sa ricks and Kvitek (1991) that convey the estimated number of fatalities per unit distance
traveled. The total non radiological impacts are calculated by multiplying the total shipping

The impacts of potential severe transportation accidents for the No Action Alternative are

distance traveled by on site shipments by the appropriate unit risk factors.

shown in Table 5.11-5. The maximum exposed individual and public collective doses are shown
in Table 5.11-5 for shipments of miscellaneous SNF in the 300 Area to dry storage in the

The total nonradiological transportation impacts for the No Action Alternative were

200 Area. This was determined to be the most severe reasonably foreseeable onsite

calculated to be less than one (1.9E-05) fatality.

transportation accident scenario for the No Action Alternative. even though its probability is
significantly smaller than IE-07. as discussed above. As shown. consequence estimates are

5.11.2 Decentralization Alternative

presented for two atmospheric dispersion conditions; I) neutral (Pasquill stability class D. wind
speed = 4 meters per second) and 2) stable (Pasquill stability class F • wind speed = I meters
per second). 16

Implications of implementing the Decentralization Alternative for interim storage of SNF
on traffic and incident-free onsite transportation of SNF and materials supporting SNF storage
are discussed in the following subsections.

Table 5.11-5. Impacts of accidents during transportation for the No Action Alternative.'

Exposure Group

Dose Consequence

Cancer Fatalities

Point Estimate
of Risk

Stability Category

Stability Category

Stability Category

D

F

D

F

D

F

1.4E+OI

l.lE+02

6.8E-03

5.5E-02

6.8E-12

5.5E-II

person-rem

person-rem

5.0E-OI rem

I.7E+OO rem

2.0E-04

6.7E-04

2.0E-13

6.7E-13

5.11.2.1 Traffic. Under the Decentralization Alternative. the numbe r of construction

workers would range from about 220 to 870. During operations. the number of workers wo uld
range from about 1100 to 1300. depending on the option selected. This would add from I to
6 percent to the present workforce and to additional commuting traffic on the Hanford Site.
assuming that the proportion of workers that take the bus to work or drive their own ve hicles

b

Offsite Population

Maximum Exposed
Individual

remains essentially C(l nstant.
5. 11.2.2 Transportation. The same approaches and basic assumptions and data

described in Section 5.11.1.2 for the No Action Alternative were used to assess the impacts of
a. The maximum-consequence o nsite transportation accident for the
No Action Alternative is one involving a shipment of miscellaneous fuels
cu rrently located in the 300 Area. This is also the most likely accident
scenario. but its probability is below the IE-07 criteria for a credible
accident.
b. Rural population density.

onsite transportation for the Decentralization Alternative. The key differences between the
alternatives are the numbe rs of shipments and destinations. More SNF is transported in this
alte rnative than in the No Action Alternative. In this alternative. all N Reactor SNF in the 105·
K Basi ns is to be transported to the 200 Area for processing and/ or storage. depending upon

the particular suboption selected. The FFTF fuel is to be transported from the 400 Area to the
200 Area for storage. The PWR Core-II . single- pass reactor fuels. and JOO Area miscella neous
fuels are also to be transported to a new facility in the 200 Area for storage.
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Table 5.11-6 presents the incident-free transportation impacts for the Decentralization
Alternative. As shown in Table 5.11-6, the truck crews are the largest exposure group. The
total doses were found to be dominated by the exposures received during transportation of
N Reacto r fuel. This is because there are significantly more truck shipments of N Reactor fuel
in this alternative than shipments of other types of fuel .

Table 5_11-7. Impacts of accidents during transportation for the Decentralization Alternative.
Point Estimate
of Risk
Dose Consequence Cancer Fatalities
Accident Scenario Exposure
Group

0

The doses to the maximally-exposed workers and members of the public are summarized

Highest
Probability'

below:
•

Stability Category

The dose to a tailgater was calculated to be 0.015 millirem.
The dose to a bystander was calculated to be 0.0014 millirem.

Highest

The dose to a truck crewman that accompanies all of the spent fuel shipments in
the Decentralization Alternative was calculated to be about BOO millirem.

The worker MEl dose is higher than that calculated for the No Action Alternative because there

ConsequenceC

F

Stability Category
0

B.6E-03
Offsite
1.7E+01 1.4E+02
Population" Person- Person-rem
rem

F

Stability
Category
0

F

6.BE-02 4.3E-IO 3.4E-09

Maximu m
2.4E+00
7.2E-01
2.9E-04 9.6E-04 1.4E-11 4.BE-II
Exposed
Rem
Rem
Individual
B.4E-02 6.7E-OI 5.0E-1O 4.0E-09
Offsite
1.7E+02 1.3E+03
Population Person- Person-rem
rem
Maximum
Exposed
Individual

5.4E+00
Rem

I.BE+OI
Rem

2.2E-03 7.2E-03 \.3E-1I 4.3E-1I

are many more on site spent fuel shipments in the Decentralization Alternative.
Table 5.11 -7 presents the impacts of potential severe transportation accidents for the
Decentralization Alternative. The maximum exposed individual and public collective doses are
shown in Table 5.11 -7 for two accident scenarios: the highest probability and highest consequence. As explained in the table footnotes, the probabilities of both scenarios are less tha n
MEl IE-07 criteria discussed in Appendix

r.

As shown, consequence estimates are presented for

a. The highest-probability accident is one involving a shipment of N Reactor fuel. The
probability of this accident scenario was calculated to be approximately 5E-B over the
entire N-Reactor fuel shipping campaign.
b. Rural population density.
c. The highest-consequence accident scenario was determined to be one involving
shipments of FFTF fuel. However, the probability of the accident scenario analyzed here
is approximately 6E-09, which is below the 1E-07 probability criteria for a reasonably
foreseeable accident.
two atmospheric dispersion conditions; I) neutral (Pasquill stability class 0 , wind speed = 4

Table 5_1 Hi. Impacts of incident-free transportation for the Decentralization Alternative.
General
Population"

Occupational

Total Dose (person-rem )

4.3E-0 1

1.7E+OO

Cancer Fatalities

2.2E-04

6.BE-04

Impacts'

meters per second) and 2) stable (Pasquill stability class F . wind speed = I meters per second).
This table is different from Table 5.11-5 (No Action Alternative) because of the additional fuel
types transported in the Decentralization Alternative.
The total non radio logical transportation impacts for the Decentralization Alternative we re

a. Total detriment. which includes latent cancer fatalities. non-fatal cancers. and genetic
effects in subsequent generations. can be calculated by multiplying the total dose to the
general population by 7.3E-04 effects per person-rem and the total occupational dose by
5.6E-04 effects per persor -rem.
b. Rural population density.
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calculated to be 6.6E-04 fa talities. The nonradiological transportation impacts of this alternative
are significa ntly higher than the impacts of the No Action Alternative because the num bers of
shipments. and thus total shipment mileage. is significantly higher.
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Option B2 - The sa me as Option B I except that Naval SNF will also be transported to
H anford. This alternative would result in the same onsite transportation impacts as
Option BI.

5.11.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative

Implications of implementing the 1992/ 1993 Planning Basis Alternative for interim
storage of SNF on traffic and incident·free onsite transportation of SNF and materi als

Option C - All Ha nford SNF will be transported offsite to a facility at INEL or NTS.
O ffsite transportation impacts are addressed in Appendix I.

supporting SNF storage are discussed in the following subsections.

5 . 11.4 . 1 Traffic. Under the Regionalization Option A, the number of construction
5.11.3.1 Traffic. Because the only difference between the Dece ntralizatio n Alternative

workers would range from about 180 to 1200, depending on the option selected. During

and the 1992/ 1993 Planning Basis Alternative is the shipment of the small amount of TRIGA

operations, the number of workers would range from about 280 to 320, depending on the

fuel offsite, traffic patterns would not be significantly different from those described for the

suboption selected. This would add from less than I to about 5 percent to the present work·

Decentralization Alternative.

force and to additional commuting traffic on the Hanford Site, assuming that the proportion of
workers that take the bus to work or drive their own vehicles remains essentially constant.

5.11.3.2 Transportation. The impacts of onsite transportation for the 1992/ 1993
Planning Basis Alternative are substantially the same as the impacts of the Decentralization

Assuming that all of th e N Reactor fuel shipments travel 16 kilometers (10 miles) one way
(approximate distance from the 100 Areas to the 200 Area), a total of about 40,000 vehicle-

Alternative (see Section 5.11.2). The only difference between these two alternatives is the

kilometers are needed for the N Reactor fuel shipments in this option. It was stated in Section

dispositio n of the TRJGA fuel in the 308 Building. The quantity and number of TRJGA fuel

4.11 that in 1988 DOE vehicles logged over 19,000,000 vehicle-kilometers (12,000,000 vehicle-

shipments is small relative to the other fuel types so the disposition of the TRJGA fuels will

miles) at Ha nford. The increase in vehicle mileage resulting from the Regionalization Option

have a negligible impact on the results presented in Tables 5.11·3 and 5.11·4.

A, assuming th at all the Hanford SNF shipments will be made in one year, is less than I percent

above the 1988 base DOE-vehicle mileage.

5.11.4 Regionalization Alternative
For the Regionalization options B I and B2, the impacts on traffic would be essentially th e
Implications of implementing the Regio nalization Alternative for interim storage of SNF

same as those described for the Decentralization Alternative (see Section 5.11.2.1).

o n traffic and incident·free on site transportation of SNF and materials supporting SNF storage
are presented in this section. The onsite transportation requirements for the four
Regionalization Alternative options are as follows:

The Regionalization Option C involves offsite shipments "f Hanford fuel. The numbe r of
Hanford workers would stay approximately the same as the No Action Alternative. The impacts
on traffic are predominantly related to the additional vehicles on the highways that are carrying

Option A - Defense production fuel will be shipped from the 105·K basins and Plutonium
a nd Uranium Recovery through Extraction to a new facility in the 200 Area for storage.
All other fuel will be shipped offsite; the tra nsportation impacts of offsite shipments are
addressed in Appendix I.
Opt io n B I - All SNF located or to be generated west of the Mississippi River will be sent
to Ha nfo rd fo r sto rage. except for Naval SNF. Shipments of SNF from offsite locations
arc addressed in Appendix I. The onsite SNF will be transported from its current
loca tions to tht: 200 Area fo r storage. In terms of onsile transv'utation impacts. this
option is esse ntia lly the sa me as the Decentralization Alternative (see Section 5_11.2).
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Hanford fuels to lNEL or NTS. Assuming that all of th e on site Hanford fuel shipments travel
48 kilometers (30 miles) one way (approximate distance from the 100 Areas to the 300 Area), a
total of about 130,000 vehicle-miles are needed for the onsite segments of these shipments. It
was stated in Section 4. 11 that in 1988 DOE vehicles logged ove r 12,000,000 miles at Hanford.
The increase in vehicle mileage resulting from Regio nalization Option C, assuming that all the
Hanford fuel shipme nts will be made in one year, is about I percent above th e 1988 base DOE·
vehicle mileage.
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5.11.4.2 Transponation. In Regionalization Option A, all N Reactor SNF in the

105-K basins and at PUREX would be transported to the 200 Area for processing and/or
storage, depending on the particular suboption selected. The FFfF, PWR Core-II, single-pass
reactor fuels, and 300 Area miscellaneous fuels are to be transported to INEL. Offsite transportation impacts are addressed in Appendix I. Onsite transportation impacts for this option,
therefore, would consist of the impacts of transporting N Reactor fuel from the 105-K basins
and PUREX to the 200 Area.

The transportation impacts of this option were calculated by determining the impacts of
transporting N Reactor fuel on a per-shipment basis and then multiplying the total number of
shipments. The methods and input data described in Section 5.11.1 were used to calculate the
per-shipment impacts. The results of the transportation impact calculations for the Regionalization Option A are as follows:
•

Incident-free transportation impacts: Public exposures - 2.4E-Ol person-rem (9.6E05 LCFs); Worker exposures - 1.4E +00 person-rem (5.6E-04 LCFs).

•

Impacts of transportation accidents: Public, Pasquill Stability Class D - 1.7E+ 01
person-rem (8.6E-03 LCFs); Public - Pasquill Stability Class F - 1.4E + 02 personrem (6.8E-02 LCFs). Maximum exposed individual, Pasquill Stability Class D 7.2E-Ol rem (2.9E-04 LCFs); Maximum exposed individual Pasquill Stability
Class F - 2.9E+00 rem (9.6E-04 LCFs). See the "highest probability" accident in
Table 5.11-7.

•

Nonradiological impacts: 5.6E-04 fatalities.

The incident-free doses to the maximally-exposed workers and members of the public are
summarized below:

•

The dose to a tailgater was calculated to be 0.015 millirem.

•

The dose to a bystander was calculated to be 0.0014 millirem.

•

The dose to a truck crewman who accompanies all of the SNF shipments in
RegionaLization Option A was calculated to be about 680 millirem.

The worker MEl dose is higher than that calculated for the No Action Alternative
because there are many more onsite spent fuel shipments in the RegionaLization Option A.
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The work er MEl dose is lower tha n tha t ca lcul ated for the Decentralization Alternative because

Therefore, the onsite transportation impacts for the Centralization Alternative a re the same as

on ly N Reactor fue l is shipped onsite in Regionalization O ption A, and all fue l types are

those fo r the Decentralization Alternative (see Section 5. 11.2).

shipped onsite in the Decentralization Al ternat ive.

5.12 Occupational and Public Health and Safety
In Regionalization options Bland B2, all Hanford SNF would be shipped onsite fro m its
current locations to the 200 Area. T ra ffic a nd transportation impacts for both Regionalization
options Bland B2 wo uld be essentially the same as those calculated for the Decentralization
Alternative.

Im plications of implementing the altern atives for interim storage of SNF on worker and
public health and safety a t the Hanfo rd Site are discussed in the following subsections. By and
la'ge this materi al consists of summary material extracted from Section 5.7, "Air Quality and
Related Consequences;" 5.8, "Wate r Quality and Related Conseque nces;" 5.11 , "Traffic and

In Regionalization Option C, all of the Hanford Site SNF wou ld be shipped to and stored

Transportation;" and 5. 15, "Accidents."

at e ither INEL or NTS. Because all of the shipments of Hanford SNF wou ld be considered to
be offsite shipments, the impacts are addressed in Appendix I. For Hanford, this option is

5.12.1 No Action Alternative

identical to the Centralization Alternative, minimum option.
Radiological and nonradiological consequences relating to occupational and public health

5.11.5 Centralization Alternative

and safety for the No Action Alternative are presented in the following subsections.

Implications of implementing the Centralization Alternative for interim storage of SNF on
Iraffic and incident·free onsite transportation of SNF and materials supporting SNF storage are
discussed in the following subsections.

5. 12. 1.1 Radiological Consequences. The consequences of air emi» ions from routine

operations of existing facilities utilized in the No Action Alternative include a maximum a nn ual
dose of 1E-5 rem to a potential onsite worker with a 5E-9 probability of fatal cancer. The
collective annual dose to workers in spent fuel storage facilities is 24 person-re m per year

5. 11.5 . 1 Traffic. Traffic patterns would be essentially the same as for the Decentrali·

zation Alternative if Hanford were selected to receive all DOE SNF. The patterns would last

(Bergsman 1995), which would require about 60 years of such operation to accumulate a collective worker dose from which one fatal cancer might be inferred.

for up to twice as long because of the additional fuel to be brought to the reprocessing/
stabilization and storage fac ility (although there is only 25 weight percent more fuel to be
shipped, it would likely require smaller quantities per shipment because of its higher heat load).

The dose to an offsite resident at the highest exposure location is estimated as
3E-6 rem/yea r, a nd the corresponding probability of fatal cancer is IE-9.

If all Hanfo rd fuel were to be shipped offsite, traffic patterns wo uld not be significantly different
fro m those of the No Action Alternative.

The peak collective dose to the popUlation wit hin 80 kilometers (50 miles) is 3E-2 personrem per year, which is predicted to result in less than one fatal cancer (about 36,000 years I)f

5. 11. 5.2 Transportation. The Centralization Alternative results in the same onsite

transportation impacts as the Decentralization Alternative. In the Decentralization Alternative,

such operation would be required to reach a dose fro m which one fatal cancer might be
infe rred).

all Hanfo rd Site SNF will be transported to the 200 Areas for further processing and/or storage,
depending on the specific option. In the Centralization Alternative, all Hanford Site SNF is
transpo rted to e ither a stabilization/packaging facility in the 200 Area for preparation for offsite
shipment or to the Central Storage Facility to be located in the 200 Area. AU of these cases
requires onsite shipment of Hanford SNF from their current locations to a 200 Area facility.
VOLUME I, APPEND IX A. APRIL 1995
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5.12.2 Decentralization Alternative

5.12.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative

Radiologica l and nonradiological consequences re lating to occupational and public health
and safety fo r the Decentralization Alternative are presented in the fo llowing subsect ions.

Because the activities are similar. radiological consequences of routine operations for the
199211993 Planning Basis Alternative are considered to be the same as those for the

5. 12.2 . 1 Radiological Consequences. The consequences of air emissions from individ·

Decentralization Alternative.

ual facilities in the Decentralization Alternative are summarized in Table 5.7·8 a nd include a
maximum annual dose of 2E·9 rem to a potential onsite worker (8E·13 probability of fata l

5.12.4 Regionalization Alternative

cancer) for any combination of wet or dry spent fuel storage facilities. The dose to an offsite
resident at the highest exposure location is estimated as 6E· 10 rem per yea r. and the
corresponding probability of fatal cancer is 3E-13 . The peak collective dose to the population

Radiological and nonradiological consequences relating to occupational and public health
and safety for the Regionalization Alternative are presented in the following subsections .

within 80 km is 2E-5 person-rem per year. whkh is predicted to result in less than one fatal
cancer. The collective annual dose to workers at SNF facilities for a combination of wet and dry

5.12.4. 1 Radiological Consequences. Because of the similarity of activities. the

storage facilities is 2 person-rem per year for maintenance and operations. Loading the new

radiological consequences of routine operations for the Regionalization Alternative Option A are

facilities would require an additional 17-18 person-rem depending on the form of dry storage.

considered to be the same as those for the Decentralization Alternative. The consequences to the

For dry storage only . the dose from initial loading would be 7-12 person-rem. and there would
be no dose from normal operations (Bergsman 1995).

public of options B and C are the same as described in the following section for the
Centralization Maximum and Minimum options. respectively. Consequences to onsite workers
would differ based on the processing and storage options for onsite fuel as in the decentralization

For dry storage of defense fuel. stabilization prior to dry storage is included in the routine
operations of the Decentralization Alternative. and additional emissions would result from these
activities . The dose to the onsite worker from air emissions would increase by 4E-6 rem/year for
a shearlleach/calcine process or 3E-5 rem /ye:1T for a solvent extraction process (2E-9 or IE-8
probability of fatal cancer. respectively). Collective worker dose at fuel stabilization facilities

alternative. as we ll as on the quantity of imported fuel to be received and placed into dry storage
under each option. The consequences over the 40-year storage period range from 98 to 320
person-rem for option A. 700-920 person-rem for options BI and B2. and 190-320 person-rem
for option C. No fatal cancers would be expected as a result of implementing any of these
options .

would range from 44 person-rem per year at a shear/leach/calcine facility to 78 person-rem per
year at a solvent extraction facility over the 4 years in which these facilities are expected to

5.12.5 Centralization Alternative

operate (Bergs man 1995). The dose to an individual worker in the facility is assumed to be
limited by administrative controls to no more than 0.5 rem per year.

Radiological and nonradiologicz! consequences relating to occupational and public health
and safety for the Centralization Alternative are presented in the following subsections.

The consequences from stabilization for the offsite resident would be 7E-6 rem per year
(4E-9 probabi lity of fatal cancer) for the shear/leach/calcine facility and 2E-5 rem per year
(I E-8 probabi lity of fatal cancer) for the solvent extraction facility . The collective dose to the
offsite population from the respective fuel stabilization facilities is estimated at 0 .3 to I personrem per year. resulting in less than one fatal cancer (would require from about 1000 to
3700 years of such exposure to reach a dose fro m which one fatal cancer might be inferred) .
VOLUM E 1. APPEl''O IX A, APRIL 1995
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5.12. 5. 1. Radiological consequences of air emissions from routine operations in the
Centra lization Allernative include a maximum annual dose of 9E-9 rem to a potential onsite
worker (4E-12 probabil ity of fatal cancer) for any combination of wet or dry spent fuel storage
facilities. The collective annual dose to SNF facility workers for a combination of wet and dry
storage facilities is 2 person-rem per year for maintenance and operations . Loading the new
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facilities would require an additional \9-22 person-rem depending on the form of dry storage.

Table 5-13-1. Materials and energy required for Decentralization suboptions.

For dry storage only, the dose from initial loading would be 9-12 person-rem , and there would
Option

be no dose from normal operations (Bergsman 1995). Shear/ leach/calcine and solvent extraction
activities would add 44 or 7S person-rem per year, respectively , and the receiving, canning , and
technology development facilities would entail an additional 20 person-rem per year.

The dose from air emissions to an offsite resident at the highest exposure location is
estimated as 2E-9 rem per year, and the corresponding probability of fatal cancer is SE-13. The
peak collective dose to the population within SO kilometers (50 miles) is 7E-5 person-rem per
year, which is predicted to result in less than one fatal cancer. These estimates do not include
relocation of the expended core facility to Hanford, which is discussed in Appendix D to Volume
1 of this EIS . Assumptions used in the Appendix D calculations for consequences of locating an
expended core facility at Hanford may differ from those used for other Hanford facilities .

Ilem
Concrete, th ousand cubic
metcrs/(c ubic ya rds)

x

W

y

z

p

o

13 (17)

15 (20)

17 (23)

24 (32)

22 (29)

29 (38)

Carbon steel, thousand
to nnes (tons)

2.4 (2.7)

2.8 (3.1)

3.3 (3.6)

4.5 (5.0)

3.9 (4.2)

5.1 (5.6)

Stainless sleel, thousand

0.1 (0.1)

0. 1 (0.1)

o

0.5 (0.6)

0.7 (0.8)

o

o

0.06 (0.07)

0.08
(0.09)

lonnes (tons)
Copper, thousand lonnes
(ton,)

Lumber. thousand cubic
melcrs (board

1.2 (500)

1.4 (570)

1.6 (650)

2.2 (930)

2.0 (850)

2.6
(1100)

0.6 (0.8)

0.7 (0.9)

0.8 (1.1)

1.2 (1.5)

1.1 (1.4)

1.4 (1.8)

reel)

Asphalt, sand, and crushed
rock. thousand cubic
meters (t housand cubic
ya rds)

5.13 Site Services
Implications of implementing the alternatives for interim storage of SNF on site services at
the Hanfor<1 Site are discussed in the following subsections.

Electricity
Construction (MW-hrs)

2500

Operations (M W-I: .. s/yr)

2900

1600

1600

3500
100

4800
100

4370
40,000'

5700
127,000'

Diesel fuel , thousafld cubic

0.5 (130)

0.6 (ISO)

0.7 (175)

0.9 (240)

0.8 (220)

1.1 (290)

0.5 (130)

0.6 (150)

0.7 (175)

0.9 (240)

0.8 (220)

1.1 (290)

265

280

350

310

580

835

mclc:s (thousand gallon s)

Gasolin e, thousand cubic
me te rs (thousa nd ga ll ons)

5.13.1 No Action Alternative

Construction Cost ($
Milli on)

Implementing the No Action Alternative would require no significant additional consumption of material or energy ; however , about 12,000 megawatt-hours per year are currently used
for SNF management activities .

a ..A~sumes ope ralion or the process ra cility (28,000 or 115,000 MW·hrs/ yr) concurrently with those

:<lCI!I~IC~ w~c rc SN F IS curren tly stored ( 12,000 M\V.hrs/yr, as in the No Action Alternative) ror an
mt erlm peri od less than 4 yca rs.

In Ihe Decenlral ization Alternalive, an extension of existing utililies to the projecl site

5.13.2 Decentralization Alternative

area would likely be neces'3ry. This would include waler mains, electrical power lines,
Incremental requirements for materials and energy in construction associated with the

sewage facilities , telephone lines, etc . All of these utilities are available in the adjacent 200-

Decentralization Alternative are shown in Table 5. 13-1. Annual consumption of energy during

East Area. In addition, an exisling rail line might need to be upgraded for increased traffic ,

operations is similar to that used during construction for the water storage options (Wand X), the

and construclion of new spurs going to various proposed new facilities would likely be

total would be a small fraction of the present consumption rate. Annual consumption of energy

required. The projecl would be served by an S-inch water main capable of delivering 7600

during operations in the options where defense production fuel is stabilized is significantly

lilers per minute (2000 gallons per minute). Facilities would be designed to preclude

greater; however it is still within the capacity of existing facilities.

di scha rge of water except for sanitary waste.
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5.13.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative

Table 5-13-2. Materials and energy required for Regionalization A suboptions.
Option

Energy requirements in the 1992/ 1993 Planning Basis Alternative would be essentially the

z

W

x

9 (12)

9 (12)

16 (21)

19 (25)

22 (29)

29 (38)

Carbon steel, thousand
tonnes (tons)

1.7 (1.9)

1.7 (1.9)

3.0 (3.4)

3.6 (4)

3.9 (4.2)

5.1 (5.6)

Stainless steel, thousand
tonnes (lons)

0.1 (0.1)

0.1 (0.1)

o

0.5 (0.6)

0.7 (O.S)

in the Regionalization options would be similar to those cited above for the Decentralization
Alternative, although the construction requirements would occur over most of the interim

Copper, thousand tonnes

o

0.06 (0.07)

storage period. Incremental requirements for materials and energy in construction associated

(tons)

It em

same as those cited above for the DecentraLization Alternative.

Concrete, thousand cubic
meters/(cubic yards)

5.13.4 Regionalization Alternative
Material and energy requirements in the Regionalization Option A would be slightly less
than those cited above for the Decentralization Alternative. Material and energy requirements

with the Regionalization options are shown in Tables 5.13-2 and 5.13-3. For the Regionalization
options that involve fuel from other locations being stored at the Hanford Site, the requirements
shown are for fuel received from other locations and are in addition to those shown in
Table 5.13-1 for fuel already at the Hanford Site. For the Regionalization option that has no
fuel stored at the Hanford Site, the requirements shown are the total incremental requirements.

Similar to the Decentralization Alternative, annual consumption of energy during operations is similar to that used during construction for the water storage options (Wand X), and

o

P

Q

O.OS
(0.09)

Lumber, thousand cubic
meters (board [eet)

O.S (350)

O.S (350)

1.4 (600)

1.7 (700)

2.0 (850)

2.6
(1100)

Asphalt, sand, and crushed
rock, thousand cubic
meters (thousand cubic
yards)

0.5 (0.6)

0.5 (0.6)

O.S (1.0)

0.9 (1.2)

1.1 (1.4)

1.4 (I.S)

ISOO
1600

ISOO
1600

3200
100

380C
100

4370
40,000"

5700
127,000"

Diesel fuel, thousands
cubic meters (thousand
gallons)

0.4 (100)

0.4 (100)

0.6 (160)

0.7 ( \90)

O.S (220)

1.1 (.190)

Gasoline, thousand cubic
meters (thousand gallons)

0.4 (100)

0.4 (100)

0.6 (160)

0.7 (190)

O.S (220)

1.1 (290)

200

200

340

250

580

835

Electricity
Construction (MW-hrs)
Operations (MW-hrs/ yr)

5.13.5 Centralization Alternative

y

the total wouLd be a small fraction of the present consumption rate. Annual consumption of
energy during operations in the options where defense production fuel is stabilized is significantly greater; however it is still within the capacity of eXIsting facilities. Materials and energy
requirements for construction in the Centralization Alternatives are shown in Table 5.13-4.

Construction Cost ($
Million)

Similar to the Regionalization options, the Centralization Alternative that involves fuel from
other locations being stored at the Hanford Site shows the requirements associated with storing
the fue l received from other locations and are in addition to those shown for fuel already at the
Hanford Site in Table 5.13-1. For the Centralization option that has no fuel stored at the

a. Assumes operation of the process facility (28,000 or 115,000 MW-Hrs/ yr) concurrently with thr.sc
facilities where SNF is currently stored (12,000 MW-Hrs/yr, as in the No Action Alte rnative) fp'j' an
interim period less than 4 years.

Hanford Site, the requirements shown are the total incremental requirements.

In the Centralization Alternative where all SNF is brought to the Hanford Site, an
extension of existing utilities to the project site area would be necessary. This would include
water mains, electrical power lines, sewage facilities, telephone lines, etc. All of these utilities
VOLUME I. APPENDIX A. APRI L 1995
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Table 5-13-3 . Materials and energy required for construction of Regionalization B a nd Captions.
Option

Item
Concrete, thousa nd cubic
meters/(cubic ya rds)
Carbon steel, thousand tonnes
(tons)
Stainless steel thousand tonnes
(tons)
Copper, thousand tonnes (tons)
Lumber, thousand cubic meters
(board feet)
Asphalt, sand, and crushed rock.
thousand cubic meters (thousand
cubic yards)
Electricity
Construction (MW·hrs)
Operations (MW·hrs/yr)'
Diesel fuel, thousand cubic
meters (thousand gallons)
Gasoline, thousand cubic meters
(thousand gallons)
Construction Cost ($ Million)

Table 5-13-4. Materials and energy requirements for construction of Centralization options.

SNF Stored at No SNF Stored at
SNF Stored at the
the Hanford Site the Ha nford Site
Hanford Site
Without Naval SNF With Naval SNF
54 (70)

115 (150)

18 (23)

8.2 (9)

19.1 (21)

3.1 (3.4)

0.1 (0. 1)

0. 1 (0.1)

0.4 (.5)

0
4.8 (2000)

0
10 (4200)

0.05 (0.05)
1.6 (660)

2.5 (3.3)

5.4 (7.1)

0.8 ( 1.1 )

16,000
100·127,000
1.9 (500)

30,000
100· 127,000
4.2 (1100)

3400
0·20,000
0.6 (170)

1.9 (500)

4.2 (1100)

0.6 ( 170)

765

1465

560

a. Minimum value represents require ments during the period afte r all fuel has been placed
into dry storage, or has been shipped offsite. Maximum value represents requirements
during the interim period (less tha n 4 years) while SNF is being processed a nd prepared for
storage or shipme nt offsite, assuming concurrent operation of the process facility and the
existing facilit ies where SNF is currently stored (as in the No Action Alternative).

a re available in the adjacent 200·East Area. In addition, an existing rail line might need to be

No Fuel Stored at
the. Hanford Site

Item
Concrete, thousand cubic meters (cubic yards)
Ca rbon Steel, thousand tonnes (tons)
Stainless Steel, thousand tonnes (tons)
Copper, thousand tonnes (tons)
Lumber, thousand cubic meters (board feet)
Asp halt, Sand, and Crushed Rock (thousand cubic
meters (thousand cubic yards)
Electricity
Construction (MW·hrs)
Operations (MW·hrs/yr)'
Diesel fuel, thousand cubic meters (thousand gallons)
Gasoline, thousand cubic mete rs (thousand gaUons)
Construction Cost ($ Million)

AU Offsite Fuel
Stored at the
Hanford Site

18 (23)
3.1 (3.4)
0.4 (0.5)
0.045 (0.05)
1.6 (660)
0.8 (1.1)

150 (200)
25 (27.5)
0.1 (0.1)

3400
0·20,000
0.6 (170)
0.6 (170)
560

40,000
100·127,000
5.7 (1500)
5.7 (1500)
1950

o
13 (5600)
7.2 (9.5)

a. Minimum value represents requirements during the period after all fuel has been placed
into dry storage, or has been shipped offsite. Maximum value represents requirements during
the interim period (less than 4 years) while SNF is being processed and prepared for storage
or shipment offsite, assuming concurrent operation of the process facility and the existing
facilities where SNF is currently stored (as in the No Action Alternative).

5.14 Materials and Waste Management
5.14.1 No Action Alternative

The No Act ion Alternative involves only fuel storage at existing facilities, and material

upgraded for increased traffic and the construction of new spurs to various proposed new facilities

require ments for the curre nt configuration are minimal. The exception is make.up water fo r the

wo uld likely be required.

105·K fuel storage basins, which amounts to 2.8 million cubic ",eters per year.

The following section describes the material requirements fo r operation of facilities in each
SNF alte rnative and the corresponding quantities of waste gene rated by these activities.

The quanti ty of waste generated in the No Action Alternative is also relatively small
because the only pla nned modifications to existing facilities are safety a nd security upgrades to

Table 5.14· 1 lists the breakdown by alternative and suboption of the various rypes of waste gener·

the 105·K basins. About 530 cubic mete rs of low·level waste would result from containeriza tion

ated by SNF management facilities.

of SNF in 105·KE Basin, and small qua ntities of radioactive and mixed waste are generated at
the 325 Building.
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Table 5.14-1. Waste generation for spent nuclear fuel management alternatives.

s:

Decentral ization

m

Waste Type

No Action

W

x

y

Central ization

z

p

Q

o ffsite

at Hanford

Construction
Waste (m 3 , total)

0

1500

1700

1700

2800

2600

3400

2000

15000

High-Level
Radioactive
Waste (m3/y)

0

0

o

o

o

o

57

14

o

Transuranic
Waste (m 3 /y)

o

o

o

o

o

28

50

o

o

50

o

o

280

420

140

68

Low-Level
Radioactive
Waste (m 3 /yY

95

41

Mixed Waste
(Low-Level
Radioactive and
Hazardous,
(m 3 /y)

0.96

0.23

0.23

o

o

2.0

2.0

1.0

0.28

Non-radioactive
Hazardous Waste

2.3

1.1

1.1

o

o

2.8

2.8

1.4

1.1

I .b

(m3/y)

a. These quantities are associated with new facilities that would be required for management of SNF shipped to Hanford from other
sites. They represent incremental increases over those for facilities that are required to manage SNF currently at Hanford , which are
discussed in the No-Action and Decentralization Alternatives.
b. A new ECF is not included in these totals; requirements for this facility are discussed ir. Volume 1, Appendix D.
c. Annual totals do not include containerization of defense production reactor SNF currently stored at the 105-K basins. This activity
is expected to generate 530 cubic meters of low-level radioactive waste over a period of approximately 2 years.

Table 5.14-1. (contd)
Regionalization

"'""
"'zw

S2
x
?>

>

"'c:"

r

AQ

B I"

B2"·b

AZ

AP

900

1600

2100

2600

3400

5400

11 ,500

2000

High-Level
Radioactive Waste
(mJ/ y)

0

0

0

0

57

0

0

14

Transuranic Waste
(mJ/y)

0

0

0

28

50

0

0

0

Low-Level
Radioactive Waste
(m3/ y)"

61

0

0

280

420

1.7

1.7

Construction Waste
(mJ , total)

>

AX

AY

Waste Type

C

140

Mixed Waste
{Low-Level
Radioactive and
Hazardous , (m3/y)

0.23

0

0

2.0

2.0

0.028

0.028

1.0

Non-radioactive
Hazardous Waste
(m3/y)

1.1

0

0

2.8

2.8

0.057

0.057

1.4

a. These quantities are associated with new facilities thitt would be required for management of SNF shipped to Hanford from other
sites. They represent incremental increases over those for facilities that are required to manage SNF currently at Hanford, which are
discussed in the No-Action and Decentralization Alternatives.
t>. A new ECF is not included in these totals; requirements for this facility are discussed in Volume 1, Appendix D of this document.
c. Annual totals do not include containerization of defense production reactor SNF currently stored at the 105-K basins. This activity
is expected to generate 530 cubic meters of low-level radioactive waste over a period of approximately 2 years.

greater quantities because of additional facilities that would be necessary to receive. package.

5.14.2 Decentralization Alternative

and store imported SNF. Note that the waste quantities reported in Table 5.1 4- 1 represent
incremental increases for SNF faci lities ahove those listed for the Decentralization Alte rnative.

Material requirements for the Decentralization Alternative depe nd on the suboption
chosen. The suboptions involving wet storage of production reactor fuel (suboptions Wand X)

The Regionalization Alternat ive Option C involves only stabilization of defense

require make·up water for the storage basin at approximately 2300 cubic meters per year.

production fuel a nd packaging of all Ha nford SNF for shipment offsite. It is identical to the

Material requirements for dry storage of fuel (s uboptions Y a nd Z) are minimal, and consist of

Centraliza tion Alternative minimum option as described in Section 5. 14.5.

deconta mination che micals in sma ll quantities. Those suboptions including processing of
production reactor fuel (suboptions P and Q, which wou ld be comhined with eithe r Y or Z)

5.14.5 Centralization Alternative

require relatively large quantities of nitric acid (2000 . 4000 cubic me ters per yea r) and other
process chemica ls in smaUer quantities.

The Centralization Alternative minimum option for offsite shipme nt of Hanford fue l
requires construct ion of a stabilization and canning facility, which would produce annual

Construction waste generated fo r each of the suboptions depends on the size and

quantities of construction and operational wastes similar to those fo r onsite combined wet and

number of facilities required. Dry storage of all fuel, including processing of production reactor

dry storage (suboptions W and X) in the Decentralization Alte rnative. However, these wastes

fuel. would result in the largest quantity of const ruction waste. which is assumed to be

wo uld only be generated for the time required to stabilize and package fuel for offsite shipment

nonradioac tive, nonhazardous solids. Radioactive and hazardous waste from operations is also

(approximately 4 years).

greater for the dry storage suboption wi th processing. Wet storage of pro duction reactor fue l
a nd dry storage of other onsite fu el results in the smallest quantity of both construction and
operat ional hazardous waste.

Centralization at Hanford (maximum option) would include the same suboptions as
Decentralization for SNF currently at Hanford, a nd the material requirements and waste
generation wo uld be identical. For SNF imported from other sites, additional dry storage

5.14.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative

capacity wo uld be needed, and new add itional facilities to package and examine the fuel would
be constructed. The estimates in Table 5. 14-1 for Centralization at Hanford represent

This alternative wo uld be essentially the same as the Decentralization Alterna tive at
Hanford.

incremental increases for these additional facilities above those in the Decentralization Alter-

native. They do not incorporate the additio nal requirements of the Expended Core Facility,
which are discussed in Volume I, Appe ndix D of this docume nt. Operational material require-

5.14.4 Regionalization Alternative

me rts for the incremental dry storage capacity would be minimal. as would be the quantities of
waste generated. Construction of the new facilities would generate nonhaza rdous solid waste in

Regionaliza tion Al ternative Option A would be essentially the sa me as the Decentraliza ti on A ltern ative at Ha nford in terms of operational material requirements and wa ste

qua ntities greater than a ny of the other options, but operation of the additional facilities would
produce re latively small quan tities of radioactive and haza rdo us waste.

generation beca use these originate largely from the storage pool or process faci lities, depending
on the suboption selected. The quantity of construct ion waste would be smalle r because the dry

5.15 Facility Accidents

storage capacity for nondefense prod'lction fuel would not be needed.
Implications of facility accide nts associated wit h im plementing the alternatives fo r SNF
The Regionalization Alte rn ative B options would req uire materials in si milar quanti ti es

storage at Hanford are discussed in the following section The method used to screen and seJect

to the Decentralization Alternative, but wo uld genera te construct ion and operational was tes in
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accidents for analysis is described. as are the procedures for evaluating the consequences of

building•. For the other alternatives (Decentralization, Regionalization, 1992/ 1993 Planning

selected accidents. and the results of the analysis. Additional detail concerning specific accidents

Basis, and Centralization), construction of new facilities dedicated solely to SNF management is

and parameters used in the analysis is provided in Attachment A. Facility Accidents.

assumed.

5.15.1 Historical Accidents Involving SNF at Hanford

Accidents evaluated for existing facilities at Hanford consisted of maximum reasonably
foreseeable accidents described in such previously published analyses as safety or NEPA

There are no known instances at Hanford where storage. handling, or processing of SNF

documentation. The source documents for specific accidents evaluated in this section are

has resulted in an accident that involved a significant release of radioactive or other hazardous

referenced in the detailed accident descriptions in Attachment A. In the case of new facilities,

materials to the environment or that resulted in detrimental exposure of workers or members of

hypothetical accidents were based on operation of similar facilities at Hanford or other sites.

the public to hazardous materials.

Depending on the time at which the source document was prepared, the number and types of
accidents considered for each facility would be somewhat variable. However, the screening

5.15.2 Emergency Preparedness Planning at Hanford

process used in the relatively recent analyses considers a wide scope of accident initiators and
scenarios, including industrial accidents (fires, explosions, overpressurization, loss of containment

Although the safety record for operations at Hanford and other DOE facilities is
generaUy good. DOE-RL and aU Hanford Site contractors have established Emergency

or confinement), criticality, operator error or injury, external hazards (surface vehicle or aircraft
impact), waste management, natural phenomena (seismic events, wind, floods, volcanic activity),

Response Plans to prepare for and mitigate the consequences of potential emergencies on the

interactions with activities at adjacent facilities (construction, maintenance, operations), and

Hanford Site (DOE 1992c). These plans were prepared in acco rdance with DOE Orders and

common cause events (power failure). Older safety documents generaUy address these issues as

other fede ral. state. and local regulations. The plans describe actions that will be taken to

weU, although perhaps not with the same rigor as newer anal. ;es. Transportation accidents are

evaluate the severity of a potential emergency and the steps necessary to notify and coordinate

considered in a separate section of this appendix and are not discussed here.

the activities of other agencies having emergency response functions in the surrounding
communities. They also specify levels at which the hazard to workers and the public are of

Acts of terrorism are accounted for indirectly in the present analysis because the

sufficient concern that protective action should be taken. The Site holds regularly scheduled

potential consequences of terrorist activities are used to determine security requirements for a

exercises to ensure that individuals with responsibilities in emergency planning are properly

given facility. Security measures are implemented to mitigate the impact, or reduce the

tramed in the procedures that have been implemented to mitigate the consequences of potential

probability, of high consequence events. Therefore, reasonably foreseeable scenarios for

accidents and other events.

terrorist activities would entail risks that are similar to those for the types of accident initiators
generaUy considered in the source documents that provide the basis for this analysis.

5.15_3 Accident Screening and Selection for the EIS Analysis
For the purposes of this EIS, accidents are ideaUy grouped into three categories based
The alternatives for SNF storage considered in this EIS necessitate evaluation of

on their estimated frequencies as foUows: abnormal events (frequency ~ 10-3 per year), design

accidents at a va riety of diffe rent types of facilities. In the No Action Alternative, the facilities

basis accidents (frequencies < 10-3 to 10-6 per yea r), and beyo nd design basis accidents

consist of those where SNF is currently stored on the Hanford Site, or those where SNF will be

(frequency < 10-6 to 10-7 per yea r). Because the accident categories commonly used fo r

stored at the time of the record of decision. All facilities considered b the No Action

development of safety documents encompass different probability ranges, the estimated

Alternative currently exist at the Hanford Site. and no construction of new facilities is assumed.

frequ encies (or frequency ranges) for Hanford facility accidents are reported as indicated in the

For many of these facilities. storage of SNF is incidental to other activities that take place in the

source document without regard to the accident frequency categories established for use in the
EIS. For accidents where only a range rather than a point estimate of frequency is available.
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the frequency of the accident is reported as being less than the highest frequency that defines

estimates were based on historical operation of similar facilities at Hanford. These estimates

the range. In alternatives that consider SNF imported from other sites (such as other DOE

were also assumed to represent typical accidental releases in alternatives that consider storage

facilities or U.S. and foreign research reactors), frequencies for specific accidpnts have been

of fuel from offsite locations, such as other DOE facilities or U.S. and foreign research reactors.

adjusted to account for increased fuel handling at receiving, canning, and storage facilities.

Accidents evaluated for the research reactor fuels indicate that releases for such specialized
fuels would be comparable to those included in this analysis (DOE 1993b; Hale and Reutzel

Accident frequencies as reported in safety documents (Safety Analysis Reports and

1993). The assumptions used to determine radio nuclide releases are included in Attachment A.

related analyses) typically represent the overall probability of the accident, including the
probability of the initiating event combined with the frequency of any contributing events

Because most source documents (other than the more recent Safety Analysis Reports)

required for an environmental release to occur. The contributing events may include equipment

do not evaluate hazardous materials other than radionuclides, a different approach was used for

or barrier failures, or failures of other mitigating systems designed to prevent accidental

accidents involving nonradioactive materials. The hazardous material inventories for each

releases. In general, the safety documents do not evaluate the consequences of events with

facility were used to estimate releases based on the physical state of each compound as

expected frequencies of < 10-6 per year because such accidents are not considered reasonably

described in Attachment A. Specific initiators and accident scenarios were generally not

foreseeable; therefore, accidents in the beyond design basis category are generally not evaluated

postulated for nonradioactive materials; therefore, frequencies were not estimated for hazardous

for this analysis. Evaluation of aircraft traffic at the Richland and Pasco, Washington airports

chemical accidents.

1

determined that impacts of commercial or military aircraft were less than 1x10· for a facility in
the Hanford 300 Area, which is at highest risk because of its location (PNL 1992a). Therefore,

The downwind concentrations for materials released in accidents were then calculated at

aircraft accidents are not considered further in this analysis as initiators for accidents at

receptor locations as defined for the EIS. The receptors included a worker who is onsite but

Hanford SNF management facilities .

outside the facility where the accident takes place, a member of the public who is temporarily at
the nearest access location (such as a road that crosses the site or at the site boundary), and the

As noted previously, the safety documents for SNF facilities generally considered a broad
range of accidents; however, only the consequences of the maximum reasonably foreseeable

maximally exposed offsite resident. Collective dose to the population within 80 kilometers
(50 miles) was also calculated for radionuclide releases. Individual dispersion calculations were

accidents for each facility in a given alternative were evaluated for this document. Of the

performed using 95 percent atmospheric conditions (those resulting in air concentrations that

existing facilities assessed in the No Action Alternative, most are multipurpose facilities with

would not be exceeded more than 5 percent of the time). Dose to the population was calculated

diverse missions such as research or process development. These facilities typically contain

using both 50 percent and 95 percent atmospheric dispersion parameters. Dispersion

relatively small quantities of SNF relative to the 105·K basins, where the bulk of Hanford's

calculations were performed using the GENII computer code (Napier et al. 1988) for radio·

existing SNF is stored. The accidents evaluated in the source documents for multipurpose

nuclide releases and the EPlcode (Homann 1988) for nonradioactive compounds.

fac ilities may therefore reflect activities other than SNF storage or handling. The risks for such
accidents are reported in this EIS for completeness, although in some cases, neither the

The radiation dose to each receptor eVdluated for the EIS was recalculated for the

frequency nor the consequences associated with the accident depend on the presence of SNF in

specific conditions and release location as appropriate to each alternative using the GENlI

the facility.

computer code. Doses were calculated as the effective dose equivalent using standard

5.15.4 Method for Accident Consequence Analysis

were also estimated as probability of fatal cancer based on recommendations of the Inter·

assumptions for the Hanford Site as summarized in Schreckhise et al. ( 1993). Health effects

national Commission on Radiological Protection in its Publication 60 (ICRP 1991). The
In the No Action Alternative, accident consequence analyses utilized release estimates as
presented in the source document for a given existing facility. For new facilities, release
VOU : .\1'E I. APPEi'DIX A. AP KIL 1995
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evaluated in the EIS. This was necessary because the methods used in the source documents

multipurpose facilities that house a variety of activities in addition to storing relatively small

were not necessarily consistent and in some cases were outdated. For th is reason, the doses

quanti ties of SNF. T he consequences and risks of accidents associated with these facilities are

developed fo r this analysis may diffe r from those reported in the source documents that describe

described in Tables 5. 15-1 through 5.15-5.

the accidents; however. they should be viewed as a screening analysis for the purposes of the
EIS and are not intended to replace or invalidate the previous results.

The maximum reasonably foreseeable accident for multipurpose facilities is an
earthquake scenario at the 324 Building, which releases non-SNF related radioactive material

Individual doses were based on exposure of the receptor during the entire release. except
where the release time was sufficiently long that such an assumption is unrealistic. For releases

that has accumulated in a hot cell (Table 5.15-1 through Table 5. 15-5). The cont ributions of
other activities at the facility, including SNF storage, are estimated to be relatively minor. The

that were expected to last more than a few hours. the exposure duration for onsite workers and

maximum reasonably foreseeable accide nt directly involving SNF management is a fire at a fuel

members of the public at accessible onsite locations was limited to 2 hours. corresponding to the

storage facility adjacent to FFTF. Several of the accident scenarios evaluated for this alternative

maximum time required to evacuate the Hanford Site in the event of an accident. Offsite

involve initiators that could affect more than one facility (e.g., earthquakes); however. the

residents we re assumed to be exposed during the entire release. regardless of the accident

combined consequences of releases from potentially affected facilities have not been evaluated

duration. Exposure via inhalation and external pathways (groundshine and submersion in the

for a common receptor.

plume) we re considered for workers and the nearest public access receptors; ingestion of
contaminated food was evaluated only fo r offsite residents. Because protective action guidelines

5. 15.5_2 Decentrlllizlltion Alternlltive. The Decentralization Alternative involves

specify mitigative actions to prevent consumption of contaminated food. the ingestion dose to

several options for construction of new facilities at Hanford. One option includes a combination

offsite individuals and populations is reported separately from the other exposure routes.

of new wet storage for defense production reactor fuel currently stored at the 105-K basins and

Reduced exposure to the plume or to contaminated ground surface as a result of early evacu-

new dry storage for fuel that is currently at other locations. Alternative options are included fo r

ation of offsite populations is not assumed for the purposes of this analysis. although such

processing of production reactor fuel prior to dry storage. The consequences of accidents at the

actions would also be mandated if the projected dose from an accident exceeded the prot ective

new fac ilities are based on previously evaluated accidents for similar installations, adapted for

action guidelines. Because the circumstances and consequences postulated for workers at the

the conditions and location of these facilities as assumed in this EIS.

scene of an accident are so speculative. they serve no useful purpose in the decision-making
process. As a consequence. discussion of impacts on "close-in" workers are not brought forward

The maximum reasonably fo reseeable accident for the new facili ties is a severe cask

into the text of this Appendix. Consequences in terms of the "close-in" workers for one scenario

impact followed by a fire at a dry storage facility (Tables 5.15-1 thro ugh 5.15-5). The risk fro m

in each accident may be found in Attachment A.

a cask drop while loading fuel at a wet storage facil ity is similar for most receptors, alt hough th is
scenario is conservative fo r a new facility as discussed in Attachment A.

5_15.5 Radiological Accident Analysis
5. 15. 5.3 7992/ 1993 Plllnning Bllsis Alternlltive. Accidents and consequences would
5. 75.5. 7 No Action Alternative. The No Action Alte rnative consists of fuel storage at

be essent ially the same as fo r the Decentralization Alternative.

existing Hanford facilit ies. including the 100-K wet storage basins; T Plant. and a low-level burial
ground in the 200-West Area; the 308. 324. 325. and 327 buildings in the 300 Area; and the Fast

5_15.5.4 Regionlllizlltion Alternll tive. The consequences of the regio nalizat ion

Flux Test Facility (FFTF) in the 400 Area. Of these facilities. only the 100-K storage basins and

alternatives are similar to those of other action alternatives because they only differ in the

the FFTF fuel storage facility are primarily devoted to SNF storage; the others are all

quantity of imported fuel placed into dry storage at the site. The types of facilities and activities
involved are generally the same as those considered for the dece ntralization and centralization
alternatives. Point estimates of risk for some accidents differ from those of correspo nding
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Table S.IS-1. Radiological accitlents, indiyitlual worker probability of latent cancer fatality.
Accident
Descri pt ion

Attribute

No Actio n

Decentra lizat io n

I')92/ I')93
Pla nning Basis

Regionalizatio n or
Centralization Centralization - Other
Regionaliza tio n A. B at Ilanford
Si te

S:"F facilities:
1.4E -03

3.5E-04

3.SE-Q4

3.5E-Q4

3.SE-Q4

NA'

<IE-O-l

< lE-\J4

< lE-Q4

< IE-Q4

<IE-Q4

~A

< 1.4E-07

< 3.5 E-08

<3.SE-08

< 3.SE-08

<3.5E-08

NA

Consequences

2.4E-07

NA

NA

NA

A

NA

Annual Frequency

< IE-Q4

NA

'A

NA

NA

NA

< 2.9E -ll

NA

i'A

~A

NA

NA

(b)

NA

NA

A

NA

NA

4E-Q4

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

Wet sto rage fuel cask Consequences
dro p
Annual Frequency
Point Estimate of Risk
FFrF liqu id metal
fire in fuel storage

Point Estimate of Risk

Multi-Purpose Filcilities:
324 Building
Seismic event'

Consequences
Annual Frequency
Point Estimate of Risk

325 Building
Seismic event

Conseque nces
Annua l Frequency
Poi nt Estimate of Risk

308 Building
Consequences
Fuc l tra nsfer accident
F
A nnual requency
Point Estimate of Risk

(b)

'A

NA

NA

NA

NA

I.OE-O I

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

2E-04

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

2.0E-OS

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

S.2E-O/"'

~A

NA

5.2E-06

NA

NA

< I E-02

NA

i'A

< l E-02

NA

NA

< 5.2E-08

NA

NA

< 5.2E-08

NA

NA

~Cr-7

Table 5.15-1 . (contd)
Accident
Description
New dry storage cask impact & fire

Vl

,a

New S:\fF process U metal fire

<

Q
C::

s:

r.1

>
'"C
"0

r.l
Z

g
X

?
>
"0

c:r

Regionalization or
Centralization Other Site

9.4E-02

9.4E-02

9.4E-02

No Action

Decentralization

Consequences

NAa

9.4E-02

9.4E-02

Annual Frequency

NA

6E-06

6E-06

6E-06

1£-06

8E-06

5E-06

Point Estimate of Risk

NA

5.6E-07

5.6E-07

5.6E-07

6.6E-07

75E-07

4.1£-07

Consequences

. A

8.3E-08

8.3E-08

8.3E-OS

8.3E-08

8.3E-08

8.3E-08

Annual Frequency

. A

< 1.0E-04

< 1.0E-04

< 1.0E-04

< 1.0E-04

< 1.0E-04

< 1.0E-04

Point Estimate of Risk

NA

<8.3E-12

<8.3E-12

<8.3E-12

<8.3E-12

<8.3E-12

<8.3E-12

(c)

Attribute

-.J

New ECF

B

Centralization
at Hanford

Regionalization
1992/1993
Planning Basis

A
9.4E-02

Consequences

NA

NA

NA

NA

(c)

Annual Frequency

NA

NA

NA

NA

_ d

Point Estimate of Risk

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA
NA
NA

a. NA = Not applicable.
b. The dose from this scenario (1.1 E + 03) rem is sufficiently high that applicat ion of a fatal cancer risk factor is inappropriate.
c. See Appendix D for consequences of accidents at this facility.
d . Dash indicates that the informat ion was not available.
e . The consequences associated with this accident are a result of existing contamination in the 324 Building hot ce lls. and neither its likeli hood nor its severity depend on the presence of
spen t nuclear fuel at the facilit y. The actual contribution of spent nuclear fuel to releases from the accident is assumed to be negligible compared with that of other sources.

o<
C:

:,::

:>
~

z
c
x
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Table 5. 15-2. Radiological accidents, general population·

Xo

km latent cancer fatalities, 95% meteorology.
Centralization at
Hanford

Regionalization or
Centralization· Other
Site

:"ol\cti on

(kcentrali7.a tion

1')')2/ 1993
Planning Basis

Consequences

6.9E+00

3.0E+00

3.0E+00

3.0E+00

3.0E+OO

NI\'

I\nnual frequency

< 1.0E-().t

< 1.0E-().t

< 1.0E-().t

< 1.0E-04

< 1.0E-04

NA

<6.9E·().t

<3.0E-(W

<3.0E-04

<3.0E·().t

<3.0E-04

NI\

3.2E+01

;-';1\

NA

i':A

NI\

i':1\

< 1.0E·(W

~A

:"A

i':1\

NA

:"1\

< 3.:?E-03

:"A

i':,\

;-';1\

NA

~I\

9.7E+02

~I\

;-';A

:-\A

NI\

:-\1\

I\ccident
Dcsniption

Attribute

Regionaliz3tion i\. B

S:"F Facilities:
Wet Storage fuel
Cask Dro p

Point

E.~timate

o f Risk

FFrF

,

VI

Consequences
Liquid \-1cta l Fire in I\nnual Frequency
Fuel Storage
Poi nt Estimate of Risk

\0

oc

\1ultipurpose

Facilitie~ :

32-1 Building
Seismic Event'

325 Building
Seismic Event

Consequences

4E-04

:"A

;-';A

:"\A

NA

i':A

Point Estimate of Risk

3.9E-01

:"A

. A

:"A

NA

NA

Consequences

2.0E+OO

i':A

NI\

NI\

;-';A

NI\

I\nnual Frequency

Annual Frequency
I'oi nt Estimate o f Risk

30!! Building
Fuel Transfer
/\ccident

Consequences
Annual Frequency
Po int Estimate of Risk

2E-04

1\A

1\A

NI\

NA

NA

4.0E-04

NI\

NA

:"IA

NA

:-':A

NCb

:"1\

:"11\

1\E

NA

1\A

< 1.0E-02

:"A

:"/\

- <

1\A

~/\

:"/\

:"/\

1\A

:"/\

c2f.tQ

Table 5.15-2. (contu)
Accident
Dcscnpti on
:"cw dry storagc cask Impact & fire

:"elOo S:"F proccss U metal fire
Vl
,
-.::l

-=

:"elOo ECF

Regionalization

:"0 AClion

Decent rahza tl on

1992/ 1993 Planning
6asls

A

6

Centrahzation at
llanford

Regionalization or
Centralization - Other Site

Conscquenccs

:"A

8. IE+01

8. IE+01

8.IE+01

8.IE+01

B.IE+Ol

B. IE+Ol

Annuill Frequency

:"A

6E-06

6E-06

6E-06

1£-06

BE-06

SE-06

POint b.timatc of
Risk

:"A

HE-!»

-I.9E-!»

-I.9E-O-I

S.7E-O-I

6.5E-O-I

-I.IE-O-I

_c

t\lInbutc

Consequences

:",\

6.-1E-02

6.-1E-02

6.-1E-02

6.4E-02

6.4E-02

Annual Frequency

:"1\

< 1.0E·0-I

< 1.0E-O-I

< 1.0E-0-I

< I.OE-04

< I.OE-O-I

Point Estimate of
Ri sk

:"A

<6.-1E·06

< 6.-1E-06

<6.-1E-06

<6.4E-06

< 6.4E-06

(d)

:-IA

Consequences

:";\

:"A

:"A

:"A

A,lnual Frequency

:"A

:\1\

:\1\

:\A

:\A

Poi nt Estimate of
Risk

:\

:\;\

:\A

;'1;1\

:\1\

a. :\1\ = :\ot applicable.
h. :\E = Coll ective dose not evaluated for this sce nario.
c. Dash indica tes that the information was not available
d. See Appendix 0 for consequences.
e. The consequences associated IOoith this accident are a result of existing contamination in the 32-1 Duilding hot cells. and neither its likelihood nor its severity depend on the presence
of S:\F at the fa cil ity. The actual contribution of S:"F to releases from the acciden t is assumed to be negl igible compared WIth that of other sources.

>

Table 5.15-3. Radiological accidents, general population - 80 km latent cancer fa talities, 50% meteorology.
Acciden t
Description

Attribute

No Action

Decentralization

1')')219/93
Planning Basis

Regionalization A. B

Ce ntral ization at
Ha nfo rd

Regionali zat ion o r
Centralization - Other Site

S:'>F Facilitie., :
Wet storage - fuel
cask drop

V,
,

fFTf liquid metal
fire in fu e l sto ragc

:\lullipurpo~e

Conseq ue nccs

4.0E-Ol

1.9E·01

1.9E·Ol

1.9E-OI

1.9E-OI

NA'

A nnua l Frequency

< 1.0E-o.t

< 1.0E-o.t

< 1.0E-o.t

< 1.0E-04

< 1.0E-04

NA

Poi nt Estima te of Risk

< 4.0E-05

< 1.9E-05

< 1.9E-05

< 1.')E-05

< 1.9E-05

NA

Conseque nces

3.8E+00

~A

:-;A

NA

NA

NA

Annual Frequency

< 1.0E-O-l

~A

NA

;>':A

NA

NA

Poi nt Estim a te of Risk

< 3.8E-04

NA

NA

~A

NA

NA

1.0E + 02

NA

NA

NA

NA

'A

4E-04

i':A

NA

NA

NA

NA

Point Esti mat e o f Risk

4.0E-02

I'A

I'\A

NA

·A

NA

Consequences

2.3E-OI

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

2E-()..:

I\A

NA

NA

NA

NA

Po in t Est im ate o f Risk

HIE-OS

:-;A

i'A

NA

NA

I'\A

Co nsequences
Annual F requen cy
Poi nt Estimate o f Risk

NEil

:-;A
:-IA
:-;A

NA
NA
NA

:-IE

:-.IA
NA
NA

A
NA
NA

Facilities:

31-1 Building
Seismic Even t'

325 Buildong
Seismic Even t

3(IX Building fuci
Ira nsfe r act·ident

Consclluences
Annual frequency

A nnu al frequency

< 1.0E-02

eX'!l

_c

Table S.lS-3. (contd)
Regionalization
Accident
Desc ript ion

New dry st o rage·
cask impact & fire

.

VI

ew SNF process •
U metal fire

o

New ECF

o<

rC

s::

m

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
of

Regionalization or
Centralization at Centralization· Other
Hanford
Site

No Action

Decentralization

1992/1993
Planning Basis

Consequences

'A

4.0

4.0

4.0

4.0

4.0

4.0

Annual Frequency

A

6E-06

6E-06

6E-06

7E-06

8E-06

5E-06

Attribute

A

B

Point Estimate of Risk

NA

2.4E-05

2.4E-05

2.4E-05

2.8E-05

3.2E-05

2.0E-05

Consequences

NA

4.6E-03

4.6E-03

4.6E-03

4.6E-03

4.6E-03

4.6E-03

Annual Frequency

NA

< \.OE-04

< \.OE-04

< \.OE-04

< \.OE-04

< \.OE-04

< \.OE-04

Point Estimate of Risk

NA

<4.6E-07

<4.6E-07

<4.6E-07

<4.6E-07

<4.6E-07

<4.6E-07

Consequences

NA

NA

NA

NA

(d)

(d)

NA

Annual Frequency

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

Point Estimate of Risk

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA = Not applicable.
NE = Collective dose not evaluated for this scenario.
Dash indicates that the information was not available.
See Appendix D for consequences of accidents at this facility.
The consequences associated with this accident are a result of existing contamination in the 324 Building hot cells, and neither its likelihood nor its severity depend on the presence
SNF at the facility. The actual contribution of SNF to releases from the accident is assumed to be negligible compared with that of other sources.
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Table 5.15-4. Radiological acciJents, nearest public access - individual probability of latent cancer fatality.
/\ccident
Oescription

Wet sto rage
fuel cask dro p

1')92/1?')3
No Action

Decentralization

Planning Basis

Regionalization A. B

Consequences

I.3E·03

3. I E-05

3. 1E-05

3. 1E-05

3.IE-05

NA'

/\nnual Frequcncy

< IE·().t

< IE-().t

< IE-().t

< IE-().t

< I E-<J4

1'\/\

< 1.3E-07

< 3.IE.(J')

<3. IE·09

<3.1E-09

< 3.1 E-09

NA

Consequcnces

1.21.:.-07

:'\/\

NA

;'\A

NI\

NA

Annual Frequency

< IE-<J4

:,\A

~A

;'\/\

~A

N/\

< I.2E-11

:,\A

:'\A

:'\/\

:'\1\

NA

I.?E-OI

:'\/\

:'oJA

~I\

l'A

:"A

Attributc

Point Estimate o f Risk

Vl
,

fFfF liquid metal
fire in fuel storage

I

Rcgionaliza tion or
Centralization - Other
Site

Centralization a t
Hanford

Po int Estimate o f Risk

:\1uitipuYp",e fadlilie"

31-1 BUIlding
SCl smi c Event d

.' 25 BUlldon g sCl smic
e\ en t

' II!! Bu ildong fuel
tra nsfe r acci dent

Conseque nces

4E·().t

:'\A

:'oJA

NA

NA

:,\A

Point Estimate of Risk

7.6E-05

:'\1\

NA

N/\

NA

;'\/\

Co nsequences

6.3E·03

:'\1\

NA

:'\/\

;'\A

NA

Annua l Frequency

2E·().t

:'\/\

:,\A

NA

i'\A

NI\

I'o int Estimate of Risk

1.3E-06

:'\1\

~A

N/\

i'\A

NA

Consequen ces

-1 .31:-07

:'\/\

i'\/\

4.3E-07

i'\/\

NA

< IE-02

:,\A

NA

< IE-02

NA

N/\

<-1.3[-0')

:'\,\

~A

i'\A

:'\1\

Annual Frequency

An nual Frequency
I'o lnt Estimate 01 Risk

d '1~q

<-I.3E·O,)

Table 5.15-4. (contd)

B

Centralization at
Hanford

Regionalization or
Centralization Other Site

Regionalization
Accident
Description
New dry
storage - cask impact
and fire

'-!'

New SNF process U metal fire

a

Vl

New ECF

o<

r
C

s:

m

No Action

Decentralization

1992/1993
Planning Basis

Consequences

NA

3.8E-05

3.8E-05

3.8E-05

3.8E-05

3.8E-05

3.8E-05

Annual Frequency

NA

6E-06

6E-06

6E-06

7E-06

8E-06

5E-06

Point Estimate of Risk

NA

2.3E-1O

2.3E-10

2.3E-1O

2.7E-1O

3.0E-IO

1.9E-IO

Consequences

NA

2.2E-08

2.2E-08

2.2E-08

2.2E-08

2.2E-08

2.2E-OS

Annual Frequency

NA

< l.OE-04

< l.OE-04

< l.OE-04

< l.OE-04

< l.OE-04

< l.OE-04

Point Estimate of Risk

NA

<2.2E-12

<2.2E-12

<2.2E-12

<2.2E-12

<2.2E-12

<2 .2E-12

A

A

NA

NA

(c)

(c)

NA

Annual Frequency

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

Point Estimate of Risk

NA

NA

NA

NA

, A

Attribute

Consequences

A

a. NA = Not applicable .
b. See Appendix D for consequences of accidents at this facility.
c. The consequences associated with this accident are a result of existing contamination in the 324 Building hot cells, and neither its likelihood nor its severity depend on the presence of
SNF at the facility. The actual contribution of SNF to releases from the accident is assumed to be negligible compared with that of other sources.
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Table 5.15-5. Maximum exposed offsite individual - probability of latent cancer fatality.
Accident
Description

Regionalization A , B

Centralization
at Hanford

Regionalization or
Centralization Other Site

No Action

Decentralization

1992/1993
Planning Basis

Consequences

25E-04"

1.8E-04

1.8E-04

1.8E-04

1.8E-04

NAb

Annual Frequency

< IE-04

<lE-04

< JE-04

< lE-04

<lE-04

NA

< 25E-08

< 1.8E-08

< 1.8E.{)8

< 1.8E-08

< 1.8E-08

NA

25E-04"

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

< lE-04

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

Point Estimat.;: of Risk

25E-08

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

Consequences

25E-04·

A

NA

NA

NA

NA

Annual Frequency

4E-04

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

Point Estimate of Risk

1.0E-07

NA

NA

A

NA

NA

Consequences

25E-04'

NA

NA

A

NA

A

Attribute

SNF Fac:iJjties:
Wet storage
fuel cask drop

Point Estimate of Risk
FFTF liquid metal Fire Consequences
in fuel storage
Annual Frequency

Multipurpose Facilities:
324 Building
Seismic Event d

325 Building
Seismic Event

308 Building fuel
transfer accident

2E-04

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

Point F..stimate of Risk

5.0E·08

NA

NA

NA

A

NA

Conseque nces

4.3E-08

NA

NA

4.3E.{)8

A

NA

Annual Frequency

Annual Frequency

< lE-02

A

NA

< lE-02

NA

NA

Point Estimate of Risk

4.3E·1O

NA

NA

4.3E·1O

NA

NA

c:J.7 5

Table 5.15-5. (co ntd)

B

Ce ntralization
at Ha nford

Regionalization o r
Centralization Othe r Site

Regionalization
Acciden t
O eseri pt io n
:'\cw dry storage cask impact & fire

V'

;\icw S:,\F pr(){'css Li met al fire

:=l
1Il

:'\ew E CF

>

>

;-\0 Act ion

Decentra liza tion

1992/1 9<)3
Pl anning Basis

Co nsequences

~A

2.5E.()..I

2.5 E.()..I

2.5E-04

2.5E-04

25 E.()..I

2.5E-04

An nual Frequency

i\A

6E-06

(,1.:.-06

6E-06

7E-06

8E .Q(,

5E-06

Poi nt Estimat e of Risk

:-.IA

1.5E-0'J

1.5E-09

15E-09

1.8E.{)9

2.0E.{)9

1.2E.{)9

Co nseq uen ces

1'A

3A E-06

3.4 E-06

3.4E-06

3.4 E-06

3.4 E-06

3.4E-06

Annual Frequency

NA

< 1.0E-Q.I

< 1.0E-Q.I

< 1.0E·Q.I

< 1.0E.()4

< 1.0E-04

< 1.0E.()4

Po int Estimate of Risk

:'\A

< 3AE- 1O

< 3.4 E- 1O

< 3.4 E- 1O

< 3.4 E- 1O

< 3.4E-1O

< 3.4E-1O

Conseq uences

NA

NA

1'A

NA

(c)

(c)

NA

Annual Frequency

NA

:,\A

NA

I'A

:,\A

Poi nt Estima te o f Risk

:'-1A

1'A

NA

NA

1'A

t\ttrihute

A

a. The offsi te dose from this accident is ass umed to be limited to 0.5 rem hy a ppl ica tion of pro tective action guidelin es. Po te nti al dose ",i thout prot ective actio n is 1.4 re m fo r 105- K
n asin Cask d rop. 5-100 re m fo r 32-1 Bu ild ing se ismic event. 16 rem fo r 325 Build ing se ismi c event. and 5 rem fo r FFTF liquid me tal fire.
b. :,\A = i\o t applicab le .
c. Se e Appe nd ix D fo r conseq uences o f accide nts at this faci lity.
d. Th e conseque nces associa ted "'i th this accid ent a re a result o f c .~i s ti n g cont amina tio n in the 32-1 Bui ld ing ho t ce lls. and neithe r its likelihood no r its seve rity depe nd o n the prese nce of
S:,\ F a t the faci lity. T he actua l contrib ut ion o f S:,\F to re leases fro m the acci dent is assumed to be negligible compared with tha t of o the r sources.

accidents in th e oth er altern atives hecause th e frequencies we re adjusted to accou nt fo r th t.'

5.15.6 Secondary Impacts of Radiological Accidents

quan tity of fu el handled in each option (See Tables 5.1 5- 1 th ro ugh 5. 15-5). Under suhalte rn at ives A and B. th e types of accidents and the ir consequences wo uld be the sa me as those
for the decentralizat ion a lte rn at ive. However. the frequenc ies (a nd the re fore the risks). wo uld

Secondary impacts of radiological accidents have been evaluated qu a litatively fo r this
ana lysis. Accide nls thai resulted in doses to the maximally exposed offsile resident of less than

diffe r in some cases because of the volume of imported fu el that would be placed into dry

100 millirem were considered to have little or no secondary impact beca use the levels of

storage. For suba ltern ative C. all fu el currently at Hanford would be tra nsport ed to anot her

e nv ironme n,,1 contamination in these cases would be relatively sma ll. Accidents that exceed

site, and th e risks would be identical to those in the centraliza ti on minimum alternative.

this level may have secondary impacts with severity depending on the expected levels of
environmental contamination. Although the levels of en vironmental contamination were not

5. 15.5.5 Centraliza tion Alternative. T he Centraliza tion Alternative consists of two

assessed qu a nt itatively for this ana lysis, the offsite individual dose provides a measure of the a ir

options at Hanford: a minimum option in wh ich all DOE spe nt fu el a t Ha nford is tra nsported

concent ration and radionuclide deposilion a t the receptor location and ca n be used as a semi-

offsite to a nother location for interim sto rage. and a maxi mum opt ion that would result in

quantit at ive estimate of the level of environmental contamination from a given accident. Th e

storage of aU DOE spent fuel at Hanfo rd. Accident scenar ios for the minimum option wo uld

esti mated secondary consequences of max imum reasonably foreseeable SNF facil ily accidenls

include those discussed under the No Action Altern ative prior to shipment of the fuel offsite. In

are presented in Table 5. 15-6.

addition. defense reactor fu el wo uld be processed and repackaged in a new facility prior to
shipment. Th e ri sks associated with thi s new fac ility are expected to be similar to th e processi ng

5.15.7

Nonradiological Accident Analysis

f<Jcilit y discussed under th e D ecentr(t iizat ion A ltern ative. Th e ca sk impact accident at a dry

storage facility has been included in this option to account fo r ha ndl ing of fue l prior to shipment

For purposes of the EIS. a worst case accident scenario was developed for each ex isting
a nd pla nned fa ci!ity. The details of the non radiological accident scenario a re presented in

from Hanford.

Attac hment A , and th e information is summarized in thi s sec ti on. Th e acci dent assumes that a

The maxim um opt ion contains suboptions for we t or dry fu el storage wi th processi ng

che mica l spill occurs with in a building and is followed by an environmental release from the

sim il ar to th ose for th e D ecentraliza ti on A ltern at ive. and th e consequences are expected to be

normal exha ust syste m. It is assumed that the building rem a ins intac t but conta inme nt measures

essentially the sa me a' those described previo usly. The freq ue ncy of the cask impac t at a dry

fail . a llowing releases occur Ihro ugh Ihe ve nlilation system. It is assumed that all. or a portion

storage faci lit y has hee n increased to acco unt for additional fuel that wou ld be handled at

of. the entire inventory of loxic che mica ls stored in each building is spilled. The environme nta l

Hanford under this option. Th e only ot her installat ion tha t wo ul d be included in th is oplion is

releases are modeled. and the hypo thelica l concentra tions at three receptor locations are

the Expended Core Facility (ECF). which wou ld be relocated fro m INEL. The conseque nces of

compa red to tox icologica l limits.

accide nts at this faci lity are discussed in Volu me I. Appendix D of this E IS. and are not
described here. Note th at the accide nt analysis fo r the ECF in Appe nd ix D incorp orates

Several chemica l inventory a nd chem ica l em issions lists a re provided by altern alive a nd

differe nt assumptions than those used fo r othe r Hanfo rd fa cilities in Ihis sectio n. and the two

facility (Be rgs man 1995) . Effect s to onsite workers. the nea rest po int of public access. a nd the

se ts of results art.' not directly comparahle. Th e consequences of ECF accidents at H anford

public at the nearest offsite residence we re estima ted using the compute r model EPlcode ( DOE

using assumptions consistent with th ost.' in thi s sec ti on wo uld be higher th an th ost.' rt.' porlt:d in

ItJ<JJh ). Res ults from the EP lcode model we re compared to ava ilable Eme rge ncy Response

Appendix D.

Planning G uiddine (E RPG) va lues. Immedi ate ly Da nge ro us to Life a nd Hea lth ( IDLH ) values.
and Threshold Limit Values/Ti me We ighted Ave rages (TLV/ TWA). In the abse nce of Ihese
va lues. toxicologica l data for si milar health endpoints. from the Registry of Toxic Effecls for
Chemica l Suhsla nces (RTEC) a re used.

\'n I.L~I E

I. .. \I'I' I : ~n l x A J\I'R lt 19')5

5-106

') '7' )

5- 107

C)/)F

VOI.U~ I E

1.

;\I ' I' E~D I X

A ,WRIt. I'.m

The results of the accident scenario for each alternative are presented in Table 5.15-8. As
a general statement. in the event of an accident. the existing 105-KE and 105-KW fa cilities and
the proposed new wet storage facility present the predominant risk for chemical exposure.

Under the No Action Alternative there is a potential for irreversible health effects to
occur in the 308. 324. 325 A and B buildings. while nitric ac id is a potential odor and irritation
problem from both of th e proposed fuel stabi.lization alt ernatives.

5. 15.7. 1 No Action Alternative. A baseline of chemicals kept in spent nuclear storage

facilities was developed from chemical inventories for these facilities compiled to comply with
th f' Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act (EPCRA). The existing storage
facilities include 105-KE. 105-KW. PUREX (202A), T-Plant (221T), 2736-ZB Building, 200-West
low-level burial grounds. FFfF 403 Building. 308 Building. 324 Building. 325 A&B Building. and
'},27

Building. The Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act (EPCRA) lists

used are from 1992.

Because most facilities have various missions. the need to have a supply of chemicals at
these facilities may not be related to the storage of SNFs. However for purposes of the EIS, the
assumption is made that the existing inventories represents the anticipated amounts and types of
chemicals which may be needed in the future.

The results of the accident scenario under conditions of the No Action Alternative are
presented in Table 5.15-7.

5. 15.7.2 Decentralization Alternative. The Decentralization Alternative involves

construction of several new facilities at Hanford, including new dry storage for spe nt fuel. or a
combination of new wet and dry storage. Options are also included for seve ral types of fuel
processing prior to storage. The conse

ences of new facilities are based on previously

evaluated accidents for similar installations. ada pted for th e conditions and locations of these
facilities as assumed in this EIS .

The baseline chemical inve ntory for the proposed facilities is primarily derived from the
facility costs section in the engineering design data (Bergsman 1995). However. the wet storage
facility uses the I05 -KE Basin a a surroga te for a baseline chemical inventory because th e
facility cost secti on lists only two chemicals. sodiu m hydroxide and sulfuric acid .
\ ·()I.L·\I E I. :\PI'E"DIX A ,\P R(I.
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Tallie 5.15-6. Assessment of secondary imracts of acciuents for the No-Action Alte~native.
E nvironmenta l or Social Factor
Accident
I)csrripti o n

Bio tic
Resou rces

Water
Rcsourccs

Eco no mic
Im pacts

i\ational
Dcfensc

E nviron me ntal
Con ta mination

Endangered
Specics

Land
Use

Treaty Rights,
Cultural Resourccs,
Native Cultures

a

a

a

a

a

a

Acci d~nt s with frequ~ncie s 2: 111. 3 per year

308 Building
(fuel handling
alTident)

a

a

Accidents with frequencie s < II)"J per year
324 Building
(seismic event)

Potent ia l local
effects
on individua ls
of some
species

Potcntial
temporary
closure of
Hanford Reach
of Columbia
River 10 boat
traffic, rcstriction
of water use
loca lly (Rich land,
Pasco)

Possible loss of
crops, cost
incurred for
clean-up

None a nticipated

May be
cxtensive in vicinity of
facility a nd adjacent
offsitc areas

None
anticipated

Rcstriction on Possible tcmporary restrictions
use of adjacent on access to traditional fishing
land for
sitcs
agricult ure, and
of Columbia
River islands,
pending
radiological
survey

325 Building
(seismic event)

b

b

b

b

b

b

b

b

FFTF fuel storage
(liquid metal firc)

b

b

b

b

b

b

b

b

I05- K wet storagc
(cask drop)

b

b

b

b

b

b

b

b

200-W burial ground b
(cask impact & fire)

b

b

b

b

b

b

b

s::

327 BUilding (hot
cell fire)

b

b

b

b

b

b

b

b

>
r::

T-pla nt (fuel
damage)

a

a

a

a

a

a

a

a

VI
,

<

C

r

C

r.:

:g

%

~
X

:>

>
1::

r

a. Conseque nces o f this accident would be limited to very loca l o nsite impact o nly. if any.
h. Conscquences of this accide nt would bc similar in nature to those of the 324 building or new dry storage faci lity (worst case) accidents; however they would be less se'/erc because
o ffsite conccn trations would be lower by a t Icast two orders o f magnitudc .

The results of the accident scenario under conditions of the Decentralization Alternative
are presented in Table 5.15-8.

5. 15.7.3 1992/93 Planning Basis Alternative. Accidents and consequences would be
essentia lly th e same as for the Decentralization Alternative.

5. 15.7.4 Regionalization Alternative. Except for Regionalization Option C, which would
be essen tially the same as th e Centralization Alternative minimum case, accidents and
consequences for options A. B 1. and B2 would be essentially the same as for the
Decentralization Alternative. The quantity of nondefense fuels placed into dry storage would
not affect the potential for releases of hazardous chemicals because no such materials are
present in th e dry storage facilities.

5. 15.7.5 Centralization Onsite Alternative. The Centralization Onsite Alternative
consists of consolidating all spe nt fuel at the Hanford site. Options are available for wet or dry
fuel storage with processing similar to those for the Decentralization Alternative. The consequences are expected to be esse nt ially the same as those described for the first 5 years of the
No Action Alternative. and then they are the same as those described for the Dece ntralization
A lternative.

The results of the accident scenario under conditions of the No Action a nd
Decentralization Alternatives are presented in T able 5. 15-8.

5. 15. 7.6 Centralization Offsite Alternative. The Centralization Offsite Alternative
consists of transporting all DOE SNF at Ha nford offsite to a no th e r location for interim stor<lge.
Fuel would be stabilized prior to shipment in a fuel drying and passivation facility . Therefore
the impacts from this alternative are the same as those for th e No Action Alternative for the
first 5 years, and then they are the same as those described for the fuel drying and passivation
facility.

The results of the accident scenario under conditions of the No Action Altern ative and
the fuel drying and passivation facility a re presented in Table 5.15-8.
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Table 5.15-7. Assessment of secontlary impacts of accitlents for the Decentralization, 1992/1993 Planning Basis, Regionalization, and
entralization Alternatives.
Environmental or Social Factor
Accitlent
Description

:>
;::

Economic
Impacts

National
Defense

Environmental
Conta mination

Entlangered
Species

Land

Use

Treaty Rights/
Cultural Resources/
Native Cultures

New dry
storage (cask
impact with
fire)

Minimal
local
efkcts

Possible
temporary
restriction
of use of
Columbia
River for
recreation

Clean-up
None
costs 10caUy, anticipotential
pated
loss of
crops

Motlerate in
None anticipated
immediate
environs & offsite

Temporary
restriction
on
agriculture
pending
radiological
survey

Possible temporary
restriction
on access to
traditional fishing
sites

New process
facility (U
metal fire)

a

a

a

a

a

a

a

a

New wet
storage (cask
tlmp)

h

h

b

b

b

b

b

b

VI
,

:>

Water
Resources

Biotic
Resources

a. Consequences of this accident would be limitetl to very local onsite impact only, if a ny.
h. Consequences of this acc itlent woultl be similar in nature to those of the 324 builtling or new dry storage facility (worst case)
accitle nt s: howeve r they woultl he less severe because offsite concentrations woultl be lower by at least two orders of magnitude.

5.15.8 Construction and Occupational Accidents

Table 5.15-9 shows the predicted number of injuries, illnesses, and fatalitie s among
workers from construction activities and operations activities for each alternative. Injury, illness,
a nd fatality counts for construction workers are presented separately because of th e relatively
more haza rdous nature of construction work.

Decentralization suboptions P and Q represent the highest predicted construction and
occupational accident count of any of the alternatives. The higher number of acciden ts is
att ributable to increased construction and fuel processing required by these alternatives. The
Centralization Onsite Alternative has accident counts similar to those for suboptions P and Q .
The lowest accident counts are for the No Action Alternative and the Centralization Offsite
Alternative. All other a lternative are similar in their predicted accide nt counts.

5.16 Cumulative Impacts Including Past and Reasonably Foreseeable
Actions
Cumulative impacts associated with implementing the alternatives for

int~rim

storage of

SNF a t the H anford Site together with impacts from past and reaso nably foreseeable future
action s are described in the following subsections.

5.16.1 No Action Alternative

Cu mulative impacts associated with implementation of the No Action Altern a tive a re
described in the following subsections.

5.16.1.1 Land Use. The Hanford Site consists of about 1450 squ a re ki lo mete rs

(360.000 acres) , of which about 87 square kilom ete rs (22,000 acres) have been disturbed.
Impleme ntation of the No Action Alternative would not change th at la nd use. Construction of
the Environ mental Resto ration Disposal Facility will require disturba nce of approxi mate ly 4.1
square kilom eters (1.020 acres) of land. Howeve r, restoration of ex isting disturbed si tes will
compensate for this loss.
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Table 5.15-8. Nonradiological exposure to public a nd workers to chemicals in spent nuclear fuel storage locations released
during an accidt!nt.
Alternative/
Facility/
Chemical

Worker
E~ure

mg/ m3

E~sure at
Nearest Public
Access mg/m3

Exposure at Nearest Public
ERPG I' or
Residence mg/m3
TLVfIWA mg/m3

ERPG 2b or 0.1
IOlH mg/m3

ERPG 3' or
IOlH
mg/m3

~o

Action
10S-KE
4.30

4.30

0.\3

23.00
140.00
220.00

23.00
140.00
220.00

0.66

2.tjd
0.5

0.40
6.40

2
2

4.30
2.40
15.00

4.30
2.40
0.86

0.07
0.43

4.20

0.24

140.00
220.00

140.00

0.12
0.40

220.00

6.40

cadmium nitrate tetrahydrate

0.03

0.03

0.02

diesel fuel

1.80
7.20E.{)4
2.IOE.{)4

1.70
6.90E.{)4
2.00E.{)4

1.10
4.3OE.{)4
1.3OE.{)4

0.00

0.00
0.03

0.00
0.01

0.04

0.03

2
96

chlonne
PCB
sodium hydroxide
sulfuric acid

8.7

58

0.5
20
10

5
200
30

10S-KW
chlo rine
ethylene glyco l
kerosene
polyacrylamide

.

lI'I

sodi um hydroxide

w

sulfuric acid
P REX (20lA )

mercury
metha no l
PCB
sod,um hydroXIde

~
~

t-:

sodium nitnte
T-Plant (22 1n

0.03
0.04

0.13

2.9
127
100

0.03

0.05
7

170

105
1700

3276

10
32760

OS

0.01

0.00

0.00

2

0.00

>

sod ,um hyd roXIde

0.02

0.01
0.01

0.00

2
2

%

sodi um nitrite

0.05

0.00

0.00

X

FFTF (403 Building)
sod ,um

67.00

24.00

0.83

5.40

2.70

0.03
70.00
88.00

>
>
-:l

c:
.:;
.:;

.J>

sod ,um potassI um a lloy
308 Buildin!!
acetone
elhyle ne glycol
x·ray film (Ag)

lOS

om
262

0.10

;:;

5000
4000

20
10

potassi um pcrmanganate
sod,um

~

400

58
3000

1
2

:-

3::

r.:

8.7
300
500

OS

200

30

20

5
200

960

9600

10
20

30

20

200
200

96

960

9600

2
2

20
20

200

0.39

0.02
57.00

0.01
37.00

1780
127

2000
300

o.n

0.36

20000
3000
620

~f~

0.01

62

200

<

2
C:
::::
r.:

Table 5.15-8 (contd)
Alternat ive/
FaClII ty/
Chemical

:-

>

Wo rke r
Exposure
mg/ m3

Exposu re at
;\earest Pub lic
Access mg/ m3

Exposure at Nearest Public
ERPG I" or
Residence mg/m3
TIVfIWA mg/m3

ERPG 2b or 0.1
IDLH mg/m3

ERPG 3< or
IDLH
mg/m3

-0
-0

m

z

324 Bldg

v

alkyl di methyl be nl)'1 a mmonIum

29.00

\.90

0.24

X

bis-tri-n-butyl tin oxide

38.00

2AO

0.3 1

poly oed mi ethyle ne d ic hloride

82.00

5.20

0.68

?

>

-0

c:

325 Building

-0

poly oed mi et hylene dichloride

'"

"J>

me rcury

10
0.1
40
0_01

13
20

200

400

4000

130

1

10

400

4000

3.20

0.20

0.03

2\.00

\.30

0.17

40

zi nc
327 Building

0.04

0.00

0.00

5

pol)· oed mi ethylene dichloride

0.05

0.0 1

0.04

40

ch lorine

0.75

0.10

0.04

2.9

8.7

58

PCB

3.90

0.54

0.20

sodium hydroxide

36.00

1.10

0.06

39.00

5.30

2.00

0.5
20
10

200

sulfuric acid
Vault Dry Storage facility

0.5
2
2

chlorine

0.75

0.10

0.04

2.9

8.7

58

PCB

3.90

0.54

0.20

sodium hydroxide

36.00

1.10

0.06

39.00

5.30

2.00

0.5
20
10

200

su lfuric acid
Casks Dry Stordge facility

0.5
2
2

170

12.4
400

124
4000

Decentralization Suboption W
Wet Storage facility

If
~

5
30

no chem icals of concern
Decentralization Suboption X
Wet Storage facility
5

30

no chemicals of conce rn
Decentralization SuboptioR Y
Vault Dry Storage facility
no che mica ls of conce rn
S hear\Leach\ Calcine Stabilization
Facility
diesel fuel

OA2

OAO

0.26

7

nitnc acid

2\.00

20.00

13.00

sodiu m hyd roxide

0.86

0.73

0.20

2
2

sodium nitrit e
sulfuric acid

0. 11

0. 10

0.06

05 3

0.51

0.32

d1 ?5

1700

25.8

258

20

200

96

960

9600

2

10

30

Table 5.15-8 (cantu)
I\lt crna t,vcl

Ful'l10 t)'1
Chemical

Worker
Exposure
mg/ m3

Expos ure at
:-\carest Public
Access mg/ m3

E RPG I" o r
Exposure at :"earest Public
Residence mg/m3
T1. V fTW A mgl m3

E RPG 2b o r 0.1
ID1.H mg/m3

ERPG 3< or
IDLII

mg/m3

Decentralization Suboption Z
Cask., Dry Storage Facility
no chemicals of concern
Shear\Leach\Calcine Stabilization
Facilit~·

dicsel fuel

0.42

0.40

0.26

7

nit ric acid

21.00

13.00
0.20

2

sod ium hydroxide

0.86

20.00
0.73

sodium nitrite

0.11

0.10

sulfuric acid

0.53

170
25.8

1700
258

20

200

0.06

2
96

960

9600

0.5 1

0.32

2

10

30

Decentralization Suboption P
I05-KE
chlori ne

l(l
VI

<

0

r

c:

3'::
m
:-

>
-0
-0

r::

z
d
X

?
>
-0

c:
-0

""

V>

PCB
sod ium hyd roxide
sulfuric acid
I05-KW
chlorine
ethylene glycol
kerosene
polyacrylamide
sodium hydroxide
sulfuric acid
Shear\Leach\Calcine Stabilization
Facility
diesel fuel
nitric acid
sodium hydroxide

4.30

4.30

0. 13

2.9

8.7

58

23.00

23.00

0.66

0.5

140.00
220.00

140.00
220.00

0.40
6.40

2
2

0.5
20
10

200
30

4.30

4.30

0.13

2.40

2.40

0.07

127

300

100

500

3000
5000

2.9

8.7

5

58

15.00

0.86

0.43

4.20

0.24

0. 12

0.03

400

4000

140.00

140.00

0.40

220.00

6.40

20
10

200

220.00

2
2

170

1700

30

0.42

0.40

0.26

7

21.00

20.00

13.00

2

25.8

258

0.86

0.73

0.20

2

20

200

sodi um nitrite

0.11

0.10

0.06

96

960

9600

sul fu ric acid

053

0.51

0.32

2

10

30

4.30

4.30

0.13

2.9

8.7

58

23.00

0.66

0.5

140.00

23.00
140.00

0.40

220.00

220.00

6.40

2
2

0.5
20
10

200
30

Decentralization Suboption Q
I05-KE
chlorine

PCB
sodi um hydroxide
sulfuri c acid

0{ 8"&;

5

c<
c:

r

Table 5.15-8 (contu)

s:

Alternative/
FaciII ty/
Chemica l

~

>

""""r.:
z
0

><
~

:>

~

r

:;;
-=:

'"

Exposure a t l'earest Public
ERPG I" or
Residence mg/m3
lLVrnvi\ mg/m3

E RPG 2b or 0.1
IOLH mg/m3

E RPG 3< or
lOll I
mg/m3

IOS-KW

2.9

4.30

4.30

0.13

ethylene glycol

2.40

2.40

0.07

127
100

8.7

58

300
500
400

3000
5000
4000

20
10

200

kerose ne
polyacryla mide
sodi um h ydro.~i de

15.00
4.20

0.86
0.24

0.43
0.12

140.00

140.00

0040

sulfuric acid

220.00

2~0 . 00

6.40

0.03
2
2

0.03
0.42
0.02

0.03

0.02

0.05

10.5

105

0.40
0.02

0.26
0.01

7
0.13

170
10.5

0.84

0.81
20.00

0.51
13.00

1700
104.8
5000

0.00
0.73

0.00
0.20

0. 11

0. \0

0.06

0.53

0.5 1

0.42

0040

30

Sn h'ent Extraction Fuel Stabilization
Facility
diese l fuel
hyd razi ne
kerose ne

0\

Exposure a t
i\'earest Public
i\cl'es.~ mg/ m3

chlo rine

cadm iu m nitrate tetrahydratc

Y'

Worker
Expos ure
mg/m3

nitric acid
potass ium permanga na te
sodium hydroxide
sodium nitrite
sulfu ric acid

21.00
0.00
0.86

100

5.2
2

500
25.8

96

10
20
960

258
30
200
9600

0.32

2

\0

30

0.26

7

170

1700

2

1992/1993 Planning Basis
sa me as Decentrali za tio n
Regional ization
same as Decentra lization
Centralization Ons ite
sa me as ;-';0 Action for first 5 yea rs,
then
sa me as Decentra lization
Centra li1.ation Offsite
sa me as No Action for first 5 yea rs ,
th en
sa me as fuel drying and passiva tion
faci lity
Fuel Drying a nd Passivation Faci lity
diesel fuel

~ ~'7

Table 5.15-8 (contd)
Alternative/
Facility/
Chemica l

Worker
Exposure
mg/m3

Exposure at
cares! Publ ic
Access mg/ m3

Exposure at Nea rest Public
ERPG I" or
Residence mg/m3
TLVfl"WA mg/m3

sodium hydroxide
sodium nitrite

0.09

om

0.02

2

0.11

0.10

0.06

96

sulfuric acid

0.53

051

0.32

2

ERPG 2b or 0.1
IOLiI mg/m3
20
960
10

ERPG 3< or
lOll I
mg/m3

200
9600
30

a. Emergency Response Planning Guideline (ERPG) value I (irritation or odor) , or Threshold Limit Values{fime Weightcd Averages (rLV{TWA), or value for a similar toxicological
end point from toxicological data in the Registry of Toxic Effects for Chemical Substances (RTEC).
b. ERPG 2 (irreversible health effects), or 0.1 of Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health ( IOLII). or valuc for a similar toxico logical end point from toxicological data in RTEC.
c. E RPG 3 (death). IOLII. or value for a similar toxicological end point from toxicological data in RTEC.
d. Bold italic type indicates that the toxicological limit was exceeded at one or more exp~ure points.

----------------------------------------------------
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Table 5. 15-9. Estim ated inj uries. illn esses. and filw lit ies of wor kers expec ted during cons truction
anu operation of facilities in e<J ch alt erna tive (cumulative tota ls through 2035).
Constru ction \Vorke rsa Operations Workersa
A ltern ative

No Acti onb

Tota l Workers
Inj ury &

Injury &
illness
(perso ns)

Inju ry &
Fata lit ies
(pe rsons) illness
(pe rso ns)
(perso ns)

(pe rso ns)

0

0

Fa talities

illness

Fa talit ies

(persons)

5. 16. 1.2 Air Duality. A ir quality limits (WAC I 73-470·QJO.· 100) at th e Hanfo rd Site
hou ndary are not expec ted to he:: approached as a resu lt of implementing th e N o Action
,-\ It ern ati\'e or from reaso nahly foreseea hle addit ions to the H anfo rd Site. e.g.. construction and
operat ion of a Lase:: r Interfe rometer G ra vi tational-\Vave Observa tory or fro m decommissioning
of unused faci lities or site restoration activities.

23 1

0

23 1

0

83

0

137

0

D ecentralization

5.16. 1. 3 Waste Management. U nd er th e No Acti on Alte rn ative. th ere wo uld be a co n-

Subop ti on W

54

Suboptio n X

49

0

84

0

133

Suboptio n Y'

79

0

69

0

148

0

Subop ti on Z'

48

0

Suboption P<

183

Suboptio n Q '

223

0

tinuing generation of ahout 100 cubic meters of low-level wastes per yea r from incidental

activities and abo ut 530 cub ic meters d uring co nt a ineriza tio n of SNF and sludge in th e 100·K

69

0

11 7

0

84

0

267

0

139

0

362

0

120

Area basi ns. A ll presently anticipated acti\'iti es on the H anford Site would res ult in

approx imately 20.000 cubic meters o f low-level waste per yea r. Thus. at a max imum. th e to tal
qu a ntity of low-level waste from SNF activities wo uld account fo r a bout 5 pe rcent of the annu al
qu a nt ity o f low· level waste ge nerated at th e Hanford Site.

1992/3 Planning Basis same as D ecentralizati on
Regionalization

Suboption A X

5. 16. 1.4 Socioeconomics. Under the No Actio n Altern ative. th e SNF wo rkfo rce wo uld

38

0

82

Suboptio n A Y'

74

0

69

0

143

0

Subopt ion A Z'

37

0

69

0

106

0

Suboption B I"

99

0

109

0

208

Suboptio n B2"

21 1

0

136

0

347

Subop ti ons C

sa me as Centralizatio n o ffs ite
205

0

490

84

0

238

Centraliza ti on O nsiled

285

Cen tra liza ti on O ffsite

154

0

0

re ma in th e sa me. about 60 wo rkers. The Hanfo rd Site workforce is expected to drop from
abo ut 18.700 in 1995 to 14.700 in 1997 and to remai n approxi mately a t 14.700 through 2004.
The reg ional wo rkfo rce is expected to ra nge from 8 1.000. to 86.000 in th at sa me peri od.

5. 16. 1. 5 Occupational and Public Health. The cumul ative populati on dose si nce pla nt

sta rtup was estima ted to be abo ut 100.000 pe rson-re m (estim ated to one significa nt fig ure ;
0

Section 4. 12.2.4.2). The num ber of inferred fata l cancers since plant sta rtup wo ul d a mount to
abo ut 50 (esse nti ally all o f which wo uld be attributed to dose received in the 1945-52 time

a. Facility construction and operation estim ates iJre based on D OE anu D OE contractor

acc iden t rates (See Vo lu me 2, Pa rt B. T able F-4·7 o f this EI S).
b. Worke r yea r est imates fro m Bergsman ( 1995).
.
.
c. Dry sto rage subop ti o ns (Y or Z ) wo uld be pai red with e ithe r of two processing opllo ns
( P or Q).
.
.
d. These esti mates re prese nt increment al increases for fu el imported fro m offsHe localto ns
o nly; estimates for sto rage (a nd stabil iza ti on where req uired ) of o nsi te fuel wo ul e be th e sa me

frame) . In th e 50 yea rs since plant startu p. the populati on o f inte rest (ass umin g a co nstant
pop ul atio n of 380.000 and a n individu al dose o f a bo ut 0.3 rem/yea r) wou ld have received a bout
5.000.000 perso n-rem from natura lly occurring rad iation so urces (natural backgro und) which
woul d re late to abo ut 2.500 la tent ca ncer fatalities. In th e sa me 50 yea rs abo ut 27.000 CllnCer
fa talit ies from aU causes would have been expected in th at population.

as in th e Decentraliza tion A ltern ative.

If th e Hanfo rd s itewide co ntr ibuti o n to publ ic dose fro m " II exposure pa thways is
considered (O.R perso n· rem per ye" r fro m DOE faci lities " nd 0.7 perso n-re m pe r yea r fro m
\Vashington Puhlic Power Supply System reac tor operation fo r 40 yea rs). it is estim ated that the

cu mulative collective dose wo uld be approxi mate ly 60 perso n-rem. No latent fata l ca ncers wo uld
be expec ted from such a dose. Over 40 years of interim storage of SN F. the pop Ul ation o f
inte res t would have rece ived 4.000.000 pe rson ·re m fro m na tu ra l backgro un d rad ia tion. That
\'01
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dost: wo uld relate to 2,000 latent ca ncer fata lit ies. In th e sa me 40 years. abo ut 21.000 cancer

0.6 s4uare ki lometers ( 160 acres) for a total of about 88 square kilometers (22,000 acres). The

fata lit ies from all causes would be expected amo ng the population in th e region of interest

amo unt of land actua lly occupi ed by new facilities would ra nge fro m about 4 ha ( II ac res ) to

(380,000 population) .

abo ut 7 hec tares ( 18 ac res). Constru ction of the E nviro nme nta l Resto ratio n Disposal Facility
will require d isturbance of approx imately 4.1 sq uare kilometers ( \.020 acres) of land. However,

Air qu ality limits [(40 C FR 6 1 Subpart H ), 10 millire m per yea r at the Hanford Site

restoration of existing disturbed sites will compensate fo r this loss.

boundary] are not expected to be approached as a result of implement ing the No Action
Alternative or from reasonably foreseeable additio ns to the Hanford Site, e.g.. construction and
operation of a Lase r Interfe ro meter Gravitational-Wave Observatory or fro m oecommissio ning
of unused facilities or site restoration activities.

5. 16.2.2 Ai, Quality. Ai r q uality lim its (WAC 173-470-030,-100) at th e Hanford Site
bo und ary art: not expected to be approached as a res ult of implemen ting a ny of th e opt ions in
the Decentnoliza ti o n Alternative o r from reasonably foreseeable additions to the Hanford Site,
e.g .. construction and operatio n of a Laser Interfe rometer Grav itatio nal-Wave Observatory or

Cumulative spent fuel wo rke r dose from plant startup to date was est imated at about

from deco mmissioning of unused facilities or resto ratio n act ivities.

2,000 person-rem (Section 4.12.1.2), from which o ne fatal cancer might be infe rred. In the near
term th e a nnu al increments to cumulative worke r dose wou ld be expected to be about
24 person-rem. No late nt fatal cancers would be expected from 40 yea rs of the No Ac ti on
Alterna tive (960 person-rem).

5.16.2.3 Waste Management. In th e near term und er the Decentralizatio n A lte rna tive,
there would be abou t 530 cubic meters of low-level waste ge ne rated during 2 yea rs of
repackaging and containerization of SNF a nd sludge in th e 100-K Basins. Thereafter low-level
waste gene ration would range from 41 to 420 cubic me ters per yea r fo r about 4 yea rs depending

The cumul ative worke r dose since start up of activi ties at the Ha nford Site is about 90,000
person-rem, to which would be add ed about 210 person-rem/yr fo r a total cumulat ive worker

on suboptio n selected. All prese ntly anticipated activi ties o n the Ha nford Site wo uld result in
approximately 20,000 cubic meters of low-level waste per yea r. Thus, at a maxi mum, the tot a l

dose of abo ut 100,000 pe rson-re m through the nex t 40 years. Thus for 90 yea rs of Ha nford

low-level waste from SNF act ivi ties would acco unt for abo ut 8 percent of the annua l quantity of

opera tions, abo ut 50 latent ca ncer fatalities (LCFs) might be inferred (4 LCFs inferred from

low-level waste ge ne rated at the Hanford Site.

1995 onward). In those 90 yea rs abo ut 4,500 LCFs would be inferred from natura l background
radiatio n and 48,000 LCFs from all causes wo uld be expected.

High-level waste that migh t be generated in the Decentralization Alte rn ative wou ld not
add significantly to the more th an 250,000 cubic meters of waste at Hanford currently ha ndled

Although the worker dose assocated with all future site restora tio n activi ties is expected to

as high-level

was t ~ .

be small in comparison with cumulative worke r dose to da te, it is too speculative to quantify at
this time.

5.16.2 .4 Socioeconomics. Unde r th e Decentralization Alte rn ative. the SNF workforce
would increase from 80 to abo ut 740. The Hanford Site workforce is expected to drop from

5.16,2 Decentralization Alternative

18.700 in 1995 to 14.700 in 1997 a nd rem ai n at approximately 14,700 through 2004. The regio nal
wo rkfo rce is ex pected to range from 81.000, to 86,000 in th at sa me period . T he maximum

Cumulative impacts associa ted with implementation of the Decentralization Alternative

change with respect to the regional workforce would be an increase of abo ut 0.9 percent.

a re described in th e following subsections.
5. 16.2 .5 Occupational and Public Health. The cumulative population dose since plant
5. 16.2 . 1 Land Use. The Hanford Site consists of abo ut 1450 square kilometers

sta rtup was estimated to be abou t 100,000 person-rem (estimated to o ne sign ificant figure :

(360,000 acres), of which abo ut 87 sq uare kilo me te rs (22,000 acres) have been distu rbed.

Sect ion 4. 12.2.4.2). The numbe r of in fe rred fata i ca nce rs since plant startu p wou ld amou nt to

Implementation of the Decentra lization Alte rn ative wou ld disturb an additiona l area of up to

about 50 (esse ntia lly all of which wo uld be att ributed to dose received in the 1945-52 time
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frame} , In tht! 50 years since pl ant startup. th e populati on of interest (assuming a constant

5.16.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative

population of J 80.000 and a n individua l dose of about 0.3 rem / yea r) would have received abo ut
5.000.000 person-rem from naturally occurring radiat ion sources (natural backgrou nd ). which
would rela te

to

2.500 latent cancer fatalities. In the sa me 50 yea rs about 27.000 ca ncer fatalities

from all ca uses wo uld have been ex pected in the region of interesl.

If the Han fo rd sitewide contribution to public dose from all exposure pathways is

Because of the simila rity of activit ies. cu mula tive impacts of the 1992/ 1993 Pla nning Basis
Alte rnative woulu be esse ntia lly the sa me as those described for the Decentral ization

Alternative.

5.16.4 Regionalization Alternative (Options A, B1, B2, and C)

conside red (0.8 person·rem per year from DOE facilities and 0.7 person-rem per year from
Washington Public Power Supply System reactor operation for 40 yea rs), it is estimated that the
cumulative collective dose would be app roximately 60 person·rem. Additional collective

Cumu lative impacts for implementation of the four Regionalizat ion Subalternatives are
described in the followi ng subsections.

population dose from impleme ntation of the Decentralization Alternative would range from I to
~ person· re m over 40 yea rs (dose from 4 yea rs of processing would domina te). Thus. in tota l.

5.76.4.7 Regionalization Option A. Cumulative impacts associated with imple me n·

the collective popula tion dose from man·made sources wo uld remain approximately 60 person·

tation of the Regionaliza tion Option A where Hanford's defense SNF is stored at the Hanford

rem. No latent fat al cancers would be expected from such a dose. Over 40 yea rs of interim

Site and other SNF is shipped offsite for storage are described in the following subsections.

storage of SNF. the population of interest would have received 4.000.000 person· rem from
naturally occu rring radiation sources (natural background). That dose would rela te to 2.000

5. 76.4.7.7 Land Use.

The Hanford Site consists of about 1450 square

latent ca ncer fatalities. In the sa me 40 yea rs, about 21.000 cancer fatalities from all causes

kilomete rs (360.000 ac res) of which about 87 square kilometers (22.000 acres) have been

would be expected among the popula tion in the region of interest (380.000 population).

disturbed. Implementation of Regiona lization Option A would disturb an additional a rea of up
to 0.6 square kilometers (160 acres). for a total of about 88 square kilometers (22,000 acres).

Air qua lity limits [(40 CFR 61 Subpart H). \0 millirem per year at the Hanford Site
boundary] are not expected to be approached as a result of impleme nting the Decentralization

The a mount of land actually occupied by new facilities would ra nge from about 2 hectares
(6 acres) to about 7 hecta res (18 acres). Construction of the Environmental Restora tion

Alte rnative or from reaso nably foreseeable additions to the Hanford Site. e.g.. construction and

Disposa l Facility will require disturbance of approximately 4.1 square kilometers (1.020 acres) of

operation of a Laser Interferometer Gravitational·Wave Observatory or decommissioning of

land. However. restoration of existing disturbed sites will compensate for this loss.

unused facilities. or site restoration activities.
5.76.4. 7.2 Air Quality.

Cumulative spent fuel worker dose from plant startup to date was estimated at about
2.000 person·rem (Section 4. 12. 1.2). from which one latent fatal cancer might be infe rred.

Air quality limits (WAC 173·470·030,· 100) at the

Hanfo rd Site boundary are not expected to be approached as a result of imple me nt ing a ny of
the options in the Regiona lizat ion A A lt ernative or from reasonably foreseeable add itions to the

Collective wo rke r dose from SNF activities would amount to about 80 person·rem for

Hanford Site. e.g.. construction and ope ration of a Lase r Inte rferometer Gravita tional· Wave

main tenance and opera tions. 18 person·re m for loading storage facilities. a nd 180 to 320 pe rson·

Obse rva tory or from decom missioning of unused facilities or restora tion activities.

re m depe nding on processing option selected. Thus. the total collective 40·year worke r dose
from SNF activities would be from abo ut 300 to 420 person·rem. Within the accuracy of the
estimates. cumu lative worker dose in the Decentralization Alternat ive would not add

5. 76.4. 7.3 Waste Management.

In the near term unde r Regionalizat ion

Option A. the re wo uld be abo ut 530 cubic mete rs of low· level waste generated dur ing can·

significa ntly to the cumulative Ha nford Site worker dose over 90 yea rs as described for the No

tai ne rization of SNF and sludge in the IOO·K basins. Thereaft e r. low· level waste generation

Action Alternative.

would range from 61 to 420 cubic me ters per year for abou t 4 years depe nding on option
selected .. All presently a nticipat eu activities on the H anford Site would resul t in approx ima te ly
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20.000 cubic mders of low·levei waste per yea r. Thus. at a maximum. the to tal low·levd waste

In the sa me 40 years. about 21.000 cancer fata lit ies from a ll causes wo uld be expected a mong

fro m SNF activ ities would account fo r abo ut 8 pe rcent of th e an nual Hanfo rd gene ration of low-

the po pU lat ion in the region of interest (380.000 population).

level waste.

Air q uality li mits ([40 C FR 6 1 Subpart H], 10 millirem pe r yea r at the Site boun dary) are
High-level waste that might be generated in Regionaliza tio n A wo uld not add sign ificant ly
to th ~ more tha n 250_000 cubic me ters of waste at Hanfo rd curre ntly ha ndled as h igh -I~vd
wa ste.

not expected to be approached as a result of implement ing the Regionalization Alte rna tive or
fro m reaso nably fo reseea ble additio ns to th e Hanfo rd Site. e.g .. constructio n and ope ration of a
Lase r Inte rfe ro me te r Gravi tatio nal-Wave Observatory. o r decommiss io ning of unused faci li ties.
o r site resto ratio n activit ies.

5. 76.4 . 7.4 Socioeconomics.

Unde r Regionaliza tion Option A. the SN F

wo rkfo rce wo uld increase by 60 to about 470. The Hanfo rd Site workforce is expected to drop

Cumulative spent fuel worker dose from plan t startup to date was estimated at about

fro m abo ut 18.700 in 1995 to about 14.700 in 1997 and to rema in at approx imately 14.700

2.000 person-rem (Section 4. 12.1.2). from which one latent fat al ca ncer might be infe rred.

through 2004 . The regional wo rkforce is expected to range from 8 1.000. to 86.000 in that sa me

Collective wo rke r dose from SNF activities would amount to about 80 pe rson-rem for

period. The maximum change with respect to the regio nal workfo rce wo uld be an increase of

mai ntenance a nd operations, 18 person-rem fo r loading storage facilities. and 180 to 320 person-

abo ut 0.6 percent.

rem depending on processing o ption selected. Thus the total collective 40-yea r worker dose
wo uld be from about 300 to 420 person-rem. Within the accuracy of the estimates. cumula tive

5. 76.4 . 7.5 Occupational and Public Health.

The cumu lative pop ul atio n dose

since pla nt startup was estim ated to be about 100.000 person-re m (estimated to one significant

wo rke r dose in Regionalization A wo uld not add significa ntly to the cumulative Ha nford Site
wo rk dose over 90 years as described for the No Action Alte rnative.

figure; Section 4.12.2.4.2). The num ber of inferred fa ta l ca ncers since pla nt sta rtup would
a mo unt to abo ut 50 (essentia lly all of which would be attributed to exposures in the 1945-52

5. 76.4 .2 Regionalization Option 87. C umulative impacts associated with the

ti me fra me). In th e 50 yea rs since plant sta rtu p the popula tion of interest (assuming a constant

im ple mentation of Regiona lization O pt io n BI. where all SNF west of the Mississippi River.

popUlatio n of 380.000 and a n individual dose of abo ut 0.3 rem/ yea r) would have rece ived about

except for Nava l SN F. is transported to Hanford are described in the following subsections.

5.000.000 person-rem from natura lly occurr ing radi ation sources (natura l background). which
wo uld relate to 2.500 latent cancer fa talities. In the sa me 50 yea rs abo ut 27,000 ca ncer fa tali ties
from all ca uses would have been expected in the region of interest.

5. 76.4.2.7 Land Use.

The Ha nford Site consists of abo ut 1450 squa re

kilometers (360.000 acres). of which abo ut 87 square kilomete rs (22,000 acres) have been
disturbed. Im ple mentation of Regionaliza tion O ptio n B I would disturb an add itional area of

If the Hanford sitewide cont ribution to public dose fro m all expos ure pathways is

upto 0.6 squ are kilo meters ( 160 acres). fo r a total of abo ut 88 squa re kilometers (22.000 acres).

considered (0.8 person-rem per yea r from DOE fac il ities and 0.7 person-re m per year from

T he amo unt of land actua lly occupied by new facilities wo uld ra nge from about 15 hectares

Washington Public Power Supply Syste m reactor operation for 40 yea rs), it is estima ted that the

(36 ac res) to about 28 hec ta res (68 acres). Construction of the Enviro nme nta l Restoration

cumulative collective dose wou ld be approx imately 60 person-re m. Additiona l collective

Disposa l Facility will requi re distu rbance of approxi mately 4.1 square kilometers (1.020 acres) of

popula tion dose from imple menta tion of Regionalization Option A wo uld range from I to 4

lanu. However. restoratio n o f ex istin g disturbed sit es will compe nsate for this loss.

p~ rso n·rem over 40 yea rs (dose from 4 yea rs of processing wo uld dominate). Thus. in to ta l. the

collective population dose from ma n-made sources wo uld be abo ut 60 person- re m. No la te nt

5. 76.4.2.2 Air Quality.

Air qu ali ty li mits (WAC 173-470-030.-100) at the

fatal ca ncers would be expected fro m such a dost . Over 40 yea rs of interim storage of SNF. the

Hanford Site bo undary are not expected to be approached as a result of im ple ment ing any of

po pulation of interest wo uld have received 4.000.000 person-rem from nat ura lly occurr ing

the options in Regiona lization Option B 1 or from reaso nably foreseeable addi tions to the

radiation sources (na tural bac kgro un d). Tha t dose wou ld relate to 2.000 latent ca ncer fa ta lities.
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H an foru Sileoe .g.. con str ucti on and operati on of a Laser In terferometer G ravit ational-W ave

Washington Pu!:>lic Power Supply System reactor operation for 40 years), it is estimated that the

Obse rv~ t ory or fro m decommissioning of unuseu faci lities or restoration act ivities.

cumul a tive

collect iv~

dose would be approximately 60 person-rem. Additiona l collective

pop ul a ti o n dose from implementatio n of Regionalization Option B I would ra nge from I to 4
5. 16.4 .2.3 Waste Management.

In the near te rm und er Regio naliza ti o n

Opt io n B I. there wo uld be abo ut 530 cubic me te rs of low·level waste generated du ring

person-re m over 40 yea rs (dose from 4 yea rs of processing would dominate). Thus, in total, th e
collective population dose from man-made sources wou ld remain approximately 60 person-rem .

repackaging and containerization of SNF and sludge in 100·K Basi ns. The reafter low·level waste

No latent fa tal cancers would be expected from such a dose. Over 40 yea rs of interim storage of

ge nera ti o n wo uld range from 61 to 420 cubic meters per year for about 4 years dependin g on

SNF, th e popUlation of interest would have received 4,000,000 person-rem from naturally

th e suboptio n selected. All presently anticipated processi ng activities o n th e Ha nfo rd Site would

occurring radi ation so urces (nat ural background). That dose would relate to 2,000 latent cancer

res ult in approximately 20,000 cubic mete rs of low·level waste per year. Thus, th e total qua nt ity

fatalities. In the same 40 years, abo ut 2 1,000 cancer fatalities from all causes wou ld be expected

of low·level waste fro m SNF activities would acco unt for about 8 percent of the a nnu a l quantity

a mong the population in the region of interest (380,000 population).

of low·level waste ge nerated at th e Hanford S·te.
Air quality limits [(40 CFR 61 Subpart H), 10 millirem per year at th e Hanford Site
High·level waste that might be generated in Regio nalization BI would not add
significantly to the more than 250,000 cubic meters of waste at Hanford currently handled as
high·level waste.

boundary] are no t expected to be approached as a result of implementing Regionalization
Option B I or from reasonably foreseeable additio ns to the Hanford Site, e.g. , construction and
operati o n of a Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave ObseIVatory or from decomm issioning
of unused facilities or site restoration activities.

5.16.4.2.4 Socioeconomics.

Under Regionalization Option B I, the SNF

workforce would increase by about 170 to about 800. The Hanford Site workforce is expecteJ to

C umulative spent fuel worker dose fro m plant startup to date was estimated at about

drop from 18,700 in 1995 to 14,700 in 1997 and remain around 14,700 through 2004 . The

2,000 person-rem (Section 4. 12. 1.2), fro m which o ne latent fatal cancer might be inferred.

regional workforce is expected to ra nge from 81,000, to 86,000 in that same period. The

Collective worker dose from SNF activities would amo unt to about 80 perso n-rem for

max imum change with respect to th e regional workforce wou ld be a n increase of about 1

ma intenance a nd operat ions, 18 person-rem for loading storage facilities, and 180 to 320 perso n-

percent.

rem depe nding on processing option selected. Thus the total collective 40-yea r worker dose
wou ld be fro m abo ut 300 to 420 pe rson-rem. Within the accuracy of th e estimates. cumulative
5.16.4.2.5 Occupational and Public Health.

since plant startup was estimated to be abo ut 100,000

The cumula tive popUlation dose

person· r~ m

(estimated to o ne significant

worker dose in Regio naliza ti on B: would not add significantly to the cumul ative Hanford Sit e
worke r dose over 90 yea rs as described for the No Action Alternative.

figure ; Secti on 4. 12.2.4.2). The number of inferred fatal cancers since plant startup would
amo unt to abo ut 50 (essentia lly all of which would be a ttributed to exposures in the 1945-52

5. 16.4. 3 Regionalization Option 82. Cumulative impacts associa ted with the

time frame). In the 50 years since plan t startup, the populatio n of interest (assuming a constant

im plement a tio n of Regionaliza tio n Option B2, where all SNF west of the Mississippi Rive r and

population of 380,000) wo uld have received about 5,000,000 person-rem from na turally occ urr ing

Naval SNF, a re transport ed to Hanford are described in the fo llowing subsections.

ra diatio n so urces (na tural backgro und), which would relate to 2,500 late nt cancer fata lities. In
the sa me time, abo ut 27,000 cancer fa talities fro m all causes would have been expected in the
regio n of interest.

5. 16.4.3. 1 Land Use.

The Ha nfo rd Site consists of abo ut 1450 square

kil o me ters (360.000 ac res) of which aboHt 87 square kilomete rs (22,000 acres) have been
disturbed. Im pleme ntat io n of Regio nalization Option B2 would disturb an add iti onal a rea of up

If the Ha nfo rd s itewide contri buti on to public dose from aU exposure pathways is
conside red (0.8 perso n-re m per yea r from DOE facilities and 0.7 perso n-re m per yea r from
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to 0.6 squ are kil o meters ( 160 ac res), for a to tal of abo ut 88 squ are kil o me te rs (22,000 ac res).
Th e amo unt of lan d aClllally occupied by new faci lities wo uld range from about 21 hectares
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(52 ac res) to abo ut 30 hectares (74 acres). Construct ion of the Enviro nme ntal Restoration

popul ation of 380.000) would have received about 5.000.000 person-re m from naturally occurring

Disposal Facility will require disturbance of approximately 4.1 squa re kilometers ( 1.020 acres) of

radia tion sources (natura l background) which would rela te to 2,500 la te nt cancer fa ta lit ies. In

land. However. restora tion of existing disturhed sites will compensate fo r th is loss.

the sa me time about 27,000 ca ncer fatalities from all causes would have been expected in the
region of intert!st.

5. 16.4 .3.2 Ai, Quality.

Air quality limits (WAC 173-470-030,-100) at the

Hanford Site bounda ry are not expected to be approached as a result of impleme nt ing a ny of
the suboptions in Regionalization Option 8 I or from reasonably foreseeable additions to the

If the Hanford Site contribution from all exposure pathways to public dose is added
(0.8 pe rson-re m pe r year from DOE facilities and 0.7 person-rem per year from Washington

Ha nford Site. e.g .. construction and operation of a Laser Inte rferomete r Grav itational-Wave

Puhlic Power Supply Syste m reactor operation for 40 years), it is estimated that the cumulative

Observato ry. or from decommissioning of unused facilities or restoration activities.

collective dose would be approximately 60 person-rem. Additional collective population dose
fro m implementation of Regionalization Option B2 would range from I to 4 person-re m ove r

5_16.4 .3.3 Waste Management.

In the near term under Regionaliza tion

40 years (dose from 4 years of processing would dominate). Thus, in tota l. the collective

Option 82, there would be about 530 cubic meters of low-level waste generated during

population dose from man-made sources would remain approximately 60 pe rson-rem. No late nt

repackaging and conta inerization of SNF and sludge in the 100-K Basins. Thereafte r, low-level

fa tal ca ncers wo uld be expected from such a dose. Over 40 years of interim storage of SNF, the

was te genera tion would ra nge from 61 to 420 cubic meters per year. All presently a nticipated

popula tion of inte rest would have received 4.000,000 person-rem from na turally occurring

activities on the Hanfo rd Site would result in approximately 20.000 cubic meters of low-level

radia tion sources (natura l background). That dose would relate to 2,000 latent cance r fatalities.

waste per year. Thus, at a maximum, the total quantity of low-level waste from SNF activities

In the sa me 40 yea rs. about 21 .000 cancer fa ta lities from aU causes would be expected a mong

wo uld acco unt for about 4 percent of the a nnual qua ntity of low-level waste generated at the

the popula tion in the region of interest (380,000 population).

Ha nford Site.
Air qua lity limits 1(40 CFR 6 1 Subpa rt H), 10 millirem per year a t the Site boundary] a re
High-level waste that might be generated in Regionalization B2 would not add
significantly to the more tha n 250,000 cubic meters of waste at Hanford curre ntly ha ndled as
high-level waste.

not ex pected to be approached as a result of implementing Regionalization Option B2 or from
reasonably fo reseeable additions to the Hanford Site, e.g., construction a nd operation of a Lase r
Interfe rometer Grav itationa l-Wave Observatory, or decommissioning of unused facilities or site
res toration activities.

5. 16_4 .3.4 Socioeconomics.

Under Regionalization Option B2. the SNF

workfo rce would increase by about 170 to about 800. The Hanford Site workforce is expected to

Cu mu lat ive spent fue l worke r dose from plant startup to date was e timated at abo ut

dro p fro m 18.700 in 1995 to 14.700 in 1997 and rema in around 14,700 through 2004. The

2,000 pe rson-re m (Section 4. 12. 1.2). from wh ich one latent fatal cancer might be infe rred.

regiona l workfo rce is expected to ra nge from 81,000, to 86,000 in that same pe riod. The

Collective worker dose from SNF activities would a mount to about 80 person-re m for

maximum change with respect to the regional workforce would be an increase of about

mai nte nance a nd operations, 18 pe rson-re m for loading storage facilities, and 180 to 320 person-

percent.

rem depe nding on the processing suboption selected. Thus the total collective 40-yea r worke r
dose wo uld be fro m about 300 to 420 person-rem. Within the accuracy of th e estimates,
5. 16.4 .3.5 Occupational and Public Health.

The cumulative population dose

since pla nt startup was estimated to be about 100,000 person-re m (estima ted to one significa nt

cumulative wo rke r dose in Regionalization B2 would not add significa ntly to the cumula tive
Hanford Site wor ke r dose over 90 years as described for the No Action Alte rnative.

figu re; Section 4.12.2.4 .2). The numbe r of infe rred fata l cancers since plant sta rtup would
amou nt to about 100 (essentially a ll of which would be attributed to exposures in the 1945-52
time frame) . In the 50 yea rs si nce plant startup, the population of interest (ass uming a constant
VO LL'ME 1, IW PE~IJ I X A. APRIL 11)95
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5. 16.4 .4 Regionalization C Option. Cumulative impacts in this option. where all

Hanford SNF is sent to INEL or NTS, would be essentially the same as those described for the

meters of low-level waste per year. Thus, at a max imum, SNF activities would account for abo ut

I percent of the total.

Centralization Alt ernative. minimum option.

High-level waste tha t might be generated in the Centralization maximum option would not

5.16.5 Centralization Alternative

add signi ficant ly to the more than 250,000 cubic meters of waste at Hanford currently ha ndled
as high· level waste.

Cumulative impacts associated with implementation of one or the other of two options
under the Centralization Alternative are described in the following subsections.

5. 16.5.1.4 Socioeconomics.

Under the Centralization Alternative maximum

option, the SNF wo rkforce would increase by about 290 to about 900. The Hanford Site
5. 16.5. 1 Centralization Alternative Maximum Option. Cumulative impacts associated

with implementation of the Centralization Alternative maximum option, where aU SNF is sent to
the Hanford Site, a re described in the foUowing subsections.

wo rkforce is expected to drop from 18,700 in 1995 to 14,700 in 1997 and remain around 14,700
through 2004. The regional workforce is expected to range from 81,000, to 86,000 in that same
period. The maxi mum change with respect to the regional workforce would be an increase of
abo ut 1 percent.

5. 16.5.1. 1 Land Use.

The Hanford Site consists of about 1450 square

kilometers (360,000 acres), of which about 87 squa re kilometers (22,000 acres) have been
disturbed. Impleme ntatio n of the Centralization Alternative maximum option would disturb up

5. 16.5.1. 5 Occupational and Public Health.

The cumulative population dose

since plant sta rtup was estimated to be about 100,000 person-rem (estimated to one significant

to an additional area of abo ut 0.6 square kilometers (160 acres) for a total of about 88 square

figure ; Section 4.12.2.4.2). The number of inferred fatal cancers since plant startup would

kilometers (22,000 acres). The a mount of land actuaUy occupied by new facilities would ra nge

amo unt to about 50 (essentiaUy aU of which would be attributed to exposures in the 1945-52

from about 35 hectares (86 acres) to about 38 hectares (93 acres). Construction of the

time frame) . In the 50 years since plant startup, the population of interest (assuming a constant

Environmental Restora tion Disposal Facility will require disturbance of approximately 4.1

population of 380,000) would have received 5,000,000 person·rem from naturaUy occurring

squa re kilometers (1.020 acres) of land. However, restoration of existing disturbed sites will

radiation sources (natural background), which would relate to 2,500 latent cancer fatalities. In

compensate for this loss.

the same time about 27,000 cancer fatalities from all causes would have been expected in the
region of interest .

5.16.5.1.2 Air Quality.

Air quality limits (WAC 173·470-030,.100) at the

Ha nford Site boundary are not expected to be approached as a result of implementing any of
the suboptions in the Centralization Alternative maximum option or from reasonably

If the Ha nford sitewide contribution to public dose from aU exposure pathways is
considered (0.8 person·rem per year from DOE facilities a nd 0.7 person·rem per year from

foreseeable additio ns to the Hanford Site, e.g.. construction and operation of a Laser

Was hington Public Power Supply System reactor operation for 40 years), it is estimated that the

Inte rferometer Gravitational·Wave Observatory, or from decommissioning unused facilities or

cumulative collective dose would be app roximately 60 person· rem. Additional coUective

resto ratio n activities.

popUlation dose from implementation of the Centralization Alterna tive maximum option would
range from I to 4 person-rem over 40 years (dose from 4 years of processing would dominate).

5. 16. 5. 1.3 Waste Management.

In the nea r term under the Centralization

Altern ative maxi mum option, there would be abo ut 532 cubic mete rs of low· level waste

Thus. in total, the coUective population dose from man·made sources would re main
approximately 60 pe rson·rem . No la te nt fat al ca ncers would be expected from such a dose.

gene rated during repackagi ng a nd containerization of SNF a nd sludge in the 100·K Basi ns.

Over 40 years of interim storage of SNF, the population of interest would have received

Thereafter. low·level waste generation would amount to about 140 cubic meters pe r year. All

4.000.000 pe rson·rem from natura Uy occurring radiation sources (natural background). That

presen tly a nticipated ac tivities on the Hanford Site wo uld result in approximately 20,000 cubic

dose would relate to 2.000 latent cancer fa talities. In the same 40 years, about 21 ,000 cance r
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fatalities from all ca uses would be expected among the population in the region of interest

(380.000 population).

5. 76.5.2 .2 Air Quality.

Air quality limits (WAC 173-470-030,-100) at the

Hanford Site boundary are not expected to be app roached as a result of implementing the a ny
Air quality limits [(40 CFR 6 1 Subpart H), 10 millire m pe r yea r at the Ha nford Site
boundary] are not expected to be approac hed as a result of imple me nting the Centralization

of the suboptions in the Centralization Alternative minimum option or from reaso nably
foreseeable addi tions to the Ha nford Site, e.g., construction and operation of a Laser

Alternative maximum option or from reasonably foreseeable add itions to the Ha nford Site. e.g.,

Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory, or from decommissioning unused facilities or

construction a nd operation of a Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory, or

restoration activities.

decommissioning of unused facilities or site restoration activ ities.

5. 76.5.2. 3 Waste Management.
Cumulative spent fuel worker dose from plant startup to date was estimated at about

In the near term under the Centralization

Alternative minimum option, there would be about 532 cubic meters of low-level waste

2,000 person-rem (Section 4.12.1.2), from which one latent fatal cancer might be inferred.

generated during repackaging and containerization of SNF and sludge in the 100-K Basins.

Collective worker dose from SNF activities in the Centralization Alternative maximum option

The reafter, low-level waste generation would range from 110 to 490 cubic meters per year. All

wo uld a mount to abo ut 80 person-rem for maintenance and operations, 18 person-rem for

presently a nticipated activities on the Hanford Site would result in approximately 21,000 cubic

loading storage facilities, and 180 to 320 person-rem depending on processing suboption

meters of solid waste pe r yea r. Thus, at a maximum, SNF activities would account for about

selected.

2 percent of the annual generation of low-level waste at the Hanford Site.

Within the accuracy of the estimates, cumulative worker dose in the Centralization

High-level waste that might be generated in the Centralization mininim option would not

maximum option would not add significantly to the cumulative Hanford Site worker dose over

'add significantly to the more than 250,000 cubic meters of waste at Hanford currently handled

90 yea rs as described for the No Action Alternative.

as high-level waste.

5.76.5.2 Centralization Alternative Minimum Option. Cumulative impacts associated

with implementation of the Centralization Alternative minimum option, where all SNF on the
Hanford Site is shipped offsite for storage, are described in the following subsections.

5. 76.5.2.4 Socioeconomics.

U nder the Centralization Alternative minimum

option, the SNF workforce would increase by abo ut 390 to about 590. The Hanford Site
workforce is expected to remain at about 18,000 from 1995 through 2004. The regional
workfo rce is expected to range from 81,000, to 86,000 in that same period. The maximum

5.76.5.2. 7 Land Use.

The Hanford Site consists of abou t 1450 square

change with respect to the regional workforce would be an increase of about 0.7 percent.

kilometers (360,000 acres) of which abo ut 87 square kilometers (22,000 ac res) have been
disturbed. Implementation of the Centralization Alternative minimum option would disturb up
to an additional area of abo ut 0.6 squa re kilometers (160 acres) for a total of about 88 squa re

5 . 76.5. 2.5 Occupational and Public Health.

The cumulative population dose

since plant start up was estimated to be about 200,000 person-rem (estimated to one significant

kilometers (22,000 acres) . The amount of la nd actually occupied by new facilities would range

figure ; Section 4.12.2.4.2) . The number of inferred fatal cancers since plant sta rtup would

from about 2 hectares (6 ac res) to abo ut 15 hectares (12 acres). Construction of the

a mou nt to abo ut 50 (essentially all of which would be attributed to exposures in the 1945-52

Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility will require disturbance of approximately 4.1

time fra me). In the 50 yea rs since plant sta rtup, the population of interest (assuming a constant

squa re kilomete rs ( 1.020 acres) of la nd. However, restoration of existing disturbed sites will

popula tion of 380,000) would have received 5,000,000 person-rem from naturally occurring

compe nsate for this loss.

radia tion sources (natural background), which would relate to 2,500 latent cancer fatalities. In
the sa me time abo ut 24,000 cancer fa talities from all causes would have been expected in the
region of inte rest.
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Cumulative spent fuel worker dose from plant startup to date was estimated at about

5.17.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative

2.000 person ·rem (Section 4.12.1.2), from which one latent fatal cancer might be inferred.
Collective worker dose from SNF activities in the Centralization Alternative minimum option

Adverse impacts associated with the 1992/ 1993 Planning Basis Alternative wo uld be

would amount to about 80 person-rem for maintenance and operations, 18 person-rem for

essentially the same as those for the Decentralization Alternative. If transport of any amount of

loading storage facilities, and 180 to 320 person-rem depending on processing suboption

SNF we re considered a n adverse impact. that impact would occur in this a lternative if the small

selected. Thus the total collective 40-year worker dose would be from about 300 to 420 pe rson-

amount of TRIGA fuel at Hanford were transported to INEL.

rem.

Within the accuracy of the estimates, cum ulative worker dose in the Centralization

5.17.4 Regionalization Alternative

minimum option would not add significantly to the cumulative Hanford Site worker dose over 90
yea rs as described for the No Action Alternative.

Unavoidable adverse environmental impacts for the Regionaliza tion Alternative range
from those of the Centralization (Minimum) Alternative for Regionalization C where all

5.17 Adverse Environmental Impacts that Cannot be Avoided

Hanford SNF is shipped offsite to essentially those of the Centralization (Maximum) Alternative
for Regiona lization B2 where all SNF west of the Mississippi River including Naval SNF is

Unavoidable adverse impacts that might arise as a result of implementing the alternatives

shipped to Ha nford.

for interim storage of SNF at the Hanford Site are discussed in the following subsections.

5.17.5 Centralization Alternative
5.17.1 No Action Alternative
In the option where Hanford receives all DOE SNF, adverse impacts would be somewhat
Adverse impacts associated with the No Action Alternative would derive from the expense
and radiation exposure associated with maintaining facilities that are near or at the end of their

larger than those associated with implementing the Decentralization Alternative because about
25 we ight percent more fuel than already exists on the Hanford Site would need to be stored;

design life and the possible future degradation of fuel and facilities, thus increasing the potential

however. higher heat loads on that fuel might nearly triple the capacity needed for storage.

for releases of ma terials to the environment.

Transport of that 25 weight percent of SNF to the Hanford Site also likely would be viewed as
a n adverse impact.

5.17.2 Decentralization Alternative
In the option where Hanford ships a ll of its fuel to another site. adve rse impacts would be
Adverse impacts associated with the Decentralization Alternative would derive principally

associated with construction and operation of a fuel packaging facility. The impacts. however.

fro m construction activities needed for new facilities. There would be displacement of some

would be expected to be substa ntially less tha n those noted for the Decentraliza tion Alternative.

a nimals from the construction site and the destruction of plant life within the site up to

Transporting a relatively large amou nt of SNF offsite to anot her DOE facility also likely would

9 hectares (24 acres). Criteria pollutants, radionuclides, and hazardous chemicals would also be

be considered an adve rse impact.

released in up to permitted quantities during processing preparations. Traffic congestion a nd
noise are ex pected to increase by a few percent during the construction of major facilities.
Competition fo r adeq uate housing would increase in the already tight market, a nd capacities at

5.18 Relationship Between Short-Term Uses of the Environment and
the Maintenance and Enhancement of Long-Term Productivity

some of the local school would be moderately strained with approxi mately 0.5 to 1.5 perce nt
a ddit ional students, depending on which processing and/or storage option were chosen.

SNF storage is conte mplated for up to 40 yea rs fJe nding decisions on ultimate disposition.
SNF is essentia lly ura nium-238 with varying a mounts of uranium-235 and small amounts of

V O I. L:~1 E

1, J\PPE:"DI X J\ , ..,PRJ!. 1995

5-134

3(')5

5· 135

3{)(f "

VOLUME 1, APPEND IX A. APRIL 1995

plutonium contaminated by small masses of fission products (but high activity). Because of this
composition. a decision could be made at the end of the planned storage pe riod to either

secure facilities. A new SNF facility would not be built, and Hanford SNF would continue to be
managed in the curre nt mode.

continue storage until the energy resource value of the SNF warrants processing for powerreactor fuel or to determine that the fuel will never have any resource value a nd will be
disposed of. If the decision is to continue to store the SNF. that option could be seen as the
best use of land at the Hanford Site in terms of long-term productivity. This conclusion would
apply to all of the alternatives except for the Regionalization C Alternative and the
Centralization Alternative with storage at other than Hanford.

If

th ~

No Action Alternative were implemented. the following facilities would likely be

used at the Hanford Site to maintain continued safe and secure storage of SNF: the 105-KE
a nd KW Basins. FFTF. T-Plant. and the 308, 324. 325. a nd 327 buildings. Excluding e ne rgy a nd
materials expe nded during construction of minor facilities to maintain safety and security, the
operational staff is estimated at 215 personnel, and electrical power consumption is estimated to
be 12.000 megawatt hours pe r year. This alternative represents less than a 2 percent increase in

If the decision is to dispose of the SNF or if the non-Hanford centralization option for
storage is selected. the land on the Hanford Site would become available for other uses.

existing personnel at the Hanford Site and a negligible increase in the total amount of electrical
energy currently used a t the Hanford Site.

Because of the potential for, or perception of, contamination, use of the land for agriculture
might not be appropriate. Moreover. the land occupied (or that would be occupied) by SNF
facilities was of marginal utility for farming before it was obtained for the Hanford Site. and it
remains so. However, other uses, such as for wildlife refuges. might be appropriate long-term
uses of land vacated by SNF facilities after decommissioning is completed.

5.19.2 Decentralization Alternative
The irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources for the Decentralization Aiternative would include an additional increment of energy, materials. and personnel. Existing
Hanford Site SNF would be safely stored for a 40-year period. with some limited SNF ship-

5.19 Irreversible and Irretrievable Commitment of Resources

ments. To accom modate th is mission. existing facilities would require upgrading and new
storage systems would need to be constructed. Various options have been proposed on which

This section addresses the irretrievable commitment of resources that would likely be used

faciliti~s

to build a nd how to upgrade existing ones, but it has not been determined exactly which

to implement the proposed project or its alternatives. An irretrievable resource is a natural or

kind of facilities would need to be built. A representative set of values is presented in

physical resource tha t is irreplaceably lost and cannot be replenished.

Table 5.19-1. which roughly indicates the material, personnel, and energy commitme nts.
Depe nding on the option chosen. the alternative could require less than a 1.5 percent increase

Implementatio n of the proposed project would result in the irretrievable use of fossil fuels
in construction activi ties and in the transport of raw materials to the project site. In addition,

or up to a 33 percent increase (but only for 4 years) in the total amount of electrical energy
currently used at the Hanford Site.

there would be a n irretrievable use of electricity and fossil fuel in the SNF operations. Briefly
summarized below are discussions of irretrievable a nd irreversible resource impacts for each

In addition to energy increases. addi tional water resources would be required for this

alternative.

altern ative. but are not expected to be an excessive amount. compared to th e more than

5.19.1 No Action Alternative

processes.

IS million cubic meters (4 billion gallons) of water used each year on the Hanford Site for all

The irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources for the No Action Alternative
would include an addit ional increment of energy, materia ls. and manpower to maintain safe and
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Table 5. 19- 1. Irretrieva ble commit ment of ma terials in th e Decentralizati o n Alternative
suhop tions.

With the exception of Option C. wh ich for Hanfo rd is eq uivalent to the Centralization
Ahermlt ivc mi n imum option. the irretrievable and irreversible comm itme nt of mate rial

Suboplion
W

hem

Concrete. thousa nd
cubic mctcrs/ (cubic

13 (17)

X

Y

15 (20)

Z

P

0

17 (23)

24 (32)

22 (29)

29 (38)

5.19.5 Centralization Alternative

ya rds)
Lumber. thousa nd cubic
meters {board fect}

1.2 (500)

1.4 (570)

1.6 (650)

2.2 (930)

2.0 (850)

2.6 (1100)

2500
1600

2900
1600

3500
100

4800
100

4370
40,000

5700
127,000

500 (130)

570 (150)

660 (175)

900 (240)

830 (220)

1100 (290)

5tlO (130)

570 (150)

660(175)

900 (240)

830 (220)

1100 (290)

The Centra lization Alte rn ative has two major options: eit her a U Hanford SNF wou ld be

Electricity
Construction (M\V-- hrs)
Operations (M\V.

hrs/ yr)
Diesel fucl, cubic meters

(t housand gallons)
Gasoline, cubic meters

reso urces are provided in Tables 5. 19· 2 through 5.19·4.

(thousand gallons)

sh ipped offsite to anothe r DOE facility where all SNF would be centralized (mi nim um option).
or the Hanford Site would become the centra lized loca tion for aU DOE SNF to be temporarily

Table 5.19-2. Irretrievable commitment of material reso urces in the Regionalization A
suboptio ns.
SuboptioD

a. Ass umes operation of the process facilit y (28,000 or 115,000 MW-H rs/yr) concurrently wit h those
faci lities whe re SNF is currently stored (1 2,000 MW-H rs/yr, as in the No Action Alter native) for an
interim periC'lc:i less than 4 years.

Item
Concre te, thousand
cubic mcters/(cubic

W
9 (12)

X

Y

9 (12)

Z

P

0

16 (21)

19 (25)

22 (29)

29 (38)

ya rds)

5.1 9.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative

The irreve rsi ble a nd irretrievable comm it ment of resou rces fo r the 1992/ 1993 Pla nning
Basis Alternative wou ld be very sim ilar to those for the Decentraliza tion Altern ative. The
mate rials. personnel. a nd ene rgy estimates a re assu med to approximate those stated in the

Lumber. th ousand cubic

0.8 (350)

0.8 (350)

1.4 (600)

1.7 (700)

2.0 (850)

2.6 (1100)

1800
1600

1800
1600

3200
100

3800
100

4370
40.000'

5700
127.000'

380 (100)

380 (100)

610 ( 160)

720 (190)

830 (220)

1100 (290)

380 ( 100)

380 (100)

610 ( 160)

720 (190)

830 (220)

1100 (290)

meters (board feet)
E le ctricity
Const ructio n (i\o1\V· hrs)

Opera tions (MW.
hrs/ yr)
Diesel fue l, cubic meters

(thousand gallons)

Decentralization Alternative.

Gasoline, cubic mete rs

(thousand ga llons)

5.19.4 Regionalization Alternative

The Regio nalizatio n Alternative as it applies to the Ha nfo rd Site con tai ns the foUowing

a. Assumes ope ration of th e process facility (28,000 or 115,()(X) M\V-Hrs/yr) concurrently with th ose
racilities where SN F is curre ntly stored (12,000 MW-Hrs/yr, as in the No Action A lternative) for an
int erim period less th a n ~ yea rs.

options:

Option A . All SNF exce pt defense productio n SNF would be sent to INEL.

•

Table 5. 19-3. Irretri evable co mmitment of material resources in th e Regio na lization 8 I optio n.
(I n add itio n to th ose listed for th e Decen traliza tion Altern ative)

Optio n 8 I - All SNF west o f the Mississippi River except Naval SNF wo uld be se nt to
Ha nfo rd.

Concrete. th o usand cubic me te rs/(cubic ya rd s)

54 (70)

Lumbe r. t ho usa nd cubic me te rs (boa rd fe et)

5 (2.000)

Op tio n 82 . All SNF west o f the Mississippi River a nd Naval SNF would be sent to
Hanford.

Electricity. megawatt hours per yea r

3.000

Diesel fuel. cubic mete rs (t ho usa nd ga llo ns)

1.900 (500)

Gasoline. cubic mete rs (th ousa nd gallo ns)

1.900 (500)

Optio n C . All Hanfo rd SNF would be se nt to INEL or NTS.
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Table 5 .1 9-4 . Irretr ievable commitment of material resources in the Reg io nalizati on B2 option.
(In addi tion to those listed fo r the Decentralization Alternat ive )
Concrete . thousand cub ic meters/(c ubi c ya rds)

120 (150)

Lumber. thousa nd cubic meters (boa rd feet)

10 (4.200)

Electricity. mega wall hours per yea r

3.000

Diesel fuel. cubic meters (thousand galions)

4.400 ( 1.200)

Gasoline . cubic meters (thousand galions)

4.400 (1.200)

Possible mitiga ti o n measures are generally th e sa me for a ll altern atives and are
summar ized by resou rce category below. No impacts on land use and aesthetic a nd scenic
resources were identified; therefore. mitigfltion measures would not be necessary.

5.20.1 POlluti on Prevention/Waste Minimization

The U.S. Depa rtm e nt of Energy is responding to Executive Order 12856 a nd associated
DOE orders and gui delines by reducing the use of toxic che micals; improvi ng emerge ncy

stored (max imum optio n). The increases in energy . materials. and personne l fo r both optio ns are
shown in T able 5 .19-5. If all the S NF were shipped to the Hanford Site. then the impacts would
be similar. although somewhat larger . than those of the Regionalization B options. If all the SNF

pla nning. response, and accident notification; and encouraging the development a nd u,e o f clea n
techn o logies a nd th e testi ng of innova tive pollution prevention tech nologies. Program
components include waste minimiza tio n. source reduction and recycli ng, a nd procureme nt

we re shipped offsite . then the impacts wou ld be identical to the s imilar Regionalizatio n B options.

practices th at prefere ntially procure products made from recycled materials. The pollutio n

If all SNF were shipped offsite. construction and operation of a fuel packaging faC ility wou ld be

preve nt ion program at the Hanford Site is for malized in a Hanford Site Waste Minimization

necessary before Shipments could be made to an offsi:e facility.

a nd Po llution Prevention Awareness Progra m Plan.

5.20 Potential Mitigation Measures

The SNF progra m activities would be co nducted in accord ance with this plan a nd
implement atio n o f th e poll ut ion prevention an d waste minimization pla ns would minimize the

This section summarizes possible mitigation measures that mi ght be considered to avoid or
reduce impacts to the environment as a result o f Hanford Site operations in support of SNF

ge ne ratio n of waste during SNF ma nage ment activities.

5.20.2 Socioeconom ics

management. These measures wou ld be rev iewed and revised as appropriate. depending o n the
specific ac tio ns to be taken at a facility. the level of impact. and other pertinent factors.

The level of predi cted employment for SNF activities at the Ha nford Site is not la rge
eno ugh in comparison with present H anford, local, or regional e mployment to produce a boom-

Table 5 .19-5 . Irrelfievable commitment of materials in the Centralization options .
Nc Fuel
Stored at the
Hanford Site

Item

bust impact on th e eco no my.

Ali Offsite Fuel Sto red
at the Hanford Site

5.20.3 Cultural (Archaeological, Historical, and Cultural) Resources

18 (23)

150 (200)

Lumber . thousand cubic meters (boa rd feet)

1.6 (660)

13 (5600)

Elec tri ci ty. megawall hours per yea r

0-20.000

100 · 127.000

640 (170)

5700 (1500)

Concrete. thousand cubic meters (cubic ya rds)

Diesel fuel. cubic meters (thousand ga lions)

.

To avo id loss of cultural resources during construction of SNF facili ti es on th e Ha nford
Site a cultural reso urces survey of th e area of interest wo uld be co nducted by PNL Cultural
Reso ~rces staff. Assumi ng no suc h resources were found , co nstructio n would proceed. If,

howeve r. d urin g co nstru cti on (earth movi ng) a ny cultural resource is discovered. construction
640 (170)

Gasoline . cubic meters (thousand galions)

5700 ( 1500)

activities wo uld be halted a nd th e PNL Cultural resources staff ca lled up o n to evaluate a nd
dete rmine th e ap propriate d isposi ti on of th e find .
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To avoid loss of cult ural resources during operation, such as unauthorized artifact

proposed SNF site. The presently proposed site at Hanford has been sut'/eyed and no currently

collection, workers could be educated through programs and briefing sessions to inform the m of

listed species were fo und. While not enda ngered, sta nds of Big Sagebrush habitat a re

applicable laws and regulations for site protection . These educational progra ms wo uld stress the

diminishing gene ra lly a nd Hanford wo uld expect to implement its habitat replace ment program

importa nce of preserving cultura l resources and specifics of the laws and regulations for site

to provide areas on at least a 2 to 1 basis to mitigate habitat loss. [n addition, areas disturbed

protection. The exact locat ion of cultural resources are not identified by the PNL Cultura l

wou ld, as appropriate, be seeded wit h native plant species.

Resources group; therefore, any such artifact collection would be in an a rea discovered by the

5.20.8 Noise

worker(s).

Ge neration of construction and operations noise would be reduced, as practicable, by

5.20.4 Geology

using equipme nt that complies wit h EPA noise guidelines (40 CFR Parts 201 -2 11 ). Construction
Soil loss wo uld be controlled during construction using standard dust suppression

wo rkers a nd other personnel working in environments exceecFng EPA·recomme nded guidelines

tech niques on disturbed soil a nd by stockpiling with cover where necessary. Following

during SNF storage construction or operation wo uld be provided with earmuffs or earplugs

construction, soil loss would be controlled by revegetation and relandscaping of di, tu rbed areas.

approved by the Occupat ional Safety and Health Admi nistration (29 CFR Part 1910). Because

Any so il that might become contaminated as a result of SNF ma nage ment activities could be

of the remote location of the Ha nford SNF activities, there would be no noise impacts with

remediated using methods appropriate to the type a nd extent of contamination.

respect to the public for which mitigation would be necessary.

5.20.5 Air Resources

5.20.9 Traffic and Transportation

To avoid impacts associa ted with e missions of fugitive dust during construct ion activit ies,

At sites wi th increasing traffic concerns, DOE could encourage use of high-occupa ncy

exposed soils would be treated using sta ndard dust suppression techniques. New facility sources

ve hicle, (such as vans or buses), implementing carpooling and ride·sha ring programs, and

of pollutant emissions to the at mosphere would be designed using best available technology to

staggering workhours to reduce peak traffic.

reduce emissions to as low as reaso nably achievable.
5.20.10 Occupational and Public Health and Safety

5.20.6 Water Resources
Alth ough no radiological impacts on workers or the public were evident from the
The impac ts to surface and grou ndwater sources could be mi nimized th rough recycling of

evaluation of routine SNF activities at Ha nford, furth er improvement in controls to protect

wate r, where feasible. a nd with c1ean·up of excess process water before release to grou nd or

both worke .. a nd the general public is a continuing act ivi ty. The as low as reasonably

surface water.

achievable (ALARA) principle wo uld be used for controlling rad iatio n exposure and exposure to

5.20.7 Ecology

emergency preparedness, a nd e mergency response programs in place to protect both workers

hazardous/ toxic substa nces. Hanfo rd would continue to refin e its curre nt emergency planning,

and the pUblic.
To avo id impaots to e nda ngered, candidate, or sta te·identified sensit ive species, preconst ru ction surveys would be completed to determine the presence of these species or their
habitat. Withi n six months of grou nd breaking. DOE would aga in consult with the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service to determi ne cu rre nt species listings and perfo rm a biological survey of the
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6. LIST OF PREPARERS

5.20.11 Site Utilities and Support Services

No mitigation measures beyond those identified for ground disturbance act ivities

Rosanne L. Aaberg, dose calculations. B.S. (Chemical Engineering) University of Washington.
Seventeen years of experience in dose calculations, and EIS preparation.

associated with bringing power and water to the SNF site would appear necessary. In those
cases use of sta ndard dust suppression techniques and revegetation of disturbed areas would
mitigate ground disturbance impacts.

John C. Abbott, affected environment and environmental impacts. B.A. (Geography) Southwest
Texas State University, M.S. (Conservation of Natural Resources) University of Texas at San
Antonio. Over seventeen yea rs of experience in the preparation of NEPA documents, ecological
risk assessment evaluations, regulatory compliance activities, and other program oversight
activities.

5.20.12 Accidents

The Hanford Site maintains an emergency response center and has emergency action
plans and equipment to respond to accidents and other emergencies. These plans include
training of workers, local emergency response agencies (such as fire departments) and the public
communication systems and protocols, readiness drills, and mutual aid agreements. The plans
would be updated to include consideration of new SNF facilities and activities. Design of new
facilities to current seismic and other facility protection standards would reduce the potential for
accidents, and implementation of emergency response plans would substantially mitigate the
potential for impacts in the event of an accident.

John M. Alvis, Jr., facility descriptions. B.S. (Nuclear Engineering) and M.S. (Nuclear
Engineering) Texas A&M University. Six years of experience in reviewing safety analyses,
licensing submittals, and contributing to the development of safety policies and guidance.
Assisted in the technical review of licensee documents for NRC.
Larry K. Berg, meteorology. B.S. (Meteorology) Pennsylvania State University. One year of
experience in analyzing air quality and air resource parameters.
Frances M. Berting, fuel inventories. BA (Physics) Oberlin College, MA (Physics) Smith
College, Ph.D. (Materials Science) University of Virginia. Characterization of high temperature
gas-cooled reactor spent fuel, characterization of N Reactor spent fuel, and experience with nondestructive and destructive examination of irradiated fuel elements. Prepared NRC annual
reports on fuel performance at commercial power plants and a report on commercial spent fuel
rerac king.
Charles A. Brandl, ecological characterization. B.S. (Zoology) Oregon State University, Ph.D.
(Zoology) Duke University. Over ten years of experience as a terrestrial ecologist involved in
ecological restoration, ecological risk and impact assessment, and conservation biology.
Extensive experience in preparation and analysis of NEPA-related documentation.
Mitchel E. Cunningham, spent nuclear fuel management. B.S. (Nuclear Engineering) and M.S.
(Nuclear Engineering) Oregon State University. Several years of experience in such projects as
the behavior of spent fuel during both inert and air dry storage, investigating in-reactor fission
gas release, and the development of integrated computer codes for predicting nuclear fuel rod
behavior.
Colbert E. Cushing, deputy project manager, ecological resources. B.S. (Fisheries Manage ment)
and M.S. (Limnology) Colorado State University, Ph.D. (Limnology) University of
Saskatchewan. Thirty-four years of experience in freshwater ecological research in streams and
radioecology, and over twenty years of experience in EIS preparation. Teach university classes
in strea m ecology and writing journal articles.
Phillip M. Daling, transportation impacts. B.S. (Physical Metallurgy) Washington State
University. Related experience includes performing transportation impact calculations for
various EIS and environmental assessments and in support of environmental documentation for
over ten years.
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James F. Donaghue. materials and waste management. B.S. (Civil Engineering) University of
Arkansas. J ,D, Golden Gate School of Law. Nine years of experience in environmental planning
compliance activities, Reviewed EISs and prepa red portions of EISs a~d e~vironm ~n tal
assessments for Air Force construction projects, Involved In the analysIs of alterna tIves and
writing for the DOE Environmental Restoration Programmatic EIS,

Ronald C. Phillips. geology and water resources. B.S. (Biology) Wheaton CoUege, M,S,
( Botany) Florida State University. Ph,D. (Botany) University of Washington. Wetlands
ecologist, including delineation and mitigation of freshwater wetlands. Several years of
experience in the preparation and review of categorical exclusion documents. review of
environmental assessments. a nd preparation of biologicaJ assessments,

Elizabeth A. Flores. materials and waste management. B.S, University of Connecticut. M,A,
(Environmental Studies) Yale University, Twelve years of experience in environmental
protection and waste ma nagement. Assistant Director for Connecticut Department of
Environmental Protection for RCRA program,

Kathleen Rhoads. air quality and accident analysis. B.S. (Microbiology) and M,S. (Radiological
Sciences) University of Washington, Nineteen years of experience in the anaJysis of risk
assess ment variables. estimation of radiation does foUowing routine or accidental release of
radionuclides to the environment. a nd evaluation of heaJth effects from energy production,

Stephen Gajewski, regulatory framework and requirements, B.A. (English) and B,A.
(Psychology) Gonzaga University, J.D. University of Washington. Over f~urteen years of
experience in geotechnical operations planning, land management a nd envIronmental regula tory
compliance. including quality assurance on commercial power reactor.s,. onshore an~ offshore oil
and gas exploration. industrial hygiene program development and trammg, a nd e nvIronmental
strategic planning.

Chikashl Sato, water quality and related consequences, B,S. (Chemical Engineering) Fukushima
National CoUege of Technology, M.S. (EnvironmentaJ Health Engineering) University of Kansas.
Ph.D, (Environmental Engineering) University of Iowa. Thirteen years of experience in
university teaching, application of the Multimedia EnvironmentaJ PoUutant Assessment System
(MEPAS), and performance of fate a nd transport anaJysis at waste sites.

Clifford S. Glantz, non·radiological air quality impacts, B.S, (Physics and Atmospheric Sciences)
State University of New York at AJbany, M.S, (Atmospheric Sciences) University of Washington,
Twelve years of experience in the a nalysis of non·radiological air quality impacts,

Dillard B. Shipler, Introduction and review, B.S, (Mathematics and Science) Southern Oregon
CoUege, M.s. (Physics) University of Wisconsin·Milwaukee, other studies at University of
Oregon. Oregon State University. Reed CoUege, University of Nevada, and University of
Washington. More than thirty years of experience in the planning and management of major
programs on regulatory compliance. radiologicaJ protection. environmental impact assessment.
radiological waste management, and environmentaJ safety and heaJth protection,

Richard J. Guenther aJternatives and facilities descriptions, B,S. (Engineering Physics), M,S,
(Nuclear Engineerin~), and Ph.D, (Nuclear Engineering) Oregon State University, Ov~r fifleen
years of experience testing and evaluating nuclear fuels to determme theIr charactenstlcs and
performance under reacto r operating conditions. wet and dry interim storage. and long·term
storage in a monitored retrievable or geologic storage environment.

Donna J. Stucky. socioeconomics, B,A. (Economics) Pacific Lutheran University, M,S,
(Agricultural Economics) Purdue University, Two years of experience in the compilation of
economic data relating to eastern Washington State,

George V. Last. cultural resources and land use. B,S. (Geology) Washington State Univer~ity ,
Eighteen years of experience in geological research and culturaJ resources studIes, ExtensIve
experience in preparation a nd review of NEPA·related documents,

Betty Tegner. editor. BA (English) University of Washington, MA (English) California
Polytechnical State Unive rsity, Previous experience in journalism and university teaching,
Five years of experience in technical editing.

John P. McDonald, water quality and rela ted consequences, A.A.S, (Computer, Science) ~ nd .
A.S, (Arts and Science) Columbia Basin CoUege. B.S, (Geology) Eastern Washington Umverslty,
Four years of experience in conceptual model development of groundwater flow systems ..
coUection of hydraulic head data, and determination of groundwater flow rate and dIrectIon.
hydraulic testing to determine aquifer properties. testing and mainten?nce of the wate~borne
portion of a multiple environmental media computer model, and appltcatlon of numencal and
analytic computer models to environmental problems
Emmett Moore, project manager. B,S, (Chemistry) Washington State University. Ph,D, (Physical
Chemistry) University of Minnesota, Twenty years of experience in environmental regulation,
.
participat ion in a nd ma nage ment of the preparation of environmental permits and
docume ntation (NEPA), University professor of physics, chemistry, and envlfo nme ntal SCIences,

Gene Whelan. water quality and related consequences. B.S. (Civil Engineering) Pennsylvania
State University, M,S, (Mechanics a nd Hydraulics) University of Iowa, Ph,D, (Civil and
Environmental Engineering) Utah State University, Seventeen years of experience in
multimedia contaminant environ mental exposure assessments.

Mona K. Wright, cultural resources and land use, B.A. (Anthropology) Eastern Oregon State
CoUege. M.A. (Anthropology) Washington State University, Fifteen years experience in cultural
resource management. Federal regulations including the National Historic Preservation Act. the
NEPA, Executive Order 11593, the Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979. a nd the
Native American Grave Protection and Repatriation Act. and historic and prehistoric site
identification and recording.

lral C. Nelson. deputy project manage r. environmental consequences. B,S. (Mathematics)
University of Oregon. M.A, (Physics) University of Oregon. diplomate, American Board of
Health Physics. Thirty·eight years of experience in various aspects of health physics (radiation
protection) and twenty yea rs of experience in conducting NEPA reviews and preparing NEPA
documentation .

VOLUME 1. APPENDIX A. APRIL 1995

6·2

31'7

6·3

VOLUME I, APPE1\'D1X A, APRJL 1995

7. REFERENCES

Chatters. 1. C .. H . A. Gard . M. K. Wright. M . E. Crist . J . G . Longenecker. T . K. O ' Neil. and
M. V. Dawso n. 1993. Hallford Cultural Resources Laboratory Annual Reportfor Fiscal Year 1992.
Hanford Site, Washin gton , PNL·8676. Pacific Northwest Laboratory . Ri chl and. Washi ngton .

Ame ri can Cancer Society . 1993. Callcer Facts alld Figures ·· 1993. American Cancer Society . Inc . .
Atlanta . Georgia .
Beck. D. M .. M . J . Scott. M. D. Davis. S. F . Shindle . B. A. Napie r. A. G. Thurman. D. B.
Pittenger. and N. C . Batishko. 1991. Hallford Area 1990 Populatioll alld 50· Year Projectiolls.
PNL·7803. Pacific Northwest Laboratory . Richl and. Washington.
Bergsman . K . H .. 1994. Hanford Spent Fuellll vemory Baselille . WHC·SD·SNF·TI·OOL Rev . O.
Westinghouse Hanford Company. Richland . Washington.
Bergsman . K . H .. 1995 . Preliminary Hallford Techllical illput for the Departmem of Ellergy
Programmatic Spem Nuclear Fuel Mallagemem alld Idaho National Ellgilleering Laboratory

Environmental Restoration and Waste Managemelll Programs Environmental Impact Statement,
WHC·Ep·0848 . Rev . O. Westinghouse Hanford Company. Ric hla nd . Washington.
Campbell. N. P .. 1989. Struclllral alld Stratigraphic Imerpreration of Rocks Under the Yakima Fold
Belt. Columbia Basill , Based 011 Recent Surface Mapping and Well Data . Special Paper 239,
Geulogical Society of America , Boulder. Colorado.

Cooney. F. M .. D. B. Howe. and L. J . Voight. 1988. Westinghouse Hanford Compan)' Eff/uem
Releases and Solid Waste Mallagemem Reportfor 1987: 2001600111 00 Areas . WHC·Ep·0141.
Westinghouse Hanford Company . Ri chland . Washington .
Cushing. C. E .. (ed .). 1994. Hanford Site National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
Characteri:arioll. PNL·6415. Rev . 6. Pacific Northwes t Laboratory . Richland . Washington.
Cushing. C. E .. and E. G. Wolf. 1984 . "Primary Production in Rattlesnake Springs. a Cold Desert
Spring·St ream." H)'drobiologia. 113 :229·236 .
Dauble. D. D .. and D. G. Watson. 1990. Spawllillg alld Abundallce of Fall Chinook Salmoll
(OncorhYllchus tshawytscha) in th e Hanford Reach of the Columbia River. 1948· 1988. PNL·7289.
Pacific Northwest Laboratory. Richland. Washington .
Daugherty. R. D .. 1952. "Archaeological Investigations of O'Sullivan Rese rvoi r. Grant County.
Washington." Americall Amiquiry 17 :274·278 .

Center fo r Population Research and Census. 1993. Provisional Projections of the Population of
Oregon and its Coumies 1990·2010. Center for Population Research and Census. School of Urban
and Public Affai rs. Portl and State University . Portland. Oregon.

Davis. J . D .. D. B. Barnett. L. C . Swanson. W. 1. McMahon. and C. D. Palomares . 1993. Site
Characteri:ation Report: Results of Detailed Evaluation of the Suitability of the Site Proposed for
Disposal of 200 Areas Treated Eff/uem . WHC·SD·EN·SE·OO4. Westinghouse Hanford Company.
Richland. Washington.

Chatters . J . C .. 1982 . "Prehistoric Settlement and Land Use in the Dry Columbia Basin." Northwest
Amhropol. Res . Notes 16: 125·147.

Den Beste. K .. and L. Den Beste. 1976. Background and History of the Vemita Site. Annual Report
fo r 1974 of the Mid·Columbia Archaeological Society. Richland. Washington .

Chatters . J . C . (ed .) . 1989. Hallford Cultural Resources Managemem Plall . PNL·6942. Pacific
Northwest Laboratory. Richland. Washington .

Department of Human Resources. 1990. 1990 Oregon COI'ered Emplo)'mem and Payrolls by Industrv
and Coumy. Department of Human Reso urces. Employment Division. State of Oregon. Salem.
O regon.

Chatters. J . C .. and N. A. Cadoret. 1990. Archeological Survey of the 200·East and 200·West
Areas. Hallford Site, Washillgtoll. PNL·7264. Pacific Northwest Laboratory . Richland . Washington .
Chatters. J . C .. and H. A. Ga rd. 1992. Hallford Cultural Resources Laboratory AmllIal Reportfor
Fiscal Year 1991 . PNL·8101. Pacific Northwest Laboratory . Richland. Washington.
Chatters. J . C .. N. A. Cadoret. and P. E. Minthorn. 1990. Hallford Cultural Resources Laboratory
Allllual Reportfor Fiscal Year 1989. PNL·7362. Pacific Northwest Laboratory . Richland .
Washingto n.
Chatters . J . C .. H. A. Gard. and P . E. Minthorn . 1991. Hanford Cullllral Resources Laboratory
Allllual Reportfor Fiscal Year 1990, Hallford Site, Washingtoll, PNL·7853 . Pacific Nort hwest
Laboratory . Richland. Washington.
Chatters. J . C .. H. A. Gard . and P. E. Minthorn. 1992. Fiscal Year 1991 Report 011 Archaeological
Surveys of th e 100 Areas, Hallford Site. Washillgtoll. PNL·8 143. Pacific Northwest Laboratory.
Ri chland . Washington.

7· 1

31q

VOLUME I. APPENDIX A. APRIL 1995

Diedikie r. L. P.. B. L. Cum . K . Rhoads. E. G. Damberg. J . K . Soldat. and S. J . Jette. 1994.
Radiolluclide Air Emissiolls Report for the Hallford Site Calelldar Year 1993, DOEIRL·94·5 1.
U.S . Department of Energy. Richland Operations Office. Richland . Washington .
Dirkes. R. L .. R. W. Hanf. R. K. Woodruff. and R. E. Lundgren (eds .). 1994. Hanford Site
ElIl'irollmemal Reportfor Calendar Year 1993 . PNL·9823. Pacific Northwest Labo rato ry. Richland .
Washington .
DOE (U .S. Departl1lelll of Energy). 1982. Operatioll of PUREX and Uranium o.ride Plam Facilities.
Hanford Site. Rich/alld. Washillgtoll. DOE/ EIS·0089D . U.S. Department of Energy. Richland.
Washington .
DOE (U .S . Department of Ene rgy). 1986a. EI/I'irollmemal Assessmem. Reference Repository
Locatioll. Hallford Site. Wa shingtoll. DOE/RW·0070. Vol. I of 3. U.S. Department of Energy.
Washington. D.C .

VO L L'~1 E

I . APPEN DIX A . APRIL

1~}5

7·2

DOE (U .5 . Departmem of Energy). 1986b. Draft EIII'ironmelllallmpact Statemelll. Process Facility
Modifications. Project Hanlord Site. Richland. Washington. DOE/ E!S-0115D. Ap ril 1986. U.S .
Departmem of Energy . Washington. D. C.

DOE (U.S . Depart ment of Energy). 1993c. U.S. Department 01 Energy Interim Mixed Waste
IIII'elllor" Report: Waste Streams. Treatmelll Capacities and Technologies. DOE/ NBM-IIOO . April.
U.S. Departmem of Energy. Washington D.C.

DOE (U .S. Departmem of Energy>. 1987. Enviroll melllalimpact Statemelll. Disposal 01 Halliord
High-LeI'el alld TrallSllrallir alld Tallk Wastes. Hanlord Site. Richlalld. Washingtoll. DOE/ EIS-0 11 3.
Vol. 1-3. U.S. Depa rtlll em of Energy. WashinglOn. D.C.

DOE (U.S . Depa rtment of Energy). 1993d. EnvironmellIal Restoration and Waste Managemelll
Fiscal Year 1993 Site-Specific Plan f or the Richlalld Field Office. DOE/ RL-92-27. U.S. Department
of Energy . Ri chland Operations Office. Richland. Washington .

DOE (U .S. Depa rtm em of Energy). 1988. Consllitation Draft: Site Characterization Plan.
Referellce Repository Location. Halliord Site. Washingtoll . Vol. I of 9. DOE/RW -OI64. U.S.
Departme m of Energy . WashinglOn. D.C.

DOE (U .S. Department of Energy). 1994a. Plan 01 Action to Resolve Spelll Nllclear Fllel
Vllinerabilities. Phase I . Vol. 2. U.S . Department of Energy . WashinglO n. D.C .. February.

DOE (U .S. Depart mem of Energy). 1989. Decommissiolling 01 Eight SlI rpllls Prodllction Reactors at
th e Hanlord Site. Richlalld. Washington . Draf! Environmemal Impact Statemem .
DOE/ EIS-0 11 9 D. PNL-6756. March. U.S. Departmem of Energy. Washington . D.C .

01 Foreign Research Reactor Spelll Nllclear Fllel. DOE/ EA-0912.

DOE (U.S. Depa rtmem of Energy). 1991 . ElIl'irollmelllal Restoratioll alld Waste Managemelll SiteSpecific Plan lor the Richlalld Operatiolls Office. DOE/RL-91 -25. U.S. Departmem of Energy.
Richl and Operations Office. Richland . Washington .
DOE (U.S . Departmem of Energy). 1992a. Characteristics 01 Potelllial Repositorv Wastes .
Volume 2. DOE/RS-0184-R I . U.S. Departmem o f Energy. WashinglO n. D.C .
DOE (U.S . Departmem of Energy). 1992b. Revised En vironmental Assessmelll. Transportation.
Receipt. and Storage 01 Fort St. Vrain Spelll Fllel at the Irradiated Fllel Storage Facility at th e Idaho
Chemical Processillg Plalll. Idaho National Ellgineering Laboratory. DOE/ EA-0742 (Table 5-4).
Office of Nuc lear Energy. U.S. Department of Energy. Washington. D.C.
DOE (U .S. Department of Energ y). 1992c. Emergency Response Plan for U.S. Departmelll 01
Ellergy. Richland Field Office . prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy by Pac ific Northwest
Labo ralOry. Richland. Washington .
DO E (U .S. Department of Energy). I 992d. Integrated Data Baselor 1992: U.S. Spelll Fllel and
Radioacti ve Waste Invelllories. Projections. and Characteristics. DOE/RW-0006. Rev. 8. U.S.
Department of Energy . Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Oak Ridge . Tennessee.
DOE (U.S. Department of Energy). 1993a . Spelll Fllel Working Grollp Report on Ill velllor)' and
Storage 01 the Departmelll's Spelll Nllclear Fllel and Oth er Reactor Irradiated Nllclear Materials alld
Their En vironmelllal Salety and Health Vllillerabilities. U.S. Department of Energy. Was hinglOn
D.C. (Nove mber). Vo l. I (Summary) and Volume 3 (Site Team ReportS).
DOE (U .S. Department of Energy). 1993b. ImplemellIation Plan lor the Departmelll 01 Energy.
Programmatic Spem Nuclear Fuel Management and Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
En virollmelllal Restoration alld Was te Managemelll Programs Envirollmenral lmpact Statemflll.
U.S. Department of Energy. Idaho Operations Office . Idaho Falls . Idaho.

DOE (U.S . Department of Energy) . 1994b. EnvironmellIal Assessmelll 01 Urgelll-Reliel Acceptance
U.S. Department of Energy.
WashinglOn . DC.
DOE (U.S . Department o f Energy). 1994c. Natural Phenomella Hazards Design and Evaillation
Criteria lor Departmelll 01 Energ), Facilities. DOE-STD-I020-94 . U.S. Department of Energy.
Washington. D .C.
DOE/ RL (U .S. Departmem of Energy. Richland Operations Office) . 1993 . Radiollllclide Air
Emissions Reportlor rh e Hanford Site. Calendar Year 1992. DOE/RL-93-36. U.S. Department of
Energy. Ri chland Operations Office . Richland . WashinglOn.
DOE /RL (U.S. Department of Ene rgy. Richland Operations Office). 1994. Bald Eagle Site
Mallagemelll Plan lor the Hanford Site. SOlllh-Celllral Washillgton . DOE/RL-94-150. Rev . O. U.S.
Department of Energy. Richl and. WashinglOn.
Drucker. P .. 1948. Appraisal 01 the Archaeological Resollrces 01 the McNary Reservoir.
Oregon- Washington. report on file. Columbia Basin Projec t. River Bas in Survey. Smithsonian
Institution . WashinglO n. D.C.
Ebe rh ardt. L. E .. 1. E. Hedlund . and W . H. Ricka rd . 1979. Tagging Stlldies
the Hanlord Site. Pacific Northwes t Laboratory. Richl and . Washington.

01 Mille Deer Fawns on

Ebe rhardt. L. E .. E. E. Hanson . and L. L. Cadwell. 1982 . Analysis 01 Radionlle/ide COllcelllratiolls
alld Movemelll PalleTIIS 01 Hanlord Site Mille Deer. PNL-4420. Pacific Northwest Laboratory.
Richland. WashinglOn .
Ebe rh ardt. L. E .. E. E. Hanso n. and L. L. Cadwell . 1984 . "Movement and Activity Pauerns of
Mu le Deer in the Sagebrush-Steppe Reg ion." J . Mammal .. 65(3):404-409.
Emery. R. M. and M. C. McShane . 1980. "Nuclear Waste Ponds and St reams on the Hanford Site :
An Ecological Sea rch for Radiation Effects." Health Phys. 38:787-809 .
EPA (U .S. Envi ronmental Protec tion Agency). 1977. Office of Air and Waste Management.
Compilatioll 01 Air Polllllalll Emissioll Factors. Office of Ai r and Waste Managemem. Research
Triangle Park. North Carolina .
EPA (U.S. Envi ronmental Protection Agency). 1988 . Gap Fillillg PM IO Emissioll Factorslor
Selected Opell Area Dllst SOllrces. EPA-450/4-88-003. U.S. Environmemal Protection Agency .
Resea rch Triangle Park. North Carolina .

7-3

VOLU~1 E

I. APPENDIX A. APRIL IQQ5

VOLUME I. APPENDIX A. APR IL 1995

7-4

EPA (U .S. Environmental Protection Agency). 1992. User's Guide for the Industrial Source
Complex (ISC2) Dispersion Models Volume I-- User Instructions. EPA-450/4-92-008a. Office of Air
Quality Planning and Standards . Technical Support Division . Research Triangle Park. North
Carolina .
ERDA (U .S. Energy Research and Development Administration). 1975. Final En vironmental
Statement of Waste Management Operations. Hanford Reservation. Richland. Washington. 2 vols .
ERDA- 1538. U .S. Energy Research and Development Administration, Washington, D .C .
ERDA (U .S. Energy Research and Development Administration), 1976. Evaluation of Impact of
Potential Flooding Criteria 011 the Hanford Project. RLO-76-4 . U .S. Energy Research and
Development Administration . Richland , Washington .
Ertec Northwest. Inc .. 1981. A Culrural Resources Overview and Scenic and Natural Resources
Assessment for the Skagit-Hanford Nuclear Power Project. Ertec Northwest. Inc .. Seattle ,
Washington .
Ertec Northwest , Inc ., 1982, Cultural Resources Survey and Exploratory Exca vations for the
Skagit-Hallford Nuclear Power Project, Ertec Northwest, Inc ., Seattle, Washington .
Fitzner, R. E .. and R. H . Gray, 1991. "The Status . Distribution, and Ecology of Wildlife on the
U.S. DOE Hanford Site : A Historical Overview of Research Activities , " En viron. Monit . Assess.
18 : 173-202 .
Fulton . J . c.. 1994. Hanford Spent Nuclear Fuel Project. Recommended Path Fonl·ard.
WHC-EP-0830. Rev O. Westinghouse Hanford Company. Richland. Washington .
Gaines , W . E .. 1987, Secondary Production of Benthic IlISects in Three Cold Desert Streams .
PNL-6286. Pacific Northwest Laboratory. Richland , Washington .
Gantt. D . A .. 1989. Fuel Storage Facility Final Safety Analysis Report. WHC-EP-0132.
Westinghouse Hanford Company. Richland , Washington .
Geomatrix Consultants. Inc .. 1993. Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis Doe Hanford Site,
Washington. WHC-SD-W236A-TI-002. Rev O. Prepared by Geomatrix Consultants. Inc .. for
Westinghouse Hanford Company. Richland. Washington .
Gilbert. E . S .. E . Omohundro . J . A . Buchanan. and N . A . Ho lter . 1993. "Mortality of Workers at
the Hanford Site : 1954- 1986. " Health Physics 64 :577-590 .
Glantz. C . S. , and M . M . Islam. 1988 , The Data Collection Component of the Hanford
Meteorology Monitoring Program. PNL-6684 . Pacific Northwest Laboratory . Richland . Washington .
Glantz, C . S .• and P . J. Perrault , 1991. Climatological Summa ry of the 300 Area for the 300-FF- J
Operable Unit Remedialln vestigatioll. WHC-SD-EN -TI-005 . Wes tinghouse Hanford Company.
Richland, Washington .
Glantz. C . S .. M . N . Schwartz. K. W . Burk. R. B. Kasper. M . W . Ligotke. P. J. Perrault , 1990.
Climatological Summary of Wind and Temperature Data for the Hanford Meteorology Monitorin g
Network. PNL-7471. Pacific Northwest Laboratory . Richland . Washington.
7-5

VOLUME 1. APPENDIX A. APRIL 1995

Graham. M . 1.. M . D. Hall . S . R . Stra it. and W . R . Brown . 198 1. Hydrology of the Separatiolls
Area. RHO-ST-42 . Rock we ll Ha nford Operati o.". Ri chland . Was hington.

Kl eppe r. E. L .. L. E. Roge rs. J . D. Hedlund. a nd R . G . Schreckhise. 1979 . Radioacti vity
Associmed I\'ith Biota and Soils of th e 2 16-A-24 Crib . PNL- 1948. Pacific North west Laboratory.
Ric hlanu . Was hington.

Gray. R. H .. and D. D. Dauble . 1977 . "Checklist and Re lative Abund ance of Fish Species from the
Hanfo rd Re ac h of the Colum bia Ri ve r." Northwest Sci. 5 1:208-2 15 .
Greene . G . S . 1975 . Prehistoric Utili:atioll of the Challll eled Scablallds of Eastern Washillgtoll .
Ph .D. Disse rt ati on. Depa rtm ent of Anth ropo logy . Wash ingto n State University. Pullman .
Washi ngton .

Kri ege r . H. W .. 1928. "A Prehistori c Pithouse Village Site at Wahluke. Grant Co unty .
Was hingto n." Proc. U.S. Natl. MilS. 73 : 1-29 .
Lande en . D. S .. A. R. Johnson . a nd R. M . Mitche ll. 1992 . SWillS of Birds at th e Hallford Site ill
Southeastern Washingtoll . WHC- EP-0402 . Rev . I. Westinghouse Hanford Company . Richl and .
Was hington .

Greengo. R. E .. 1982. SlIIdies ill Prehistory: Priest Rapids and Wanapllm Reservoir Areas.
Coillmbia Ril'er, Washingtoll . Department of Al1lhropology. University of Washington. Seanl e.
Washington.
Had ley. D . L .. 199 1. Air Qllality Impact Analysis in SIIPPOrt oft/re New Prodllctioll Reactor
En vironmemallmpact Statemem . PNL-7682 . UC -630 . Pacific Northwe st Laboratory. Ri chland .
Washingto n.
Hajek. B. F .. 1966 . Soil SlIrvey: Hanford Proj ect in Benton COllllty. Washillgton. BNWL-243 .
Pacific Northwest Laboratory . Ri chl and. Washington .

Lansing. K. A .. T . L. Aldridge . D . S. Cunningham . D. A. Hammond. J . E. Lindsey.
J . L. Newco mb . I. L. Sc rimsh er . and J , J . Severud . 1992 . Westinghollse Hanford Company Health
alld Safery Report, /99/ . WHC-SP-0564-24 . Westinghouse Hanford C ompany . Richland .
Was hingto n.
Leo nha rdy. F . C .. and D. G . Rice . 1970 . "A Proposed Culture Typology for the Lower Snake Rive r
Reg ion. So utheastern Washington. " Northwest Allthropol. Res. Notes 4 : 1-29 .
McC orquodale. S. M .. L. E . Eberhardt. and G . A . Sargeant. 1989 . "Antl er Characteristics in a
Coloniz ing I::l k Population . " J Wildl. Mallage. 53(3): 618-621 .

Hal e. D .. 1994 . Imem al Technical Report - Description of a Generic Spem Nllciear Fllel

Infrastrllctllre fo r the Programmatic En vir01l1.remallmpactStatement.EGG-WM-11230 . EG&G
Idaho. Inc .. Id aho. Ma rch 10 .

Monthey. M . J .. 1993 . Engineerillg SlIIdy of the Trallsf er of Irradiated Fll els all th e Hallfo rd Sire.
WH C-S D-TP-ES-OO I. Rev . O. Westinghouse Hanford Company. Richl and . Washington .

Ha le. D .. a nd E. Reutzel. 1993 . SlImmary Engineering Description Dry Storage Facility f or Foreign
Research Reactor Spem Nllciea r File! . B430-93-076. EG&G Id aho. Idaho Fa lls. Idaho.

Morga n. V .. 198 1. Archaeological Recollllaissan ce of the North Richland Toll Bridge alld Associated
Access Roads (L6909) . Archaeological and Historical Services. Easte cn Washington Univers ity.
Che ney. Washington .

Hickey. E. E .. G . A . Stoe tzo l. P. C . Olse n. and S . A. McGuire. 1991. Air Samplillg ill th e
Workplace (Draft Report). NU REG - 1400. U.S. Nuclea r Regulatory Commission. Washington D .C.

Was hington.

Mye rs. C. W .. S. M . Price . J . A. Cagg iano, M . P . Cochran. W . J . Cz ime r, N . J. Davidso n.
R. C. Edwa rds. K. R . Fecht . G . E. Holmes . M . G . Jones . J . R . Kunk . R . D. Landon .
R . K. Ledge rwood . J. T . Lill ie. P. E. Long. T . H . Mitchell. E. H . Price. S . P. Re ide l. and
M . Ta llman. 1979 . Geologic SlIIdies of the Coillmbia Plateall Starlls Report . RHO-BWI-ST-4.
Rockwell Hanfo rd Operations. Ric hland. Washington .

Holloman. W . D .. a nd C . M . M ~tzko . 1993 . Westinghollse Hanford CompallY Performallce
Indicators December 1992. WHC -SP-0440-51 . Westinghouse Hanford Company . Richland .

Napie r. B. A .. 1982. A Method f or Determillillg "A llowable Residllal Comamillatioll Levels" of
Radiollllciide MixlUres ill Soil. PNL-3852 . Pacific Northwest Laboratory. Ri chl a nd . Was hington .

Holl oma n. W . D .. and C. M . Motzko. 1992. Westillghollse Hanford Company Performan ce
Indicators December 1991. WH C-SP-0440-39 . Westinghouse Hanford Company. Richl and .

Washington .
Homann Assoc ia tes Incorpo rated. 1988. EPI Code. Homann Associates Incorporated . Fremont ,
Ca lifo rnia .
IC RP (Inte rnati ona l Commission on Radiological Protecti on). 1991 . 1990 Recommelldatiolls of the
Intem atiollal Commissioll all Radiological Protectioll . ICRP Publication 60. Pergamon Press.

Napie r. B. A .. R. A. Pe loquin. D. L. Strenge. and J . V . Ramsdell. 1988. GENII -Th e Hanfo rd
Ell virollmelltal Radiatioll Dosimetry Software S),stem , PNL-6584. Vo ls . 1-3. Pac ific North wes t
Labo ratory . Richl and . Washington .
Neuhauser. K. S .. a nd F. L. Kanipe. 1992. RADTRA N 4: Voillme 3 User's Gllide. SAND89-2370.
Sand ia Nati ona l Laboratories. Albuq ue rque. New Mex ico.

Elmfo rd. Ne w Yo rk.
Jac kson. R. R .. and G . L. Hanso n. 1978. PWR Core 2 Proj ect Acridem Allalysis. RHO-CD-296.
Roc kwell Hanford Ope rations. Richl and. Washington .
Jaqui sh R .. and R. Bryce (eds .). 1990. Hanford Site En vironmental Reportfor Calendar Yea r 1989,
PNL-7346 . Pacific No rth west Laborato ry . Ric hland . Washington .
\' O L C~f E

I . AP PE:"'OIX ,\ , APR IL 1995

7-6

Newcomb . R . C .. J. R. St ra nd. and F. J. Fra nk. 1972. Geology and Grollnd-Warer Characteristics
of th e Hallford Resermtioll of the U.S. Atomic Ell ergy Commission. Washillgton. Pro fe ssiona l Pape r
7 17. U.S . Geological Survey . Was hington. D .C.
North west Powe r Pla nning Counc il. 1986 . North west Ellergy News. April / May 1986. Vol. 5 . No . 3.
Port la nd . Orego n.
7-7

\' O L U ~'f E

I. APPEND IX A. APRIL

1 Q9~

NRC (U.S . Nuclear Regul ato ry Commission). 1980. Proposed Revisioll I to Regulatory 1.23.
Meteorological Programs ill Support of Nuclear Power Plants. Washington. D.C.
NRC (U .S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 1982. Draft Ellvirollmelltal Statemem Related to the
COllstruction of Skagit/Hallford Nuclear Project. Ullits I alld 2. Prepared by Puget Sound Power &
Light Company. Pacific Power and Light Company. the Washington Water Power Company . and
Portland General Electric Company. NUREG-0894. U.S . Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Washington. D.C.
Office of the Secretary of State. 1991. 1991 -92 Oregoll Blue Book. Office of the Secretary of State.
State of Oregon. Salem. Oregon.
Office of the Secretary of State . 1993 . 1993 Washillgtoll State Yearbook : A Guide to Govefllmem ill
the Evergreell State. Richard and Chanty Yates . eds .. Office of the Governor and the Office of the
Secretary of State. State of Washington. Olympia. Washington .
PNL (Pacific Northwest Laboratory). 1991. Air Pathway Report . PNL-7412 . HEDR . Rev . I . Pacific
Northwest Laboratory. Richland . Washington .
PNL (Pacific Northwest Laboratory) . 1992a. Safety Analysis Report for 324 Buildillg Waste
Technology. Engineering Laboratory. PNL-7989. Pacific Northwest Laboratory. Richland.
. Washington .
PNL (Pacific Northwest Laboratory). 1992b. Safety Analysis Reportfor 325 Building . PNL-7748.
Pacific Northwest Laboratory. Richland Washington .
Poole . L. D. 1992. Reproductive Success and Nestillg Habitat of Loggerhead Shrikes in Shrubsteppe
Communities. M.S. Thesis. Oregon State University. Corvallis. Oregon .
Relander. C .. 1956. Drummers and Dreamers . Caxton p,.inters. Caldwell . Idaho.
Ri ce. D. G .. 1984. Archaeologicallnvelllory of the Basalt Waste Isolation Project, Hanford
Reservation. Washington. SD-BWI-TA-006. Rockwe ll Hanford Operations. Richland . Washington.
Rice. D. G .. 1968a. Archaeological Reco:maissance: Ben Frallklill Reservoir Area, 1968.
Washi ngton State University. Laborato ry of Anthropology. Pullman . Washington .
Rice. D. G .. 1968b. Archaeological Reconllaissance: Hanford Atomic Works , U.S. Atomic Energy
Commission. National Park Service and Wa, hington State University. Pullman. Washington .
Ri ce. D. G .. 1987. Archaeological Renaissance of Gable Blllte alld Gable Moulllaill on the Hallford
Site. Wa shington. Westinghouse Hanford Company. Richland. Washington .
Rice. D. G .. 1980. Overview of Cultural Resources all the Hanford Reservation ill SOlllh Celllral
Washillgton State. repo rt submitted to U.S . Department of Energy . Richland Operations. Richland.
Washing lon.
Ri ce. D. G . . 198 1. Archaeological Transects Through Imerior Dunes on the Hanford Reservation ,
Washington. U.S. Department of Energy. Richl and . Washington .

VOLC~'! E I. APPE:"OIX 11.. APRIL 1995

7-8

Rickard. W. H .. and L. E. Rogers. 1983. "Industrial Land Use and the Conservation of Native BiOla
in the Shrub-Steppe Region of Western North America ." Ellviron . ConserI' . 10 :205-211.
Rickard. W. H .. and D. G . Watson. 1985 . "Four Decades of Environmental Change and Their
Influences Upon Native Wildlife and Fish on the Mid-Columbia River. Washington . U.S.A ....
Ellviron . COllsen ·. 12 :241 -238.
Rogers . L. E .. and W. H. Rickard. 1977. Ecology of the 200 Area Plateau Waste Managemelll
Ellvirons: A Status Report. PNL-2253. Pacific Northwest Laboratory. Richland. Washington .
Rohay. A. C. 1987. Earthquake Focal Mechanisms. Recurrence Rates alld Deformation in the
Columbia River Basalts. RHO-BW-SA-666 P. Rockwell Hanford Operations. Richland. Washington .
Rohay. A. C .. 1989. Earthquake Recurrence Rate Estimates for Eastefll Washington and th e
Hanford Site. PNL-6956. Pacific Northwest Laboratory. Richland. Washington.
Sackschewsky. M . R .. D. S. Landeen. G . I. Baird , W. H. Rickard , and J . L. Downs. 1992.
Vascular Plallls of the Hanford Site . WHC-EP-0554. Westinghouse Hanford Company. Richland .
Washington .
Saito . G. H .. 1992, Retrievable Storage of Irradiated Fuels ill the Solid Waste Burial Groullds .
WHC-SD-WM-SAR-D47 . Rev . O. Westinghouse Hanford Company. Richland. Washington.
Saricks . C, and T . Kvitek . 1991 , Trends in State-Level Accidelll Rates: All Enhancemelll of Risk
Factor Developmelll for RADTRAN. unpublished report submitted to Reactor Technology and
Transportation Division. U.S. Department of Energy , Chicago Operations Office , Argonne. Illinois.
Schramke. J. A .. 1993. Hanford Hydrologic Data for th e PElS. Pacific Northwest Labora to ry.
Richland . Washington.
Schreckhise . R. G . K. Rhoads. J . S. Davis. B. A. Napier. and J . V. Ramsdell . 1993 . Recommended
Environmemal Dose Calculation Methods and Hanford-Specific Parameters, PNL-3777 . Rev. 2.
Pacific Northwest Laboratory. Richland , Washington.
Scott. M. J. , D. B. Belzer. R. J. Nesse. R . W. Schultz. P. A. Stokowski. and D. C . Clark. 1987.
The Economic and Community Impacts of Closing Hanford 's N Reactor alld Nucleur Materials
Production Facilities. PNL-6295. Pacific Northwest Laboratory . Richland. Washington .
Scott. M. J .. D. B. Belzer. S. J . Marsh. D. M. Beck. R. W. Schultz. and S. "' . Harkreader. 1989 .
Hanford and the Tri-Cities Economy: Review alld Ollllook. March 1989. PNL-6813. Pacific
Northwest Laboratory, Richland. Washington .
Schramke . 1. A .. C. S. Glantz. G. R. Holdren . 1994. Hanford Site Envirollmemal
Sellillg Data Developed for th e Unit Risk Factor Methodology in Support of the
Programmatic En vironmemallmpact Statemem (PElS). PNL-9801. Pacific
Northwest Laboratory. Richland. Washington .
Seinfeld. J. H .. 1986. Atmospheric Chemistry alld Physics of Air Pol/Ulioll. John Wiley and Sons.
Inc .. New York .

7-9

VOLUME I. APPENDIX A, APRIL 1995

Serne. R. J .. and M . I. Wood. 1990. Hallford Waste· Form P.elease alld Sedimelll lllleracrion: A
Statlls Report with Rariollale alld Recommelldatiolls fo r Additiollal Sflldi es . PNL·7297. Paci fi c
Northw<s t Laborato ry. Ri chl and . Washington.
Skaggs. R. L.. and W . H. Wahers. 1981. Flood Risk Allalysis of Cold Creek Near th e Hallford Sire.
RHO· BWI·C· I 20/PNL-42 19. Rockwell Hanford Operations. Richland . Washingto n.
Smith . R. M .. 1980 . 216·B·5 Rnerse Well Characteri~atioll Sflldy. RHO·ST· 37 . Roc kwell Hanford
Operati ons . Richland . WashinglOn.
Smith . M. H .. P. A. Eschbach. R. Harty . W . H. Mille!. and V. A. Scholes. 1992. Twell,,··Secolld
Allllllal Report. Radiatioll Exposures f or DOE alld DOE COlllra ctor Employees· 1989.
DOE/EH. 0286P. Pacific No rthwest LaboralOry. Richl and . WashinglOn .
Smith . W . c. . M . L. Uebelacker. T . E. Ecken. and L. J. Nickel. 1977 . An Archaeological
Historical SlIrvey of the Proposed Tran smission Power Line Corridor from Ashe SlIbstation.
Washingtoll to Pebble Springs Substation . Oregon . WashinglOn Archaeological Research Cemer
Project Repon 42 . WashinglOn State University. Pullman. Washington.
Soldat . J . K. K. L. Swimh. and H. J . Peuengill . 1994. Historial Developmelll of Radiation Dose
Calculations f or th e Public ill the Vicinity of Nuclear Sires in the United States. PNL·SA· 24: I';.
Pacific North west Laboratory . Ri chland . WashinglOn .
Spier. L. . 1936 . Tribal Distril' lItioll in Washington . General Series in Amhropo logy No. 3. Geo rge
Bama Publishing Co .. Men"ha . Wisco nsi n.
SlOne. W . A .. J . 1vI . Thorp . O . P. Gifford . and D. J . Hoitink . 1983 . C1imarological Summary f or the
Hanford Area. PNL·4622 . Pacific Nonhwest Laboratory. Richland . WashinglOn .
Tallman . A. M .. K. R. Fech!. M . C . Marrau . and G . V . Last. 1979. Geology of the Separation
Areas Hanford Site . SOlllh·Celllral Washington . RHO·ST·23 . Rockwell Hanford Operations.
Richl and . Washi nglO n.
T rafzer . C. E .. and R. D. Scheuerm an. 1986 . Renegade Tribe : The Palouse Indians and the
Im'asion of the Inland Pacific No rth west. WashinglOn State Univers ity Press . Pul!man . Washington .
TSP (Technical Stee ring Panel of th e Hanford Environrnemal Dose Reconstruction Project). 1994 .
SlImmarv: Radia tioll Dose Estimates f rom Hanford Radioactive Material Releases to the Air and to
th e Coil;mbia River. Cemers for Disease Co mrol and Prevention . Atlama . Georgia .
U.S. Army Corps o f Engineers . 1989. Water COlllrol Manualfor McNary Lock and Dalll . Colulllbia
River. Oregon and Washillgton. U.S. Army Co rps of Engineers . Walla Walla DlStrlc!. Walla Walla.
Washi nglO n.
U S. Departmem o f Comme rce . 1990. 1987 CenSl/s of GOI'emlllelllS Volullle 4. Govemlllem
Finall ces. Number 3 Fillances of COllil ly Govemmems. GC87(4 )·3. Bureau of the Census. U.S.
Depa rtme nt of Comme rce. Washington. D.C.
U.S Department o f Commerce. 1992 . Regional Ecol!omic Illformation System . Bureau of Economic
Anal ysis. U.S. Department of Commerce. Washington. D.C .

\ 'OU '\ 1E I APPE:"01X A. APRIL 1995

U.S. Depart ment of Commerce. 1993. COllllty Government Finances : 1990·1 991 . GF/91·8. U.S.
Departm e nt of Commerce . Washington. D.C .
United Way. 1992.1992 Allllllal Report. United Way of BenlOn and Franklin Counti es. Kennewick .
Was hinglO n.
WAC (Washington Administra tive Code). 1990a . WAC 173·470·030 . Air Quality Standards.
State of WashinglOn. Olympia . Washington .
WA C (Washington Administrative Code). 1990b. WAC 173·470·100. Ambiem Air QuaiiO' Standards
f or Particulate Maller. State of Washington. Olympia . Washington .
Wark . K .. and C. F . Warner. 1981. Air Polllllion. Its Origin and Comrol . second edition .
New Yo rk : Harper & Row. Publishers .
Was hinglOn Natural Heritage Prog ram . 1994 . Endangered. Threatened and Sensitive Vascular Plams
of Washington. Washington State Departmem of Natural Resources. O lymp ia . Washington.
Washington State Employmem Security. 1992 . Employmem and Payrolls in Washington State by
County and Industry : 1990 Anlllwi Averages. No . 182. Washington State Employmem Security
Labo r Market and Economic Anal ysis Branch. Olympia. WashinglOn .
Washington State Office of Financial Managemem . 1992a. Washington State County Population
Projections 1990·2010. 2012. Office of Financial Management . Forecasting Div ision. State of
WashinglOn . Olympia . Was hington.
WashinglOn State Office of Financia l Management . 1992b. 1992 Popularion Trends f or Wa shingtoll
State. Office o f Financial Management . Forecasting Di vision . State of Washingto n. Olympia.
Was hington.
Watson. D. G .. 1970. Fall Chinook Sallllon Spa wning in the Colulllbia River Near Hanford 1947·
1969. BNWL· 151 5 . Pac ific Northwest Laborato ry. Ri chl and . WashinglO n.
Watson. D. G .. 1973 . Fall Chinook Sallllon Population Census . BNWL· 1750. Pac ific No rth west
Labo ralO ry Annu al Repo rt for 1972 10 the USAEC Division o f Biomedica l and Environmemal
Resea rch Vo lume I Life Soiences Part 2 Eco logical Sciences. Pac ific North west Laboratory .
Ri ch land . Washington.
Watso n. E. C .. C. D . Becke r. R. E. Fitzner. K. A. Gano. K. L. Imhoff. R. F. McCallum .
D . A. Mye rs. T . L. Page. K. R. Price. J . V. Ramsdell . D. G . Ric e. D. L. Schreibe r. L. A. Skum atz.
D. J . Sommer . J . J . Tawi t. R. W . Wallace . and D. G . Watson. 1984 . En vironlllemal
Characterization of Two Potem ial Locarions at Hallford f or a Nell' Production Reactor. PNL·5275 .
Pacific No rth wes t Laboratory. Richl and . WaShington.
WDO E (Washington State Department of Ecology). 199 1. Washington State Air Qllalir.. Report:
1989· 1990. WashinglOn State Department of Ecology. Olympia. Washingto n.
WH C (Westinghouse Hanford Company) . 1987 . Postirradim ioll Testing Laboratory (327 B" ilding)
Safery Analysis Report. HEDL·TC· 1009. Westinghouse Hanford Co mpa ny. Richl and. WashinglOn .

7· 1\

VOLUM E 1. APPESD IX A. APR IL

11}tJ~

WHC (Westinghouse Hanford Company). 1990. Draft Revision B. Illterim Safety Basis f or the 308
Buildillg. WHC-SD-FL-ISB-OOI. Westinghouse Hanford Company. Richl and. Washington.
WHC (Westinghouse Hanford Company). 1993a. Ell virollmelllal Releases f or Calelldar Year 1992.
WHC-EP-0527-2. Westinghouse Hanford Company. Richland . Washington.
WHC (Westinghouse Hanford Company). 1993b . leuer report : Annual Report for Solid Waste
Lalldfill Operatiolls . 8701982B R6. January 14. Westinghouse Hanford Company. Richland .
Washington.
WHC (Westinghouse Hanford Company) . 1995 . Spelll Nuclear Fuel Proj ect Technical Baselille
Document Fiscal Year /995. WHC-SD-SNF-SD-003. Revision O. Westinghouse Hanford Company.
Ri chland. Washington.
Whelan . G .. D. W . Damschen . and R. D. Brockhaus . 1987. Columbia River Statistical Update
Model - Versioll 4.0 (COLSTAT4): Background Documentatioll alld User 's Guide . PNL-6041.
Pacific Northwest Laboratory. Richland . Washington .
Whelan . G .. 1. P. McDonald . and C. Sato. 1994. Envirolllnelllal COllsequellces to Water Resources
from Altemati" es of Managing Spent Nuclear Fuel at Hallford. PNL-10053 . Pacific Northwest
Laborato ry. Richland. Washington .
Wichmann . T .. 1995. U.S. Department of Energy. Idaho Operations Office . Idaho.
leuer to distribution: "Spent Nuclear Fuel Inventory Data." OPE-EIS-95 .028 . February I.
Winges. Kirk . 0 .. 1992. User 's Guide for the Fugitive Dust Model (FDM) . Volume I : User 's
Instmctions, EPA-910/9-88-202R (revised), U.S. Environmental Protection Agency . Region 10.
Seaule. Washington .
Woodruff. R. K .. and R. W . Hanf (eds .). 1991. Hanford Site En virollmemal Report for Calelldar
Year 1990, PNL-793C. Pac ific Northwest Laboratory . Richland . Washington .
Woodruff. R.K .. and R.W . Hanf (eds.). 1992 . Hallford Site Envirollmemal Report for Calelldar
Year 1991. PNL-81 48. Pac ific Northwest Laboratoty . Richland . Washington .
Woodru ff. R. K .. and R. W . Hanf (eds.). 1993. Hallford Site Ell vironmental Reportfor Calelldar
Year 1992. PNL-8682. PaCi fic Northwest Laboratory . Richland . Washington.
WPPSS (Washington Publ ic Powe r Suppl y Syste m) . 198 I . Filial Safety Allalysis Report, Washillgtoll
Nuclear Power Plam No . 2. Amendment 18. Washington Public Power Supply System. Richland .
Washington .
Wright. M. K .. 1993. Fiscal Year 1992 Report 0 11 Archaeological Surveys of the 100 Areas, Hallford
Site. Washillgton. PNL-88 19. Paci fi c Northwest Laboratory . Richland . Washington .
Yuan. Y. C .. S. Y. Chen. D. J . Le Poire . and R. Rothman . 1993 . RISKIND- A Computer Program
f or Calculatillg Radiological COllsequell ces alld Health Risks from Trallsportatioll of Spem Nuclear
Fuel. ANLlEA IS-06. Rev . O. Argo nne National Laboratory . Argon ne. Illinois .

\'OLl \-fE I APPE:"OD IX A. APR IL I QlJ5

7- 12

3,30

8_ ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ALARA

as low as reasonably achievable

ANL

Argonne National Laboratory

ARMF

adva nced reactivity measurement facility

ATM

approved testing materials

ATRC

advancerl test reactor canal

BWR

boiling water reactor

CEQ

Council on Environme ntal Quality

CFR

Code of Federal Regulations

CFRMF

co upled fast reactivity measurement facility

DCG

Derived Concentration Guides

DFA

driver fuel assemblies

DOE

U.S. Department of Energy

EA

e nvironmental assessment

ECF

Expended Core Facility

EIS

environmental impact statement

EPA

Environmental Protection Agency

EPCRA

Community Right-to-Know-Act

ERPG

Emergency Re ' ponse Planning Guideline

ER&WM

environmental restoration and waste manageme nt

FAST

Flourinel a nd Storage Facility a t INEL

FECF

fuel e lement cutting facility

FFTF

Fast Flux Test Facility

FSF

fue l storage facility

FSF

Underwa ter Fuel Storage Facility (loca ted a t INELl

HLW

high-level waste
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IDF

Inspection dose factor

PWR

pressurized water reactor

IDLF

Immedi ately Dangerous to Life and Health Values

RH -TRU

remote-ha ndled transura nic material

IDS

interim decay storage

RTEC

Registry of toxic effects for chemical substances

IDLH

Immediately Dangero us to Life and Health Values

SBA

stand ard blanket asse mblies

IEM

interim examination and maintenance

SHPO

Washington State Historic Preservation Officer

INEL

Idaho National Engineering Laboratory

SNF

spent nuclea r fuel

IVS

in-vessel storage

SPR

single-pass reactor

LCF

latent cancer fatalities

SRS

Savannah River Site

LLW

low-level waste

SS

singie-sheU tank

MEPAS

Multimedia Enviro nmental Po Uutant Assessment System

TDFA

test driver fuel assemblies

TEDF

Treated Effluent Disposal Facility

MT

metric tons

MTHM

metric tons of heavy me tal

TFA

test fuel assemblies

MTR

materials test reactor

l1.V/ TWA

Threshold Limit Values/Time We ighted Ave rages

MTU

metric tons of uranium

TR!GA

Tra ining, research, and isotope reactors built by General Atomic

NE PA

Na tio nal Environmental Po licy Act

WAC

Washington Administrative Code

NPDES

Natio nal PoUutant Discharge Elimination System

WIPP

Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

NRF

Naval Reactors Facility

NR HP

Na ti onal Register of Historic Plac.es

NTS

Nevada Test Site

O RNL

Oak Rid ge Na tional Laboratory

OSHA

Occupatio nal Safety and Health Administration

PBF Canal

power bu rst facility canal

PElS

programmatic enviro nmental impact statement

PFP

Plutonium F inishing Plant

PSD

Preventio n of Significant Dete riorati on

P U REX

Pl utonium and Uranium Recovery through EXtraction
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ATTACHMENT A
FACILITY ACCIDENTS

exposed during the entire release, regardless of the accident duration. Because protective action
lIidelines specify mitigative actions to prevent consumption of contaminated food. the dose to

ott _Ite individuals and populations was estimated both with and without the food ingestion
Methods used to eva luate facility accidents associated with implementing the alternatives

pathways. Reduced exposure to the plume or to contaminated ground surface as a result of

for SNF storage at Hanford a re discussed in this attachment. The selection of raddogical

early evacuation of offsite populations was not considered for the purposes of this analysis.

accidents for the a nalysis was based on information available in previously published safety or

although such action would certainly be taken in the event of a 3evere accident at the site.

National Environmental Policy Act documents, as described in Section 5. 15. Analyzed rele"es
of no nradiological hazardous materials we re based o n actua l or expected invento ries at SNF
managemen t facilities using conservative release assumptions. Industrial construction and

operational accidents are also evaluated based on the person-years needed to build and operate
SNF facilities.

Individual dose calculations were performed using atmospheric dispe rsion parameters
tha t represen ted 95 percent conditions (i.e., the air concentrations used would not be exceeded
more than 5 percent of the time). In the case of collective dose, the area surrounding the
source was divided into 16 directions a nd 10 sectors by distance. and the dose was calculated for
only the direction resulting in maximum collective exposure. Dose to the population was

A_1 Radiological Accidents
The GENII computer code (Napier et al. 1988) was used to perform calculations for

calculated using both 50 percent and 95 percent atmospheric dispersion parameters.

A,1 _1 No Action Alternative

each facility to estimate the consequences of radionuclide releases to the atmosphere for onsite
workers. me mbers o f the public at accessible locations o n or near th e site, individual residents at

the site boundary, and the population within 80 km of the release location. Dose calculations

The No Action Alternative consists of fuel storage at existing Hanford facilities, including
the 100-K Area wet storage basins; T Plant and a low-level burial ground in the 200-West Area;

used standa rd assu mptions for the Hanford Site (Schreckhise et al. 1993), and health effects

the 308, 324, 325. and 327 buildings in the 300 Area; and the Fast Flux Test Facility in the

were estimated using reco mmendations of the International Commission on Radiological

400 Area. Maximum reasonably foreseeable accidents determined by previously published

Protection in its Fublication 60 (ICRP 199 1). The risks of ca ncer and other long-term stochastic

analyses were used fo r this evaluation, and the impacts of these accidents were reevaluated

health e ffects as estimated by ICRP ( 199 1) are based on populations exposed to relatively high

using a consistent set of parameters for the spectrum of receptors required for this docume nt.

doses of radiation at high dose rates. For estimating risk to populations where the total doses
a re below 20 rad. the IC RP recommended a low-dose redu ction factor equal to 2. In this
analysis, whe re accidents would yield individ,·al dose est imates greater than 20 rad, the ICRP
risk fa ctors a re used without th e low dose correction to obtain the potential health e ffects.

A. 1_1_1 105-KE and 105-KW Basin W..t Storag... Airborne releases fro m the fue l

storage pool are bounded by a postulated accident fo r the 105-KE a nd 105-KW Basins. In the
accident, a cask is dropped and overturned in the fuel transfer area, wit h broken fuel elements
spilling out of the cask, within the pool building, but away from the pool. The scenario assumes

Individual doses we re est ima ted based on ex posure of the receptor during the entire
re lease, except where the release was sufficiently long that it could be divided into short-term

that the shipping cask ruptures, exposing all of the broken fuel elements in three canisters:
42 fuel elements each containing 22.5 kilograms (50 pounds) of fuel. The probability of this

a nd long- term components. In tha t case, onsite workers and members of the public at accessible

accident is estimated as 10'" to 10-6 per year. The a nalysis assu mes 10-year-old fuel-grad e fuel

onsite loca tions were assumed to re mai n in the path of the plume for the du ration of the short-

( 12 percent of plutonium content is plutonium-240). The source term is calculated by

term component. Th e exposure duration for onsite individuals was assumed to be two hours,

multiplying the inventory at risk by the release fraction . The calculation of the re lease fractio ns

corresponding to the maximum time required to evacua te the Hanford Site in the event of a n

assumes the fuel heats but does not me lt. Also, site evacuation is assumed, giving a two-hour

CJ ccident. and no ingesti on pathways were considered. Offsite individuals were assumed to be

time for calculation of the on site re lease factor. The offsite release factor was calculated using
an eight-hour release time. The calculated release quantity was 61 grams (0.14 pounds) for
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A-2

onsite exposure and 244 grams (0.54 pounds) for offsite exposure, resulting in the radionuclide
releases listed in Table A-I. Recalculation of the doses for this a nalysis yields the results in
Table A-2.

Table A-2. Consequences of IOS-KE Basin cask drop accident.
Individu al Impacts - On site and Offsite
Individual Resident
Onsite Worker Public Access

Location

A cask drop involving broken fuel elements faUing out of the cask would most likely be
observed by the workers. who would also be alerted by area radiation alarms a nd the radiation

2.7E +00
I.3E-03

AU Pathways

Without
Ingestion
S.2E-OI
2.6E-04

Dose (rem)
Fatal Cancer

3.4E+00
1.4E-03

Dose (person-rem )
Fatal Cancers

CoUective Impacts to Population within 80 km
SO percent E/Q6
9S percent E/Q
Without
Without
AU Pathways
AU Pathways
Ingestion
Ingestion
6.IE+03
1.4E+04
3.5E+02
8.0E +02
3.IE+00
1.8E-O I
6.9E+00
4.0E-OI

a

monitor in attenda nce of a change in rad iation intensity. The assumed 12 workers would likely
be in Special Work Permit protective clothing, but typicaUy would not be wearing respiratory

Table A-I. Estimated radionuclide releases for a dropped fuel cask accident in the IOS-K wet
storage basins.

Release (Ci)
Onsite
(2 hou rs)

Offsite
(8 hours)

Yttrium-90

3.5 E-OI

1.4 E+OO

Strontium-90

3.5 E-OI

1.4 E+OO

Rutheni um-I 06

3.2 E-03

1.3 E-02

Antimony-12S

7.3 E-03

2.9 E-02

Isotope

a. The estimated potential dose to an offsite resident from the ingestion pathway is 1.4 rem.
In practice. the dose would be limited by protective action guidelines that specify remedial
measures if the potential dose is greater than 0.5 rem.
b. The term E/ Q refers to the time - integrated air concentration at the receptor location for
a n acute release. It is analogous to the X/Q dispersion parameter useJ for a chronic release
scenario.

TeUurium-12SM

1.8 E-03

7.3 E-03

Cesium-134

7.9 E-03

3.2 E-02

protection. The workers would immediately evacuate the area to reduce their exposure to direct

Cesium-137

4.5 E-OI

1.8 E+OO

radiation (by increasing their distance from the source), for which their clothing provides no

Cerium-144

1.7 E-03

6.8 E-03

protection. Once at a distance, they would move upwind of the postulated airborne release

Praseodymium-144

1.7 E-03

6.8 E-03

before beginning decontamination procedures. Assuming the workers evacuate within I to 2

Praseodymium-144M

2.0 E-OS

8. 1 E-OS

minutes. their dose would range from about 70 to 140 rem.' Using risk facto rs cited previously.

Promethium-147

1.2 E-OI

4.9 E-OI

Europium-IS4

S.4 E-03

2.1 E-02

Plutonium-236

1.3 E-08

S.4 E-08

Plutonium-238

2.9 E-03

1.2 E-02

Plutonium-239

6.7 E-03

2.7 E-02

Plutonium-240

3.5 E-03

Plutonium-24I

2.7 E-OI

1.4 E-02
1.1 E+OO

Americium-24 1

S.7 E-03

2.3 E-02

the maxi mum probability of an individual contracting a fatal cancer from a dose of 140 re m
would amount to abo ut 0.06. The coUective worker dose for such a scenari o would amount to
about 1800 person-rem for which one fatal cancer would be inferred. It should be noted.
however. the risk factors used are not generaUy intended to be applied to large acute doses and
such acute doses might produce minor near term adverse health effects.

Recent preliminary analyses. based on updated infor-nation on the ability of the IOS-K

Plutonium-242

1.3 E-06

S.I E-06

Basins to wit hstand natural forces indicate that seismic-ir ~ u ce d damage at {he IOS-K Basins

Curium-244

2.8 E-04

1.1 E-03

could. under some circumstances. result in radiation expOSLJre to the PlhJlK and workers greater
tha n that indicated in this EIS. The underlying concern is whether the fuel in its present

a. Acute doses of this magnitude are in the lower end of the range of doses that migh! produce
symptoms of acute ndiation syndrome in humans.
A-3
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condition could become uncovered by loss of the basin water thereby resulting in larger releases

10. 13 fatal cancers. The corresponding risks from a spill at the 105-KE Basin were 2 x 10·\0 fatal

of radionuclides to the atmosphere; in the present analysis the fu el is assumed to remai n

ca ncers for the maximum nuclide and pathway (also from ingestion of plutonium·239 in fish).

covered. A scenario in which the fuel would remain exposed to the ai r and allowed to burn is

and about 6 x 10·\0 fatal cancers for all radio nuclides and pathways (Whelan et al. 1994).

not considered a reasonably foreseeable accide nt for the time peri od covered by this EIS.
The overflow scenario described in the previous paragraph has been extrapolated to
A . 1. 1.2 Liquid Release Scenario for 105-KE or 105·KW Basin. Accidental liquid

releases from the 105·K Basins are bounded by seismic events or other mecha nical disrupt ion of

include a larger release because of recent concerns about the effects of a seismic event severe
enough to breach joints in the basin. A crack in the basin would potentially release all of the

the basin or its water supply system. The most probable scenario is a break in an 8·inch water

basin water and perhaps some of the sludge to the subsurface environment, where it would be

supply line that overfills the storage pool causing water to overflow onto the surrounding soil

ava ilable for leaching to groundwate r and tra nsport to the Columbia River. Because the liquid

(Bergsman 1995). The flow is assumed to continue for 8 hours before the supply is shut off,

overflow scenario assumes release of over half of the basin water. the risk to a downstream

resulting in release of 2300 cubic meters (600,000 gallons) of water and 60% of the radionuclide

individual from release of all the basin water would be less that twice that estimated for the

inventory in the pool water. The inventory released from the 105-KE Basin is assumed to be 13

overflow scenario. Radionuclides in the sludge would be much less mobile and would leach into

Ci tritium, 0.029 Ci cobalt·60, 9.2 Ci strontium-90, 0.042 Ci cesium· 134, 12 Ci cesium·

groundwa ter slowly, providing time for remediation and mitigation measures as necessary. Even

137/ barium-137m, 0.0098 Ci plutonium-238, and 0.056 Ci plutonium-239.

if significant quantities of sludge remained in the subsurface soil for an extended period prior to
clean up, the risk to the downstream individuals and population would not likely be substantially

The corresponding radionuclide inve ntory in the 105-KW Basin overflow pond is as-

higher than that estimated for the overflow scenario.

sumed to be as follows: 0.48 Ci tritium. 0.0013 Ci cobalt·60, 0.003 1 Ci cesium-134, 0.22 Ci
cesium- I37, 1.1 Ci strontium-90, 5.9E-06 Ci plutonium-238, and 3. I E-05 Ci plutonium-239. The

This accident would not likely present any hazard to wo rkers at the basin because the

overflow is assu med to leach through the subsurface environment to the Columbia River.

scenario is liquid to ground to groundwater and on to the Columbia River and does not involve

Because the tra nsmission rate of the soil is estimated as 570 centimeters per day [based on

a source of exposure to the close-in workers.

DOE's Progra mm at ic Environmenta l Impact Statement (PElS) (Schramke 1993)), a leaching
rate of 26.3 centimeters per day (10 inches per day) will not result in a ponded situation;

A . 1. 1. 3 308 Building. The maximum reasonably foreseeable accide nt fo r airborne

the refore. the entire 2300 cubic meters (600.000 gal) of overfl ow will leach into the soil over an

releases related to fuel storage at the 308 Building is dropping a transfer basket while moving

eight-hour period. Conta minants are ass umed to travel through the vadose zone, through the

fuel from the reactor core to the storage pool (WHC 1990). It was conservatively estimated that

satura ted zone to the Colum bia River and in the Columbia River to receptors downstream. The

15 fue l elements would have their cladding damaged. resulting in the re lease of 100 percent of

fl ow discha rge in the Colum bia River is assumed to be under low-flow conditions of 1000 cubic

the krypton-85 to the envi ronment in 5 minu tes. The probability of this accident is estimated as

meters per second (36.000 cubic feet per second ) (Whela n et al. 1987), which represents the

10. 2 to 10'" per year. In the original Safety Analysis Report, the resulting dose was estimated at

most conservative case for maximizing surface water concentrations. A s a conservative

0.013 rem to the worker. 8.6 x 10'" rem to the onsite individual. and 8.6 x 10.5 rem at the site

assumption. the removal of wa ter fro m the Columbia River is ass umed to be 100 meters

boundary. Collective dose to the popUlation was not reported in the SA R. The individual doses

(328 feet) downstream of the point of e nt ry of the contamina nt into the river. The assessment

correspond to a probability of fata l cancer of 5.2E-06 per yea r for the worker. 4.3E·07 per yea r

addres' ed recreationa l activities (e.g .. boating. swimming. fishing) in the Columbia River and use

for the onsite member of the public. and 4.3E·08 per year at the site boundary.

of the water as a drinking·wa ter supply and for bathing, irrigation, etc. The collective risk of
fatal cancer from the spill at the 105-KW Basin was estimated as approximately 1.1 x 10. 13 fatal

This information is provided in more detail in WHC ( 1990). which. however. does not

cancers for the maxi mum pathway and radionuclide (ingestion of plutonium-239 in fish) at 2800

detail the total quantity of krypton-85 released in any of its accident scenarios. Because release

yea rs. The cumulative risk from all radionuclides and pathways amounted to approximately 6 x

quantities for krypton·85 were not available, the consequences of this accide nt were not re-
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eva luated for this analysis. Note that the SAR worker evaluatio n is for an individual in the
facility who is assumed to evacuate within 5 minutes. This is a somewhat different analysis from
those for the other worker consequences presented for the Hanford Site, which assu me a worker
remains outside the facility at the point of maximum air concentr.11. Ion for a period of up to

2 hours.

Table A-3. Consequences of a seismic event at the 324 Building.
Individual Impacts - Onsite and Offsite
Individual Resident
Onsite Worker Public Access
Location
All Pathways
Without
Ingestion
I.IE+03

Dose (rem)
Fatal Cancer

3.5E+01
3.5E-02

I.OE+02
I.OE-OI

A transfer basket drop that results in damage to 15 fuel elements would most likely be
CoUective Dose to Population within 80 krn

observed by the workers, who would also be alerted by area radiatio n alarms and the radiation

50 percent E/Qb

monitor in attendance of a change in radiation intensity. The assumed 12 workers would likely

All Pathways

be in Special Work Permit protective clothing, but typicaUy would not be wearing respiratory
protection. The workers would immediately evacuate the a rea to reduce their exposure to direct
radiation (by increasing their distance from the source), for which their clothing provides no

Dose (person- rem)
Fatal Cancers

2.IE+05
I.OE+02

Without
Ingestion
1.8E+03
9.0E-01

95 percent E/Q
Without
Ingestion

All Pathways

1.9E+06
9.7E+02

1.6E+04
8.2E+00

protection. Once at a distance, they would move upwind of the postulated airborne release
before beginning decontamination procedures. It was estimated (WHC 1990) that the workers
would receive a dose of 13 millirem. The coUective worker dose would amount to about
0.2 person-rem, and no latent cancer htalities would be predicted for these workers.

A _7. 7. 4 324 Building. The greatest potential safety concern at the 324 Building comes

from a safety assessme nt of the current levels of potentiaUy highly mobile radioactive material in

a. These doses a re sufficiently high that application of long-term risk factors is inappropriate.
An acute total body dose of greater than 1,000 rem would be expected to be fatal from other

mechanisms within a relatively short time. The estimated potential dose to an offsite resident
from the ingestion pathway is 5.4E+03 rem. In practice, the dose would be limited by
protective action guidelines, which specify remedial measures if the potential dose is greater
than 0.5 rem.
b. The term E/Q refers to the time - integrated air concentration at the receptOr location for
an acute release. It is analogous to the X/Q dispersion parameter used for a chronic release
scenario.

B·CelJ ( PNL 1992a). The potential failure of the 324 Building exhaust ventilatio n system in a
0. 1 g seismic event, along wit h shaking of highly mobile holdup material in the 324 Building hot

building could occur at any time, whether or not there were workers in the building. An earth-

ceUs, could ca use a total release of 610 Ci of cesium-1 37 and 310 Ci of strontium-90 within

quake of sufficient intensity to cause the ventilation failure would surely be noticed by any

12 hours. Of this total, approximately 55 percent (340 Ci of cesium-137 and 170 Ci of

workers in the building. In aU likelihood, area radiation alarms would also sound. The assumed

strontium-90) would be released in the first two hours. The probability of the initiating seismic

50 wo rkers would immediately evacuate the building and move to a position upwind of the

4

event is 4 x 10 per year, and the other events leading to the release are assumed in this

building. Although speculative, the workers might receive as much as 25 rem before reaching a

analy. is to occur with certainty. The consequences of this accident are presented in Table A-3.

completely safe zone. If that were the case, they would probably be restricted fro m further

In comparison to this accident, other potential releases from the building a re judged to be

radiation worker pending resu lts of reading their dosi meters and complet ion of a medical

insignificant, or they have been determined to be less probable because of radioactive material

evaluatio" . The maximum probability of an individual contracting a fatal cancer from such a

conta inment or handling frequency. The consequences associated with th is accident are a result

dose would amount to about 0.02. The postulated coUective dose would a mount to about

of existing contamination in the 324 Building hot ceUs, and neither its likelihood nor its severity

1300 person-rem, from which one latent cancer fatality might be inferred. Based only on the

depend on the presence of spent fuel in the facility. The act ual contribution of spent fuel to

estimated initiating earthquake frequency, the chances of these consequences occurring would be

re leases from the accident is assumed to be negligible compared with that of other sources.

about I in 5,000 per year.

A seismic event that causes the failure of the 324 Building exhaust ventilation system and
releases significa nt quantities of non-spent nuclear fuel-related radioactive materials from the
A-7
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A. 7. 7.5 325 Building. A severe earthquake, without subsequent fire, is the maximum

reasonably foreseeable accident for the 325 Building (PNL 1992b). It is postulated that an

Table A-4. Radionudide releases for the 325 Building earthqu. ke scenario.'
Releases in the first 2 hours

earthquake would cause windows to break but not cause general or local structural collapse.

Radionudide

Ci

Doors may be jammed open after building evacuation, leaving additional openings for unfiltered

Tritium

0.0425

releases. Building power or ventilation could be lost. Further damage would be caused to glove

Krypton-85

66.2

Radionudide

Ci as nitrate

Ci as oxide

Thorium-232

2.23E-1O

2.32E-06

Uranium-238

1.04E-08

4.17E-05

Uranium-235

5.34E-1O

1.16E-06

Ura nium-233

1.36E-06

4.68E-07

Neptunium-237

6.88E-07

2.36E-07

Plutonium-238

0.002016

0.000772

boxes and the contents of shelves and cabinets. The expected effects are considered to be the
most severe that could result from a 0.135 g horizontal acceleration, corresponding to the
2 x 104 per year seismic event fOf which protection is required by DOE design criteria for a new
structure .

Radionudide releases associated with this accident are listed in Table A-4. It should be
noted that the environmental releases associated with the earthquake scenario are from all

Plutonium-239

0.002047

0.001203

sources in the 325 Building; fuel storage activities account for only a small fraction of the total.

Plutonium-240

0.001037

0.000609

Because these releases consist of a variety of chemical forms, the dose factors used for calcula-

Plutonium-24I

0.051751

0.030407

Americium-24I

0.000877

0.000343

tion of the consequences represented the maximum dose for all radionuclides in the total
release. The consequences of this accident are presented in Table A-5.

An earthquake that results in openings for unfiltered releases from the 325 Building

Plutonium-242

2.88E-07

1.65E-07

Americium-243

2.09E-05

7. 17E-06

Curium-244

0.003130

0.00 1075

Activity released after the first 2 hours but within the first 4 days

releasing significant quantities of non·spent nudear fuel-rel ated radioactive materials could

Rad ionuclide

Ci as nitrate

occur at any time, whether or not there were workers in the building. An earthquake of

Thorium-232

4.08E-1O

2.0 IE-06

sufficient intensity to cause damage to the ventilation system and possibly glove boxes and

Uranium-238

1.91E-08

3.6 I E-05

windows would surely be noticed by any workers in the building. Whether area radiation

Uranium-235

9.76E- 10

1.0E-06

monitors alarmed or not, the assumed 50 workers would immediately evacuate the building and,

Uranium-233

7.08E-07

3.49E-07

Nep tunium-237

3.58E-07

1.76E-07

Plutonium-238

0.002231

0.000614

Plutonium-239

0.008545

0.00 1143

Plutonium-240

0.004329

0.000579

Plutonium-24 I

0.2 16022

0.028896

Americium-24I

0.001077

0.000276

once outside, would move to a position upwind of the building. Although speculative, the
workers might receive as much as 3 rem before reaching a completely safe zone. The maximum
probability of late nt fatal cancer for such a dose would be 0.001. The postulated collective dose
would amount to about 150 person-rem, from which no latent cancer fatalities would be inferred.

Ci as oxide

Plutonium-242

1.4 1E-06

1.56E-07

fuel storage at the 327 Building consists of mechanical damage to fuel pins and subsequent fire

Americium-243

1.08E-05

5.34E-06

involving reactive fue l within a hot cell (WHC 1987). Because of the variety of activities that

Curium-244

0.001626

0.00080 1

A. 7. 7. 6 327 Building. The postulated maximum reaso nably foreseeable accident for

can occur in the hot cells, specific details of the acciden t were not postulated. The mechanical
damage wo uld breach the pin cladding and immediately release the gaseous fission products in

a. Data fro m Draft Safety Analysis Report for the 325 Building
(PNL 1992b).

the fu el-cladding gap. The subsequent fire wo uld cause complete reaction of reactive fuel forms.
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Table A-5. Consequences of a seismic event at the 325 Building.
Individual Impacts - On site a nd Offsite
Onsite Worker

Public Access
Location

I.3E+OI
6.3E-03

Dose (rem)
Fatal Cancer

I.3E+02
LOE-OI

Dose (person·rem)
Fatal Cancers

50 percent E/ Qb
Without
All Pathways
Ingestion
3.2E+02
4.5E+02
L6E·Ol
2.3E·Ol

Individual Resident
Without
All Pathways
Ingestion
5.9E+00
3.0E-03

a

Collective Dose to Population within 80 km
95 percent E/ Q
All Pathways
Without
Ingestion
4.1E+03
2.0E+00

2.9E+03
L5E+00

a. The estimated potential dose to an offsite resident from the ingestion pathway is 10 rem.
In practice, the dose would be limited by protective action guidelines, which specify remedial
measures if the potential dose is greater than 0.5 rem.
b. The term E/ Q refers to the time · integrated air concentration at the receptor location for
an acute release. It is analogous to the X/Q dispersion parameter used for a chronic release
scenario.

Fission products are released to the environment through the ventilation system, which includes
HEPA and activated charcoal filtration. The frequency of this accident is estimated as 10 4 to
10-6 per yea r. The hot cell inventory and the fraction of the inventory released are shown in
Table A-6.

The previous analysis evaluated the most extreme case for damaged material containing
the maximum allowable limits of fission products that had not been vented to release fission
gases. In thi s case, fuel materials involved are assumed to be nonreactive in water and to

contain a maximum fission product inventory of 6.5 x 106 Ci including 2500 Ci of halogens.
Radionuclide releases from the fu el into the basin water and thence into the air above the water
are based on U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guide 1.25, which addresses
accide nts involving spent fuel in a storage pool. The conseque nces of the accident as evaluated
for this document are listed in Table A· 7.

A·l l
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Table A-6. Assumed inve ntories and release fractions for a 327 Building hot cell fire.
Source

Source

Inventory
(Ci)

Radionuclide
Halogens
3. 16E-3
Iodine· 129
Noble Gases
4.63E+2
Krypton-85
8.55E+0
Xenon· 133m
Volatile Solids
2. 17E-2
Selenium· 79
9.02E +0
Cadmium· 113m
L37E+3
Cesium· 134
7.27E +3
Cesium· 137
Nonvolatile Solids
4.41E-2
Strontium-89
2.74E+3
Yttrium-90
L52E·I
Zirconium-93
2.68E-2
Niobi um-95m
L72E-3
Kuthenium-103
I.72E-3
Rhodium· 103m
L60E-2
Palladi um· 107
2.82E-8
Indium· 114m
2.58E +0
Tin· 119m
6. 13E +0
Tin-123
5.96E-4
Antimony· 124
9.30E-3
Antimony· 126m
2.29E-3
Tellurium· 123m
3.31E +0
Tellurium· 127m
2.55E-6
Tellurium· 129m
6.88E+3
Barium-137m
7.36E+3
Cerium· 144
l.lI E+4
Promethium-147
4.28E-6
Promthium· 148
L05E+0
Europium· 152
8.83 E+2
Europium-155
8.24E-3
Terbium· 160
Heavy Metals
2.24E+0
Plutonium-239
3.46E+2
Plutonium-241
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Release
Fraction

Radionuclide

Inventory
(Ci)

Release
Fraction

5E·03
Xenon-13lm
Xenon-133

6.25E+2
L03E+4

2.5E-4

Rubidium-87
Cadmium· 115m
Cesium· 135

9. 15E-7
9.96E-6
1.1 7E·I

2.5E-4

5E-6

Strontium-90
Yttrium-91
Zirconium-95
Niobium-95
Ruthenium· 106
Rhod ium-l 06
Silver· 1 10
Indium-114
Tin-121m
Tin· 126
Antimony-125
Antimony· 126
Tellurium· 125m
Tellurium· 127
Tellurium-129
Cerium-141
Praseodymium-144
Promethium· 148m
Samarium· IS I
Europium-1S4
Gadolinium·IS3
Holmium·1 66m

2.74E+3
3.03E·I
2.113+0
4.55E+0
1.34E+4
1.34E+4
L94E+2
2.72E-8
9. 13E-2
9.30E-3
9.5 IE+ 2
1.30E-3
2.32E+2
3.24E+0
L62E-6
2.23E-5
7.36E+3
6.21E-5
3.04E+2
1.35E+2
L24E-2
LS2E-3

5E-6

Plutonium-240

5E-6
5E-6
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2.2 IE+0
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Table A-7. Consequences of 327 Building hot cell fire .
Individual Impacts - Onsite and Offsite
Individual Resident

Dose (rem)
Fatal Cancer

On site Worker

Public Access
Location

2.2E-02
B.6E-06

3.2E-02
1.6E-OS

All Pathways

Without
Ingestion

2.3E-02
I.IE-OS

a

Collective Dose to Population wi thin BO km
SO percent E/Qb
All Pathways
Dose (person-rem)
Fatal Cancers

4.7E+02
2.4E-01

Without
Ingestion
S.4E+OO
2.7E-03

9S percent E/Q
All Pathways
4.3E+03
2.IE+00

Table A-S. Rad ionuclide releases for spent nuclear fuel storage at 200-West Burial Ground,
accident scena rio 2 - extremely severe impact with long duration fire.
Re lease
(Ci)

Without
Ingestion
4.BE+01
2.4E-02

a. The estimated potential dose to an offsite resident from the ingestion pathway is 2.S rem.
In practice, the dose would be limited by protective action guidelines that specify remedial
measures if the potential dose is greater than O.S rem.
b. The term E/Q refers to the time-integrated air concentration at the receptor location for
an acute release. It is analogous to the X/Q dispersion parameter used for a chronic release
scenario.
This accident involves mechanical damage to fuel pins, subsequent fire within a hot cell,
and releases of radioactive material to the intact filtered ventilation system and on to the
at mosphere. There wo uld be no added source of rad iation exposure to the close-in worker at
the hot cell.

A . 1. 1. 7 200-West A rea Low-Level Waste Burial Grounds. The only accident

Radionuclide
Cobalt-60
Krypton-BS
Strontium-90
Yttrium-90
Ruthenium- t06
Cesium-137
Cerium-144
Praseodymium-144
Promethium-147
Europium-15S
Uranium-233
Uranium-234
Uranium-236
Uranium-23S
Uranium-23B
Plutonium-23B
Plutonium-239

Maximum
TRU Fuel'

Maximum

1.4E-04

B.6E-04
2.4E+02
6.3E-03
6.3E-03
6.6E-02
6.9E-OI

O.OE+OO
S.6E-OS
5.6E-OS
S.IE-04
7.2E-03
1.9E-04
1.9E-04
1.4E-04
I.IE-OS
O.OE+OO
4.IE-OS
O.OE+OO
S.6E-tO
2.0E-09
7.5E-05
1.4E-04
4.0E-04
2.3E-02
1.4E-06

Plutonium-240
Plutonium-24I
Plutonium-242

FP Fuel'

1.9E-02
1.9E-02
I.SE-02
I.3E-04
2.5E-07
3.SE-06
1.7E-09
S.3E-OB
6.6E-tO
l.SE-05
2.BE-OS
7.9E-OS
4.SE-04
1.4E-OB

a. Maximum TRU Fuel is that having the maxi mum concentration of tr~nsura~ic radionuclides;
maximum FP fuel has the maximum concentration of fission product radlOnuchdes.

postulated to have any significant radiological releases in the Burial Ground safety analysis
report is briefly described as a vehicle impact on one or more EBR II casks followed by a fire

would be approximately an order of magnitude lower. The radio nuclide releases for accide nt

(Saito 1992). Two vehicle impact scenarios were discussed in the document:

scena rio 2 are shown in Table A-B; the accident consequences as re-evaluated for this document
are presented in Table A-9. The maxi mum fission product inventory fuel yielded the highest

I.

Severe impact or collision followed by a short-duration fire caused by a vehicular
accide nt in the trench .

consequences for offsite receptors where the ingestion pathway was considered. The maximum

2.

Extremely severe impact or collision followed by a long duration fire.

exposure pathways.

The consequences of the latter accident were evaluated for fuels containing maximum

transuranic inve ntory was assoc iated with higher consequences for th e inhalation and exte rnal

The severe impact or collision followed by fire as postulated here migh t have serious-to-

inventories of either fission product or transuranic radionuclides. The probability of the

fatal non radiological consequences to drivers and passengers of the vehicles involved. It is

accident is estimated to be 9.B x 10" per year. The consequences of the less severe accident

assumed that two drivers and two passengers are involved. These individuals would evacuate
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10% of no nvo latile radionuclides in broken fue l are released to the building floor

Table A-9. Consequences of cask impact accident and fire at 200-West Burial Ground.
Individual Impacts - Onsite and Offsite
Individual Resident
Without
Public Access All Pathways
Ingestion
Onsite Worker
Location
Maximum TRU'
Dose (rem)
Fatal Cancer
Maximum FP'
Dose (rem)
Fatal Cancer

6.0E+00
2.4E-03

6.7E-03
3.3E-06

3.6E-03
1.8E-06

2.5E-03
1.2E-06

2.0E+00
8.0E-04

2.2E-03
I.IE-06

I.OE-OI
5.0E-05

9.5E-04
4.8E-07

Collective Dose to Population wit hin 80 km
50 percent E/Qb
95 percent E/Q
All Pathways
Without
All Pathways
Without
Ingestion
Ingestion
Maximum TRU'
Dose (person-rem)
Fatal Cancers
Maximum FP'
Dose (person-rem)
Fatal Cancer

2.4E+00
1.2E-03

1.8E+00
8.9E-04

4.9E+01
2.4E-02

3.6E+ OI
1.8E-02

5.6E+OI
2.8E-02

6.6E-OI
3.3E-04

I.IE+03
5.7E-OI

1.3E+OI
6.6E-03

a. Maximum TRU Fuel is that having the maximum concentration of transuranic
radionuclides; maximum FP fuel has the maximum concentration of fission product
radionuclides.
h. The term E/Q refers to the time-integrated air concentration at the receptor location for
an acute release. It is analogous to the X/ Q dispersion parameter used for a chronic release
scenario.

0.1 % of the released particulate material is resuspended in the huilding
All of the volatile krypton-85 is released to the building atmosphere
Building fi ltration removed 98.6 percent of the particulate materials from th e
effluent exiting the stack.

Release estimates for this scenario are presented in Table A- 10 and the consequences of the
release are listed in Table A-II.

Because workers evacuate the canyon area when fuel assemblies are being moved 10 or

from the casks or pool, there would be no opportunity for impacts on workers from a dropped
fuel assembly in fuel storage at T Plant.

Table A-IO. Rel eases for damaged assembly of Shippingport Core II fuel with 4-year decay at
T Plant.
Release (Ci)
Radionuclide
5.0E-06
Iron-55
3.0E-06
Cobalt-60
9.6E+OO
Krypton-85
1.0E-04
Strontium-90
1.0E-04
3.0E-06

Ruthenium- 106
Antimony-125
Cesium-134

8.0E-06
I.OE-04
I.OE-04

Cesium-137
Cerium-144
Prometh ium-147

the area. if they were able. Because it cannot be assured that after the collision either drivers
or passengers would be able to evacuate the area to a safe distance from radiological
conseq uences, the worst case is assumed, th at the four individuals perish in this accident
principally from trauma caused by the collision and fire. The likelihood of these consequences
occurring are estimated at 1 chance in 100,000 per year.

Europium-154
Plu tonium-239

I.OE-04
3.0E-05
6.2E-07

PlulOnium-240
PlulOnium-24I

1.6E-06
3.IE-04

PlulOnium-242

3.9E-09

A. 1. 1.8 T Plant. The maximum scenario for fuel storage at T Plant is a dropped fuel
assembly inside the building (Jackson and Hanson 1978). The probability associated with this
accident is estimated to be 2.8 x 10-3 per year. The release estimates assume damage to a
fract ion of the wafers in the dropped fuel mod ule containing 4-year-cooled Shippingport PWR
Core II fuel (a conservative assumption because the fuel has now been cooled for approximately
20 years). Other release assu mptions include the following:

A-IS
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Table A-II. Conseq ue nces of fu el asse mbly damage a t T Plant.

Table A- 12. Conseque nces of liquid metal fire at the Fast Flux Test Facility.
Individual Im pacts - O nsite and Oft·site

Individ ual Impacts - Onsite a nd Offsite

-~.,.-----=--:-:,

Individ ual Resident
Onsite Worker
Dose (rem)

2.6E-04

Fatal Ca ncer

1.0E-07

Public Access
Location
5.7E-05
2.BE-OB

3.2E-05

5.3E-05

B.6E-05

1.6E-OB

2.6E-OB

4.3E-08

50 percent E/ Q'

7.3E-04

2.4E-04

1.6E-02

Faw l Cancer

2.9E-07

1.2E-07

7.9E-06

Total

Inha latio n
+ External

Ingestion

Dose (pe rson-re m )

1.4E-02

1.6E-02

3.0E-02

3.2E-0 !

3.6E-O!

Fatal Ca nce rs

7.2E-06

B.OE-06

1.5E-0,

1.6E-04

I.BE-04

Total

Collective Dose to Population wi th in 80 km
50 percent E/Qb

95 percent E/Q

Ingestion

Ingestion

Inha la ti on
+ External

Dose (rem)

Collective Dose to Population within BO km
Inhalation
+ External

Individual Reside nt

Public Access
Location

Onsite
Worker

Total

Ingestion

Inha la tio n
+ External

Inh alation
+ Externa l

Total
6.BE-01
3.4E-04

a. The term E/ Q refers to the time-integrated ai r concentration a t the receptor location for
a n ,cute release. It is analogous to the X/Q dispersion parameter used for a chro nic release
scena rio.
A . 1. 1_9 Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF). The accide nt scena ri o for the handling and

Ingest io n

95 percen t E/ Q
Total

Inhalat ion

(n gestion

Total

+ External

Dose (pe rso n-re m)

2.6E+0!

7.6E+03

7.6E+03

2.3E+02

6.4E+04

6.4E+04

Fatal Cancers

1.3E-02

3.8E+00

3.BE+00

1.2E-OI

3.2E+0 1

3.2E+01

The esti ma ted potential dose to an offsite reside nt including the ingesti on pathway is 5,0
re m. In practice. the dose wou ld be limited by pro tective acti on guidelines. whic h specify
re media l measures if the potential dose is greater tha n 0.5 rem .
.
'
b. The te rm E/ Q refers to the time·integrated air co ncen tration at tht: receptor IDea tion tor
an acute release. It is ana logous to thl! X/ Q di spersion parame ter used fo r a chronic rel ease
scenario.

<I.

storage of irradia ted FFTF fue l in the Fuel Storage Facility (FSF) is a liquid metal fire (Gantt
1989). The accide nt sce nario is a spill of 11.793 kg of liq uid sodiu m a nd subseq ue nt fire. The
spill is initiated by e ith e r an internal event or a seismic event that causes a break in th e piping

An internal eve nt or a seis mic event dIal causes a break in the piping hetwee n th e FSF
a nd heat exc hangers could occu r whet her worke rs were prese nt o r not. The eve nt would sure ly

be twee n the FSF a nd heat excha nge rs. The liquid sodium is assum ed to ignite sponta neously

be noticed by a ny workers in the huilding. In a ll like lihood. a rea radia tion alarms wou ld ;.lIso

a nd burn. releasing ae rosols to the atmosphere. The probability of this accident is estimated to

so und. The assu med 50 wo rke rs would immed iate ly evacua te th e bu ilding a nd. o nce outs ide.

be 10-' to 10.6 pe r yea r.

would move to a posit ion upwind of the buildin g. Because this is an accident that in\'olves a
slow release of materia l to the atmosphe re, it is speculated that dose to th e cJose·in workers

The rad io nuclide release is from cesium th at has bee n leac hed from the fue l int o the
sodi um . It is assumed fo r this acc ide nt that 0. 1 percent of the e le ments are breached a nd that

would not exceed 0. 1 re m fro m this acc iden!. The postul a ted collec tive dose wou ld amount to
a bout 5 pe rso n-re m. from which no latent cancer fa ta lities would be expected.

the sodium co nt ai ns 0.9 !,-Ci cesium-1 34 pe r gram o f sodium a nd 5!'-Ci cesium- 137 per gram of
sodium . It is ass umed that 35 pe rce nt of the sodium a nd cesium aerosols ge ne rated in th e fire

A.1 .2 Decentralization Alternative

a re re leased to the a tm osphe re. The tota l activity released is estimated as 3.7 C i cesi um-134
an d 25 C i cesium-1 37. Th e consequences of the acc ident as estimated are listed in Table A-12.

The Dece ntraliza ti o n Alt e rnative involves co nstru ctio n o f several ne\I,' facilit ies at

Onsite indi viduals (wo rk e rs a nd members o f the public a, onsite access locations) were assu med

Hanford. includi ng new dry storage for spe nt fu e l o r a combin ation of new wet and ury sto rage.

10

be exposed during 0.4 perce nt of the total re lease. because the spilled sodium wo uld requi re

Options a re also includ ed fo r seve ra l types o f fuel processing prior to sto rage. The conse-

ove r 20 days to burn co mpl e tely, a nd onsile indivi du als were assumed to be evacuated within

quences of new facilit ies a re based on pre viously eva lua ted accide nts for simila r installations.

2 ho ur s.

adapted fo r th e conditions and loca t ion of th ese faciliti es as assumed in this a nalys is.

A- 17
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A. 1.2. 1 New Wet Storage. This accident scenario is the same as that described for a

dropped fuel container at the 100·K Basins. The releases are assumed to be the same as for the
accident previously described (see Table A·I), but the evaluation was repeated for potential
location of the new facility adjace nt to the 200·East Area. The accident frequency in the
No Action Alternative is also assumed for this alternative because the quantity of fuel handled
in either case would be the same. The consequences of this accident for a new facility are
shown in Table A·I3.

Table A-B. Consequences of cask drop accident at new wet storage facility adjacent to the
200-East Area.
Individual Impacts - Onsite and Offsite
Individual Resident
Without
Public Access AU Pathways
Ingestion
Onsite Worker
Location
3.6E-OI
I.3E-OI
6.3E-02
8.7E·OI
Dose (rem)
6.4E-OS
3.5E-04
1.8E-04
3.IE-05
Fatal Cancer

A maximum reasonab!y foreseeable liquid release scenario has been postulated for the
new pool storage facility for wet storage of nudear fuels . The leak is based on a 20·cm (8·inch)
water·supply pipe breaking inside of the pool building a nd releasing 7600 liters per minute
(2000 gallons per minute). The flow is not shut off for 8 hours, resulting in 3600 cubic meters

Dose (person-rem)
Fatal Cancers

Collective Dose to Population within 80 km
SO percent E/Q'
9S percent E/ Q
AU Pathways
Without
AU Pathways
Without
Ingestion
Ingestion
6.0E+03
2.7E+03
1.7E+02
3.7E+02
3.0E+00
1.3E+00
8.4E-02
1.9E-OI

(960,000 gal) being added to the pool. Because the pool cannot handle this a mount of liquid,
there is an overflow of 2300 cubic meters (600,000 gal) in this 8·hour period. Because the trans·
mission rate of the soil is estimated as S70 centimeters per day (220 inches per day) [based on

a. The term E/ Q refers to the time-integrated air concentration at the receptor location for
an acute release. It is analogous to the X/ Q dispersion parameter used for a chronic release
scenario.

DOE's Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PElS) (Schramke 1993)], a leaching
rate of 26.3 centimeters per day (10 inches per day) will not result in ponding; therefore, the

A cask drop involving broken fuel elements falling out of the cask at a new wet storage

entire volume of overflow will leach into the soil over an 8·hour period. The basin overflow

facility would be the same as discussed in Section A. 1. 1. 1. No prompt radiation illness or latent

does contain 61 percent of the basin·water radionuclide inventory, which is estimated as 1.8 Ci.

cancer fatalities would be predicted for workers in this scenario.

The specific radionudide inventory in the overflow pond is assumed to be as follows: 0.48 Ci
tritium, 0.0013 Ci cobalt·60, 0.031 Ci cesium-134, 0.22 Ci cesium- 137, 1.1 Ci strontium-90,

The accident scenario at the IOS-KE and !OS-KW Basins and its results described under

S.9E·06 Ci plutonium-238. and 3.1 E-OS Ci plutonium·239. All of the constituents in this

the No Action Alternative would also be applicable under the Decentralization Alternative prior

assessme nt are radionudides. Contaminant migration is through the vadose zone, through the

to transport of fuel to a new storage facility.

saturated zo ne to the Columbia River, and in the Columbia River to receptors downstream.
The flow discharge in the Columbia River is assumed to be under low-flow conditions of

A.1.2.2 New Dry Storage - Small Vault or Cask Facility. The maximum reasonably

1000 cubic meters per second (36.000 cubic feet per second) (Whelan et al. 1987), which

foreseeable acciden t for the dry storage facility is assumed to be the same as that for a

represents the most conservative case for maximizing surface water concentrations. As a

previously evaluated accident involving transport of FFTF fuel (DOE 1986b). This accident is

conservative assumption, the removal of water from the Columbia River is assumed to be

used as a surrogate for a dry storage facility accident involving a n impact by either an internal

100 meters (328 feet) downstream of the point of e ntry of the contaminant into the river. The

or external initiator that results in a fire. The release assoc iated with this accident is estimated

assessment addressed recreational activities (e.g., boating, swimming, fishing) in the Columbia

at S.4E+02 Ci, based on the hypothetical scenario of six FFTF fuel assemblies irradiated to

Rive r and use of the water as a drinking-water supply and for bathing, irrigation, etc. The

ISO MWD/ Kg being subjected to a severe impact followed by a fire . The fuel pins rupture on

overall risk of fatal ca ncer from this acciden t was found to be less than 10 chances in a billion.

impact or on heating in the fire, which burns for an hour before being extinguished. The

(Whelan et al. 1994).

probability of such an accident resulting in breach of the transport cask is estimated to be
9 x 10.7 or lower for 100 onsite shipments of FFTF fuel. The estimated freq uency for this
accident in the Dece ntralization Alternative has been adj usted to 6 x 10" per year based on the
A·19
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quanti ty of fue l that wo uld be handled in loading the dry storage facility. Volatiles, particulates,

An internal or external initiator that causes a breach followed by fire in a dry storage

and noble gases are released to the atmosphere. The estimated radionuclide releases are listed

facility would surely be noticed by nearby workers. In all likelihood, area radiation alarms would

in Table A-14, and the radiological consequences are presented in Table A-IS.

also sound. The assumed 12 wo rkers would immediately evacuate the area and, once at a safe

Table A-14. Estimated radionuclide releases for cask impact accide nt and fire at new dry
storage facility, based on FFTF fuel transport.
Release
(Ci)
Radionuclide

would be measured in minutes. The dose to close-in workers is speculated to be about 3 rem.

distance, wo uld move to a position upwind of the building. Evacuation time to that location

4.6
4.0
2.7
J.3
1.7
8.0
8.9
1.6
1.8
7.3
1.0

Tritium
Krypton-8S
Strontium-90
Ruthenium-106
Cesium-134
Cesium-137
Plutonium-238
Plutonium-239
Plutonium-240
Plutonium-24I
Americium-24 I

The maximum probability of latent fatal cancer from such a dose would be 0.00 I. The
postulated collective dose would amount to about 36 person-rem, from which no late nt cancer
fatalities would be expected.

E+OI
E+02
E-02
E+OO
E+OI
E+O I
E-04
E-03
E-03
E-02
E-03

A. 1_2 _3 New Fuel Stabilization Facility. The maximum reasonably foreseeable

radiological accident for fuel processing (either calcine or solvent extraction) is a uranium metal
fire in a storage vessel (DOE 1986b; Bergsman 1995). The frequ ency of this accident is
estimated at 10-' to 10'" per year. Releases for the accident from a new facility adjacent to the
200-East Area are listed in Table A-16. The total release assumes that fuel burns for a period
of 20 hours; therefore, doses to on site receptors were calculated on the basis that they were
exposed for 2 hours (or 10 percent of the total release, assuming a constant release rate for the
duration of the fire) . The consequences of the accide nt are listed in Table A- 17.

Table A-IS. Consequences of cask impact accident with fire at new dry storage facility.
Individual Impacts - Onsite and Offsite
Individual Resident
Public Access All Pathways
Without
Onsite Worker
Location
Ingestion
Dose (rem )
Fatal Cancer

1.2E+02
9.4E-02

Dose (pe rson-rem)
Fatal Cancers

Collective Dose to Population within 80 km
SO percent E/ Qb
9S percent E/ Q
All Pathways
Without
All Pathways
Without
Ingestion
Ingestion
8.0E+03
4.SE+Ol
1.6E+OS
9.OE+02
2.3E-02
8. 1E + 0 I
4.SE-0 I
4.0E + 00

7.6E-02
3.8E-OS

S.OE-02
2.5E-OS

a. The estimated potential dose to an offsite resident from the ingestion pathway is 10 rem.
In practice, the dose would be limited by protective action guidelines, which specify remedial
measures jf the potentia l dose is greater tha n O.S rem.
b. The term E/ Q refers to the time-i ntegrated air concentration at the receptor location for
an acute release. It is a nalogous to the X/ Q dispersion parameter used for a chronic release
scenario.
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This accident involves a uranium fire in a storage vessel with re leases of radioactive

material to the atmosphe re. There would be no added source of radiation exposure of the
close-in worker in the processing facility.

A,1 ,3 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative

Accidents and consequences would be essentially the same as those for the Decentralization Alternative.

A_1_4 Regionalization Alternative

Accidents and consequences would be essentiaUy the same as for the Decentralization
Alte rnative. The accident frequencies fo r a cask impact and fire at handling and storage
facilities were adjusted to acco unt for the quantity of imported or exported fuel handled in each
of the suboptions at a receiving and canning facility or in loading storage facilities. For
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Table A- 16. Estimated airborne radionudide release from shear/leach/calcine stabilization
facility as a result of maximum reasonably foreseeable accident (uranium metal fire in storage
vessel).
Previous Estimate of
Current Estimate of
Total
Available Material
Available Material
Curies
Release
(Ci)b
Il.adionudide
(Ci)'
Fraction
Released

Tritium
Carbon-14
Krypton-B5
Strontium-B9
Strontium-90
Yttrium-91
Zirconium-95
Ruthenium-103
Ruthenium-106
Antimony-125
Tellurium-127m
Tellurium-129m
lodine-129
10dine-131
Cesium-134
Cesium-137
Cerium-141
Cerium- 144
Prometh ium-147
Plutonium-23B
Plutonium-239
Plutonium-240
Plutonium-241
A mericium·241

3.20E+02

2.16E+02

IE+OO

2. 16E+02

2.60E-01

7.B4E-05

IE+OO

7.B4E-05

6.50E+03

4.12E+03

IE+OO

4.12E+03

1.90E+05

4.27E-16

IE-07

5.IOE+04

4.76E+04

IE-07

N/A'
4.76E-03

3.30E+05

5.03E-13

IE-07

N/A

4.BOE+05

2.44E-11

IE-07

N/A

1.20E+05

3.00E-22

IE-06

2.50E+05

3.B9E+02

IE-06

N/ A
3.B9E-04

9.40E+03

B.B2E+02

IE-07

B.B2E-05

6.90E+03

1.79E-06

IE-06

N/A

2.30E+03

I.B5E-2B

IE-06

1.90E-02

2.00E-02

IE-02

N/A
2.00E-04

4.IOE-01

0.00

IE-02

0.00

2.20E+04

1.04E+03

IE-06

1.04E-03

Table A-17. Consequences of uranium metal fire at fuel stabilization facility.
Individual Impacts - On site and Offsite
Individual Resident
Onsite Wo rker

Public Access
Location

All Pathways

Without
Ingestion

Dose (rem)

2.IE-04

4.4E-05

6.9E-03

2.7E-04

Fatal Cancer

B.3E-OB

2.2E-OB

3.4E-06

I.3E-07

Collective Dose to Population within BO km
50 percent E/Q'

All Pathways

Without
Ingestion

95 percent E/ Q

All Pathways

Without
Ingestion

Dose (person-rem)

9. IE+00

5.3E-OI

I.3E+02

7.3E+GO

Fatal Cancers

4.6E-03

2.6E-04

6.4E-02

3.6E-03

a. The term E/ Q refers to the time-integrated air concentration at the receptor location for
an acute release. It is analogous to the X/ Q dispersion parameter used for a chronic rel"ase
scenario.

Regionaliza tion A (all fuel except defense fuel would be shipped offsite) the frequency was
assumed to be the same as in Decentralization (6E-06 per year). The frequency in

6.40E+04

5.B7E+04

IE-06

5.B7E-02

Regionalization B (Western fuel comes to Hanford) is slightly higher (7E-06) because of the

7.BOE +04

6.0 I E-2B

IE-07

additional fuel that would be handled. The Regionalization C Alternative is assigned a lower

9.30E+05

2.27E+02

IE-07

N/A
2.27E-05

1.70E+05

1.57E+04

IE-07

1.57E-03
3.54E-05

frequency (5E-06) whe n all SNF is shipped offsite.

2.50E+02

3.54E+02

IE-07

7.70E+02

7.70E+02

IE-07

7.70E-05

4.:0E+02

4. IBE+02

IE-07

4. IBE-05

4.90E+04

3.I3E+04

IE-07

3.13E-03

5.60E+0 1

6.53E+02

IE-07

6.53E-05

which all DOE spe nt fuel at Hanford is transported offsite to another location for interim

4.34E+03

storage, and a maximum alternative that would result in storage of all DOE spent fuel at

TOTAL

A,1,5 Centralization Alternative

The CentraLization Alternative consists of two options at Hanford - a minimum option in

Hanford. Accident scenarios for the minimum option would include those discussed under the
a. Mixed (BO percent Mark IV, 20 percent Mark lA) N-fuel irradiated to 3,000 MWD / MTU,
cooled IBO days after discharge from reactor. Estimated 7 MTU uranium metal fuel burned
and radio nuclides released in 20 hours.
b. Mark lA N-fuel ( 100 percent) irradiated to 3,000 MWD/MTU, cooled 10 years after
discharge from reactor. Estimated 7 MTU uranium metal fuel burned and radionuclides
released in 20 hours.
c. N/ A = Not applicable.
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No Action Alternative prior to shipment of the fuel offsite. In addition, N reactor and SPR fuel
would be stabilized prior to shipment in a facility similar to the shear/ leach/ calcine facility
discussed under the Decentralization Alternative. The uranium metal fire accident discussed
under that alternative is assumed to be the maximum reasonably foreseeable accident fo r a
stabilization facility in this case as well. The estimated freq ue ncy for the cask impact a nd fire at
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storage or canning and shipping facilities has been adjusted to 5 x 10-6 per year based on the

which ones are of particular interest. The second type, presented in the Facility Costs section. is

quantity of fuel that would be handled in the centralization minimum alternative.

a general statement listing proposed process chemicals. The third type of list is an estimate of
proposed liquid effluents and airborne emissions, presented in the Facility Discharges section.

The maximum option contains suboptions for wet or dry fuel storage with processing

Effluent and emissions data are not presented for every option.

similar to those for the Decentralization Alternative, and the consequences are expected to be
essentially the same as those described previously. The estimated frequency for the cask impact

A.2.2 Baseline Chemical Inventory Based on Existing Facilities

and fire at a receiving and canning or dry storage facility has been adjusted to 8 x 10-6 per year
based on the quantity of imported fuel that would be handled in the Centralization Alternative,

A baseline inventory of chemicals kept in SNF facilities was developed from chemical

maximum option. The only additional installation that would be included in this option is the

inventories for these facilities that were compiled to comply with the Emergency Planning and

Expended Core Facility (ECF), which would be relocated from the [NEL. The consequences of

Community Right-To-Know Act. The existing storage facilities are 105-KE Basin, 105-KW

accidents at this facility are discussed in Volume I, Appendix D of this document. It should be

Basin, PUREX (202A), T Plant (22IT), 2736-ZB Building, 200W low-level burial grounds, Fast

noted that the accident evaluation for the ECF at Hanford in Appendix D uses assumptions that

Fuel Test Facility (FFTF) (403 Building), 308 Building, 324 Building, 325 A&B Building, and

are different from those used for the Hanford accidents in this attachment and therefore the

327 Building. The Emergency Planning and Comrr:unity Right-To-Know Act lists used are from

risks associated with the ECF at Hanford cannot be compared directly with

thos~

for the other

1992.

Hanford facilities presented here. The consequences of the ECF accidents using Hanford Site
assumptions would be higher than those presented in Appendix D.

Because most facilities have various missions, the need for an inventory of chemicals at

these facilities may not be related to the storage of SNF. The assumption is made that the

A.2 Nonradiological Accidents

existing inventories represent the amounts and types of chemicals that may be needed in the
future.

For purposes of the analysis, a worst·case accident scenario was developed for each
existing and planned facility. The details of the nonradiological accident scenario are presented
in this section . The scenario involves a chemical spill within a building, followed by an
enviro nmental release from the normal exhaust system.

[t

is assumed that the building remains

Table A-18 lists chemicals by facility, the regulated reportable quantity (RQ) in the event
of an environmental release, the maximum quantity stored, its physical state (gas, solid, liquid),
the reference where the chemical is listed, the hypothetical release fraction (I for gases, 0.1 for

intact but containment measures fail, allowing release to occur through the ventilation system.

liquids, and 0.01 for solids), the calculated total hypothetical chemical release, and the chemical's

It is assumed that all, or a portion of, the entire inventory of toxic chemicals stored in each

probable use.

building is released. The environmental releases are modeled and the hypothetical
concentrations at three receptor locations a re compared to toxicological limits.

In the table, a solid frame a round a number indicates that a stored quantity exceeds the
reportable quantity for that chemical; a double-lined frame indicates that a conservative
hypothetical accide ntal release would exceed the reportable quantity. A total of seventeen

A.2.1 Chemical Lists

chemicals fall in the latter category and have the highest probability to be released to the air.
Chemical inventory and chemical emissions lists have been developed provided by
alte rnati ve and facility (Bergsman 1995). These chemical lists are of three basic types. The first

These seventeen chemicals are the ones that would demand the highest attention in a n
emergency plan.

type is a "wo rst·case chem ical inventory," prepared to comply with the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-To-Know Act reporting requirement. For facilities that store SNF, this lists

Because a reportable quantity has not been defined for every chemical. the inherent
toxicity of each chemical was also considered in assessing its importance. The release fraction s
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used in the accidental spill scenario are conservative, higher than those reported in the literature
by as much as three orders of magnitude (Hickey et at. 1991).

A.2.3 Proposed FaCilities
Table A-19 is primarily derived from the Facility Costs section of the engineering design
data (Bergsman 1995). However, the 105·KE Basin is used as a surrogate for a baseline
chemical inventory for the wet storage facility because the Facility Cost section lists only sodium
hydroxide and sulfuric acid.

Table A·19 lists chemicals by facility, the regulated reportable quantity (RQ) in the event
of an environmental release, the maximum quantity stored, its physical state (gas, solid, liquid),
the reference where the chemical is listed, the hypothetical release fraction (1 for gases, 0.1 for
liquids, and 0.01 for solids), the calculated total hypothetical chemical release, and the chemical's
probable use. In the table, a solid frame around a number indicates that a stored quantity
exceeds the reportable quantity for that chemical; a double-lined frame indicates that a
conservative hypothetical accidental release would exceed the reportable quantity. A total of six
chemicals fall in the latter category and have the highest probability to be released to the air.
These six chemicals are the ones that would demand the highest attention in an emergency plan.

A.2.4 Atmospheric Modeling

Effects to onsite workers, the nearest point of pubic access, and the public at the nearest
offsite residence were estimated using the computer model EPIcode (DOE 1993b). EPIcode
uses a straight line Gaussian plume model and characteristics of an individual chemical to
estimate downwind concentrations independent of direction. The 95 percent meteorological
parameters were used to determine the wind speeds and stability class used for the simulation.
In each case, stability class F was used. Wind speeds of 0.89 meters per second (2.0 miles per
hour) were used for calculating effects to an on site worker, the nearest point of public access,
and at the nearest offs ite residence. Other criteria used in the model simulations can be found
in DOE (l993a).
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Table A-IS. Baseline Chemical Inventory for Existing Facilities in SNF Storage Locations
Facility/Chemical Name

105-KE
argon
chlorine
EDTA disodium salt
hydrogcn peroxide
methane
nitrogen
paraffin
PCB
potassium permanganate
sodium carbonate
sodium hydroxide
sodium metabisulfite
stannous chloride
sulfuric acid
105-KW
argon
chlorine
EDTA disodium salt
ethylene glycol
helium
hydrogcn peroxide
kerosene
lubricating oil
methane
nitrogen
polyacrylamide
potassium permanganate
sodi um carbonate
sodium hydroxide
sodium metabisulfite
stannous chloride
sulfuric acid
PUREX (202A)
bromochlorodinuoromcthane
bromotrinuoromethane
cadmium nitrate tctrahydrate
diesel fuel
EDTA disodium salt

RQ'
lb.

Maximum
Quantity Stored

Unitsb

na
10
na
na
na
na
na
1
100
na
1000
na
na
1000

42
9000
267.5
7
42
6
1485
4701
8.8
2.2
3000
4
133
3000

lb .
lb.
lb.
lb .
lb.
Ib
gal
lb .
lb .
lb .
gal
lb.
lb .
gal

na
10
na

16
9000
267.5
507.4
2
1.74
385
275
288
48
110
8.8
2.2
3000
1500
133
3000

Ib
lb .
lb .
lb.
lb .
lb.
gal.
gal.
lb.
lb .
gal.
lb .
lb.
gal
gal.
lb.
gal

g

308
1800
1488
10700
4

lb .
lb.
lb .
gal
lb.

g
g
I

na
na
10
na
na
na

100
na
1000
na
na
1000
na
na

10
na

Physical
State'

g

I
g
g
I
I

Ref. 3

I
2
2.1
2.1

0.01
0.1

I

0.1
0.1

2.1
2.1
2
2.1
2.1
2

s
I
g
1

Rele ase
Fraction'

2
2
3
1
2.1

1
g
g
I

JiJ; I

1
2.1
2
2
2
2
2

O.o!

O.o!
O.o!
0.1
0.01

Total
Release

42
90
2.675
0.7
42
6
148.5
470.1
0.088
0.022
300

O.o!

0.04
1.33

0.1

300

O.o!
O.o!
0.1
1
0.1
0.1
0.1
1
0.1

O.o!
O.o!
0.1

O.o!
O.o!
0.1

16
90
2.675
50.74
2
0.174

38.5
27.5
288
48
11
0.088
0.022
300
15
1.33
300
308
1800

0.1
0.1

148.8
1070

O.o!

0.04

Comments

Used to create an inert atmosphere.
For treatment of intake water.
Used for water analysis.
Cleaning and disinfection .
Fuel.
Used to create an inert atmosphere.
Shielding and insulation.
Transformer coolant.
Reagent.
Reagent and cleaner.
For water pH control.
Neutralizer.
Reagent . catalyst, and cleaner.
For water pH control.
Used to create an inert atmosphere .
For treatment of intake water.
Used for water analysis.
Antifreeze.
Used to create an inert atmosphere.
Cleaning and disinfection.
Fuel.
Equipment lubrication.
Fuel.
Used to create a nonnammable atmosphere.
Vinyl polymer.
Reagent.
Reage nt. cleaner.
For water pH control.
Neutralizer.
Reagent. catalyst. and cleaner.
For water pH control.
Halon fire extinguishers.
Halon fire exti nguishers.
Use unknown .
Fuel.
Used for chemical analysis.

Table A.IS (contd)
Faci lity/Chemical ;-.iame

»
I

IV
\0

ferris sulfamate
mercury
methanol
mineral oil
nitrogen
PCB
potassium pcnnanganate
sodium nuoride
sodium hydroxide
sodium metabisulfite
sodium nitrite
sufuric acid
T-Plan. (ZZm
argon
helium
methane
nitrogen
oxalic acid
phosphoric acid
potassium pennanganate
propane

Total
Release

0.1
0.1
0. 1
0.1

3.4
1

Maximum
Ouantity Stored

Unitsb

na

100
1000
1000
na
100
1000

320
34
10
2178
2520
1
3
10
1M3
6
2008
200

lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
cu ft
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb .
lb.

na
na
na
na
na
5000
100
na

940
200
20000
200
405
372
ZZO
1020

cu ft
cu ft
cu ft
cu ft
lb .
lb.
lb.
lb.

g
g
g
g

s
g

om

10
1000
100

1800
7600
800

lb.
lb.
lb.

s

om

18

0.01

76
8

na
na
na

6
87
10

lb.
lb.
lb .

na
na
na
na
10
10
1000

3500
880
160
1000

lb.
cu ft
lb.
cu ft
lb .
lb.
lb.

na
na

Physical
StateC

Release
FractionC

RO'
lb .

Ref. 3

I
g

0.1

om
s

0.01
0.1
0.01
0.1
0.1

s

om
0.1

32

20

Usc unknown.
Use unknown .
Fuel.
Coolant and equipment lubricant.
Used to create a nonnammable atmosphere.
Transfonner coolant.
Reagent
Use unknown .
For water pH control.
Neutralizer.
Reagent.
Battery acid.

940
200
20000
200
4.05
37.2
2.2

Used to create an inert atmosphere .
Used to create an inert atmosphere .
Fuel.
Used to create a nonnammable atmosphere .
Reagent.
Reagent, catalyst.
Reagent.

217.8
2520
0.1
0.03
0.1
184.3
0.06

200.8

1
1020

<

0

~

s:
:-:1
:-

>
-0
-0

".
Z

g
X

?
>
-0
~

:-

'"
'"
-0

sodium
sodium hydroxide
sodium nitrite
Z736-ZB Bldg
commercial adhesive
commercial clea ners
commercial lubricant
LL- burial Grounds
no chemical inventory noted
FITF (403 Bldg.)
argo n
argon
bromotrinuoromethane
helium
sodium
sodi um potassium alloy
s ulfuric acid

240000
Z780
12

Comments

om
I, s
I

I
g
g
g
I
I

0.1
0.1
0.1

0.6
8.7

Super 77 adhesive.
Comet. 409. ucta clean. 3c's window clea ner.
WD40.

0.1

350
880
160
1000

Used to create an inert atmosphere.
Used to create an inert atmosphere.
Halon fire extinguishers.
Used to create an inert atmosphere.
Industrial coolant.
Industrial coolant.
Reagent.

1

1
0.1
0.1
0.1

...3d.IQ

Fuel.
Industrial coolant.
For water pH control and as reagent.
Reagent.

24000
278
1.2

5
C:
s::

Table A. IS (co ntd)

:-

>

j

Z

s:X
?

>

~
-=

..::>

v.

»
~

Faci lity/Chemical :\"ame
308 Bldg
l.2-c· hJ ncdiol
ace tone
acetylene
a rgo n
bromotnnuo ro methane
chem reage nts. wet lab
E DTA disodium sa lt
ethyl alcoh o l
et hyle ne glycol
glyce nnc
heat transfer 011
helium
hydroge n/ argo n ml.x
hydroquinone
liqu id nitrogen
methane/a rgon mIx
minerdl o il
nItrogen
oxyge n
potassi um pcrmanganatc
odiu m hlsulfi te
stoddard solvent
sulfur hexan uo ndc
ulfun c acid
tergllo l
x- ray fIlm ( Ag)
324 Bld~
acetylene
alkyl dImethyl hen?yl
ammo nIum
argon
bl. -tn- n-hut),ltin o." dc
ca rho n d,o.x,dc
helium
nitroge n
oxyge n
po ly oedm l ethylene
dlChl o ndc
potassIu m h ~dro)(ldc

RO a
Ih .

\1aximum
Ouantity 'ito red

na

18832

Cnltsb

Physical
St3te C

RcfJ

Z

Release
Fraction'

Total
Release

0. 1
0.1

1883.2
0.1
20
832
95

0.01
0. 1
0.\
0.1
0.1

0.01
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.01

0.04
4.8
201.5
0.\
23.5
408
598
4.5
6227.5
104
23.5
-119942
20
2
0.02
1.1
53.9
15.7
-1 .1
27. 1
690
0.5

Welding.
Degreaser. Dearcide 7\1 ( 14-200) .
Used to crea te an inert atmosphere .
Degreaser. Dearcide 717 ( 14-200).
t.:se unknown .
Used to create an inen atmosphere.
Used to create a nonnammable atmosphere .
Welding.
t.:se unk nown . Dearcide 722 ( 1-1-730)

II
539
157
-II
2710

Ih .
gal
lb.
Ih .
Ih .
lb .
lb.
lb .
gal
lb .
gal
lb .
lb .
gal
gal
lb.
gal
lb.
lb .
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
gal
Ih.
Ih.

na
5000

690
5

cu ft
gal

g
I

1.2
1.2

0. 1

na
na
na
na
na
na

1250
5
250
21
-156
(.20

cu ft
gal
Ih .
cu ft
cu ft
cu ft
gal

g
I
g
g
g
g

1.2
1.2

0.1

I

na
na
na

20
832
95
> .1

na
na
na
na
na
~a

na
na
na
na
na
na
100
5000
na
na
lfXlO
na

-I
-18
2015
I
235
408
598
-15
62275
104
235
-I 19942
20

16
II /(M)

I
g
g
g
mLxe d

1.2
1.2
1.2
I

Z
1.2
I

1.2
1.2

g
g

I
0.\
0.1

g

1.2

g
g
g

1.2

I

2
2
2

I.g
2

?

1.2

I
0. 1

1250
0.5
250
213
456
620
1.6

1.2

0. 1

1.8

1.2
1.2
1.2
1.2

gal

c...

0.1

1.c3

Comments

t.:se unknown .
Solvent.
Welding.
Used to create an inert atmosphere.
Halon fire ext inguishers.
Assorted laboratory reagents in small quantities.
Used for chemical analysis.
Solvent
Antifreeze .
Reage nt.
Coolant.
Used to create an inen atmosphere.
Use unknown
Use unknown
:\"o nnammable coolant.
C se unknown .
Coolant and equipment lubricant.
Used to create a no nnammable atmosphere.
Welding.
Reagent.
Used for chemical analysis.
WD40.
Electrical system.
Reagent.
Detergent and surfactant . no nox),Tlol.
Photographic plates.

t.:se unknown. Dearborn 727 ( 1-688)

Table A.IS (contd)
Facili ty/Chemical Na me

»

W

<

0

r

c:
:.::

(":'1

=->

-0

-0

m

Q
X

'?>

>
-0

c:

r

;0

""
Vo

325 Bldg
acetyle ne
alumi num
aluminum oxide
aluminum sulfate dihydrate
a mmo nium bicarbonate
ammonium nitrate
a rgon
boric acid
calcium carbonate anhydrous
calcium chic ride
calcium nitrate
carbon
carbon dioxide
ceric ammonium nitrate
chern reagents. wet lab
disodium phosphate
graphite
helium
hydronuoric acid gas
hydrogen nuoride
magnesiu m chloride
mercury
mineral oil
nitric acid
nitrogen
oxalic acid
oxygen
paraffin
phosophorus pcntoxide
phosphoric acid
poly oedmi ethylene
dichloride
potassiu m chloride
potassi um hydroxide
sod ium borate
sodium carbonate
sodium chloride
sodium hydroxide
sodium hypochlorite

RQo
lb .

Maximum
Quantity Stored

na
na
na
5000
5000
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na

360
10
24
II
50
23
250
20
22
20
230
9
100

na
na
na
100
100
na
na
1000
na
na
na
na
na
5000

na
1000
na
na
na
1000
100

ISO
<5
50
10
213
5
10
53
5

n
14
3270
27
220
44

7
16
4
110
64
33
2107
6
26

Unitsb

cu ft
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
cu ft
lb .
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb .
lb .
cu ft
lb .
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb .
lb.
lb.
lb.
cu ft
lb.
lb.
lb .
gal
lb.
gal
lb .
lb.
lb .
lb .
gal

Physical
State C

Ref. J

g

1.2

s

g
I.s

1,2
1.2
2
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.2

mixed
s
I
g
g
I

I
g
s
g
I

1.2
2
1.2

1,2
1.2
1.2
1.2
2
1.2
1,2
1,2
1
1,2

1.2

3!cL{-

om
om
om
0.01
0.1

om
om
om
I

om

Total
Release

360
0.1
0.24
0.11
0.5
0.23
250
2
0.22
0.2
2.3
0.09
100
1.5

I
1.2
1,2
1,2
2

1.2

s
s
s
s

0.01

0.01

s

g

Rel ease
Fract ion'

1,2
1,2

1.2
1,2
1.2
1,2

0.01
0.1

0.1
0.01
0.1
0.1
0.1

I
0.01
0.1
0.01
0.1
0.1
0.01
0.1

om
om
0.01

om
0.1

0.5
213
5
1
0.53
0.5
7.7
1.4
3270
0.27
220
4.4
0.07
1.6
0.4
\.I

6.4
0.33
21.07
0.06
0.26
0.1

Comments

Welding.
Reagent.
Reagent.
Reagent.
Reagent.
Reagent.
Used to create an inert atmosphere.
Reagent.
Reagent.
Reage nt.
Reagent.
Reagent.
Reagent.
Reagent.
Assorted laboratory reagents in small quantities.
Reagent.
Reage nt.
Used to create an inert atmosphere .
Re u ~e nt.

Reagent.
Reagent.
Use unknown.
Coolant and equipment lubricant.
Reagent.
Used to create a nonnammable atmosphere .
Reagent.
Welding.
Shielding.
Reagent.
Reagent.
Use unknown , Dearcide 722 (14.730)
Reagent.
Use unknown , Dearborn 727 (1-688)
Reagent.
Reagent.
Reagent.
Reagent.
Reagent.

<

0

r

C

s::

r.1

Table A.IS (contd)

:-

>

"'0
"'0

Facility/Chemical

arne

RQ·
lb.

Maximum
Quantity Stored

100
na
na
na
1000

102
15
100
12

Unitsb

Physical
State C

Ref. J

Release
Fraction'

Total
Release

s
s
s

1.2
1,2
1.2

0.01
0.01
0.01

0.69
1.02
0.15

s

1.2
1.2

om

Comments

tTl

%
0

X
?>
>
"'0
C!

r

'"
-0

VI

sodium nitrate
sodium sulfate
sulfamic acid
sulfur
sulfuric acid
zinc
zinc nitrate
zinc oxide
327 Bldg
poly oedmi ethylene
dichloride
potassium hydroxide
trich loro-s-t riazinet rione

69

100
11

lb .
lb .
lb.
lb .
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.

6

gal

33
50

gal
Ib

2
1000
na

1000
na

2
1.2
1.2

I.s

om
om

1.2
0.02
1
0.11

Reagent.
Reagent.
Reagent.
Reagent.
Reagent.
Reagent.
Reagent.
Reagent.

0.1

0.6

Use unknown. Dearcide 722 (14-222)

0.1
0.1

3.3
5

Use unknown. Dearborn 727 (1-688)
Use unknown. Dearcide 730 (14-730)

0.1
0.01

a. RQ = CERCLA Reportable Quantity
b. lb. = pound: gal = gallon: cu ft = cubic feet
c. I = liquid: s = solid: g = gas
d . EPCRA reports 1992 (1): Bergsman 1995 (2): EPCRA tier It report . 1992 (3)
e. Fraction of stored chemical released in accidental spill scenario: 1.0 = gases: 0.1 = liquids: 0.01 = solids
f. NA = not applicable
bold = indicates a stored quantity that exceeds the RQ for that chemical
bold/italic = indicates an accidental release that exceeds the RQ for that chemical or chemical is highly toxic.

Table A-19. Baseline Chemical Inventory for Proposed Facilities
Facility/Chemical Na me

:>
~

',;.)

Wet Storage Facility
a rgon
chlo rine
EDTA disodium salt
hydrogen peroxide
methane
nitrogen
paraffin
PCB
potassi um perrnanganate
sodium camonate
sodium hydroxide
sodium melabisulfite
sta nnous chloride
sulfuric acid
Vault Dry Storage Facility
a rgon
decon soap
Casks Dry Storage Facility
decon soap

<

Q
C:
:;:

,.,
:-

>

-0

"'='
r.:
Z

0

X

?
>
'":l
C!

~

'"

Shrar-uach-Calcinr Stabilization Facility
argo n
b romotrinuoro methane
ceram ic formers
diesel fuel
grease
mineral oil
nitric acid
nitrogen
oxygen
pa raffin
propa ne
propylene glycol
sodi um ca m onate
sodium hydroxide
sodi um nitrile
sul fu n c acid

RQ3
(lb .)

Maximum
Quantity Stored

nat

42
9000
2675
7
42
6
1485
4701
8.8
2.2

10
na
na
na
na
na
100
na
1000
na
na
1000

3000
4
133
3000

Unitsb

lb.
lb.
lb.
lb .
lb .
Ib
ga l
lb.
lb.
lb .
gal
lb.
lb.
gal

Physical
Sta te<

g

I
g
g
I
s
s
s
s

Ref. d

b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b,a
b
b
b,a

Release
Fraction e

Total
Release

0.1

42
90
2.675
0.7
42
6
1485
470.1
0.088
0.022
300
0.04
1.33
300

Used to create an inert atmosphere .
For treatment of intake water.
Used for water analysis.
Cleaning and disinfection .
Fuel.
Used to create an inert atmosphere .
Shielding and insulation.
Transformer coolant.
Reagent.
Reagent and cleaner.
For water pH control.
Neutralizer.
Reagent. catalyst, and cleaner.
For water pH control.
Used to create an inert atmosphere.
Decontamination of workers &
equipment

om
0.01
0.1

0.1
0.1
0.01

om
0.1
0.01

om

na
na

940
90

cu ft
lb.

g
s.1

a
a

I
0.1

940
9

na

90

lb .

s,l

a

0.1

9

na
na
na
10
na
na
1000
na
na
na
na
na
na
1000
100
1000

15200
1000
unk
20000
100
5000
1000000
1500
100
200
100
200
1500
50000
5000
25000

lb.
lb.
lb .
lb .
lb .
lb.
lb.
Ib
lb .
lb .
lb .
lb.
lb.
lb .
lb .
lb .

g,l
g
s

a
a
a
a
a

~&~

a
I
g
I
g
I

a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a

Comments

0.01
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
I
0.1
I
0.1
0.01
0.1
0.1
0.1

15200
1000
unk
2000
10
500
1()()(J()()
1500
100
20
100
20
15
5000
500
2500

Decontamination of workers &
equipment
Used to create an inert atmosphere.
Halon fire extinguishers.
Solidifiers
Fuel.
Equipment lubricant
Coolant and equipment lubricant.
Reagent.
Used to create an inert atmosphere .
Oxidizer
Shielding and insulation.
Fuel.
Reagent.
Reagent and cleaner.
For water pH contro l.
Reagent.
For water pH contro l.

<
0

r

c:
s::
m

Table A.19 (contd)

:-

>
"':l

Faci lity/Chemi cal Na me

RQa
(lb .)

Maxi mum
Quantity Stored

U nitsb

na
na

15200
1000
1500
1000
20000
1000
5000
100
1000
1500
1500
40000
678
5000
1000000
1500
2000
100
200
1000
100
200
1500
25
50000
5000
5000
25000
2000
5000

lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
Ib
lb.
lb.
lb .
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb .

g. 1
g
I
g

25200
1000
1000
20000
100
5000
100000

lb .
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
It>

g.\
g
g
I

Physical
Sta te"

Ref.d

Re lease
Fraction C

Total
Release

Comme nts

"':l

tTl

Z

"
;>
X

>
"':l
C
r

::=;

V>
""

»

.~
~

Solvent Extraction Fuel Stabilization Faci lity
argon
bromotrinuoromethane
cadmium nitrate tetrahydrate
ca rbon dioxide
diese l fuel
ferric nitrate
ferris sulfamate
grease
hydrazi ne
hydrogen peroxide
hydroxylamine nitrate
kerosene
lubricating oil
mineral o il
nitric acid
nitroge n
oxalic acid
oxyge n
paraffin
potassi um pennanganate
propane
pro pylene glycol
sodiu m carbona te
sodiu m nuoride
sod ium hydroxide
sodium nitrite
s ulfa mic acid
s ulfuric acid
ta rtaric acid
tribut}'l phosphate
Fuel Drying a nd Passh'ation Facility
a rgon
bro mot rinuorometh a ne
ca rbon d iox ide
diese l fuel
grease
mine ral oi l
nitroge n

na
10
na
na
na
na
na
10
na
na
1000
na
na
na
na
100
na
na
na
1000
1000
100
na
1000
na
na
na
na
na

10
na
na
na

~ /O r;

s
g

g

a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a

15200
1000
0.1

150
1000

0.1

2000

om

10
500
10

0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1

om
0.1
0.01
1
0.1
0.01
0.01
0.1
0.1
0.1
0. 1
0.01

om

I
0.1
0.1
0. 1

100
150
150

4000
67.8
500

100000
1500
20
100
20
10
100
20
IS
0.25

5000
500
500

2500
20
50
25200
1000
1000

2000
10
500
100000

Used to create an inert at mosphe re .
Halon fire extinguishers.
Use unknown .
Usc unknown .
Fuel.
Reagent.
Use unknown .
Equipment lubri cant
Reage nt.
Cleaning and disinfectio n.
Reagent.
Fue l.
eq uipment lubricant
Coolant and equipment lubricant.
Reagent.
sed to create an inert atmosphere.
Reagent.
Oxidizer
Shielding and insulation .
Reagent .
Fuel.
Reage nt.
Reagent a nd cleaner.
Use unknown.
For water pH control.
Reage nt.
Reage nt.
For water pH control.
Reage nt .
Reagent.
Used to crea te an ine rt atmosphere .
Halon fire extinguishers.
Use un known .
Fuel.
Equipment lubricant
Coolant and equ ipment lubricant.
Used to create an inert a tmosphere .

Table A.19 (eontd)
Facili ty/C hcmil'al :'\lame
oxyge n
pardffi n
propa ne
propyle ne glycol
sodi um hydroxide
sodi um nitrite
su lfuric acid
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

:-

RQ'
(lb .)

\1axi mum
Quanti ty Stored

na
na
na
na
1000
100
1000

10000
200
100
200

5000
5000
25000

nits b
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb .

Physica l
State<

Refd

Release
Fracti on '

Tota l
Release

a
a
a
a
a
a
a

0.1
I
0.1
0.1
0.1
0. 1

10000
20
100
20
500
500
2500

g
I
g
I

RQ = CE RClA Reportable Quantity
lb. = pound : gal = gallon: cu ft = cubic feet
I = liq uid: 5 = solid: g = gas
a: Bergsman 1995 h: Chem ica l inventory o f 105-KE Basin (as surrogate chemical inve ntory)
Fraction uf sto red chemical released in accidenta l spill scenario: 1.0 = gases; 0.1 = liquids; 0.01 = solids
r\A = not a pplicable.

Comments
Oxidize r
Shieldi ng a nd insulatio n.
Fuel.
Reagent.
For wate r pH cont rol.
Reagent.
For wate r pH control.

A.2.5 Toxicological Limits

Results from the EPlcode model were compared to available Emergency Response

ATIACHMENTB
EVALUATION OF OPTION FOR FOREIGN PROCESSING OF SPENT
NUCLEAR FUEL CURRENTLY LOCATED AT THE HANFORD SITE

Planning Guideline (ERPG) values. Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH ) va lues.

B.1 Description of Foreign Processing Alternative

and Threshold Limit Values/ Time· Weighted Averages. In the absence of these values.
toxicological data for similar health e ndpoi nts. obtai ned from the Registry of Toxic Effects for
Chemica l Substances (RTEC). are used.

This opt ion was considered in response to a public comment requesti ng that fo reign processing
of N Reactor spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from the Hanford Site be add ressed as a reasonable

Emergency Response Planning Guidelines are estima tes of airborne concentration

alte rnative to domestic stab il izat ion and storage. Unde r this alternative. the SNF currently stored

thresholds above which one can reasonably an ticipate observing adverse effects (DOE 1993b).

in basins at the 100·K Area of the Hanford Site would be packaged for shipmen t to a n overseas

Emergency Response Planning Guideline values are specific fo r a substance a nd are divided into

facility where it would be processed. Only production reactor fuel stored at the 100·K Basins was

th ree ge nera l severity levels: ERPG·1. ERPG·2, and ERPG·3. ERPG·I values result in an

considered in this a nalysis because it represents a large q ua ntity of relatively homogenous material

unacceptable likelihood that one would experience mild tra nsient adverse health effects or

that would require stabilization in order to be suitable fo r 40·yea r storage. SmaU quantities of

perception of a clea rly defined objectionable odor (DOE 1993b). ERPG·2 values res ult in an

other types of fuel curre ntly stored at Hanford either wou ld not require stabilization or wou ld have

unacceptable likelihood that one would experience or develop irreversible or other serious

sufficie ntly diffe rent characteristics that they could not be stabilized efficiently by a single·process

health effects or symptoms that could impair one's abili ty to take protective action (DOE

facility.

1993b). ERPG·3 values result in an unacceptable likelihood that one would experience life·
threatening health effects ( DOE 1993b).

This ana lys is assumes that high·leve l waste (HLW) arising from the process wou ld be re turned
to Hanforu for interim storage. although it could potent ially be stored overseas until a uomt.'stic

For many chem icals. ERPG levels a re not defined. In these instances. Threshold Limit

repository wa s available in which to perm ane ntly dispose of it, Similarly. ura nium a nd plutonium

Value / Time· Weighted Average (TLV / TWA) values a re substituted for ERPG·I values. Ten

resulting from the processing we re presumed to be re turned to Ha nford for interim storage;

pe rce nt of Immediately Dange rous to Life or Health (IDLH ) values are substituted for ERPG·2

howt!\'er. th ese material s could also be stored overseas until a decision is made on th eir di sposit ion

values. and IDLH values are substituted for ERPG·3 values (DOE 1993b).

Da ta from RTEC were used for eight che mica ls. Acute toxicity data we re utilized to

by th e U.S. Depa rtm ent of Energy (DOE) .
Th ~ following analysis was undert aken despit e substantial uncertaintie s co nce rnin g th e

ge ne rate exposure lim its to approximate the ERPG endpoints .. irritat ion/ odor. irreversihle

feas ihilit y of long-di stance transport of S IF in its current condi tion from th e H anford Sit e.

hea lth e ffects. a nd death .

Approxi mately half of the SNF is curre ntly stored unde rwa te r at the IOO· K West Bas in in sea leu.
\'t! nl t! d contai ners. amJ th e:! remaining fud is at IOO-K East Basin in containers th at are open to

All references for Attachment A are included
in Chapter 7 flf this Appendix

w;'lter.

Efforts to l:haracterize the physical anu chemical stat e of the SNF are just ge tt ing under-

way, antI th ose studies may reduce th e unce rt ainties associated with long-di stance transport of thi s

SN F.

The Sr\ F sh ipme nt wou ld he retlu ireu to meet ",.ttianal and international regulations
spel'i fying i nt ~gr ity of th~ cas k s~a l in the eve nt of internal pressure build*up. acce pt ab l~ gas
co nc:c ntr;'lt ions inside th e cask. anu allowable quantities of di spersible radionuclitles. Beca use th e
\ '(J I.C~I E
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defe nse p rod uct ion reac to r SNF suffered dam age during handling an d discharge fro m the reactors.

B.2.1 Shipping Scenarios

and hecause it was not des igned fo r lo ng-term du rability in wet sto rage. a substant ial fract ion o f
the! fuel elements have degraded during th e time since reactor operati ons cea sed ( ranging from 7

to more th an 20 yea rs). The Ha nford SNF in its present co nditio n may not meet th ese

Pote nt ia l ship pi ng scena rios a re d esc rihed in th is option for transporting irradiat ed N Reac tor
fue l fro m th e Hanford Site to the U.K. . and the re turn o f se parated pluto nium. ura nium. a nd HLW

requ irements hecause o f the q ua ntity of dispersible rad ionuclides in damaged and corroding SN F.

to H anford . All scenarios assume stabilizatio n and packaging. as necessary. of the SNF cur rent ly

o r hecause of he at ge nera tion and possible buildup of gases within the shipp ing contai ne r th at

sto red in th e IOO·K A rea Basins on th e Hanford Site. From th e 100 Area. th e SNF wou ld he

might result fro m reactions betwee n SNF and wa ter in the wet overpack.

loaded fo r onsi te or offsi te transport as required for each scenario. Offsite tra nsport would take
place via e ither barge. truck. or rail to a port designated as a "facility of part icular haza rd" in

If the Hanford fuel were not ah le to mee t th e tra nsportation require ments. th e overseas

acco rd a nce with 33 CFR 126. where th e shipment wo uld be loaded onto a ship for overseas

processing a lternative would necessitate additional expen se and risk to stab ilize th e fuel o r to

transport. The ove rseas segmen t of the shipm ent was assum ed to utilize purpose·b uilt ships typica l

divide th e shipments into sma ller quantities th a n assumed for the prese nt a na lysis. pe rh aps to th e

o f those em ployed by th e rep rese nt at ive processing facility in th e U.K. for shi pping SNF ( BNFL

extent th at it might prove to be impractica l altogether. The overland transport evaluation

1994). Such a system wo uld li kely be necessary if Hanford SNF were to be shipped wit hout prior

presented ir. Volume I. Appendix 1 of this EIS assumed th at Hanford SNF was in a stabilized form

sta hiliza tio n beca use alterna tive carri ers would presumably no t have either the equip ment or

prior to shipment. as described in this appe nd ix. Because o f th e uncertainties surrounding th e

expe rtise req uired for lo ng·dista nce tra nsport of metaUic SNF in a wet ove rp ack. If th e SNF were

feasibili ty of long·distance transport of Han ford SNF in its present condition. and to be co nsiste nt

stabilized befo re shipment. a va rie ty of commercial o r military shipping options might be available

with the ove rl a nd transport a nalysis in Appendix I. the SNF for ove rseas shipment is a lso

(see DOE 1995 for a disc ussion of th ose options).

pres um ed to be stahilized prior to shipme nt or is limited to e lemen ts th at are sufficie ntly int act
that th e req uirements of th e tra nsportation regulations could be met usi ng a wet overpack shipping

Afte r process ing of the SNF. th e products a nd wastes were assu med to be returned to H a nfo rd

system. The shipment quantities assum ed in the ove rseas transport a nalysis include th e total mass

for interim sto rage via th e sa me U .S. seaport a t which the initial shipments exited th e co untry.

of SNF estim ated to be in the K Basins. although so me of the SNF is known to exist as co rro sio n

T he thr ee mate rials addressed in the a nalysis for the return shipments are plutonium. ura nium.

products a nd sludge. which would not be suit able for shipment without prior treat men t to co nve rt

and HLW. It was assum ed that the separated plutonium and uranium would be converted to oxide

th e m into a less dispersible form.

fo rms and shipped to the U.S. aboard a pu rp ose·built ship similar to th at used for tra nspo rting the
irradi a ted fuel. Other transport options might also be available for these materi als. incl ud ing use

B.2 Methods and Assumptions

of military o r co mmerci al ships o r aircraft. High·level waste was assu med to be processed to a
stahle form (ho rosil icate glass encased in sta inless steel ca nisters) before ship me nt. This secti on

The following sections describe th e methods used to evaluate potential co nsequ e nces of th e

p rov ides descr ip tions of the shi ppi ng scenarios. transpo rtation a nd packagi ng systems. radiological

ove rseas processing optio n. The a nal,-sis focu ses on the activities associated with tra nsportation o f

char acteristics o f th e shi pments. tra nsportation routes, a nd port fa cilities th at were exa mined in

th e SNF to th e United Kingdom (U.K.) for processing and return of th e waste a nd products to the

th is analysis.

U.S. The a nalys is also includes activities at Hanford to prepare th e SNF for shipme nt •• s well as
th ose associated with transpo rt a nd processing o f the SNF within the U .K .• to th e ex tent th at

8 .2 . 1. 1 Port Selection. Port s eva lu ated for th e foreign processing optio n were chose n to

inform at ion was avai lahle. In fo rm ati on fro m an overseas processing facility located in th e U.K.

minimize either the overl and or ocea n segments of th e shipments and to provid e a reason able

was used as th e has is fo r this eva lua ti o n ( BNFL 1994 ). However. th e use o f th ose faciliti es as a

range o f alte rn ative transpo rt atio n modes between th e H anfo rd Site and the port (i.e .. ba rge.

represe ntative case wo uld no! precl ude processing of SNF from H a nfo rd at anot her suitable

truck. or rail). Fo r the purposes of th is eval uatio n. two pote ntia l West Coast U .S. ports

overseas installation.

(Seatt le/ T acoma. Washingt o n. a nd Po rt land. Oregon) a nd one potential East Coast port ( Norfolk.
Vi rginia) we re eva luated for th e overla nd tra nsportation a nalys is. Pop ul ation densit ies alo ng th e
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routt:s to th est: ports are representati ve of those in th e vicinity of many major U.S. seaport s. In

B.2.1.3.2 Truck/ Rail to the Port of Seattle, Transoceanic Shipment to the UK. T he

addition, the port of Newark, New Jersey, was included in th e port acc ident analysis to estimat e

fi rst leg of this scenario is different from the barge· to· Portland scena ri o in tha t the shipping casks

the conseque nces of an acciden t in a loca tion wi th a very high sur rounding population.

wou ld be loaded at the K Basins a nd sh ipped directly to the Port of Seattle, Washington, for tra ns·
loading onto the ocean·going vessel. The overland leg would consist of either truck or rail

B.2 . 1.2 Overseas Transport. The ro uting for overseas transpo rt fro m West Coast U.S.

ports wo uld include transit via the Columbia Rive r or Puget Sound to the Pacific Ocean.

d

sh ipments. It was assu med that one shipping cask would be tra nsported per truck shipment or two
casks per rail shipme nt. After arriva l at th e Port of Seattle, the shipping casks would be tra ns·

southe rly route through the Panama Ca nal or aro und Cape He rn in South America , a nd then

loaded on to the ocean·going vessel and when a shipload of casks had been loaded, the ship wo uld

north to th e U ,K. The rout e around th e cape is considered because it ma ximizes th e distance th at

sail th ro ugh Puget Sound a nd the Strait of Juan de Fuca to the Pacific Ocean, travel south via

a shipment might be req uired to travel, a nd the refore, provides a n upper bound for risks

either the Pa nama Canal or Cape Horn , a nd then north to the U.K. After processing, the

associated with the ocean transport segment. H owever, a route via th e Panama Canal would be

uranium, plutonium, a nd vitrified HLW would be returned to the U.S. by ship via Seattle a nd

preferable for West Coast shipments because it avoids potential risk associa ted with the added

finally to Hanford by truck or rail.

dista nce and adverse weat he r conditions that might be encounte red during transport around the
cape. Tra nsport via an East Coast U.S. port would be directly across the Atla ntic Oce.n to the

B.2 . 1.3 . 3 Truck/Rail to the Port of Norfolk, Virginia, Transoceanic Shipment to

U. K. The total distance for ocean transpor t via the West Coast is app roxima tely 7,000 na ut ica l

the U.K. This scenario would be similar to the truck/ rail to Seattle scenario except the inter-

miles via the Panama Canal or 17,000 nautica l miles via Cape Horn; that fnr the East Coast is

mediate port would be Norfolk, Virginia . Similar to the Port of Seattle scenario, the shipping

approximately 3000 nautical miles.

casks wo uld be loaded aboard the ocean·going vessel and shipped to the U.K. This shi pping
scena rio maxim izes the overl and transport leg and minimizes the ocea n travel distance, As with

B.2 . 1. 3 Overland Transport Scenarios. Ove rland tra nsport between the Ha nford Site and

overseas shipping ports was evaluated for three different scena rios, as described in the fo llowing

the ot he r two shi pping scenari os, the solidified HLW, plutonium oxide, a nd uranium oxide
mate rials we re assu med to be returned to Hanford via Norfolk.

sections.

8 .2.2 Shipping System Descriptions
B.2 . 1.3 . 1 Barge to Portland, Transoceanic Shipment to the U.K. This scenario begins

with cask loading operations at the Hanford Site 100·K Area Basins. The shipping casks wou ld be

T his sect ion presents descript ions of the shipping cask a nd truck, rail, and barge shipping

loaded with SNF a nd prepared for truck transport to the Port of Benton barge slip near the

syste ms that are used in the three potentia l shippi ng scenarios. The informa tion presented focuses

300 A rea of the Hanford Site. After arriva l at the barge slip, the shipping casks wo uld be

on the parameters importa nt to the impact calculations, na mely the cargo capacities a nd radio·

transloaded onto the barge via crane a nd the n secured to the deck of the barge. After a fu ll load

nuclide invent ories.

of casks was secured, the barge would depa rt for the Port of Portland, Oregon, traveling down the
Colu mbia River through routinely navigated shipping chan ne ls. At the Port of Portland, the
shipping casks would be lifted off the barge and placed aboard a shi p for the overseas segme nt of

The shipping cask assumed to be used for the SNF shipme nts from Hanford to the U.K. is a
standard design routinely used for commercial SNF transport (BNFL 1994). The cask could tra ns·

the jou rney. The shipping casks wo uld then be secured, and the ship wo uld depart for the U.K.

port approx imately 5 tons of in tact fue l (with a smaUe r capacity for damaged fuel). The loaded

Afte r processing of the SNF, the HLW shipments were assumed to return via Portla nd, where the

cask weight is about 46 tons. so it was ass umed that one cask could be tra nsported per highway

ma te rial wo uld be transloaded onto a rail ca r a nd tra nsported to Hanford for inte rim storage.
Shipments of uranium a nd plutonium oxide wo uld be returned to H anford by truck.
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shirment and two pe r rail shipment. The capacities of the barge and shir were assumeJ to he
2~
I

ca : ks each . A total of 17 transoceanic shipments would be required to accommodate the 40X

ca skk)aJ that would be necessary to ship aU Hanford SNF. The actual number of shipments
req uired would depend on the number of casks available, or on procurement of a sufficient
n'Jmber of new casks to provide for efficient shipment of Hanford SNF on a reasonable schedule.

The ra dionuclide inventories for the SNF shipments were determined using the information on
N Reactor fuel inventories presented in Bergsman (1994) . The resulting radionuclide inventories
for the three types of shipments (truck. rail, and barge/ship) are presented in Table B-1.

The return sh ipments of HL Wand plutonium and uranium oxide were assumed to be shipped
vi a the :mme routes used for overseas shipment of Hanford SNF. For the barge to Portland
option, these materials were assumed to be returned to the U .S. by ship to the Port of Portland,
where HLW shipping casks would be transloaded onto a barge and uranium and plutonium onto
trucks for transport to Hanford. Similarly for the other options, the materials would be transported by ships to the ports of Norfolk or Seattle, transloaded onto truck or rail shipping systems.
and transported to Hanford.

The number of shipments of solidified HL W was estimated using assumed shipping cask
capacit:es for HL W. It is estimated that a total of 500 contain'e rs of vitrified HL W, each weighing
about 500 kg, would result from processing the N Reactor SNF (BNFL 1994). The U .K.
processing facility has designed a new 11O-ton shipping cask for vitrified H L W that would be
capable of carrying 2 1 HL W containers pe r shi ment. Therefore, about 24 caskloads would be
required to return the HLW to the U.S. This material was assumed to be transported to a U.S.
port facility in one shipment and then transloaded onto a rail car for the overland shipment
segment (the HLW cask is too large to be transported by regular truck service). The actual
number of shipments required would depend on the number of HL W casks available or on
procurement of a sufficient number of new casks to provide for efficient re turn shipment of HLW
on a reasonable schedule.
The radionuc1ide inventories for the solidified HL W shipments are prese nt ed in T abl e B-\.
These inventories were calculated by dividing the total quantity of each radionuc1id e shipp ed to
the U.K. (exclusive of uranium and plutonium ) by the numbe r of HLW cas ks (24) to be re turn ed
to the U.S.
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Table IH . Facility and tran sport mode raJiunucliJe inve ntury J evd o pm c: nt J
Curies/Shipping Cask c

Cu ries/S hi pm e nt b
Ratlionudid e

Curies/ MT U Gram s/ MTU

Total Curic.
in S F

Shipments
Duration

cp

Truck

Rai l

Barge

HLWd

Plutonium
Oxidec

Uranium
Oxidec

40~

204

17

24/1

186

236

5 ycars

5 yea rs

5 years

7 months

2.3 years

2.9 years

H3

4.59E+OI

C).ME + 04

2.36E+02

4.73E + 02

5.67E+03

4.02E+03

Fe-55

1.22E+Ol

2.56E+04

6.28E +01

1.26 E + 02

l.S1E +03

1.07E + 03

Co-60

8.78E +OO

1.84E+04

4.52E +O l

9.04E + Ol

1.08E+03

7.68E +02

Kr-8S

8.07E +02

1.69E+06

4.1SE+03

8.3 1E + 03

9.97E+04

7.06E+04

Sr-90

9.32E +03

1.96E + 07

4.80E +04

9.S9E+04

1.1SE + 06

8.16E+OS

-.J

Y-90

9.32E + 03

1.96E+07

4.80E+04

9.S9E+04

1.1SE +06

8.16E+OS

Ru-I06

8.52E +O l

1.79E+05

4.39E + 02

8.77E + 02

1.0SE + 04

7.46E +03

Rh-106

8.S2E +O l

1.79E + OS

4.39E +02

8.77E + 02

1.0SE+04

7.46E+03

Sb-12S

2.02E+02

4.24E + OS

1.04E+03

2.08E+03

2.50E+04

l.77E +04

Te- 125

4.94E+01

I.04E + 05

2.54E+02

S.09E+02

6.10E+03

4.32E +03

<

Cs- 134

3.01E+02

6.32E+05

l.SSE+03

3.lDE + 03

3.72E+04

2.63E+04

C:

Cs- 137

1.20E + 04

2.S2E+07

6.18E+04

1.24E + OS

1.48E +06

1.05E+06

Ba-117m

1.14E +04

2.39E+07

S.87E + 04

1.17E + OS

1.41E +06

9.98E+OS

Ce- l44

3.47E+03

0

?:::

:-

>
Z
v
>:

>
>

3.97E+OI

8.34E+04

2.04E+02

4.09E+02

4.90E + 03

Pr-l44

3.97E+OI

8.34E+04

2.04E+02

4.09E+02

4.90E +03

3.47E+03

Pr- l44m

4.77E-O l

1.OOE+03

2.46E + OO

4.91E+OO

S.89E + 01

4.17E +01

Pm-147

2.72E + 03

S.71E+06

1.40E + 04

2.80E+04

3.36E +OS

2.38E +OS

~

""-c

<.on
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Table IH . (contu)
Curies/Shipping Cask(

Curil:s/Shipml:nt h

>

>

Radillnudide

Curies/ MTU

Grams/ MTU

Total Curies
in SNF

Truck

Rail

Barge

HLw<l

408
5 years
5.G6E+02
1.12E +03
2.65 E+02
2.23 E+OO

204
S years
1.l3E+03
2.23E+03
5.29E+02
4.47E+OO

17
5 years
1.36E+04
2.68E+04
6.3SE+03
S.36E+O l

24/1
7 months
9.63 E+03
1.90E+04
4.S0E+03

Shipments
Duration
Sm-ISI
Eu-IS-l
Eu-155
U-234

1. WE + 02
2.17E+02
S. I-lE + OI
·U-lE-CIl

(i.94E+OI

2.31E+05
4.5GE+OS
I.08E+05
9.11E+02

U-235
U-D(i
U-23S

1.(iOE-02
7.63E-02
33 IE-OI

7.39E+03
1.18E+03
9.84E+05

3.3SE+Ol
1.60E+02
6.94E+02

8.22E-02
3.93E-Ol
l.70E+00

l.64E-OI
7.86E-Ot
3.40E+OO

1.97E+00
9.43E+00
4.08E+OI

Np-237
Pu-238
Pu-239
Pu-240
Pu-241
Pu -242
Am-241
Cm-244

4.75E-02
1.22E+02
1.3(iE +02
9.94E+Ol
8.71E+03
6.4SE-02
1.84E+02
2.(12E+Ot

2.20E+03
4.38E+02
8.46E+Ot
l.6-lE + 01

9.98E+OI
2.56E+05
2.86E+OS
2.09E+OS
1.83E+07
1.3SE+02
3.86E+OS
5.50E+04

2.4SE-OI
6.28E+02
7.02E + 02
S.12E+02
4.49E+04
3.32E-0l
9.47E+02
I.3SE+02

4.89E-Ol
1.26E+03
1.40E+03
1.02E+03
8.97E+04
6.63E-Ol
1.89E+03
2.70E+02

S.87E+OO
l.S1E+04
1.68E+04
l.23E+04
1.08E+06
7.96E+OO
2.27E+04
3.24E+03

Plutonium
Oxidec

Uranium
Oxidee

186
2.3 years

236
2.9 years

3.73E+0
0
1.37E-Ol
6.S7E-Ol
2.8SE+0
0
4.16E+OO
1.33E+03
1.48E+03
1.08E+03
9.48E+04
7.OlE-01
1.61E+04
2.29E+03

Radionuclide inventory taken from Bergsman (1994) and rep resents IO-year cooled Mark IA fuel , in which Pu-240 constitutes 16% of total
plutonium.
h. Curies/shipment inventories assume 1 cask per truck shipment, 2 truck casks per rail, and 24 truck casks per barge shipment.
c. Curies/cask inventories arc based on one cask per truck and/or rail shipment.
d. HLW - Solidilied high level waste; inventory assumes 100% removal of plutonium and uranium. High -level waste to be shipped only by barge (24
casks per barge) or rail (I cask per rail car).
e. Plutonium and uranium oxide inventories assume 100% removal, and the number of shipments has been adjusted to reOect conversion from metal
til llxide. Plutonium and uranium oxide to be shipped by barge and truck only.
Lt .
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The num ne r of shipments o f ura nium and plutonium oxide we re estimated using stand a rd U.S.
shipp ing eq uipment fo r uranium and plutonium. The estim ated qu antities to be shipped include

Hanfurd tu Nurfolk. Virginia : The truck and rai l shipping distances frum Hanfo rd to Norfolk we re
determined to he 4585 km (~849 miles) and 4984 km (3097 milesl. respectively. Fo r the highway

2.3(,0 tons of purified uranium ox ide and 6.5 tons of pluto nium oxide generated fro m processing

rout e. th e shipment tra ve ls through 84.50/,: rural areas (7.3 perso ns/ km'). 13.4% in suourban areas

the K Basin SNF. Fo r this a nalys is. it was ass um ed th at th e plutonium ox ide would be transpo rt ed

(Y,5 persons/ km'l and 2. 1'Ii: in urban populat io n zo nes (2299 persons/km!). The rail route travels

hy !ruck in a Type B package wi th a capacity of 35 kg/shipment. This re sults in a total o f 186 cask-

through 83 «, rura l a reas (7.8 pe rso ns/km!). 14.5'1i: in subu rban zones (360.4 perso ns/ km!). a nd

loads o f plutonium ox ide. The vehicle for transport of plutonium was assumed to be a Safe-Secure

2A c, in urban a reas (2149 perso ns/km 2).

Tra iler/ Armored Tracto r specifica lly designed for shipment of special nuclea r materials within th e
U.S. The uranium oxide was assumed to be transported by truck in sh ipping systems with a

Hanford to Portland. Oregon: The only option evaluated for using th e Port of Portland was to

capac ity o f JO.OOO kg/shipme nt. This would require a total of 236 casklo.ds of uranium oxide.

barge th e SNF to Portland. where it would be transloaded onto the ship. The distance and

One cas kload per truck shipment fo r overland segments was assumed. One sea shipment of

population density infor mation for this shipment was approximated using INTERLINE (Johnso n

uranium oxide and one of pluto nium oxide we re assumed to be required.

et al. 1993b). which evaluates potential rail routes. because the rail lines closely follow the
Columbia River in which the barge would be operating. Consequently. the rout e data for a barge

The rad ionuclide invento ri es for the plutonium oxide and uranium oxide shipments a re

shipment would be si milar to that for a rail shipment. The rail dat a a re thought to be more

prese nt ed in Table B-1 . The inventories were dete rmined by dividing th e tota l quantities of

co nse rvative than actual barge data because the rail lines pass closer to the city centers along the

ura nium and pluto nium to be shipped to the U.K. by the respective num bers of caskloads

rive r than would a barge.

present ed above.

8 _2.4 Description of Methods Used to Estimate Consequences
8.2.3 Transportation Route Information
This sectio n describes th e methods used to est imate consequences of normal and accide ntal
The ove rl and transpo rtation rOUles assumed for this analysis are described in the following

exposure of individuals or populatio ns to radi oactive materials. The RADTRAN 4 (Neuhause r

section . The descriptive information includes the shipping distances a nd population density data.

and Kanip e 1992) and RISKIND (Yuan et al. 1993) comp uter codes were used to calculate the

These data were developed using th e HIGHWAY (J ohnson et al. 1993a) and INTERLINE

transpo rt at io n impacts. and the GENII software package (Napier et al. 1988) was used to estimate

(J ohnso n et a l. I 99:1b) co mputer codes for truck and ra il shipments. respectively. and a re used to

the conseq ue nces o f po rt accidents. The MICROSHIELD externa l dosimetry software (Grove

calcu late transpo rt Cition impacts. These data are summarized below for each transport segment

Engineerin g 1988) was used to determine approxi mate external dose rates for shipping co nt a iners

ues(:ribed in Sectio n 8 .2.2. No population data are prese nted for th e ocea n segments because once

as input to th e transpo rt ati on co nseque nces. Nonradiological impacts from both incide nt-free

at , ea. th e exposed popUlatio n beco mes essenti ally zero.

transpo rt and accidents were also eva luated.

i-Ianfurd to Seattle. Was hington : The tr uck a nd ra il shipping distances from Ha nford to Sea ttle

The output fro m co mpute r codes. as total e ffective dose equiva lent (TEDE or dose) to th e

we re de te rmin ed 10 be 277 km ( 172 miles) and 716 km (445 miles). respectively. The large

affected recep to rs.

diffe rence in shipping dis ta nce a rises fro m th e fact that the rail route is not a direct link to Seattle.

fata lit ies ( LCF) . Reco mmendatio ns of the Internatio nal Commission o n Radi ologica l Pro tectio n

hut tra\'e ls from Hanford to Vancouver. Washington and th en to Sea ttle. For th e highway rou te.
the shipment !rave l> through SR . I 'Ii: ru ra l areas (weighted populatio n density 4.5 perso ns/km 2).

( IC RP 199 1) fo r low dose. low do se rate radiological exposures we re used to convert dose as

WilS

then used to express th e co nseque nces in terms of potential late nt ca ncer

TEDE to LC F. The co nversion factor appl ied to ad ult wo rk ers was 4 x 10-' LCF / re m T E DE. and

JOe; in suhurban are,,, (359 persons/km 2 ) and \.9% in urba n popu lati on zones (1 870 pe r-

that fo r the gene ral populatio n was 5 x 10-' LCF / re m TEDE. The ge ne ral population was

so ns/km'). The rail ro ut e trave ls through 74. I 'Ii: rura l a reas (9.S perso ns/km 2). 19% in suburba n

assum ed to have a higher rate of ((Ince r inductio n for a give n rad iati on dose than healthy adult

zo nes (415.5 perso ns/ km 2 ). and 6.9% in urban areas (2226 pe rso ns/km 2).
B-9
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workc:rs because of the presence of more sensitive individuals (e .g.. children) in ihe general population.

tran sportation maud
•

poputation distrihuti on modd

•

;I(x'i d~nt s~ \'e rit y

es timate of risk consistent with those re poned in the remainder of this EIS . Incident-free transportation

•

meteorological dispersion model

or normal facility operations were assumed to occur ti. e .. they ha ve a frequency of 1.0): therefore. the

•

economic model.

The estimated LCF for

p Ol~ ntial

accidents was multiplied by the expected accident frequency per

year. per shipment . or for the emire duration of the foreign

proc~ssing

ope;:ration. to provide a point

heahh effecIS mouel
and package rdt:asc: modd

cumulative ri sks associated with normal operations would be identical to the predicted numbe;:r of latent
cancer fatalit ies for the duration of the operation.

The coue

u s~s

Ihe firsl Ihree mod e ls 10 calculate Ihe pOlemial populalion dose from normal.

inc iuenl·free Iransporlalion and Ihe fi rsl sLx mouels 10 calculale Ihe ri sk to Ihe pop ul alion fro m
Nonradiological incident-free and accident impacts were also evaluated . Nonradiological incident-

ust:r-dcfint:d accident scc:narios. Th e economic model is not used in thi s study.

free impacls consisl of falalilies from poilu lams emilled from Ihe vehicles . Non radiological accidem
impacts are the fatalities resulting from potential vehicular accidents involving the shipments . Neither
of these two categories of impacts are related to the radiological characteristics of the cargo . Estimates

8.2.4.1.1 Material Model. The mal e ria l model defines Ihe so urce as eilher a po inl
source or as a tine source. For exposure distances less than twice the package dimension. the

of Ihese nonradiological impacls were derived by mulliplying Ihe unil risk faclors (falalilies per mile of

source is conservatively assumed to be a line source. For all other cases, the source is modeled as

Ira ve l) by Ihe lOla I shipping dislances for all of Ihe shipmems in each shipping 0Plion . Nonradiological

a po inl sou rce Ihal emils radialion equally in aU direclions.

unil risk faclors for incidem-free IranSpOrl were laken from Rao el al. (1982). and for vehicular
accidems were laken from Sa ricks and Kvilek (1994) .

The millerial model a lso conlains a li brary of 59 isotopes each o f which has 11 defining paramo
eters that are used in th e calculation of dose. Th e user can add isotopes not in the RADTRA N

8 .2.4.1 RADTRAN 4 Description. The RADTRAN 4 compuler code (Neuhauser and Kanipe

library hy creating a data table in the input fite consisting of eleven parameters.

1992) was used 10 perform Ihe analyses of Ihe radiological impacls of rouline Iransporl. Ihe imegraled
populalion risks of aceidems during Iransporl of irradialed N-Reaclor SNF 10 the U.K .. and Ihe relurn

8 .2 .4.1.2 Transportation Model. The IranSpOrlalion model a llows Ihe use r 10 inpul

of vi lrified HLW . plulonium oxide. and uranium oxide from the U.K. 10 Hanford . RADTRAN was

desc ripli o ns of Ihe Iransporlalio n roule. A Iranspo rlation roule may be divided inlo links o r

developed by Sandia Nalional Laboralories (SN L) 10 calculale Ihe risks associalee wilh the

segme nls o f Ihe journey wilh informalion for eac h link on populalion densilY. mode of Iravel (e.g ..

transportation of radioactive materials . The original code was written by SNL in 1977 in association

trailer Iruck o r ship). acci denl rale. vehicle speed. road typ e. ve hicle den sily. and link le nglh .

wllh Ihe preparalion of NUREG·0I70. Filial £lIvirolllllelllal Statelllelll 011 the Trallsportatioll of

All e rnalive ly. Ihe Iranspo rl a lio n roule also can be described by aggre gale ro ul e dala for rural.

Radioartil'e Material br Air alld Other Modes (N RC 1977). The code has since been refined and

urhan. and suburban area s. For thi s analysis. the aggregate rou te methou was used for cach

expanded and is curreml y maimained by SNL under comracl wilh DOE . RADTRAN 4 is an updale of

potentia l origin-d es tinati on combination. Th e origin-dest inati on combinations addressed in thi s

Ihe RADTRAN 3 (Madsen el al. 1986) and RADTRAN 2 (Taylor and Daniel 1982. Madsen el al.

analysis were discussed in Section B.2. 1.

1983) compuler codes .
8 .2.4. 1.3 Health Effects Model. The heahh effects model in RADTRAN 4 is oUlda led
The RADTRAN 4 com pUler code is organized imo Ihe foll owing seven models (Neuhauser and

and is re placed by hand calculalions. The heahh effecls are delermined by muhiplving Ih e
po pul alion dose (person· re m ) supplied by RADTRA N

Kanipe 1992):

~

by a co nve rsio n faclo r.

8.2 .4 . 1.4 Accident Severity and Package Release Model. Accide nl analys is in

malerial mod el

RA DTRA
B- Il
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is pe rfo rmed using Ihe accide nl seve rilY a nd package re lease mode l. The use r ca n
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define up to 20 sever ity ca tego ries for three popula tion densiti es (urban. suburba n, a nd rural).
each increasing in magnitude. Eight severity categories for SNF containers th a t a re re la ted to fire ,
pun cture. cru sh. a nd imm e rsio n e nviro nm e nts a re defi ned in NU REG-O 170 (N RC 1977). Various
o th e r ·tudie also have been performed for sma ll packages (Clarke e t al. 1976) a nd la rge packages
( Dennis e t al. 1978) th a t also can be used to generate severity categories. Th e accide nt sce na ri os
a re further defin ed by allowi ng the use r to input release fractions a nd aeroso l a nd respirable
fractions for each seve rity category. These fractions a re also a function of th e physical-chemical
prope rti es of the materials being tra nsported.

8.2.4 . 1.5 Meteorological Dispersion M odel. RADTRAN 4 allows the user to c hoose
two diffe ren t me thods for modeling the atmospheric transport of radionuclides afte r a pot e nti a l
acc ide nt. Th e use r can input either Pasquill atmospheric-stability category data or averaged
time-integrated concentrations. In this analysis, the dispersion of radionuclides after a potentia l
accident is modeled by the use of time-integrated concentration values in downwind areas
compiled from national averages by SNL.

8.2.4. 1. 6 Incident-Free Transport. The models described above are used by
RADTRAN 4 to determine dose from incident-free transportation or risk fro m potentia l
accidents. The public a nd worker doses calculated by RADTRAN 4 for incident-free tra nspo rt atio n are dependent on the type of material being transported and the transportation index
(TI ) of the package or packages. The T1 is defined in 49 CFR 173.403(bb) as the highest package
dose ra te in millirem per hour at a distance of 1 m from the external surface of the package. Dose
conseque nces a re a lso dependent on the size of the package, which as indicated in the mat erial
model description. will determine wh e ther the package is modeled as a point so urce or line source
fo r close-proximity exposures.

8.2.4. 1.7 Analysis of Potential Accidents. The accident analysis performed in
RADTRAN 4 calcul a tes population doses for each accident severity category us ing six expos ure
pathway models. The exposu re pathways a re inhalation , resuspe nsion. groundshin e, cloudshine.
ingestion. a nd direct exposure. This RADTRAN 4 a nalysis assumes th a t any co nta mina ted area is
either mitigated o r public access controlled so the dose via the ingestion pa thway equ als zero. The
co nsequences calc ulated fo r each seve rity category a re multiplied by the appropriate frequencies
for accide nts in each category a nd summ ed to give a total point estimat e of risk for a radiological
accide nt. The parameters used to calculate th e frequencies a nd consequences of transportation
accidents are prese nt ed in Section B.2.4.2.
B-1 3
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B.2.4.2 RADTRAN 4 Input Parameters. RADTRAN 4 input parameters for calculating
rOUline population doses include route information (shipping distances. population densities. alld

T"ble B-2 is a lisl of input parameters that are used by RADTRAN 4 in the calculation of
popul"tion dose for incidem-free transpo rtation . Many of the parameters are default values in the

fracti ons of travel in rural. suburban. and urban areas). numbers of shipments. dose rate. and

RADTRAN 4 code. Those that are not default values a re identified and their sources are

parameters thaI define the population exposure characteristics. The route information and numbers

provided in footnotes 10 the table.

of shipments were presented in Section B. I .2 and will not be repeated here. The remaining
exposure parameters are described below .

The potential receptors include workers and the general public. Worker doses include those
received by the truck. rail. or barge crew and package handlers aboard the barge. Although

RADTRAN 4 uses !he dose rate at I m (referred to as !he TI) in calculating dose to !he public

RADTRAN models package handlers as persons who handle packages during intermediate stops.

and worker. All of the SNF and HLW shipments in !his analysis were assumed 10 be at !he

lhe routine doses to this group were assumed to apply to personnel who inspect the shipping

regulalOry maximum dose rate . which is 10 mrem per hour at a dislance of 2 m from !he cask

comai ners aboa rd the barge. The equations used to calculate these doses assume that a

surface . This would be equivalent to a TI of 13 (or a dose rate of 13 mrem/hr at I m from the

five-person lea rn spends approximately 0.5 hr per handling operation (or per inspection tour of the

surface). AI!hough it is likely !hat many of !hese shipments will have significantly smaller

shipping casks). Although not exact, this is believed to be a reasonable approximation.

TI values. !he use of !he regulalOry maximum value is bounding because it cannot be exceeded .
Table B-2. Input para meters for analysis of incident-free impacts'
Because shipmems of plutonium oxide and uranium oxide would have much smaller dose rates

values. The computer code MICROSHIELD (Grove Engineering 1988) was used to perform !hese
calculations. Bo!h types 01 shipmems were modeled as cylindrical sources wi!h cylindrical shields .
The parameters used in

!he ~e

calculations are shown below:

PlulOnium oxide: The plutonium source was assumed 10 be 12.7 cm in diameter and
127 cm in leng!h . Shielding was assumed to be provided by a I-cm !hick steel shield and
an 8-cm !hickness of solid hydrogenous material. The source invemory was the same as
!hat shown in Table B-1.
Uranium oxide: The uranium source was modeled as a single large comainer although the
shipmem will most likely be composed of several smaller comainers. The source
dimensions were assumed to be 114 cm in diameter and 370 cm in length . The source was
assumed 10 be surrounded by a I-cm !hick steel cylinder and a 3-cm !hick shield of solid
hydroge!1ous material. The source inventory was shown in Table B-1 .

The dose rate at I m from the surface of !he plutonium oxide shipment was calculated to be

Rail

Parameter

!han SNF or HLW. preliminary shielding calculations were performed to derive more realistic

Barge

13.1

13.1

Le ngth of p"ckage (m)

3.0

3.0

Exclusive use

No

Yes

Dose rate I m from vehicle/ package (mrem/ h)b

Truck
13.1
3.0
Yes

Velocity in rural population zone (km/h)'

64.4

16.09

Velocity in suburban population zone (km/h)b

40.3

8.06

40.3

Velocity in urban population zone (km/h)'

24.2

3.20

24.2

5

Nu mber of crewmen

Dislance from source to crew (m)

152
0.033

Stop time per km (h/km)'
Persons exposed while stopped'

100
20.0

Aver"ge exposure distance while stopped (m)'
Number of people per vehicle on link'

88.6

2
45.70

2
10.0

0.01

0.0 11

50

50

50.0

2u.O

0

2
470

Traffic count passing a specific point-rural zone, one-way'

1.0

0

Traffic count passing a specific point-suburban zone. one-way'

5.0

0

780

Traffi c cou nt passing a specific point.urban zone. one.way'

5.0

0

2.800

0.019 mrem/hr. Because !his was increased by a factor of five to provide a bounding eSlimate. the
TI value for !hese shipmems was set to O. I mrem/hr. The dose rate for the uranium oxide
shipmems was calculated to be 0.0049 mrem/hr. This was also increased by a faclOr o f five 10
0 .025 mrem/hr for conservatism .
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Valu es shown are shipme nt·specific unless ot he rwise noted.
b. Th ese values we re used for SNF and HLW shipments. See text for the derivation of TI
va lues for plulonium oxide (0.1 mrem/hr) and urani um oxide shipme nts (0.025 mre m/ hr).
c. Default va lues from RADTRA N (Neuhauser and Kanipe 1992 a nd Madsen et al. 1983).
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initia l plume passage or loss of shipping-cask shielding. For chronic or long-ter m exposures,
Public doses include doses to pe rsons on the highway or railway (th is category is not applicable
to harge shi pments as indicated in the RADTRAN documentation), doses to persons who reside

RISKIND calcu lates exposu res from ground deposition a nd ingestion from the food-chain
pathways.

near the highway. railway, or river, a nd doses a t stops (fo r barge tra nsport, this was assumed to
ind ude stops at navigation locks in dams). For aU three shipping modes. the doses to passengers
we re assu med to be 0.0 because there would be no passenge rs traveling with the shipments. In
addition, the re were assumed to be no intermediate storage needs for the shipme nts, and the doses
to in-transit storage personnel were set equal to 0.0.

Information needed to characterize the potential routes between Ha nford a nd the U.K.
include the shipping distances, population densities in rural, suburban, and urba n areas a long the
routes, and frac tions of total shipping distance that travel through rural, suburba n, and urba n
areas. These da ta we re presented in Section B.2.3.

A radiological source inventory is conta ined internal to RISKIND tha t is based on fue l type.
cooling times, a nd burn up rates. An analyst can input other radiological source inventories to
ca lculate scena rio-specific exposures. The radiological source inventory fo r this ana lysis is shown
in Table B-1.

To calculate doses to the receptor, cask accident responses for both truck and rail, and release
fractions have been incorporated into RISKIND. This information is based on the NRC moual
study (Fischer et al. 1987). As discussed ea rlie r, all shipments wiU be performed using Type B
shippi ng containers; therefore, it is appropriate to use RISKIND to calculate the dose to the
maxima Uyexposed individua l for aU waste forms.

8.2 .4 . 3 RISKIND Description. RISKIND (Yuan et al. 1993) was used to calculate doses to

the maxi mum individual and the public for both rail and truck tra nsporta tion accidents. RISKIND
was originaUy developed to model incident-free and accide nt conditions during transporta tion of

B_3 Radiological Dose to Workers

SNF. The code was specificaUy designed to model accidental releases based on data conta ined in
the NRC modal study (Fische r et a l. 1987). RISKI ND is designed to calc ula te the dose to
individuals or groups of individuals for each of the severity categories identified in the modal study

The foll owing sections describe expected radiological consequences to workers during transportation and processing of N-Reactor SNF from Ha nford.

and provide probability-weighted dose risk, acute fa tal ity, latent fa tality, and genetic effect values.
The probability-weighted dose risk values are calculated by multiplyi ng and summing the dose for

8 .3.1 Worker Dose from Pre-Shipment Activities at Hanford

each seve rity category times the fraction of accidents within each severity category. Health dfects
are calculated by mul tiplyi ng probability-weighted dose risk values by appropriate conversion
facto rs. For this a nalysis. pcint estima tes of risk for late nt cancer fatalities were estimated as

Packaging of the K-Basi n SNF for te mporary wet storage was est imated to resu lt in worker
doses of approximately 140 person-re m (5.5 x 10-2 LCF) over a period of about 2 yea rs. T he
activit ies covered by this estimate include repacki ng fuel asse mbl ies in both K-East a nd K-

described in Section B.2.4.

West Basi ns and disposi ng of e mpty ca niste rs (DOE 1992). The consequences of prepa rin g the
The code is comprised of subroutines or models used to calculate radiological exposures to
indi viduals at specific receptor loca ti ons. The information used to calculate these exposures can

be performed using the default val ues contained in RISKIND or using receptor-specific data ,
supplied by the user. The exposure ca lculations are performed based on the receptor location,
exposu re conditions (i.e .. inhalation and ingestion intake rates), and me teorological conditions.

fuel for overseas shipment were assu med to be similar for the purposes of this eva luatio n. If
stabi liza tion of the fuel prior to shipme nt were necessary, an additional 180 person-rem might be
accumu lated by onsite wo rkers over a 4-year period, resulting in 7.0 x 10.2 LCF (see Section 5.12.5
of this appe ndix). Consequences of a ir emissions from the storage or stabilization facilities to
nea rhy wo rkers wo uld be muc h lower than those from direct exposure of workers in these facili ties
(sec Sectio n 5.7 of this appe ndix).

RISKIND can be used to model aU environmental exposure pathways based on the duration of
the exposure. That is, for acute or short-term exposures, RISKI ND can calculate exposures fro m
VOU'; :\IE I. ,\PPE;\: OIX
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The consequences of accide nts at the wet storage facility or the stabilizat ion facil ity are

Table 8-3. Results of incident-free transportation impact calculations for workers.

discussed in Section S.IS of this appe ndix. Air e missions from a fuel ha ndling accident at the
IOO-K Basins or a uranium fire at the stabilization facility would result in a point estimate of risk to
the nearby workers of < 1.4 x

10. 7

LCF or <S.3 x

10. 12

Radiation doses,
Option and material

Latent cancer fatalities

person-rem

LCF per year of operation, respectively.

The estimated frequency for both accide nts is between I x 10-6 and I x 10-4 per year. Operations at
the K Basins to package SNF for shipment would last approximately 2 years, and the stabilization
facility would require 4 years to process aU of the K Basin SNF. The consequence to workers that
might be directly involved in such accidents is highly speculative, and is addressed in Attachment A-Facility Accidents.

B.3 .2 Worker Doses from Transportation to U.S . Ports

This section discusses the results of the worker impact calculations for truck, rail, and barge
shipments to a nd from the U.K. These doses were calculated usi ng the RADTRAN 4 computer
code (Neuhauser and Ka nipe 1992). The RADTRAN 4 progra m uses a combination of
meteorological, demographic, health physics, tra nsporta tion, packagi ng, and material factors to
analyze risks associated with both normal transport (incident-free) and various user-selected
acciden t scenarios. The RADTRAN 4 computer code description fo r both routine and accident
impacts was presented in Section 8.2.4.

The results of the incident-free transportation impact calculations are presented in Table B-3.
The radiological impacts are presented in terms of the population dose (person-rem) received by
exposed workers a nd the projected health effects calculated to occur in the exposed population.
As shown, no excess fata lities we re calculated to result from any of the five transporta tion options
considered in this study.

As shown in Table B-3, the transportation option to U.S. ports that results in the lowest worker
population doses is that involving barge shipments to the Port of Portland. This option is closely
followed by the option of shipping by rail to the Port of Seattle. The option involving truck
tra nsport to the Port of Seattle is the third lowest option. The option of shipping by rail to th e
Port of Norfolk is next, followed by the option of shipping by truck to the Port of Norfolk . This
result is intuitively obvious because the shipping dista nces are much longer from Hanford to

Barge to Portland
SNF
HLW
Pu
U
TOTAL
Truck to Seattle
SNF
HLW(Rail)
Pu (Truck)
U (Truck)
TOTAL
Rail to Seattle
SNF
HLW(Rail)
Pu (Truck)
U (Truck)
TOTAL
Truck to Norfolk
SNF
HLW (Rail)
Pu (Truck)
U (Truck)
TOTAL
Rail to Norfolk
SNF
HLW ( Rail)
Pu (Truck)
U (Truck)
TOTAL

3.0E+OO
l.SE-OI
7.7E-02
S.3E-02
3.3E+OO

1.2E-03
7.0E-OS
3.IE-OS
2.IE-OS
I.3E-03

6.0E+OO
3.SE-OI
4.SE-02
3.4E-02
6.SE+OO

2.4E-03
l.SE-04
l.SE-OS
I.3E-OS
2.6E-03

3.2E+OO
3.SE-O I
4.SE-02
3.4E-02
3.7E+OO

I.3E-03
l.SE-04
l.SE-OS
1.3E-OS
l.SE-03

1.0E+02
l.SE+OO
7.7E-OI
S.SE-Ol
I.IE+02

4.2E-02
S.9E-04
3.IE-04
2.3E-04
4.3E-02

1.3E+OI
l.SE+OO
7.7E-OI
S.8E-OI
l.SE+OI

S.OE-03
S.9E-04
3. IE-04
2.3E-04
6.IE·03

In general. the shipments of N Reactor SNF to the U.K. would produce the highest doses of all
the materials. This is attributed primarily to the higher number of N Reactor SNF shipments than
the oth er mate rials. Also, it can be seen that ra il shipments gene raUy result in lower worker doses
than truck shi pments. This is because the exposure distances between the source and crew are
much longer for rail shipments than fo r truck shipments. Similarly, the crew doses for rail and
barge shipments are approximately comparable.

Norfolk than to the other ports.
Maximum individual doses to workers from incident-free transport were calculated using the
RISKIND computer code, consistent with the app roach desc ribed in Volume I, Appendix I. The
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maximally exposed workers for truck shipments were found to be the truck drivers (two·person

wo rke r we re involved in ha ndling a ll 408 casks a t one point in the shipping sequence, would be on

crew) who were assumed to drive shipments for up to 2,000 hour pe r yea r. The ma ximally

the order of 0.4 rem over 5 yea rs.

c:x po!Seo worker for rail shipments was a tran sportation worker in a rail ya rd wh o spent a tim e· and

tlistance·weightetl ave rage of 0. 16 hours inspecting, classifying, and repairi ng ra ilcars a nd was
assu med to be present for all of the radioactive shipments.

B, 3, 3, 2 Consequences of Accidents During Port Activities. The consequences of

accidents during port transit were estimated based on the highest activity N Reactor SNF
(Bergs ma n 1994). The ass umed rad io nuclide content of a single shipping cask is based on a

The maxi mum incident·free exposure ca lculations for workers were performed for each
shipping option. The results are 1.46 pe rson· rem for the barge to Portla nd option, 2.0 person·rem

loadi ng of 5 MTU (see inve ntory for truck shipments in Table B· I). Representa tive ports on the
West and East Coasts of the U.S. (Seattle·Taco ma, Was hington; Portland, Oregon; Norfolk,

for the option of shipping to Seattle by truck, 1.03 person· rem for the option of shipping to Seattle

Virginia; a nd Newark, New Jersey) we re used for this analysis, based on relative population

bv rail. 35.3 pe rson· re m for the option of shipping to Norfolk by truck, and 17.9 person·re m for the

de nsities a nd suitability for handling of SNF shipments. Newark was included in this part of the

option of shipping to Norfolk by rail.

a na lysis because of its relatively large surrounding population (adjacent to New York City),
whereas the ports of Seattle·Tacoma, Portland, and Norfolk are locate d in somewhat smalle r

8.3.3 Worker Dose from Port Activities

population centers. In a previous ana lysis, the collective consequences of in·port accide nts were
shown to be proportional to the surrounding population (DOE 1995).

The following sections describe expected radiological consequences to workers from in· port
ac tivities for tra nsport of SNF to the U.K. The consequences for return of HLW, ura nium, and
plutonium a re expected to be simila r to, or lower tha n, th ose for initial shipment of SNF to the

The conseque nces (as radiation dose to individuals a nd populations and corresponding LCF
were eva luated for a range of accident severities leading to airborne release of radioactive

U.K. because of the smaller numbe r of HLW shipments required for return to the U.S.

material, corresponding to the accident categories and radionuclide release fractions used for the

Radiologica l consequences of normal transport of uranium and plutonium would be sma ll

overland transporta tion analysis (Volume 1, Appendix I, Table 1·28). The overall accide nt

compared with those for SNF and HLW.

frequency associa ted with each accident category was calculated using the conditional probabil ity
fo r that severity category, multiplied by the overall frequency with which a shipping acciden t would

B. 3. 3, 1 Consequences of Normal Port Activities, Consequences to workers during

handling a nd loadi ng act ivities in ports are based on commercial experience during the last

occur (as est imated by DOE 1994, Table E·8). The consequences (as LCF) for each severity
category were multiplied by the correspond ing frequency with which a n accident in that category

three qua rte rs of 1994. Over this pe riod, wor ke rs ha ndled two shipme nts consisting of 16 loaded

wo uld occur to obtain a point estimate of risk for each accident category. The total risk pe r

casks, a nd I shipment consisting of 5 e mpty casks. T he collective dose to the 30 workers involved

shipmen t was the n calculated as the sum of risks over all accide nt severity categories. The

was 0.024 person·rem, wit h the maximum individual receiving 0.016 rem . Assuming that ha ndling

frequenc ies fo r a irborne release acciden ts eva luated using 95 % atmospheric dispe rsion (stable)

of the empty casks did not contribute measurably to that total, the expected collective dose from

conditions (those that would not be exceeded more tha n 5% of the time) were assumed to be 10%

handling a single loaded cask is estima ted to be on the order of 0.00 I rem to the maxi ma lly

of th ose eva lua ted using 50% (neu tral ) dispersio n conditions, which are assumed to be the typica l

exposed worke r a nd 0.00 15 person·rem total to all workers. The consequences for loa ding a nd

or expected conditions. The risk to U.S. ports fo r shipping all Ha nford SNF overseas is the total

unloading of 408 casks during shi pme nt fro m the U.S. to the U.K. wo uld the refore be

risk per shi pment times 17 shipme nts. T he risk to U.K . ports is ass umed to be comparable to that

approxi mately 1.2 person·rem to a ll workers over th e ex pected 5·year campa ign. Accounti ng for

at U.S. ports.

a n additional two handling ac tivi ties per cask a t the Ha nford Site a nd at the U. K. process facility
would roughly double that estimate, resulting in a collective dose of 2.4 person·rem a nd a pote nt ial
for 9.8 X 10-' LCF fo r all shipme nts. The max imum dose to a n individua l worker, assuming that

The port accide nt a na lyses ass ume that the conte nts of a single cask were involved in any given
accide nt. The probabi lity that multiple casks could be breached in the event of a n accide nt is
smalle r tha n that for a single cask, a nd the consequences would be proportiona l to the number of
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casks involved. Beca use of the construction of the special purpose ships. with eight segregated
holds each containing at most three casks. an accide nt that would involve more than three casks is
not considered to be reasonably foreseeable.

External radia tion from a n intact shipping package must be less than specified limits that
cont ro l the exposure of th e handling personnel and general public. These limits are established in
49 CFR Pa rt 173. The limit of interest is a 10 mrem/ hr dose rate at any point 2 m from the oute r
surfaces of the tra nsport cask. This limit applies to exclusive-use shipments. i.e .• a shipment in

The consequences to a n individual at a distance of 100 m. assumed to be a port worker. was

which no othe r cargo is loaded on the platform used for the transportation casks. not that the ship

estimated fo r ap plicable exposure pathways including inhalation. exte rnal dose from submersion in

is an exclusive-use vessel. although this would not be a limitation for the commercial special

the plume. and exte rnal exposure from radionuclides deposited on the ground for a period of

purpose ships assumed for this a nalysis.

2 hours. The point estimates of risk for an accident at the Port of Portland are estimated to be
6.1 x 10. 11 to 1.0 X 1O.()9 LCF for I to 17 shipments, respectively. The corresponding point estima tes

It is a nticipated that the external dose rates at the outside of the tra nsport casks wo uld be

of risk for Seattle/ Tacoma (based on wind data from Seattle-Tacoma ai rport and the population

much less than the regulatory limits. It was estimated that the N Reactor SNF considered in this

within 50 miles of the Port of Tacoma) ranged from 4.7 x 10. 11 to 8.0 x 10·'0 LCF. The point

a nalysis would fall within the design envelope of the internationally licensed casks routinely used

estimates of risk to wo rkers at East Coast ports were similar - ranging fro m 6.1 x 10. 11 to 1.0 X 1O.()9

by the U.K. facility for SNF transport (BNFL 1994). However, estimates of dose during normal

LCF at Norfolk and 5.3 x 10. 11 to 9.0 x 10.10 LCF at Newark.

transportation have been made assuming dose rates at the regulatory limits, using analyses

The maxi mum reaso na bly foreseeable accident was a category 6 accident, which has a
freque ncy of 1.3 x 10. 7 per port transit, a nd which was evaluated for stable atmospheric conditions

performed .for tra nsport of foreign research reactor SNF as a basis (DOE 1995). These a nalyses
may be used to develop an upper bound of the doses anticipated to be received by ships crews

resulting in a cumulative frequ ency of 2.2 x 10.7 for all 17 SNF shipments. The dose to the port

during tra nsport of the N Reactor SNF. Actual doses would be expected to be lowe r than these

worker was estimated to be 1.7 re m a t Seattle/Tacoma, 1.9 rem at Newark. a nd 2.1 rem at

estimates.

Portland a nd No rfolk . The corresponding probability of LCF ranged from 6.8 x 10-4 and point
esti ma tes of risk. from 1.5 x 10·9 to 1.8 X 10·9 LCF.

B.3.4. 1. 1 Bounding Dose Calculations. Calculations performed to estimate bounding

radia tion doses during routine cask inspections aboard ship (DOE 1995) provided information

B.3.4 Worker Dose from Ocean Transport to the United Kingdom

from whic h an inspection dose factor (IDF) could be determined of 6 x 10.5 rem ' minute" . cask'"
day'" person". based on a n ave rage distance of 5.5 m. Because the ship crews are highly trained

The following sections describe radiological consequences to workers from normal transport
operations and accidents during overseas sh ipme nts of SNF from the Hanfo rd Site to the U.K.

and the ships a re designed for SNF tra nsport, it was assumed that inspection of each of the
eight holds on the ship (each conta ining three casks) would ta ke no longer than 15 minutes. or a n
average of 5 minutes per cask for the total 24 casks. The total inspection time pe r day would be

B.3.4. 1 Consequences of Normal Ocean Transit. The primary impact of routine (incident-

free) ma rine transport of SNF is potential radiological exposure to crew me mbers of the ships used

2 hours. If a n inspection crew were ass umed to consist of two members of the ship's crew. the
ho unding dose per daily inspection would be

to carry the casks. Members of the general public and ma rine life would not receive any

measurable dose fro m the SNF du ring incident-free marine transport of the casks. While at sea,

6 x 10.5 (IOF) x 5 minutes x 24 casks = 0.007 rem ' person" . day"

( I)

the crew dose would be lim ited to those individuals who might e nter the ship's hold during tra nsit
a nd receive external radiation in the vicinity of the packaged SNF. At all other times. the crew
would be shielded from the casks by the decking a nd other struct ures of the vessel. The number of

Assuming a travel time from an easte rn U.S. port of 10 days. the esti ma ted max imum dose
received by each membe r of a two-person inspection crew would be 0.07 rem. This va lue wo uld

entries a nd inspections wo uld be a fu nction of the transit ti me from the port of loading to the port

not exceed the 0. 1 re m dose limit fo r a member of the general public. The transit time for a

of off-loading.

shipme nt origina ting on the West Coast of the U.S: could be up to five times longer. resulting in a
dose per shipme nt of 0.35 rem. This val ue would exceed the 0. 1 rem dose limit for a member of
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Tab le 84. Comparison of bounding and typical ship crew's doses.

the general public. However. because the ship's crews are tra ined and issued dosimete rs, ir is

presumed that they would be considered radiation workers. Although it is not dear at this time if
radiation exposure of the ship's crew wo uld fall under the jurisdiction of the U.K. or U.S. radiatio n

Bounding Dose Calculations

Commercial Fuel
Transport Experience

protect ion sta nda rds. these standards are identica l for both countries (5 rem per yea r. with an
ad min istrative cont rol level of 2 rem per yea r). Therefore. the maxi mum possible dose received by

Individ ual dose. rem

individual wo rkers during ocean tra nsit would be well within the limits of the U.S. and U. K.

Collective dose.

radiation protection standards for wo rkers.

person-rem

0.07 - 0.35

- 17 SNF shipments

0.00 I typical
0.022 maxim um

2.4 - 12
< 24

- .s. 17 round trips

0.65
<1.3

Complete transport of the SNF to the U.K. for processing would require 17 shipments of
24 casks. The collective dose to crew members responsible for conducting inspections on the
from radiation exposure during SNF transport, and approximately 0.0005 LCF would be expected

transport shi ps duri ng fuel transport from the U.S. East Coast would be

from radiation exposure during transport of SNF and the subsequent return of processing products
(0.007 rem ' person'" day") x 2 persons x (10 days ' trip") x 17 trips

= 2.4 person-rem

(2)

Based on this bounding estimate of the collective dose to the ship's crew for tra nsportation of
the SNF. an upper limit of approximately 0.00 1 LCF would be expected among the ship's crew

and waste.

8.3.4_2 Consequences of Accidents During Ocean Transit. The consequences of

accide nts du ring ocean transit wo uld likely be similar to those of port workers who are nea r the

fro m exposure to external radiatio n from the SNF transport casks. If all shipments originated at a

scene of an accident (see Section B.3.3.2). Individuals in the immediate vicinity of the impact

western U.S. port. the collective dose could be up to 12 person-rem with a corresponding

would probably not survive an accident severe enough to cause release of radioactive materials
from a SNF shi pping cask. Effects on the ocean environment would not be expected to be

consequence of 0.005 LCF.

discernable because of the degree of dispersion in the event of an airborne release.
The above analysis does not consider the return of the processed SNF products and waste from
the U.K. to the U.S. It was projected that the number of shipments containing these products

6.3.5 Worker Dose from Return of Processing Products to the United States

wou ld be fewe r than the num ber of SNF shipments. However. as a bounding estimate the same
number of return shipments and similar external dose rates. at the regulatory limit. might be
assumed. Under those circumstances. an upper limit of 0.01 LCF wo uld be expected among the
ships crews from exposure to the external radiation duri ng all shipments.

Return of HLW to the U.S. is assumed to result in cu mulative wo rker doses that are bou nded
by those incurred in the initial SNF shipments to the U.K. However. the distribution of dose
among individual worke rs may differ because of the diffe rent configuration and radionudide
content of th e H LW ca nisters. As noted in Section 8.2.4.2, the dose rates associated wi th

8.3.4 _1.2 Commercial Fuel Transport Experience. Information on radiation doses to

ships crews during tra nsport of commercial fuel, gathered from act ual crew dosimeters. supports

plutonium and uranium shipments are substantially below the regulatory maxi mum tha t was
assumed for the SNF and HLW shipments.

the statements above that actual doses to the crew wo uld be lower than the calculated bounding
doses. The ave rage individual dose during one voyage was 0.00 I rem, with a maxi mum individual

B_4 Consequences to Members of the Public

dose of 0.022 mrem. The collective dose to the ship's crew for one voyage was abou t 0.038 personrem. On that basis, 'he crew's collective dose fo r 17 SNF shipments would be 0.65 person-rem. A
compa rison of bound ing dose estimates and commercial transport experience is shown in

The following sections describe expected consequences to the public fro m various activities
involved in transporting N Reactor SNF to th e U.K.

Table B-4. Dased on these results, less than 0.0003 LCF wo uld be expected among ships' crews
VO LC:o.tE 1. ;\ppr;:" OIX A. ,\PRlL 1995
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B.4.1 Public Impacts from Pre-Shipment Activities at Hanford

Table 8-5. Results of public incident-free exposure calculations.

Activities at Hanford prior to preparation of N Reactor SNF for shipment would result in
generally small consequences to the public. as discussed in Section S.7 of this appendix. The
removal and (Xlckaging of SNF at the basins was estimated to result in offsite consequences
comparable to those observed during initial segregation of the fuel . or approximately 2 x 10.5 to 3 X
10-' (I , 10. 11 to I.S

X

10·\0 probability of LCF) mrem to the maximally exposed offsite individ ual

( DOE 1992).

The risk from accide nts involving handling of N-Reactor SNF at the 100-K Basins was also
presented in Section S.IS of this appendix. The conseque nces to the maximally exposed offsite
individual were estimated as 2.5 x 10 4 LCF. with an associated point estimate of risk equal to
<2.5 x 10-8 fatal cancers per year (assuming a n accident frequency < I x 10" per year). The
consequences to the population within SO km (SO miles) were estimated as 0.4 LCF for SO %
(neutral) atmospheric dispersion conditions a nd 6.9 LCF for 9S% (stable) atmospheric dispersion
(conditions that would not be exceeded more than SO% or S% of the time. respectively). The
4

corresponding point estimates of risk amounted to <4.0 x 10" and <6.9 x 10 LCF per year.
respectively.

B.4.2 Public Impacts from Transportation Activities

This section presents the analysis of the public incident-free radiological exposures.
radiological accident risks, and nonradiological impacts from transporting radioactive materials to
a nd from the U.K. Members of the public exposed to radiation include persons on the highway.
railroad, or waterway with the shipment, persons residing near these transport links, and persons
a t intermediate stops along the route (such as refueling stops and stops at rail classification yards).

Radiation doses,
Option and mate rial

Latent Cancer Fatalities

person-rem

8arge 10 Portland
SNF
HLW
Pu
U
TOTAL

3.4E-OI
6.7E-03
3.7E-02
2.9E-02
4.IE-OI

1.7E-04
3.4E-06
1.9E-OS
1.4E-05
2.IE-04

Truck to Seattle
SNF
HLW (rail)
Pu (truck)
U (truck)
TOTAL

I.SE+OI
1.9E-01
2.5E-02
1.9E-02
I.SE+OI

7.6E-03
9.6E-05
1.2E-OS
9.3E-06
7.7E-03

Rail to Seattle
SNF
HLW(rail)
Pu (truck)
U (truck)
TOTAL

1.6E+00
1.9E-OI
2.5E-02
1.9E-02
1.9E+OO

S.IE-04
9.6E-05
1.2E-OS
9.3E-06
9.3 E-04

Truck to No rfolk
SNF
HLW (rail)
Pu (truck)
U (truck)
TOTAL

2.SE+02
7.0E-OI
4.IE-OI
3.IE-OI
2.SE+ 02

1.3E-01
3.5E-04
2.1E·04
1.6E-04
1.3E·01

Rail 10 Norfolk
SNF
HLW (rail)
Pu (truck)
U (truck)
TOTAL

S.9E+OO
7.0E-0 1
4.I E-OI
3.IE-O I
7.3E+00

3.0E-03
3.SE-04
2.IE-04
1.6E-04
3.7E-03

The RADTRAN 4 compute r code was used to perform these calculations. A description of
RADTRAN 4 was presented in Section B.2.4. The followi ng sections present the results of the

From a domestic transportation perspective, the lowest-impact option is one that includes rail

incident-free exposure calcu latio ns, description of the accident-analysis input paramete rs, the

shipme nts of SNF from Hanford to the Port of Seattle. This option is followed closely by the

results of the accide nt risk impact calculations, and the evaluation of non radiological impacts.

option of moving SNF from Hanford to the Port of Portland by barge. The third lowest do mestic
tran spo rtation option is that involving SNF shipments to Seattle by truck. The highest impact

8.4.2 . 7 Results of Incident-Free Transportation Impact Calculations. The results of the

public dose calculations. developed using the RADTRAN 4 computer code and the input
para me ters described in Section B.2.4. a re presented in Table B-S.

options a re those involving shipments from Hanford to the Port of Norfolk. Obviously. the lowest
impact domestic transportation option would be that involving the shortest shipping dista nces (i.e ..
Ha nford to Sea ttle or Portland). Some of the impacts of the long domestic tra nsportation links
would be offset by subsequent reductions in the le ngths of the ocean shipment segments. Conse-
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quently. the rankings of the options presented in Table B-5 do not necessari ly represent th e
ra nkings (hat wo uld result

if the

ocea n segments of th e shipments we re incluueu. H uwever. puhlic

frequencies multiplied by conseque nces integrated over the entire shipping campaign), as well as
the consequences of the maximum reasonably foreseeable accident. Population risk calculations

routine doses are not sign ificant for ocea n voyages because th e sepa ration distance betwee n th e

were performed using the RADTRAN 4 computer code (Neuhauser and Kanipe 1992). The

ship and the nea rest ex posed popula tion is greater. resulting in extre me ly low rad ia tion dose rates.

consequences of the maximum reasonably foreseeable accident were calculated using the
RISKIND computer code (Yuan et al. 1993). Separate sections are provided for the integrated

The results in Table B-5 de monstrate that barge shipments ofSNF (and HLW) wo uld produce
lower public routine doses than truck or rail shipments. This is attributed primarily to the lower

population risk (i.e .. RADTRAN 4) calculations a nd the maximum reasonably foreseeable
accident consequence (i.e., RISKlND) calculations.

tra ffic volumes on waterways relative to ra ilroads and highways. generally greater sepa ra tion
dista nces between barges and the public relative to the sepa ration dista nces between highways/

B.4 .2.2.1 Integrated Population Risk Assessment. For this analysis, risk is defined as

ra ilroads and the public, as well as the increased per-shipment capacities of barges relative to truck

the product of the frequency of occurrence of an accident involving a shipment and the conse-

and rail shipments (resulting in fewer shipments).

quences of an accident. Consequences are expressed in terms of the radiological dose and LCF
from a release of radioactive material from the shipping cask or the exposure of persons to

Table B-5 a lso demonstrates that rail shipments would produce lower public routine doses than
equiva lent truck shipme nts. This can be seen by compa ring the SNF shipment impacts for truck

radiation that could result from damaged package shielding. The frequency of an accident that
involves radioactive ma terials is expressed in terms of the expected number of accidents per unit

shipments to Seattle ( 15 person-re m) and ra il shipments to Seattle (1.6 person-rem ). Even though

distance integrated over the total distance traveled. The response of the shipping cask to the

the rail shipping route from Ha nford to Seattle is much longer than the truck route (277 km and

accide nt environment a nd the probability of release or loss of shielding. is rela ted to the severity of

716 km ). the total public routine doses are smaller. As with barge shipments. this is a ttributed to

the accident.

lower traffic volu mes. la rge r separation distances. a nd increased shipment capacity for rail
shipme nts.

The frequencies of occurrence of transportatio n accidents that would release significan t
quantities of rad ioactive mate rial are re latively sma ll because the shipping casks are designed to

Maxi mum individual doses to me mbers of the public from incident-free transport were

withstand specified transportation accident conditions (i.e., the shipping casks for all the materials

calculated using the RISKIND computer code, which is consistent with the approach described in

shipped in this a nalysis were assumed to meet the Type B packaging requirements specified in

Volume I. Appe nd ix l. For ra il sh ipments. three potential exposure scenarios were evaluated by

49 CFR 174 a nd 10 CF R 71). Accidents on the road and railways a re difficult to totally eliminate.

RISKIND. as described in Volume J., Appendix l. The maximally exposed me mbers of the public

However. because the shipping casks are ca pable of withstanding certain accide nt e nvironments.

from incident-free truck tra nsport were a lso determined usi ng three potential exposure scenarios

including mechanical a nd thermal stress. only a relatively small fraction of accidents involve

(see Volume I. Appe ndix I).

conditions that are severe enough to result in a release of radioactive materials.

The maxim um incide nt-free exposure calculations for membe rs of the public were performed

Should an accident involving a shipme nt occur. a release of radioactive material could occur

fo r each shipping opt ion. The resu lts are 0.28 person-rem for the barge to Portland option. 0.20

ofily if the cask we re to fa il. A failure wou ld most likely be a small gap in a seal or small split in the

pe rson-rem fo r the option of shipping to Seattle by truck, 0.28 person-rem for the optio n of

contain men t vessel. For the radioactive mate rial to reach the environment. it would have to pass

shippi ng to Seattle by rail. 0.20 person·rem fo r the option of shipping to Norfolk by truck. a nd

through the spli t in the cask or through the failed seal. Materials released to the environment

0.28 person-re m fo r the option of shipping to No rfolk by rai l.

wo uld be dispersed and diluted by wea the r action and a fraction would be deposited on the ground
( i.e .. drop out of the conta minated plume) in the surrounding region. Emergency response crews

B.4 .2.2 Assessment of Public Impacts from Transportation Accidents. Rarliological

accide nt impacts are presented in this section as integrated population risks (i.e .• accident
VO LU:\otE 1. APPENDIX A. APRIL 1995
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arri ving on the scene wo uld evacuate a nd secure the area to exclude bystanders from the accide nt
scene. The released ma te rial would then be clea ned up using standa rd decontamination techB-29
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niques. such as excava tion and removal of contaminated soil. Monitoring of the area would he

accident were to occur. The cond itional probabilities for truck and rail shipments were

performed to locate contaminated a reas and to guide cleanup crews in their cho ice of protective

dete rmined usi ng a binning process described in Volume I, Appendix I of this EIS. The derivation

clothing and eq uipme nt (e.g., fresh -a ir eq uipme nt and filtered masks). Access to the a rea wo uld

of the accident rates and conditional probabilities used in this analysis are discussed below. [The

be restricted by federal a nd /o r state radia tion control agencies until it had been decontaminated

conditio nal probabilities for barge accidents were take n directly from Pippen e t al. (1995)] .

to safe levels.
As discussed above, severity category levels were defined to model the response of the various
The RADTRAN 4 computer code was used to calculate the radiological risk of transportation

shipme nts to accidents. Severity category I was defined as encompassing all accidents that a re

accidents involving radioactive material shipme nts. The RADTRAN 4 methodology was

within the type 8 package envelope that would not be severe enough to result in failure of the

summar ized previously. For further de ta ils, refer to the discussions presented by RADTRAN III

shi pping cask (i.e., accidents with zero release). The higher categories (2-6) were defined to

(Madsen et al. 1986) a nd RADTRAN 4: Volume 2 -- Technical Manual (Neuhauser and Kanipe

include more severe accidents, and thus may kad to a release of radioactive ma terial. The

1992).

derivation of the severity category schemes and conditional probabilities of accidents in each
severity category are discussed below for each shipping cask or container type. Table 8-6 presents

There a re five major categories of input data needed to calculate potent' J I accide nt

the cond itional probabilities of the various severity categories that were used in this analysis.

transportation risk impacts using the RADTRAN 4 computer code. These are: I) accide nt
freq ue ncy, 2) release quantities, 3) atmospheric dispersion para meters, 4) po pulat ion distribution

Release Fractions. Release fractions (array RFRAC in RADTRAN 4) a re used to determine the

para meters, a nd 5) human uptake and dosimetry models. Accident frequency and release

quantity of radioactive material released to the environment as a result of an acciden t. The

quantities are discussed below, the remaining parameters have been discussed in previous sections.

quantity of materia l released is a function of the severity of the accident (i.e., thermal and

Accident Frequency. The frequency of a severe accident is calculated by multiplying an overa ll

conditions, and the physical a nd chemical properties of the ma terial being shipped. The basis for

accident rate (accide nts per truck-km or per rail-km) by the conditional probability that an

the release fract ions used in this ana lys is are discussed below and summa rized in Table 8-7.

mecha nical conditions produced in the accident), the response of the shipping container to these

accident would involve mechanical a nd/ or thermal conditions that are severe e nough to result in
conta ine r failure a nd subseque nt release of rad ioactive mate rial. Overall accide nt rates per

Release fractions for N Reactor fuel shipments were taken from Volume 1, Appendix I of this

kil ome te r of truck or rail travel were taken from Sa ricks a nd Kvitek (1994). State-specific accide nt

EIS . The table of release fractio ns fo r metallic fu els was used (Table 1-28). All of the released

ra tes we re used in th is study. For the Portland and Norfolk options, a composite weighted-average

material was assumed to be in respirable form for this assessment. Release fractions for damaged

accide nt rate was developed using the state-specific accident rates in Saricks and Kvitek (1994),

N Reactor SNF were modeled the same as for unda maged fuel. This is because it was assumed

a nd trave l fractions through each state that we re derived from the HIGHWAY a nd INTERLINE

that some fo rm of stabilization wou ld occur prior to shipment of damaged SNF. Stabilization was

results.

lIssumed to provide a level of conta inment for damaged SNF, such as placement in an overpack
conta ine r, to repl ace the containment boundary that was provided by the failed N Reactor SNF

For this analysis, six shipme nt-specific severity categori es were defined, with ca tegory I as the

cladding. Stabiliza tion was also assumed to include some form of treatment to minimize the

least severe and the higher categories (2-6) representing increasingly severe conditions. The

li ke lih ood of a pyrophoric reaction involving the metallic uranium and to prevent the accumula tion

conditio nal probabilities of encoun tering accident conditions in each severity category we re take n

of a n explosive concent ration of hyd roge n gas that may be generated by the fuel e lements.

from a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (N RC) document (Fischer et al. 1987) . Those
conditional probabilities were developed based on reviews of accident records a nd stat istics
compiled by va rious state and federal agencies. The conditional probability for a given severity
category is defined as the frac tion of accidents th at would fall into that severity category if a n
VOLUME 1. AP PENDI X A. APRJll 99S
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Table B-6. Accident severity categories and conditional probabilities.

A different . but related . set of release fractions were used for barge shipments of N Reactor
SNF. The relationship deals with the potential involvement of multiple shipping casks in a barge

Conditional probability by severity category
Mode

4

2

5

6

carrying 24 of them. It is overly conservative to assume that all 24 shipping casks would fail in
minor barge accidents . In the lower severity categories. the accident conditions are not severe

9.943E-01

Truck'

4.03E-05

3.82E-03

1.55E-05

1.80E-03

9.84E-06

Rail'

9.940E-01

2.02E-03

2.72E-03

6.14E-04

8.55E-04

1.25E-04

8 arge"

9.53E-OI

2.02E-03

4.02E-02

6.4IE-04

4.0IE-03

1.34E-04

Ship'

6.03E-OI

3.95E-OI

2.0E-03

4.0E-04

4.0E-04

4.0E-04

enough to damage all 24 shipping casks. In fact . in the lowest severity category that results in a
release . only the shipping casks in the vicinity of the collision would be affected. Consequently .
the release fraction for severity category 2 was multiplied by 1/24 to reflect the assumption that
only one of the total of 24 shipping casks aboard the barge would be damaged . Category 3 release
fractions were multiplied by 1112 to reflect the assumption that two shipping casks out of 24 would

a. Source: Fischer et al. (1987) and Volume I, Appendix [, Figure [-2.
b. Source: Pippen et al. (1995).
c. Source: DOE (1994).

be damaged in the accident. The release fractions for severity categories 4 . 5. and 6 were
multiplied by 116. 113, and 1 to reflect the assumption that 4. 8, and all 24 casks would be
damaged . respectively .

Table B-7. Release fractions used for assessment of accident impacts.

Release fractions for HLW shipments were assumed to be the same as those for SNF shipments. The difference is that the strength and durability of the vitrified HLW form was taken into

Release fraction by severity category
Material

2

3

4

5

6

account by assuming that not all of the materials released are in respirable or dispersable form.
RADTRAN 4 default values for "immobilized " radionuclides were used to model the dispersable

SNF'
G ases
Cesi um
Ruth e nium
Particles
HLW'

and respirable fractions of the released material. This means that the fraction of released material
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

9.9E-03
3.0E-08
4. IE-09
3.0E-1O

3.3E-02
1.0E-07
1.4E-08
1.0E-09

3.9E-OI
1.0E-06
2.4E-07
1.0E-08

3.3E-OI
1.0E-06
1.4E-07
1.0E-08

6.3E-0 I
1.0E-OS
2.4E-06
1.0E-07

H LW release fractions are the same as those for SNF

that is in dispersable form is I.OE-06. and the respirable fraction is 5.0E-02 (Neuhauser and
Kanipe 1992). The HLW release fractions for barge shipments were adjusted similarly to those for
S F to account fo r the fraction of casks that were assumed to be damaged in the six severity
categories.

Pu oxide
Pa rticles

0.0

1.0E-06

1.0E-05

1.0E-04

1.0E-03

1.0E-02

U oxide
Particles

0.0

1.0E-06

1.0E-05

1.0E-0-l

1.0E-OJ

1.0E-02

For plutonium and uranium oxide shipments . no data were readily available . Therefore . the
re lease frac tions presented in Table 8 -7 are representat ive approximations . It was assumed that
10 <:1 of the matenal released from the plutonium and uranium shipment accidents IS in dlSpersable

These relea se fra ctions were applied to truck a mI rail shipme nts of S~F a nd H LW Reka,e
frac tions fo r barge shipmenlSwere multiplied by 1 / 2~. I / I~ . 1/ 6. 1/ 3. and I for seve r i t ~
ca tegor ies 2 through 6. respectivel y. to reflect the nu mber of shipp ing casks tha t a re da maged in
d.

lo rm and 5'f of that IS In re'ptrable fo ml . based on recommendations made by Neuhauser and
Kampe t l992 11", ,hlpmc nt of small ro"der matenals .

each ca tegory .

8 .4.2.2.2 Consequences of lIIuimum Reasonably Foru ...ble Accidents. The
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RISKJ1I<D Input Parameters. This analysis evaluates the consequences of accidents involving

Table B-8. RISKJND calculated doses summarized by severity category".

truck or rail shipments. A separate assessment was not performed for ba rge shipments to Port land
Truck

beca use of the similarity between the rail a nd barge routing data (see Section B.2.3). Th e
radiological inventori es developed in Table B-1 have been used to calculate the dose to the
maximum individual a nd the public. For all analyses. inhalation doses were calcula ted for each of

Rail

Severity
Categoryb

Spent Nuclear
Fuel
(rem)

I'

2.36E-05

2.36E-05

2.36E-05

2.36E-05

2

B.59E-03

3.9!E-04

2.36E-05

1.30E-O!

1.26E-O!

5.0! E-02

1.25E-03

2.36E-05

B.53E-0!

B.39E-OI

Pu Oxide
(rem)

U Oxide
(rem)'

Spent Nuclear
Fuel
(rem)

Solidified
HLWd
(rem)

the: NRC modal study severity categories. assuming the maximum individual was located 100 m
fro m the point of release and neutral weather conditions (i.e., At mospheric Stability Class = D
and 4 mls wind speed). To determine the maximum individual dose for each of the material types.
the calculated dose for each of the NRC modal study categories (20) were binned into the accident
severity categories shown in Table B-6. The results of the RISKJND calculations for each severity
category are presented in Table B-B.

An accident frequency (accidents per year) and probable accide nt location by popula tion zone
(i.e .. rural. suburba n, a nd urban) were developed fo r each campa ign, based on the type of material,
transportation mode. transportation routing information. and state·specific transportation accident

data. For this a nalysis a campaign is defined as the total number of shipments required to
transport all of the material from the point of origin to the destination.

2.36E-05

4

9.39E-02

1.23E-02

2.36E-05

2.96E-01

1.26E-OI

5

J.JBE-O!

1.23E·02

2.36E-05

9.BOE-01

B.39E-OI

6

2.60E-01

l.23E-Ol

2.36E-OS

1.27E+OO

8.39E-Ol

a. Maximum individual doses are in BOLD. (These doses were estimated in the event an
accide nt occurs; i.e., they were not multiplied by the corresponding accident frequencies) .
b. Severity categories a re defined in Table B-6.
c. Only external doses were calculated.
d. The quantity of HLW released has been adjusted because of the immobilized form of the
material. The adjustment, 1.0E-06, was taken from RADTRAN 4 (Neuhauser and
Ka nipe 1992).
e. Although, no ma terial would be released, an external dose is calculated as a result of changes
in the cask shielding caused by an accident impact.

For each of the transportation modes. existing transportation model computer codes, i.e.,
HIGHWAY (Johnson 1993a; popula tion data revised in 1994) and INTERLINE (Johnson 1993b;
population data revised in 1994) were used to develop the route-specific information required for
the accide nt a nalyses.

The calculated maximum individual doses were cross referenced with the accident frequencies
in Table B·9. a nd the maximum individual doses for reasonably foreseeable accidents (i.e., the
accident frequency is greater than I x 1O· 7/year) have been reported.

The informa tion req uired to calculate the accident frequencies included the total number of
shipments per ca mpaign. the ca mpaign duration. the total shipping dista nce. pa pulation zo ne·
peci fic accide nt rates by state. a nd the condit ional probabilities shown in Table B-6. The

The population dose from the max imum reasonably foreseeable accident is also provided.
These analyses are based on the same assumpt ions used to calculate the dose to the max imally

population zone·specific accident frequencies a re calculated using the state·specific accide nt data

exposed individual. The location of the accident (or population zone) is the same as the accident

I accidents per kilo meter ) for each of the population zones contained in Saricks and Kvitek ( 1994)

location used to calculate the maximum individual doses. The population de nsities for each of the

dnd the distance traveled in each of the population zones. The resulting adjusted acciden t rates

impac ted population zones were developed using HIGHWAY (Johnson 1993a) and INTERLINE

.o re hown

(Jo hnso n 199Jb ).

IT1

Tahle B·9 The va lues in this table were used to select the maximu m reasonablY

foreseeable de Ident scenario
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Ta ble 8-9. Summary of ro ute-specific accide nt rates.

T o ta l
distance
(km )

Travel fraction

D istance per zone (km )
Rural

Suburba n

U rban

Ta ble 8 - 10. Results o f tran sportatio n accide nt risk assess me nt' .

Ru ral Suburba n

U rba n

Pop ul atio n zone accident
ra te (1.0E-07 / km)
Ru ral

S uburb~ n

3640.28

4 16.82

353.25

6 19.48

51.67

50.2 1

13.36

0.84

0.14

0.0 1

2.508

3.369

4. 129

2.279

2.802

3.675

2.500

2.055

1.610

0.524

0.678

0.753

0.36 1

0.298

0.271

0.349

0.349

0.349

Portland to Hanford -T ruck
0.85

0. 12

0.03

Seattle to Hanford - Truck
276.80

243.80

27.70

5.30

0.88

0. 10

0.02

Norfolk to Hanford - Rail
4984.78

4 140.40

723.60

120.78

0.83

0. 15

0.02

Portland to Hanford -Rail
430.50

366.32

492 1

14.97

0.86

0. 11

0.03

Seattle to Hanford - Rail
71 5.8

530.5

136.4

48.9

0.74

0.19

0.07

8 .4 .2 .3 Results of Transportation Accident Impact Calculations. The resul ts o f t he
integrated pop ul atio n risk assess men t a re prese nt ed in Table B-I O. The lowest im pact op tio n is
th a t in which SNF is shipped fro m H anfo rd to th e Po rt of Sea ttle by ra il. The Po rt of Sea ttle by
truck op ti o n is th e next highest followed in o rde r by the rail op tio n to No rfolk . tr uck to No rfo lk.
a nd t hen ba rge to Portl a nd. The impacts fo r all of th e optio ns are do mina ted by t he SN F shipme nts to the U.K. a nd pl ut on ium oxide retu rn shipme nts to H a nfo rd. p rimar ily beca use th ~
guantities a nd for ms of th ese ma ter ia ls a re mor~ vuln era ble to accident al releases a nd re present
highe r radiolOxici ties than vitrified HLW a nd uranium oxide. Ship me nts of vitrified H LW we re
det~rmined 10 present the lowest impacts o f all th e ma te r ia ls beca use o f the reaso ns give n plus t h ~

immohilized for m of the ma te rial relative to the o th er ma terials.

Shipm~n t s hy t""ge arc shown in Table

B- IO to

ba rge. dnd th e rc~uhang potential dccident rde.tses. a re at Icast an o rde r o f magnitude grt:'a lcr thdn
for truck a nd rail hlpments BecaUS<! the accident rates fo r th e three mod~s a rc co mpar.hle. th l>
a higher per ,hlpment (or per- m I aa:ldent rISk for barge than th e oth~ r m od~, Th "

higher per-<liihlpmt:nt

\ O il \11
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Ba rge to Portland
SNF
H LW
Pu
U
TOTAL

1.8E-02
I.SE-08
9.3E-03
2.7E-06
2.7E-02

9.0E-06
7.5E- 12
4.7E -06
1.4 E-09
1.4E-05

Truck to Sea ttle
SN F
H LW (R ail)
Pu (Truck)
U (T ruck)
TOTAL

9.3E-05
1.6E- 1O
3.6E-03
1.1E-06
3.7E-03

4.7E-08
8.0E -14
1.8E -06
5.5E- 1O
1.9E-06

Rail to Seattle
SNF
H LW ( Ra il)
Pu (Truck)
U (Tr uck)
TOTAL

6.3E-05
1.6E -1O
3.6E-03
I.I E-06
3.7E-03

3 .2E-08
8.0E-14
1.8E-06
5.5E- 10
1.8E-06

Truck to Norfolk
SNF
HLW ( Rail)
Pu (Tru ck)
U (Truck)
TOTA L

2. IE -03
9.3E- 1O
8.3E-02
2.4E-05
8.5E-02

1.1 E-06
4.7E-13
4. IE -05
1.2 E-08
4.2E-05

Ra il to Norfo lk
SN F
HLW ( Rail)
Pu (T ru ck )
U (T ruck )
TOTAL

7.4E-04
9.3E-1O
8.3E-02
2.4E-05
8.3E-02

3.7E-07
4.7E- 13
4. I E-05
I.2 E-OS
4.2E-05

a Reported \'alu~, are point e>limates of risk: i . ~ .. the accide nt frequency mul tiplied hy th~
l'lIn,ey uen ce, that wo uld be exrect~d if an accident O<.'C urred.

r~s ult in relatively higher a<'Cident impac" than

shlpmc:nts hy fail or truck Th is is hcC'IU~ the: if"! em orics of radioactive ma t erial~ transport ed hy

r~ults In

Late nt cance r
fa talities

Urba n

Norfolk to Hanford - Truck
43 11.43

Accident impacts.
pe rson-re m

Opt ion a nd mate rial

B-_,6

4(,'5

,hlpml.'nh
HO\\l'\cr .

'0

In

0
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The results of the maximum reasonably foreseeable accident consequence assessment are
provided in Tables B-II through B-14. The results in these tables were generated using the
RISKIND computer code. The following paragraphs discuss the results of the maximally

~xposed

individual consequence assessment for each material. This is followed by a discussion of the
results of the collective dose calculations.

N Reactor SNF. As discussed in Section 2.0, SNF will be loaded into shipping casks at the
K Basins and transported by barge, truck, or rail to ocean ports for shipment to the U.K. Two
shipping modes and three transportation routes were evaluated. The radiological source inventory
used in the analysis was shown in Table B-l. The release fractions used here were taken from
Volume 1. Appendix [ of this EIS (see Table B-7) . The results of the evaluation are shown in
Table B-II.

As can be seen in Table B-1 1. for reasonably foreseeable events (i.e., the accident frequency is
grea ter than 1.0E-07/year), the dose received by the maximally exposed individual from a rail accident ranges from 9.BOE-OI to 1.27E+ 00 rem depending on the location of the individual and
transportation route. The potential LCF range from 4.90E-04 to 6.3SE-04. The accident frequency also varies based on the transportation route and accident location from 1.27E-07 to
1.91 E-06/year. Table B-II also presents the dose received by the maximally exposed individual
from a truck accident. The dose to the maximally exposed individual ranges from l.IBE-OI to
2.60E-O l rem, depending on the location of the individudl and transportation route. The accident
frequency also varies based on the transportation route and accident location from 1.23E-07 to
1.02E-OS/year. The potentia l LCF range from S.90E-OS to 1.30E-04.

Collective doses to the public were also calculated for each of the transport modes and transportation route (see Table B-II ). For this analysis. it was assum ed that th e acc ide nt occurred in
the sa me locatio n a th a t determin ed in th e max imum individ ual dose calculations. The popu, la ti on do e from a rail accide nt ranges from 3. 1 E+OO to 3.27E+02 person-rem depending on
the accident locatio n. popula tion den ity. and tran portation route. The dose. to popu la tio n from
a tru 'k a cident rangl! from I.

E-OI to 9.-l4E + 02 person-rem. The potential LCF range from

1.:9 -OJ to 0. 1 0 fo r rail a nd 6. SE-OS to 4.72E-I for truck.

\'0 1 t; \tE I.
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Table B- II. Calculated maximum individual and population radiological doses and latent cancer fatalities based on accident location

and fre4uency of SNF shipments.
Accident
location:
population
zone c

TEDEd
(rem)

LCre

1.23 E-07

Urban

2.60E-OI

1.30E-04

1.01E+02 5.0SE-02

Hanford, Washington to
Seattle, Washington

1.02E-05

Rural

\.l8E-01

S.90E-OS

1.37E-01

6.85E-OS

Hanford, Washington to
Norfolk, Virginia

1.43-06

Urban

2.60E-OI

1.30E-04

9.44E+02

4.72E-Ol

3.46E-07

Rural

9.80E-Ol

4.90E-04

3.18E+00

l.S9E-03

Hanford, Washington to
Seattle, Washington

1.27E-07

Urban

1.27E+00

6.3SE-04

3.39E+02 0.170

Hanford, Washington to
Norfolk, Virginia

1.91 E-06

Urban

1.27E+ 00

6.3SE-04

3.27E+02

Transportation Route

Mode

No. of
shipmentsa

Hanford, Washington to
Portland, Oregon

Truck

408

Hanford, Washington to
Portland, Oregon

Rail

204

Accident
frequency
(per year)b

Maximum individual

Population
TEDEd
(person-rem)

<

C

r

C

3::

~

.-

a. Assumes one truck cask per truck shipment and two truck casks per rail shipment.
b. Accident frequency based on the number of shipments, campaign duration, one-way shipping distance, and conditional
probability.
c. Accident location is based on popula tion zone wh e re the maximum individual dose occurs.
d . TEDE - 50-year total effective dose equivalent.
e. LCF - Latent cancer fatalities. Calculated on dose (rem) to maximum individual or population, i.e., S.OE-04 LCF /rem
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Table 8-12. Calculated maximum individual and population radi o logi cal doses and latent cancer fatalities based on accident location
and fre quency for plutonium oxide shipments.

>
>
"'C

Accitlent
Frequency
(pe r year)b

Accident
Location :
Population
Zone c

TEDEd
(rem)

LCFs

1.22 E-07

Urban

l.23E-Ol

Seattle, Washington to
Hanford, Washington

l.OlE-OS

Rural

Norfolk, Virginia to
Hanford, Washington

1.42E-06

Urban

C
r

Transportation Route

Mod ~

No. of
Ship.3

Portland, Oregon to
Hanford, Washington

Truck

18(,

Maximum Individual

Population
TEDEd
(rem)

LCFsc

6.lSE-OS

l.88E+Ol

9.40E-03

1.23E-02

6. lSE-06

3.46E-03

l.73E-06

1.23E-Ol

6.1SE-OS

I.77E+Ol

8.8SE-03

c

a. Assum es one cask per truck shipment.
b. Accident frequency based on the number of shipments, campaign duration, one-way shipping distance, and conditional
probability.
c. Accident location is based on population zone where maximum individual dose occurs.
d. TEDE - SO year Total Effective Dose Equivalent.
e. LCFs - Latent cancer fatalities. Calculated based on dose (rem) to maximum individual or popula tion, Le., S.OE-04 LCFs/rem

Lfcq

Plutonium Oxide. The separated plutonium oxide was assumed to be returned to its point of

origin (i.e., Hanford). This material was assumed to be transported to a U.S. port (Seattle,
Portla nd, or Norfolk) by ocean-going ship and oftloaded to a Safe-Secure Trailer/Armored
Tractor for subsequent highway shipment to Hanford (one container per shipment).

The results of this analysis are provided in Table 8-12. The dose, to the maximally exposed
individual from the maximum reasonable foreseeable accident, ranges from 1.23E-02 to
1.23E-0 1 rem , depending on the location of the individual and transportation route. The potential
LCF ranges from 5.90E-06 to 5.90E-05. The accident frequency ranges from 1.22E-07 to
1.01 E-05 /year depending on the transportation route and accident location.

The potential popUlation doses from the maximum reasonably foreseeable accident have also
been calculated and are shown in Table 8-12. Assuming that the accident occurs in the same
location or population zone as that determined for the maximally exposed individual, the
population dose ranges from 3.46E-03 to 1.88E+Ol person-rem. The potential LCF range from
1.73E-06 to 9.40E-03.

Uranium Oxide. A~ with plutonium oxide, uranium oxide resulting from SNF processing was

assumed to he returned to Hanford. This material was assumed to be transported by ship to a port
facility where it would be offloaded onto a truck for subsequent highway tr?nsport to Hanford. As
with the plutonium oxide, only truck accidents were evaluated. The calculated dose received by
the maximum individual from a truck accident is 2.36E-05 rem (see Table 8-13). The potential
LCF are 1.18E-08. The accident frequency ranges from 1.23E-07 to 1.01E-05 per year depending
on the transportation route and accident location.

The potential collective dose ranges from 3.65E-06 to 1.98E '1 3 person-rem depending on the
location and transportation route. The potential LCF range from 1.83E-09 to 9.90E-07 and also
depend on the accident location and transporta tion route.

Solidified High-Level Waste. Following separat ion of all plutonium and uranium from the

N Reactor fuel, the resultin g HLW was assumed to be vitrified and poured into canisters. These
canisters were assumed to be shipp ed in rail shipping casks by ship to a U.S. port facility and
offloaded to rail cars at the port; therefore, only rail accidents were evaluated for shipments of
H L W. The radiological source inventory used in the analysis was shown in Table 8-1 a nd the
release frac tions were shown in Table 8-7. 8ecause the waste materi al that has been solidified in
8-41
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Tahle B.13. Calculated maximum individual and pop ulat ion radi ological doses and latent cancer fa talities based on accident location
and frequency for uranium oxide shipments.

~

>
"'0

Accident
frequency
(per year)b

Accident
location :
population
zone c

I .23E-07

Seattle, Washington to
Hanford, Washington
Norfolk, Virginia to
Hanford, Washington

C!

r

Transportation route

Mode

No. of
shipmentsa

Portland, Oregon to
Hanford, Washington

Truck

236

Maximum ind ividual
TEDEd
(rem)

Urban

1.0 IE-OS
1.43E-06

Population

LCP:

TEDEd
(person-rem)

LCP:

2.36E-OS

1.18E-08

1.98E-03

9.90E-07

Rural

2.36E-OS

1.18E-OB

3.6SE-06

1.83E-09

Urban

2.36E-OS

1.18E-08

I.86E-03

9.3E-07

a. Assum es one cask per truck shipment.
b. Accident frequency based on the number of shipments, campaign duration, one-way shipping distance, and conditional
probability.
c. Accident loca tion is based on the population zone wh ere maximum individual dose occurs.
d. TEDE - 50-year total effective dose equivalent.
e. LC F - Latent ca ncer fatalities. Calculated on dose ( rem) to maximum individual or population, i.e. ) S.OE-04 LCF /rem.

J-/I/

glass logs was considered to be "immobilized" materi al, the fraction of relea sed ma terial that is also
disp ersable a nd th e fraction that is also respirable were adjusted, as discussed in Section 4.2. 2. 1.

The calculated dose to th e maximally exposed individual and population a re shown in
Table 8-14 . The Gose to the maximally exposed ind ividual was 8.39E-0 1 re m and the potentia l
la te nt cancer fatalities would be 4.20E-04. The accident frequency varies by route and ra nges from
1.25E-07 to 1.88E-06/year.

The populatior. doses a: e also shown in Table 8-14. The collective dose ranges from 3.48E+00
to 1.42E+03 person-rem. The potential latent cancer fa talities range from 1.74E-03 to 0.710.

8.4.2.4 Assessment of Nonradiologicallmpacts. Nonradiological accident impacts consist

of fat alities that may result from traffic accidents involving the shipments to and from the offshore
processing fa cility. Nonradiological incident-free impacts are those resulting pollutants emitted
from the vehicles. These impacts are not related to the radioactive na ture of the materials being
tran sported. In fact , the number of estimated injuries and fat alit ies would be the same even if the
cargo were not radioactive materials. This section uses unit risk factors to estimate the
non radiological impacts associated with the five shipping scenarios considered in this eva luation .

The potential for accidents involving shipments of materials to and from a n offshore
processing facility is assumed to be comparable to that of general truck, rail, and barge tra nsport in
the U.S. Nonradiological accident unit risk fact ors were taken from Saricks a nd Kvitek (1994) to
calculate nonradiological accident impacts. These risk factors, in units of fatalities-per-km of
travel in rural and urban population zones, were multiplied by th e tota l distance traveled in each
zone by all of th e shipmenrs a nd then summed to calculate the expected numbe r of nonradiological
fa talities. The unit ri sk factor for travel in suburban zones was represented by the average of the
rura l and urban unit risk factors given by Sa ricks a nd Kvitek ( 1994).

Impacts to the public from non -radiological causes are also eva luated. This includes fatalities
resulting from pollutants emitted from the vehicles during normal transportation . 8ased on th e
information co ntain ed in Rao et al. ( 1982), the types of polluta nts that are present a nd can impact
the public a re sulfur oxides (SOx), particulates, nitrogen oxides (NO x)' carbon monoxid e (CO).
hydrocarbo ns (HC), and photochemical oxidants (Ox) , O f these pollutants. Rao et al. (1982)
determined that the maj ority of the health effects are fro m SOx a nd the particulates. Unit risk

8 -43
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Table 8-14. Calculated maximum individ ual and population radiological doses and latent cancer fatalities based on accident location
and frequency for solidified high level waste shipments
?

>
Accident
frequency
(per year)b

Accident
location :
population
zone c

TEDEd
(rem)

LCFe

TEDEd
(person-rem)

LCfC

3.39E-07

Rural

8.39E-Ol

4.20E-04

3.48E+OO

1.74E-03

Seattle, Washington to
Hanford, Washington

1.25E-07

Urban

8.39E-Ol

4.20E-04

1.42E+03

7.1E-Ol

Norfolk, Virginia to
Hanford, Washington

1.88E-06

Urban

8.39E-OI

4.20E-04

1.37E+03

6.8E-OI

"":l

~

r

Transportation Route

Mode

No. of
shipments.a

Portland, Oregon to
Hanford, Washington

Rail

24

Maximum individual

Population

a. Assumes one cask per rail shipment.
b. Accident frequency based on the number of shipments, campaign dura tion, one-way shipping distance, and conditional
probability.
c. Accident location is based on population zone where maximum individual dose occurs.
d. TEDE - 50-yea r total effective dose equivalent.
e. LCF - La te nt cancer fat alities. Calculated on dose (rem) to the maximum individual or population, i.e., 5.0E-04 LCF /rem.

J-j /3

factors (fatalities per kilometer) for both truck and rail shipments were developed by Rao et ai.

The consequences of pan accidents were estimated in a manner similar to that used for

( 1982) for travel in urban population zones (1.0E-07/km and 1.3E-07/km truck and rail

overland transponation impacts. The contents of one shipping cask were assumed to be involved

respectively) . These unit risk faclOrs were combined with the tOlal shipping distance in urban

in an acc ident (see Table B- I). with radionuclide releases according to the release fractions

population zones to calculate the nomadiological incident-free impacts to the public.

reponed in Table B-7. The dose and re,ulting LCF were calculated for each of the six accident
severity categories. The point estimates of risk included the consequences as LCF for accidents of

The results of the nomadiological accident and incident-free impact calculations for the five
pOlential shipping scenarios are presented in Table B. IS . The values reponed in the table represent

each severity category multiplied by the frequency with which an accident of that severity would
occur. The accident frequencies for each severity category were assumed to be the overall accident

the sum of the impacts from all of the shipments and include the impacts from shipments carrying

rate per pan transit (3.2 x 10~) multiplied by the conditional probability for accidents in each

cargo as well as those from empty return shipments.

severity category listed in Table B-6 (DOE 1994). The tOlal accident risk for an individual or

B.4.3 Dose to the Public from Port Activities

accidents evaluated at 9S % (stable) atmospheric dispersion were assumed to be 10 % lower than

population was then estimated as the sum of risks for all accident severity categories. Risks for

those at SO% (neutral) dispersion.
Normal pan activities during transpon of N Reactor SNF are not expected to have any
consequences for me mbers of the public other than pan workers, as discussed in Section 3.3.

The results for accidents at the four representative pons are shown in Table B-16 , with estimated risks for individual residents and populations within 80 km (SO miles). Point estimates of

The consequences of accidents during pan transit were estimated using the same assumptions

risk for the individual resident ;anged from 6.2 x 10'"

10

1.3

X

10'" LCF if no locally grown food

described for worker consequences in Section 3.3.2. Collective point estimates of risk to the

were considered; results for a'i exposure pathways including ingestion were 3.S x 10'" to

population within 50 miles (80 km) of each location was estimated for an accident at the dock and

7.8 x 10.10 LCF.

on the approach

10

the pan. The point estimate of risk to an individual at 1600 m (1 mile) was

also estimated for applicable exposure pathways as described in Attachment A of this appendix.

Collective point estimates of risk to the population within SO miles of Ponland . Oregon were

Consequences for populations and individuals are reponed , both with and without the risk from

5.2 x 10"

ingestion of locallv grown foods because protective action guidelines would require mitigative

8.3 x 10" LCF for 95% atmospheric dispersion. Corresponding results for the population in the

10

4.9 x 10" LCF assuming 50 % atmospheric dispersion conditions and 1.0 x 10.8 to

actions if the projected dose exceeded specified levels. Individual consequences assume 9S%

vicinity of Newark are 2.3 x 10.8

atmospheric dispersion. whereas consequences to populations are estimated for both SO% and 9S %

1.5 x 10.8 to 8.4 x 10" LCF for 9S % atmospheric dispersion. Consequences fo r the collective

atmospheric dispersion .

populations of Seaule-Tacoma and Norfolk fe ll between the estimates for the other two pons .

Table B.IS . Nomadiological transponation impacts of offshore processing scenarios

10

4.9 x 10" LCF assuming SO % atmospheric dispersion and

The maximum reasonably foreseeable accident was a category 6 accident. which has a
frequency of 1.3 x 10" per port transit. and which was evaluated for either neutral or stable

Accident impacts,
fatalities

Incident-free impacts,
fatalities

Barge to Pan land

I.IE-02

2.IE-03

are presented in Table B-17 . The dose to the resident member of the public ranged from an

Shipping scenario

atmospheric conditions resulting in a cumulative frequency of2.2 x 10" or 2.2 x 1O·' .,respecti vely
for 17 SNF shipments. Dose and risk estimates for the maximum reasonabl y foreseeable accident

Seattle by Truck

8.9E-03

1.2E-03

est imated 0.02

Seaule by Rail

1.2E-02

3.4E-03

was considered as an exposure pathway . The corresponding probability of LCF ranged from 9 .0 x

Norfolk by Truck

J.3E-OI

1.6E-02

JO" 10 6.S X 10 4 and point estimates of risk. from 2.0 x 10'" to 1.4 X JO.IO LCF . The collective

Norfolk by Rail

I.2E-OI

1.5E-02
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somewhat over I rem for all pons. depending on whether locally grown food
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Table 8-16. Point est imate of risk il of latent cancer fatalities from port accidents.

Port locat ion

Purtland, Orl:gon

Sl:attle-Tacoma,
Washington

Norfolk, Virginia

Newark, New Je rsey

Inhalation
Exposure Pathways

All
pathways

Inhalation
+ external

+

All
pathways

Inhalation
+ external

All
pathways

external

All
pathways

+ external

3.SE-II
6.0E-1O

G.2E-13
l.OE-ll

4.6E-ll
7.BE-IO

7.9E-13
l.3E-ll

3.9E-11
6.7E-1O

6.8E-13
1.2E-ll

1.2E-07
2.0E-06

2.7E-09
4.6E-OB

l.OE-06
l.7E-OS

2.3E-08
3.9E-07

1.4E-09
2.3E-OB

\.IE-07
1.9E-06

2.5E-09
4.3E-08

2.9E-06
4.9E-OS

6.SE-OB
l.lE-06

S.l E-09
8.8E-08

3.3E-07
S.6E-06

7.4E-09
l.3E-07

S.OE-06
8.4E-OS

l.SE-08
2.5E-07

.SE-07
4.3E-06

S.8E-09
9.BE-08

~·. 9E-06

8.3E-OS

l.lE-07
1.9E-06

Inhalation

Individual at Itillll m - 95% (stable) atmospheric conditions
I Shipml:nt
17 Shipments

4.GE-II
7.BE-1O

7.9E- 13
l.3E-ll

Population within HII km (50 miles) or dock - 50% (neutral) atmospheric conditions
I Shipml:nt
17 Shipments

2.9E-07
4.9E-06

6.6E-09
l.lE-07

1.9E-07
3.2E-06

4.3E-09
7.2E-08

Population within H() km (511 miles) or harbor approach - 50% (neutral) atmospheric conditions
I Shipment
17 Shipml:nts

2.4E-07
4.0E-06

S.2E-09
8.9E-OB

6.0E-OB
I.OE-06

Population within HII km (50 miles) or dock - 95% (stable) atmospheric conditions
I Shipml:nt
17 Shipments

4.5E-07
7.6E-06

l.OE-OB
I.BE-07

2.3E-07
3.9E-06

Population within 80 km (50 Miles) or Harbor Approach - 95% (stable) Atmospheric Conditions
1 Shipment
17 Shipm e nts

4.9E-07
B.3E-06

I.OE-OS
l.7E-07

I.2E-07
2.0E-06

2.8E-09
4.7E-08

a. Point l:stimate of risk is ddined as the consequences to the recl:ptor or population (as LCF) of an accident of a given severity category
(assuming the accident occurs), multiplied by the freque ncy per shipment with which an accident of that seve rity would occur. The risks for
accidents (If all severity categories are then summed to obtain the total ri <;k per shipment.

consequences to the populations within 80 km (50 mi) of the ports ranged from 2.0 x 10') to 380
LCF assuming the accident occurs . depending on the location of the accident (port or harbor
approach) and the exposure pathways considered. The correspondmg point estimates of risk for
latent fatal cancers amounted to 4.4 x 10.9 to 8.2 x 10.5 .
6.4.4 Dose to the Public from Ocean Transport to the United Kingdom

This analysis expects no dose to members of the public resulting from incident-free ocean
transport of N Reactor SNF to the U. K. The ships carrying the fuel are owned and operated by the
commercial vendor, and its shipboard crews are assumed to be classified as radiation workers for
the purposes of this analysis.
The effects of losing a cask at sea are estimated to be comparable to those evaluated for
shipment of foreign research reactor SNF to the U.S . (DOE 1994), based on similar shipping
inventories of long-lived radionuclides per cask. The maximum dose to an individual for a cask
lost in coastal waters was expected to be 11 mrem/year if the cask were left in place until all its
contents dispersed . The corresponding consequences to marine biota were 0 .24 mrad/year for fish.
0.32 mrad/year for crustaceans, and 13 mrad/year for mollusks. The consequences resulting from
loss of a cask in the deep ocean would be many orders of magnitude lower than estimates for
coastal waters.
The probability of accident on the open ocean was estimated to be 4 .6 x IO-s per shipment for
an average duration voyage of about 20 days in transporting SNF from foreign research reactors to
the U.S. (DOE 1995) . The frequency of accidents for overseas shipment of SNF and process
materials via special-purpose ships would likely be within a factor of two or three of this estimate.
However, that frequency applies to commercial freight shipping experience, and it is possible that
the use of special-purpose ships could result in a different accident rate. Using the commercial
freight accident rate given above, the probability of an accident on the open ocean involving
transport of SNF (17 ocean shipments), HLW (1 shipment) , uranium oxide (I shipment), and
plutonium oxide (1 shipment) was calculated to be about 9.2E-04, integrated over all the
shipments.
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Table B-17. Consequences and risk to the public surrounding port facilities from maximum reasonably foreseeable accidents involving SNF
shipments at or near the ports
Port Location

Portland. Oregon
All

pathways

Inhalation
+ external

Tacoma. Washington
Inhalation
+ External

All

pathways

Norfolk. Virginia
All

pathways

Newark. New Jersey

Inhalation
+ eternal

All

pathways

Inhalation
+ external

Resident at 1600 m

Dose (rem)

1.3E+OO

2.3E~2

9 . 9E~1

1.8E~2

1.3E+OO

2.3E~2

I.IE+OO

2.0E~2

LCF

6.5E~4

1.2E~5

5.0E-04

9.0E~

6.5E-04

1 . 2E~5

5.5E-04

9.9E~

LCF risk

1.4E-1O

2.5E-12

1.1 E-IO

2.0E-12

1.4E- 1O

2.5E-12

1.2E-1O

2.2E-12

Population within 80 Ian (50 mil of dock - 50% (neutral) abnospheric dispersion

t:O

J,.

\0

Dose (person-rem)

8.7E+02

1.9E+OI

5.5E+02

1.2E+Ol

3.5E+02

7.7E+OO

3.1E+03

6.8E+Ol

LCF

4.4E~1

9.7E~3

2 . 8E~1

6.0E~3

1.8E~1

3.9E~3

1.6E+OO

3.4E~2

LCF risk

9.5E~7

2 . 1E~8

6.0E~7

1.3E~8

3.8E~7

8.4E~9

3.4E~

7.3E~8

Population within 80 Ian (50 mil of harbor approach - 50% (neutral) abnospheric dispersion

Dose (person-rem)

6.9E+02

1.5E+Ol

1.8E+02

4.0E+OO

3.3E+02

7.3E+OO

8.5E+03

1.8E+02

LCF

3.5E~1

7.5E~3

9 . 0E~2

2.0E~3

1.7E~1

3.7E~3

4.3E+OO

9.1E~2

LCF risk

7.5E~7

1.6E~8

2 . 0E~7

4.4E~

3.6E~7

7.9E~9

9.2E~

2.0E~7

Population within 80 Ian (50 mil of dock - 95% (stable) abnospheric dispersion

<
0

r

Dose (person-rem)

1.3E+04

2.9E+02

6.9E+03

1.5E+02

9.8E+03

2.IE+02

7.5E+05

1.7E+03

tTl

~

LCF

6.5E+OO

1.4E~1

3.5E+OO

7.5E~2

4.9E+OO

I.\E~l

3.8E+02

8 . 6E~1

;I>

LCF risk

I.4E~

3.1E~8

7.5E~7

1.6E~8

I.IE~

2.3E~8

8 . 2E~5

1.9E~7

--

."
."

tTl

z

0

><
?>
;I>

Population within 80 Ian (50 mil of harbor approach - 95% (stable) abnospheric dispersion

Dose (person-rem)

1.4E+04

3. IE+02

3.6E+03

7.8E+Ol

7.5E+03

1.6E+02

I.4E+05

3.2E+03

LCF

7.0E+OO

1.6E~1

1.8E+OO

3.9E~

3.8E+OO

8 . 0E~2

7.0E+OI

1.6E+OO

LCF risk

1.5E-06

3.4E~8

3.9E~7

8.5E-09

8 .2E~7

1 . 7E~8

1.5E~5

3.5E~7

."
~

r

:0
-0

'"
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8 .5 Legal and Policy Considerations

population and environment in the foreign processing alternative. A decision to implement the
BNFL option would be likely to generate controversy over the perception of transferrring
environmental problems overseas. Transportation risks are addressed in Sections B.3 and B.4 of

B.5.1 Policy Considerations

this attachment.

For a general discussion of the policy considerations associated with DOE's management of
SNF. see Section 2 of Volume I. Several policy considerations bear on the evaluation of
international shipment and processing of SNF.

The representative facility used for this analysis (British Nuclear Fuels facility operations in
Sellafield . U.K.) began in the 1940s with the same primary mission as Hanford. This commercial
faci li ty processes large volumes of SNF from several foreign countries. Round trip shipments and
management of SNF and waste products would therefore be undertake n within a demonstrated

The primary consideration in international shipment of nuclear materials is concern for

regulatory . technical, and physical infrastructure.

unauthorized diversion of such materials to foreign weapons programs (nuclear proliferation).
This concern is mitigated, but not eliminated. because SNF is not directly useable in simple

B.5.2 Applicable Laws, Regulations, and Other Requirements

nuclear weapons. Stringent safeguards exist for overseas transportation of nuclear materials.
Highly enriched uranium has been transported overseas for research purposes, and SNF from
research reactors has been returned to the U.S. for disposition. Although such return shipments
have not occurred routinely since 1988. DOE is considering resumption of such shipments in
support of U.S. efforts to remove highly enriched uranium SNF from international commerce.
Two such shipments were completed on an urgent relief basis in 1994, and additional shipments
may resume on completion of an evaluation by DOE (1995).

DOE ( 1993) has evaluated the safety and policy issues associated with overseas transport of
plutonium and concluded that such shipments could be made safely and securely within the context

8.5.2.1 General. This discussion is limited to regulatory considerations associated with the

round trir domestic and overseas transportation of SNF and other hazardous and radioactive
materials. For a discussion of general laws and regulation governing the management of SNF, see
Section 2.2 of this appendi x. State and local requirements will not be discussed here because the
shipments of SNF under consideration would be in interstate or foreign commerce and federal
provisions would govern. Internal DOE Orders also are not discussed.

The significant international and federa l laws and regulations that apply to the transportation of
hazardous and radioactive materials include the following laws :

of current national and international regulations for transport of radioactive materials (including
special nuclear materials) . The report (DOE 1993) addresses risks to the public and the

International Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea of 1960 (as amended)

environment, emergency response requirements. safeguards. and the regulatory framework within
Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S .C. 2011 et seq .)

which such shipments could be made.

Hazardous Transportation Materials Act (49 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.)
The overseas transportation of SNF and eventual return of vit rified wastes and end products
contemplated in this alternative would be managed in accordance with well defined and

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, as amended by the Hazardous and Solid Waste
Amendments (42 U.S.c. 26901 et seq.)

demonstrated practices. However. a decision to implement the overseas transportation and
processing option will require close examination of various policy and international documents that

Executive Order 12898 (Environmental Justice)

address plutonium stockpiling and the exchange of nuclear materials.

Executive Order 12114 (Envi ronmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions) .

Other major policy considerations are the comparative risk of overseas shipment and return
ve rsus strictly domestic transportation and management of SNF and the involvement of a foreign
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8.5.2.2 Domestic Packaging and Transportation. Transportation of hazardous and
radioactive materials. substances. and wastes are governed by the regulations of the U.S.

General provisions for passage through the Panama Canal are found at 35 U.S.C . 101-135.
General regulations governing navigation. including the applicability of the International

Department of Transportation (DOT) (49 CFR 171-178. 383-397). the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Regulations for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea (1972) . are found throughout Tille 33 of the

Commissiun (NRC) (10 CFR 71) . and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

CFRs.

(4C CFR 262 . 265).
Relevant regulations applying to transport of SNF by vessel are found in 10 CFR Parts 7 I and
United States DOT regulations contain requirements for identifying a material as hazardous or
radioactive . These regulations interface with NRC and EPA regulations for identifying material.

73 (NRC) and 49 CFR Part 176 (DOT) . These regulations address prenotification to the U.S.
Coast Guard for inspection. and provide specifications for packaging. labelling. and other prepara-

but the DOT regulations govern hazard communication via placarding. label ing. reporting. and

tion for shipment. A Certification of Competent Authority must be obtained in compliance with

shipping requirements (see especially 10 CFR 71.5. in which DOT regulations are applied to

International Atomic Energy Agency requirements. Specific provisions are made for stowage .

shipping of radioactive materials by NRC regulations) .

including package surface temperature limitations. spacing. and total aggregate volume and
number of freight containers .

Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations address packaging design and certification
requirements . Certification is based on safety analysis report data on the packaging design for

B.6 Environmental Justice

various hypothetical accident conditions .
For analytical purposes. three modes of transportation were selected for evaluation: I} truck
General overland carriage is governed by specific regulations dealing with packaging notification. escorts. and communication. There are specific provisions for truck and for rail. For
carriage by truck. the carrier must use interstate highways or state-designated preferred routes .
Department of Transportation regulations found in 49 CFR 397. 101 establish routing and driver
training requirements for highway carriers of packages containing "highway-route-controlled

or rail to a port on Puget Sound (such as Tacoma. Washington); 2} barge to a Columbia River port
in the vicinity of Portland. Oregon ; or 3} rail or truck across the country to an East Coast port .
The East Coast port of reference was assumed to be Norfolk. Virginia (Hampton Roads) . These
three modes are considered to provide a reasonable range of ports and transportation options for
evaluation .

quantities " of radioactive materials. Spent nuclear fuel shipments constitute such controlled
shipments. For carriage by rail car . each shipment by the railroad must comply with 49 CFR 174
Subpart K "Detailed Re'luirements for Radioactive Materials ."

The DOE draft Environmental Impact Statement on the Proposed Nuclear Weapons
Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor (FRR) Spent Nuclear Fuel
(DOE/ EIS-0218D) provides information on the numbers and spatial locations of minority and low-

8 .5.2.3 Overseas Transportation. To the extent feasible . the NRC and DOT conform their
regulations to the model regulations of the International Atomic Energy Agency . These model
international regulations are also incorporated into the International Maritime Dangerous Goods
Code . which was developed to supplement the International Convention on the Safety of Life at
Sea. to which the U.S. is a signatory . Transportation risk in the global commons must be
evaluated in acco rdance with Executive Order 12114 (Environmental Effects Abroad of Major
Federal Actions).

income populations surrounding the ports of interest identified above and the Hanford Site .
8ecause the FRR EIS (see Section A.2) utilized somewhat different analytical methodologies for
environmental justice purposes than those uti lized in this document . some data may vary. The
reasons for such variations are explained in Section L-3.5 of Appendix L of this document .
Utilizing demographic data entirely from the FRR EIS for the purposes of this attachment. allows
for comparison of the sites of interest under consistent definitions and assumptions because the
ports identified above were not demographically evaluated in Appendix L of this EIS . The reader
is referred to the draft FRR EIS for maps locating the spatial distribution of minority and low

Transportation of dangerous cargoes through the Panama Canal is governed by the

income populations.

Interna tional Maritime Dangerous Goods Code (lMDG) and is addressed in 35 U.S.C . 113 .
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Table 8 -18 lists information on selected populations of interest for regions surrounding the Hanford

B.7 Cost

loading facility and ports. Regions surrounding each pon are areas that lie at least panially within a
16-km (IO-mile) radius of the pon. Eighty kilometers (50 miles) is used for Hanford . Population
characteristics shown in the table were extracted from detailed , block-group statistical population data

The cost estimate for the foreign processing option. as provided by the representative facilily.
includes lhe full service of transporting the SNF from the Hanford Sile to the U.K. facility.

of the 1990 census. A block group usually includes 250 to 550 housing units.
processing the malerial into recovered uranium and plutonium and HLW. packaging these products
appropriately for return to the U.S .. storing the packaged materials pending shipment. and
8ecause the impacts as a result of transponation and facility operations are small and reasonably
foreseen accidents present no significant risk, no reasonably foreseeable adverse impacts have been
identified to the surrounding population. Therefore, no disproponionately high and adverse effects
would be expected for any panicular segment of the population, including minority and low-income
populations.

transporting the materials back to the U.S. (8NFL 1994). The proposal provides only a range of
total cost ($ 1.3 - $2 billion). with no breakdown of those costs into tlte principal cost elements.
Thus . there is no detai led estimate of costs for the individual parts of the full service package .
The above estimate does not include costs incurred at Hanford to package and stabilize the fuel . if
necessary . prior to shipment. or to manage degraded fuel and sludge that may not be suitable for
overseas shipment.

Table B-18. Characterization of populations residing near candidate facilities (Hanford Site and
candidate ports of embarkation").
Total
population
within 16 km
of filcility

I

Total minority population
within 16 km of filcility>

Households
within
16 km of
filcility

Low income
households within
16 km of filcility

Facility

Number

Number

Percent

Number

Number

Percent

Hanford ,
Washingtoo·

383,934

95,042

24.8

136,4%

57,667

42.2

Tacoma,
Washington

511,575

85,341

16.7

198,458

83,101

41.9

Portland. Oregon

356,064

54,704

15.4

146,047

66,186

45.3

Norfolk , Virginia

681,864

300,179

44.0

206,464

90,723

43.9

a. Data based on draft FRR E1S (DOElEIS-m18D).
b. Hispanic origin individuals can be of any race.
c. In the case of the Hanford loading filcility. a radius of 80 km rather than 16 km was used to define the
nearby population.
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